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# **You Always Meet Twice?**

Consecutive Mediation Efforts in African Intrastate Conflicts



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*To Oma Renate*



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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AFRICOM:	U.S. Africa Command
BATNA:	Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
CAR:	Central African Republic
CHMT:	Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team
CNDD-FDD:	National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
CoH:	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPA:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRA:	Coordinated Armed Resistance
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU:	European Union
FLEC-FAC:	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda
FPA:	Final Peace Agreement
FPR:	Rwandan Patriotic Front
FRCI:	Republican Forces of Ivory Coast
Frolina:	National Liberation Front
GED:	Georeferenced Event Dataset
GoS:	Government of Sudan
GoSS:	Government of Southern Sudan
GoU:	Government of Uganda
ICC:	International Criminal Court
IO:	International Organisation
IGO:	Intergovernmental Organisation
IKV:	Interchurch Peace Council

## *Abbreviations and Acronyms*

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LNA:	Large-N analysis
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
LRM:	Lord's Resistance Movement
LURD:	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDJT:	Movement for Democracy and Justice
MHS:	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MIC:	Managing Intrastate Conflict
MLC:	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC:	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPCI:	Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire
NGO:	Non-governmental Organisation
NRA:	National Resistance Army
NSA:	Non-state actor
PRIO:	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RUF:	Revolutionary United Front
SLA-MM:	Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi
SNA:	Small-N analysis
SPLM/A:	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UCDP:	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN:	United Nations
UNITA:	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNRF:	Uganda National Rescue Front
UNRF II:	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UPDA:	Uganda People's Democratic Army
UPDF:	Ugandan People's Rescue Defence Forces
U.S.:	United States of America
ZoA:	Zone of Agreement

# **1 Introduction**

Intrastate conflicts are today's most common form of conflict. In 2016, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) counted 49 intrastate conflicts in comparison to two interstate conflicts worldwide.<sup>1</sup> The most intensely fought conflicts in 2016 took place in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan, and thousands of people have died in its course (Sundberg & Melander 2013; Croicu & Sundberg 2017). To end conflicts, the international community has several tools of peaceful conflict management at its disposal. They are listed in Article 33 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. One of these tools is mediation, which is used increasingly since the end of the Cold War (Greig & Diehl 2012). For instance, several rounds of talks between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in opposition have been mediated by state and non-state actors, spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, since 2014 (International Crisis Group 2015), while different third parties, amongst others the UN, have engaged in a number of mediation efforts to end the Syrian civil war since 2011 (Lundgren 2016).

As these empirical examples show, often more than one mediation effort is observed when third parties engage in conflict management. These mediation efforts can have different outcomes, ranging from mediation ending without an agreement to agreements of different scope being reached and, at times, reneged on. Since existing research has not accounted for consecutive mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts with theory-driven empirical analyses, it is not yet known which impact the different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts. This knowledge is crucial though, because information on the impact different mediation outcomes have on future mediation efforts might be seminal for the behaviour of third parties during and after mediation. Hence, this project addresses

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<sup>1</sup> This research follows the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) definition of armed conflict. 'An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year' (UCDP 2014). Whenever *civil war* instead of *intrastate conflict* is referred to, intrastate conflicts during which 1000 or more battle-related deaths have been counted per year are meant (Melander et al. 2016). Interstate conflicts are fought between two or more states (Allansson et al. 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

the following question: how and why do previous mediation outcomes influence subsequent mediation onset and its success?

Mediation is understood as

‘a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law’ (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 8).

It ‘is a rational, political process, representing a strategic engagement between parties and a mediator’ (Bercovitch 2011: 344–345), which is employed on ad-hoc basis only (Bercovitch 1992).<sup>2</sup> In contrast to adjudication and arbitration, which are also listed as peaceful conflict management tools in the UN Charter, mediation is a non-binding form of third-party intervention (Susskind & Babbitt 1992; Bercovitch 2011; Zartman & Touval 1996). Hence, the participants cannot be forced to agree to a mediation outcome, and are not expected to commit to reaching an agreement prior to a mediation process. Besides, mediation is a voluntary process, which only sets on if all participants agree to it. However, mediators often hold the capacity to push the conflict parties towards reaching an agreement by employing sticks and carrots. This holds especially true for ‘mediators with leverage’ (Bercovitch 2007: 174–177).

To assess the effectiveness of mediation, different criteria have been established. Subjective criteria, such as the conflict parties’ satisfaction with a mediation process, can be drawn on to estimate whether a mediation effort was successful (Bercovitch 2007). Because the conflict parties’ satisfaction is mostly difficult to observe, scholars largely refrain from using subjective success measures though. Instead, objective criteria are used. While some consider the mediator’s ability to bring the conflict parties to the table an achievement, and thus view the sole onset of mediation as a success (Bercovitch 2007), others measure mediation success in a reduction of conflict intensity, assuming that reducing casualties is one of the goals a mediator pursues (e.g. DeRouen & Möller 2013; Ruhe 2015; Pospieszna & DeRouen 2016). The most common measure of mediation success in the quantitative literature, also used in this project, is whether an agreement is reached through mediation (e.g. Clayton 2013), while the longevity of a reached

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<sup>2</sup> For other overviews on international mediation, see e.g. Greig and Diehl (2012), or Nagel and Clayton (2017).

agreement, or the duration of the ensuing peace, is often regarded when questions of long-term mediation success are addressed (e.g. Beardsley 2011; Greig 2001).<sup>3</sup>

Around 76 percent of all civil war mediation processes produce agreements, which vary in scope and topics addressed, while 24 percent end without an agreement (DeRouen et al. 2011). However, of the 85 agreements reached in intrastate conflict between 1975 and 2011 according to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset, 46 percent were reneged on overall. Of these, 49 percent were reneged on during the first six months (Högbladh 2012b; Harbom et al. 2006). For example, the Lusaka Protocol was supposed to end the civil war between the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 1994. Though initial steps to implement the Lusaka Protocol were undertaken, low-level conflict continued. Ultimately, the agreement was not fully implemented. It was considered to have ended by 1998, and the war continued (Harbom et al. 2006; Högbladh 2012b). It took until 2002 until mediation eventually set on again (Melander & von Uexkull 2011).

Actually, agreements, which have been brokered by third parties making use of their leverage to a great extent, are particularly likely to be reneged on (Beardsley et al. 2006), because time-inconsistency problems arise: once the presence of the third party is waning after an agreement has been reached, the conflict parties consider continued conflict as more beneficial than sticking to a previously reached agreement (Beardsley 2008). Existing research has highlighted that mediators who make use of their leverage to a great extent are on the one hand very likely to reach agreements, but that these agreements are on the other hand often rather short-lived. This observation is called the ‘mediation dilemma’ (Beardsley 2011). Disentangling the consequences of the mediation dilemma further, this research scrutinises the consequences of different mediation outcomes for subsequent mediation efforts.

Researchers which have analysed consecutive mediation efforts have so far focused on the impact previous conflict management outcomes have on third parties and on states engaged in interstate conflicts. While third parties and states engaged in interstate conflict collect information on the success rate of the available conflict management tools before deciding for a particular tool (e.g. Wiegand & Powell 2011; Melin 2015; Böhmelt 2015, 2016), the

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<sup>3</sup> For more elaborate discussions on the definition of mediation success, see e.g. Kleiboer (1996, 1998), Bercovitch (2007), or Greig and Diehl (2012).

consequences the different mediation outcomes have for the conflict parties' decision making on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success engaged in intrastate conflict have been neglected in existing research. Yet, the four years which had to pass between the Lusaka Protocol being reneged on and subsequent mediation onset suggest that especially reneged on mediated agreements, which existing mediation research does not account for at all, have severe negative implications, especially for timely subsequent mediation onset. Meanwhile, mediation has been increasingly used to manage intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Thus, although many agreements are reneged on within a short time period, the international community heavily draws on mediation to manage conflicts (Greig & Diehl 2012). It is therefore crucial to understand the consequences the different mediation outcomes have for the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. After all, some mediation outcomes might be more likely to encourage further mediation efforts, while others might push the conflict parties towards opting for other conflict management tools.

To account for the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation, this project provides centre stage for a mediation outcome existing research has so far overlooked: reneged on mediated agreements. If previous mediation outcomes are included in theoretical and statistical models as explanatory variables in existing research, scholars have only distinguished between mediation success and mediation failure, i.e. mediation producing an agreement, and mediation not producing an agreement (e.g. Greig 2010; Clayton 2013) – if they have differentiated between mediation outcomes at all. With an explicit focus on the conflict parties, assuming that a third party will offer its help if the disputants signal their interest in mediation, this research expects governments and rebel groups to evaluate the capability of mediation to address a conflict differently after mediation produced a lasting agreement in comparison to mediation which produced a reneged on agreement. Contrasting the consequences of a reneged on mediated agreement for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success with the consequences of mediation which produced a lasting agreement, and with the consequences of mediation which did not produce an agreement is therefore an important contribution to existing mediation research.

As the dynamics at play in intrastate conflict vary significantly from the dynamics in interstate conflict (Melin & Svensson 2009), analysing intrastate conflict mediation

separately from interstate conflict mediation is important, if questions regarding the conflict parties' decision-making process are addressed. By disentangling the impact previous mediation outcomes have on rebel groups separately from the impact previous mediation outcomes have on governments theoretically and empirically, insights on the costs and benefits each conflict actor allocates to subsequent mediation, and to sharing private information, are gathered. Light is shed onto the questions why each actor decides to (not) engage in subsequent mediation after a particular mediation outcome has been observed, and how previous mediation outcomes influence the extent to which private information is shared, given the onset of a subsequent mediation effort. Since mediation is a voluntary process, this knowledge allows for estimating the likelihood of whether the conflict parties are likely to agree to subsequent mediation, while it contributes to a better understanding of each conflict actor's behaviour during consecutive mediation efforts.

In this project, a differentiation between mediation *events* and mediation *processes* is made, while mediation *efforts* and *talks* refer to mediation taking place in general. Based on the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) in Africa dataset (Melander & von Uexkull 2011), mediation events are defined as single mediation episodes. Thus, the end of a mediation event is marked by a break in talks – be it because the overall end of mediation or because a pause between mediation events is observed. Mediation processes are defined as an accumulation of mediation events which take place under a larger framework, often structured by an overarching agenda.

As the outcomes of previous mediation efforts are the key explanatory factor of this research, a clear understanding of the terminologies is crucial. Mediation is considered *partially successful* if it produced a partial or a process agreement, thus, an agreement which addresses parts of the incompatibility (partial agreement), or provides for a peace process (process agreement), in contrast to full agreements, which settle the whole conflict (Höghblad 2012a: 10). In the following, whenever partial agreements are accounted for, all agreements which did not settle the conflict's incompatibility lasting until the point under scrutiny, are included. These agreements are in focus, as the necessity to engage in further talks is expected to be higher if a partial agreement has been reached, compared to when a full agreement has been reached (Joshi & Quinn 2015b).<sup>4</sup> As soon as an agreement is

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<sup>4</sup> In contrast, when focusing on the outcome of subsequent mediation efforts, process, partial, and full agreements are included in the measure of mediation success.

renege on, it is allocated to the category of *renege on mediated agreements*. Agreements are considered renege on when one or more signatories contest the validity of the agreement, when one or more key signatories are no longer part of the agreement, i.e. by withdrawing from it, or when the implementation of the agreement fails (Höghblad 2012a: 5). All mediation efforts which do not produce an agreement are considered part of the category *mediation which did not produce an agreement*, often termed ‘failed mediation’ in the literature.

The term *conflict parties* refers to the dyad made up of a government of a conflict country and the rebel group the government is fighting. Though many governments are in conflict with several rebel groups, the theoretical argument and the analysis are on the conflict dyad level, thus, regard one government in conflict with one rebel group – i.e. the Government of Ivory Coast and the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (FRCI). The conflict parties are also meant when *disputants* or *actors* are discussed.

This project sets out as follows: in chapter 2, existing research on mediation is introduced to embed this study in its scholarly context. The literature on mediation onset is discussed separately from the literature on mediation success to allow for a clear differentiation of the causal mechanisms at play between the various independent variables, and mediation onset and mediation success respectively. Conclusions from the literature regarding consecutive mediation efforts, which are seminal the ensuing theory chapter, are drawn. Overall, the literature review points out the lack of systematic, theory-driven, empirical research on the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts as well as the fact that renege on agreements have not been included as an explanatory variable in existing studies so far. Therefore, the literature review highlights how this project is a novel and important contribution to existing research.

In chapter 3, the theoretical argument this project seeks to test is presented. It is based on bargaining theory (Fearon 1995), and assumes both governments and rebel groups to be boundedly rational actors who make their decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, and thus do not act counterproductively to their aims. They have reason to mistrust each other, are likely to use situations to their own advantage, and do not engage in conflict for the sake of conflict (Fortna 2004b: 11). When making decisions, they take into account all information they have on the options available to them. Based on this information, a

preference order is created. The option ranked highest is chosen under consideration of resource availability (Parsons 2005: 10). Hence, when faced with the question whether to engage in subsequent mediation, and whether to share private information for working towards subsequent mediation success, the conflict parties are expected to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of mediation and of sharing private information, adding the information they have gathered on these options during the recent mediation effort. As summarised in the following paragraphs, it is assumed that the previous mediation outcome is seminal for the conflict parties' costs-benefit calculations on subsequent mediation efforts in this project, because it describes the extent to which the private information and the commitment problem have been overcome during the previous mediation effort.

If a mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are expected to be observed. Both the government and the rebel group engaged in a conflict are assumed to decide for mediation again, and, if subsequent mediation sets on, work towards its success, because the benefits of mediation were underlined by the previous mediation effort ending without an agreement. The conflict parties remained in control of the mediation outcome, while no new costs of mediation that outweigh the benefits of it were uncovered. If subsequent mediation sets on, the third party is thus expected to work towards reducing the private information sharing and the commitment problem more vigorously. Thereby, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success is assumed to increase.

If a partial agreement was reached during the previous mediation effort, subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are anticipated. The benefits of engaging in mediation are underlined by the previously reached agreement, as it indicates that the commitment problem was overcome, while the private information problem was successfully addressed by the mediator. Hence, both governments and rebel groups are expected to opt for mediation again, and, if subsequent mediation sets on, share additional private information, which increases the likelihood of subsequent mediation success. Meanwhile, the benefits of mediation are assumed to be highlighted more intensely the more comprehensive the previously reached agreement was. Thus, the likelihood of observing subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success is expected to amplify with increasing agreement comprehensiveness.

If a mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset and, given the onset of subsequent talks, subsequent mediation success are not anticipated. In these cases, the government is unlikely to agree to subsequent talks, and, should talks set on despite the reneged on agreement, share private information during talks. Instead, governments are assumed to use a reneged on agreement as grounds for reasoning and deciding against mediation, arguing for a military solution and implementing it, possibly with international support. Rebel groups are still likely to opt for mediation, while they are expected to be reluctant to share private information should talks set on, because the previously shared information was misused. As both conflict parties have to decide for mediation for talks to set on, subsequent mediation onset is not anticipated after a mediated agreement has been reneged on. In the unlikely event that subsequent talks do set on, neither the government nor the rebel group is expected to share private information. Thus, subsequent mediation success is unlikely as well, according to the theoretical argument. These negative implications of reneged on mediated agreements are assumed to be more pronounced the more comprehensive the reneged on agreement was, as the consequences of more comprehensive agreements are assumed to be more severe.

The outcome of previous mediation efforts is assumed to not only have an impact on the sole onset of subsequent talks, but to also affect the timing of subsequent mediation onset. Hence, it is anticipated that little time has to pass until mediation sets on again after a partial agreement has been reached, while – in comparison to other mediation outcomes – more time has to pass between a mediated agreement having been reneged on and subsequent mediation onset. Essentially, the timing of subsequent mediation onset is expected to mirror the costs and benefits the conflict parties ascribe to subsequent mediation, as indicated in the previous paragraphs.

In chapter 4, the research design is described. Nested-analysis as a mixed-methods approach (Lieberman 2005) is briefly discussed as it is the methodological approach deemed most useful for testing the theoretical argument. By systematically scrutinising the validity of the derived hypothesis with quantitative and qualitative means, a general conclusion regarding the overall fit of the theory can be drawn with the help of the results of probit, Cox, and Sartori estimations (Sartori 2003). The causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument are accounted for in more detail in the qualitative analysis. With process tracing, the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation

efforts is scrutinised in one specific case. The case chosen for analysis in this project is the conflict between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), because it has seen an average amount of mediation, while all mediation outcomes can be observed.

In chapter 5, the quantitative analysis is conducted and its results are presented. The likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on is scrutinised, followed by an estimation of the likelihood of subsequent mediation success. The results show that previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation efforts. In particular, the positive impact of previously reached partial agreements as well as the severe negative impact of renege on mediated agreements are highlighted, while the results point out that mediation which did not produce an agreement does not have the feared for negative consequences for subsequent mediation onset (Greig 2010).

In chapter 6, the case under scrutiny is delineated and the hypotheses derived from the theoretical argument are tested. The background of the conflict between the GoU and the LRA is described briefly, and an overview about the mediation processes which took place to manage the conflict is provided, before the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation success is scrutinised with process tracing. Again, the results underline the severe negative impact of renege on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, while the positive implications of previous partial mediation success and mediation which did not produce an agreement for subsequent mediation onset, and to a certain extent for subsequent mediation success, are traced. Additionally, the case study highlighted the importance of analysing the sequencing of mediation events and mediation processes in future research, an endeavour, which so far has not been explicitly undertaken, but which would contribute to opening the 'black box' of mediation further.

In chapter 7, the findings of both empirical parts are jointly discussed, as prescribed by nested analysis (Lieberman 2005). Overall, the results of the two parts of analysis go hand in hand. Both strongly underline the negative impact of renege on mediated agreements for subsequent mediation efforts, and thereby highlight the relevance of accounting for renege on agreements in mediation research. Meanwhile, the positive impact of previous

partial mediation success as well as of mediation which did not produce an agreement is reaffirmed. The results are reconnected to the theoretical argument, which's overall validity is assessed. The results are considered seminal for researchers and practitioners interested in consecutive mediation efforts, as they point out how the conflict parties' preference order on the question of whether to engage in mediation again and whether to work towards subsequent mediation success, should subsequent talks set on, is affected by previous mediation outcomes.

Besides, the importance of mixing methods for a project that addresses a so far unstudied research question is highlighted. Mixing methods not only allows for an overall estimation of how previous mediation outcomes affect subsequent mediation efforts, but also provides for an understanding of the causal mechanisms at play when rebel groups and governments are faced with the decision on whether to engage in subsequent mediation, and on whether to share private information, given the onset of subsequent mediation. In the discussion, the lack of data on information which was exchange during mediation, and on the decision-making progress of each conflict actor is made subject of discussion. Due to a lack of data, both the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis left some of the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument untested. Nevertheless, it is concluded that this project provides crucial results and important insights on the question how and why previous mediation efforts have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success – both for policy makers and for researchers.

Chapter 8 concludes this project. It provides a summary of the key arguments and findings of this research: while previous partial mediation success, and, to a certain extent, mediation which did not produce an agreement underline the benefits of mediation and private information sharing, as expected in the theoretical argument, previously reneged on mediated agreements underline the costs of it, and thereby set up hurdles towards subsequent mediation onset, and, given the onset of subsequent talks, towards subsequent mediation success. Furthermore, the gaps in the literature addressed in this project are underlined, namely, the importance of analysing the impact of the various mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, the differentiation between rebel groups and governments when scrutinising intrastate conflicts, and the inclusion of reneged on mediated agreements into mediation research. The results of this project are discussed in light of these gaps. Finally, policy implications

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and avenues for future research are outlined. Policy makers, in particular mediators, need to be aware of the negative consequences reneged on mediated agreements have for subsequent mediation efforts, while researches should devote attention to reneged on mediated agreements – the mediation outcome which mediation researchers have neglected prior to this project.

## 2 Literature Review

Research on mediation has increased greatly in recent years. It has been conducted from different perspectives, and with different aspects of mediation in focus (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014). Yet,

‘it has not expanded in all directions, and the field therefore suffers from lacunas that urgently need to be addressed. [...] It is hence important to emphasize that new research should build on previous insights to help accumulate knowledge’ (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014: 1).

This literature review contains studies which are most relevant in light of the posed research question, to situate this research ‘in the context of the literature [, which] is key to identifying the contribution the new research makes’ (George & Bennett 2005: 70). Therefore, the literature review not only contains studies on intra-, but also on interstate conflict mediation.<sup>5</sup> While the literature on interstate conflict mediation provides important clues on factors which need to be considered in mediation research, the dynamics at play in intrastate conflicts differ significantly from the dynamics at play in interstate conflicts. Thus, in the following, it is emphasised whenever only interstate conflicts are in focus in the described research. Moreover, reasons for how and why certain variables influence mediation onset differ from how and why they influence mediation success. Hence, the literature review presents research on mediation onset first. Second, studies which focus on mediation success are discussed.

### 2.1 Mediation Onset

The factors which influence the conflict parties’ and the third parties’ decision to engage in mediation are outlined in this chapter.<sup>6</sup> Throughout, it needs to be kept in mind that mediation in interstate conflicts aims at managing a conflict between two internationally recognised actors, while intrastate conflict mediation seeks to manage a dispute between an internationally recognised actor, the government of the conflict country, and one or more

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<sup>5</sup> Research largely neglects mediation in non-state conflicts due to a lack of data (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014).

<sup>6</sup> For a literature overview on mediation onset, see Hellman (2012).

internationally unrecognised actors, the rebel group(s) (Melin & Svensson 2009).<sup>7</sup> This difference in status strongly influences the likelihood of mediation onset and success (Clayton 2013). The mechanisms that are at play due to the status difference are outlined below.

### ***2.1.1 The Conflict Parties' Interests in Mediation***

Assuming the disputants engaged in conflict to be rational actors, mediation needs to hold certain benefits for them to agree to its onset. For example, mediation allows the conflict parties to signal their commitment to peaceful conflict resolution to the international community (Bercovitch 2002; Maundi et al. 2006; Kriesberg & Dayton 2012). They hope to avoid huge concessions by agreeing to mediation, which they fear are going to be the result of other kinds of third party conflict management efforts (Zartman & Touval 2007). Moreover, the conflict parties seek to improve their relationship with the third party (or at least prohibit a deterioration of the relationship, which might be caused by declined mediation offers). Each actor wishes for the third party to influence their opponent towards a direction beneficial to them, despite the fact that mediation is not designed to aid one of the conflict parties (Bercovitch 1989; Zartman 2008). Meanwhile, they are likely to use the mediator as a scapegoat in case of mediation failure, or if they have to sign agreements which are not favoured by their domestic audiences (Bercovitch 2011; Beardsley & Lo 2014 on interstate conflicts). Hence, the conflict parties might use mediation for political cover (Beardsley 2010). Besides, mediation allows the conflict parties to pursue 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998), thus, to

'regroup or reorganize; [for] internationalization; the search for an ally; empowerment; legitimization of their negotiation position and current status; face saving; and avoiding costly concessions by prolonging the process itself' (Richmond 1998: 707).

Mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts are marked by status asymmetries between the conflict actors. Unlike rebel groups, governments are internationally recognised actors. They are the only actors who can use force legitimately, and are expected to uphold their

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<sup>7</sup> 'Rebel groups are military organizations that fight against a central government. They engage in armed confrontations with the central government, often using violent means. They usually fight for independence of a territory, political autonomy, or greater rights for minority or ethnic groups' (Jo 2015: 36–37).

authority within the country they claim to speak for (Zartman 1993; Wallensteen 2012). This leads to a high likelihood of governments declining third-party mediation offers as intrusions into their internal affairs (Zartman 1995b). Through mediation, a rebel group's status in the international community is lifted, and it is endowed with legitimacy, which the government wants to avoid. Consequently, governments prefer to solve conflicts away from the mediation table, while rebel groups are said to be generally interested in mediation, seeking to receive legitimacy (Clayton 2013). Therefore, especially the government's approval seems to be decisive for mediation onset, which is more likely if rebel groups provide services to the population, because governments consider them less likely to produce spoilers during talks (Heger & Jung 2015). The facts that mediation does not infringe as much on the government's sovereignty as other third-party intervention tools, and the conflict parties remaining largely in control of the outcome, speak in favour of mediation (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012; Greig & Diehl 2012).

The status asymmetries between governments and rebel groups are often mirrored in the distribution of power between them. Mostly, governments are stronger than rebel groups with regard to military capabilities (Cunningham et al. 2009; Svensson 2013), while rebel groups often hold more information on the government's capacities than vice versa (Greig 2015). By accepting mediation, the government admits that it is unable to achieve military victory (Licklider 1993), and that it has lost the full control over its territory (Clayton 2013). Rebel groups are 'materially weaker, but exclusively focused on achieving their aspirations in the conflict with the government-side' (Svensson 2013: 19). They are able to commit to the rebellion wholeheartedly, and claim to represent parts of the population (Zartman 1993) from which they recruit fighters (Arena & Hardt 2014). Nevertheless, most governments are relatively stronger than the rebel groups they fight (Zartman 1993; Cunningham et al. 2009; Svensson 2013).<sup>8</sup>

Governments have little incentives to negotiate with weak rebels (Hultquist 2013). In fact, mediation onset is more likely if the rebel group is relatively strong in comparison to the government it fights, as relatively strong rebel groups can credibly challenge and threaten governments (Clayton 2013). In these cases, governments become interested in gathering

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<sup>8</sup> The power distribution in a dyad can also be influenced by a conflict's degree of internationalisation, e.g. if one of the conflict parties receives support such as troops, weaponry, or intelligence from an external actor (Cunningham 2010). If the government receives troop support, it is less likely to engage in mediation due to its increased strength (Fürstenberg 2015).

information about rebel groups aside the battlefield (Andersen-Rodgers 2015). Moreover, strong governments, who have an income from non-lootable resources, such as oil, are unlikely to engage in mediation with rebel groups, as the latter are less likely to enforce mediation (Clayton 2015). The outlined status and power asymmetries strongly underline the credible commitment and the private information problem, which mediators seek to account for by sharing additional private information, and by providing security guarantees. The latter are particularly crucial for rebel groups (Walter 1997).

Overall, conflict actors are assumed to prefer unilateral victory to mediation (Walter 1997). Thus, mediation onset is only likely if the conflict parties are unable to end the conflict unilaterally, and are unable or unwilling to continue paying the costs of conflict (Bercovitch & Jackson 2001; Bercovitch 2002). While the power distribution within a dyad strongly influences the government's likelihood of engaging in mediation, rebel groups are expected to be generally interested in mediation due to the legitimacy they receive by engaging in it (Clayton 2013, 2015; Clayton & Gleditsch 2014). Despite the relative weakness of most rebel groups (Cunningham et al. 2009) and the government's unwillingness to engage in talks with rebels (Clayton 2013), the extent to which mediation has been employed since the end of the Cold War has increased greatly (DeRouen et al. 2011). Thus, under certain conditions, the outlined benefits of mediation seem to outweigh the costs of it, and the conflict parties rank it high enough in their preference order for both to choose it. If both conflict actors decide for mediation, talks can set on.

### ***2.1.2 The Moment of Ripeness***

The conflict parties realisation of the necessity for engaging in talks is determined by a conflict's 'ripeness' (Zartman 1985). According to ripeness theory, a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) needs to be present for mediation to set on. This is the case when the conflict parties notice their inability to solve a conflict unilaterally, and when both consider the situation too painful to stand. If the disputants have reached a plateau from which they are unable to make decisive moves towards victory, and a third party offers mediation, mediation is most likely to set on.

Ripe moments are particularly likely to be observed when the conflict is costly and enduring, while neither side, particularly not the government, is able to make a decisive

move without assistance (Zartman 2000). The conflict parties perceiving a situation ‘ripe for resolution’ can be fuelled by turning points, which are marked by a change in leadership, or by an impending catastrophe (Zartman 1995b). Though the conflict parties are most likely to accept mediation offers in these situations, the challenge for third parties lies in identifying the presence of a MHS, and in recognising when the moment is ripe for resolution (Zartman 1985, 1995b).

### 2.1.2.1 Conflict Intensity

Many scholars have drawn on the concept of ripeness theory, although not all of them have done so explicitly. They reason that mediation onset is more likely in high-intensity conflicts, since the costs of conflict are more pronounced in these conflicts (e.g. Bercovitch & Jackson 2001 on interstate conflicts). Third parties react faster to high-intensity than to low-intensity intrastate conflicts, as the necessity to intervene is more pronounced by the high fatality numbers (Aydin 2010). However, conflict parties do not seem to be more likely to accept mediation offers due to high levels of conflict intensity (Greig & Regan 2008). Beardsley (2010 on interstate conflicts) also does not find statistically significant support for the proclaimed linear relationship, though e.g. Susskind and Babbitt (1992 on interstate conflicts), Greig (2005), Greig & Diehl (2006 on interstate conflicts), and DeRouen et al. (2011) do.

Nevertheless, according to Ruhe (2015), who seeks to forecast mediation onset in low-intensity conflicts, conflict intensity is one of the main predictors if neither side can prevail militarily. If one side is substantially stronger than the other, it still perceives military victory as likely, and therefore does not fear high-intensity conflicts. Hence, especially the success rates of rebel groups on the battlefield are crucial for governments to recognise ripe moments, as, through rebel group victories, the conflict costs for governments increase (Greig 2015). Yet, once high costs have been paid, the likelihood of mediation onset reduces, as these costs are considered ‘sunk costs’ which cannot be recouped. In this case, continued conflict might be perceived as worthwhile. Therefore, instead of arguing for a linear relation between conflict intensity and mediation onset, Ruhe (2015) argues for a U-shaped relationship. Greig (2015) adds that besides the degree of conflict intensity the number of battles fought has an impact on the government’s likelihood of engaging in talks, since a higher number of battles fought results in higher conflict costs.

The levels of battle deaths often correspond with the levels of one-sided violence (e.g. Hultman 2007). Hence, scholars expect the onset of mediation to be influenced by the degree of civilian victimisation. Pospieszna and DeRouen (2016) argue that rebel groups use violence against civilians to increase the government's costs of conflict, thereby trying to enforce talks and better deals during mediation. Additionally, Kreutz and Brosché (2013) note that civilian suffering invokes mediation efforts if the government is the perpetrator, especially in the wake of the Responsibility to Protect. Elaborating on this, Aduda and Bussmann (2016) find that Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) and democratic third parties are particularly likely to offer their help when governments commit atrocities, seeking to hold their members and peers accountable. However, governments are unlikely to accept these offers due to the fear of a biased mediator. The authors do not detect a statistically significant relation between rebel one-sided violence and mediation offers (Aduda & Bussmann 2016).

Though conflict intensity is mostly measured in battle deaths, a conflict's velocity also gives an impression of conflict intensity. The speed with which battles move towards the capital increases the chance of mediation onset, since governments fear an increase in the conflict costs if the conflict is not stopped. To avoid providing rebel groups with even more bargaining power, governments are likely to opt for talks before rebel groups reach the capital. With a greater conflict dispersion, the likelihood of mediation onset decreases, because the government considers the rebel group's capability of demanding for concessions as too high (Greig 2014). Terris and Maoz (2005 on interstate conflicts) support this notion.

### 2.1.2.2 Conflict Duration and Location

Conflict costs do not only increase when conflicts are fought intensely, but also with increased conflict duration. Thus, the utility of mediation increases as the utility of conflict decreases (Mason et al. 1999). Hence, longer civil wars are more likely to see mediation (DeRouen et al. 2011). However, Bapat (2005) argues for an inverted U-relationship with regard to the onset of negotiations and conflict duration. The government might not want to endow the rebel group with legitimacy, and is therefore unwilling to engage in talks in the early stages of a conflict. If talks have not set on until a certain point however, the window of opportunity closes, as rebel groups might gain enough strength to be able to

afford denying an offer of talks. Greig and Diehl (2006) support this notion with regard to interstate conflicts, while Melin and Svensson (2009) do not find statistical support for the acceptance of mediation in the ‘middle phase’ of a conflict. They, like Greig and Regan (2008), find support for this notion regarding intrastate conflict mediation. Aydin (2010) adds that third parties are less likely to engage in conflicts which have been ongoing for an extended period, because they consider their chances of successful intervention as too low. Actually, especially for rebel groups, the continuation of a conflict is often considered a success, as ‘[a] conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla army wins if he does not lose’ (Kissinger 1969: 214).

The location of a conflict contributes to the perceived costliness of a civil war, because conflicts closer to major cities threaten the government to a greater extent than conflicts in remote areas. Hence, a conflict’s location does not only have an impact on the costs of continued conflict, but also on the utility of mediation. Battles which take place close to the capital have a negative impact on mediation onset in non-secessionist wars, as governments fear the imposition of terms on the talks by rebel groups, while rebel groups might have the impression that victory is possible, and thus, diplomacy unnecessary. In secessionist conflicts, talks become more likely if fighting takes place closer to the capital. In these cases, the government does not feel threatened, since rebel groups interested in secession usually do not aim at taking over the government (Greig 2014, 2015).

If several conflicts take place at the same time, the likelihood of mediation onset reduces on the one hand. Governments seek to solve the conflict by other means than mediation to avoid having to negotiate, and having to make concession to other rebel groups (Clayton 2013). On the other hand, Findley (2013) notes that mediation onset is more likely if the government is in conflict with many rebel groups, as the information problem increases in these cases.

Overall, it becomes clear that the conflict parties’ willingness to engage in mediation is determined by the costs and benefits they allocate to continued conflict and mediation respectively. While the results on the impact of conflict intensity and the number of rebel groups engaged in conflict with the government on mediation onset are mixed, it becomes apparent that conflict duration, conflict location, and battle velocity are linked to mediation onset. With increasing costs, the conflict parties’ likelihood of accepting mediation as a

conflict management tool increases, because cost-benefit calculations result in the conclusion that continued conflict without mediation is too costly. Yet, while the focus of the previous sections has been mostly on the conflict parties, a third party needs to offer its help for mediation to set on. The reasons out of which third parties offer mediation differ from the factors that motivate conflict parties to accept mediation offers (Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009; Melin et al. 2013 on interstate conflicts). As third parties are assumed to be rational actors as well, the following question arises: under which conditions do third parties consider the utility of mediating a conflict as high enough to pay the costs of mediating?

### ***2.1.3 The Mediator's Interest in Mediation***

Assuming that third parties are rational actors as well, they are expected to offer their services (or respond to a specific demand of their services) in the pursuit of their own interests (Bercovitch 2007; Aydin 2010; Greig & Diehl 2012). Mediation bears less costs for the third party than e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or sanction enforcement (Wallenstein & Svensson 2014).<sup>9</sup> It serves as a foreign policy tool for third parties who want to keep a conflict from spilling over to neighbouring countries. Additionally, by engaging in a conflict, third parties might try to avoid the involvement of other states, while, through mediation, they are able to promote certain norms and increase their influence in a conflict country without having to take sides (Zartman & Touval 1996).

Moreover, mediating a conflict shows the third party's population and the international community that the government is 'doing something' about the conflict in focus (Zartman & Touval 2007: 439). Third parties also mediate for reputational purposes (Crocker et al. 2004; Hellmann 2012), and thus only offer their services when they are relatively sure of their offers being accepted (Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009), which is more likely if the third party has a history of mediating successfully (Greig & Regan 2008).

A third party's decision to mediate a conflict is likely to be influenced by the ties it has to a conflict state. If third parties have a defence pact with a conflict country, they are likely to offer their assistance, since continued conflict might force them to engage in the conflict

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<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, mediation is not free of costs for third parties. Third parties have to pay the costs of operational expenses, and failed mediation. Particularly the latter might damage a third party's reputation (Hellman 2012: 598–599).

militarily (Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009; Crescenzi et al. 2011 on interstate conflicts). Though Crescenzi et al. (2011), and Owsiak and Frazier (2014) find a positive link between alliance ties and mediation offers in interstate conflicts, Melin and Svensson (2009) only find this positive link with regard to intrastate conflicts. Moreover, trade ties do not seem to increase the likelihood of mediation onset in intrastate conflicts (Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009). The opposite is expected to hold true for mediation in interstate conflicts, where the engagement of a third party becomes more likely with increasing relevance of the trade ties (Böhmeit 2010; Crescenzi et al. 2011). With regard to the speed with which third parties engage, Melin (2011 on interstate conflicts) finds that third parties are neither quicker nor slower to engage as mediators if trade ties to one conflict country exist.

Additionally, third parties are more likely to mediate conflicts in countries with which they share cultural aspects (Marquis & Schneider 1996; Bercovitch & Schneider 2000 – both on interstate conflicts), or a colonial history, as they feel a bond with these countries. However, in civil wars, mediation offers from third parties with which the conflict parties share historical ties are more likely to be rejected (Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009; Melin 2011). In fact, cultural differences between the conflict parties might lead to one side fearing the mediator to be biased towards its opponent (Inman et al. 2014 on interstate conflicts).

Third parties, who share indirect ties with the conflict country via IGO membership are more likely to mediate, as direct ties are more likely to be cut off when conflicts set on (Böhmeit 2009 on interstate conflicts). Yet, Greig and Diehl (2006 on interstate conflicts) do not find a link between joint IGO membership and an increased likelihood for mediation onset. If third parties have friendly relations to both conflict states, they are likely to mediate, while they are likely to intervene in a partisan manner if they have friendly relations to only one conflict state (Corbetta and Grant 2012 on interstate conflicts).

Geographic proximity fuels the interest of third parties in mediating a conflict, as third parties who are geographically close to the conflict seek to keep it from spilling over (Bercovitch & Schneider 2000 on interstate conflicts; Greig & Regan 2008; Gartner 2011). Hence, third parties are more likely to mediate conflicts of neighbouring countries (Greig

2005; Melin & Svensson 2009; Beardsley 2010; Melin 2011 on interstate conflicts; Crescenzi et al. 2011 on interstate conflicts). This aspect is challenged by Corbetta (2015 on interstate conflicts), who notes that the closer the conflict is geographically, the more likely third parties are to employ more expensive forms of intervention, i.e. military intervention. Multiparty mediation is not influenced by geographic proximity (Böhmelt 2012 on interstate conflicts).

This subchapter showed that numerous reasons for third parties to mediate exist. Generally, third parties seem to pursue their own interests when engaging as mediators, and are influenced by ties they have to the conflict country. These links range from cultural ties to issues concerning national security. Moreover, the degree to which third parties have friendly relations with one or more conflict parties matters for their decision on whether to mediate. With regard to mediation onset, two questions arise: which third parties are likely to engage as mediators, and how does their power influence the likelihood of mediation onset?

### **2.1.4 Mediator Power and Credibility**

As has become apparent in the definition of mediation presented in the introduction, different types of third parties function as mediators – ranging from individuals, to states, to IGOs, to (International) Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Nagel & Clayton 2017). Amongst the third parties acting as intermediaries, the UN mediates most frequently in civil wars (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012). Due to its mandate ‘to maintain international peace and security’ (UN Charter 1945: Preamble), the UN often does not have another option but to follow a demand for mediation (Crocker et al. 2004). It ‘is seen as the bastion of international morality’ (Fretter 2002: 100), and its security guarantees are perceived as particularly credible (Sisk 2009). States, especially the United States (U.S.), often mediate in intrastate conflicts as well (Greig & Diehl 2012). Yet, they are able to decline mediation requests more freely than the UN, as they do not hold the same mandate as the UN (Crocker et al. 2004). Other third parties who commonly mediate are states who are part of the region the conflict takes place in (Regan et al. 2009), and regional IGOs (Gartner 2011, 2013).

Mostly, mediators are powerful third parties. They bring additional resources with them to the mediation table, while they can push and pull the conflict parties to the table and towards certain directions once mediation has set on. This leverage is crucial for them to (at least try to) manoeuvre the conflict parties when deemed necessary (Crocker et al. 2003a). Besides, stronger third parties offer mediation faster than weaker third parties – most likely since they take less time to accrue the resources they need to spend on mediation (Melin 2011 on interstate mediation). Yet, comparably weak third parties also mediate – especially in intrastate conflicts. Their advantage is the credible promise to limit their involvement, as they do not have the capacity to employ strong sticks and carrots. Indeed, if rebel groups are particularly hostile towards governments, third parties without leverage are more likely to mediate, and to convince the government that mediation provides a way out without the mediator enforcing an agreement (Beardsley 2009). In fact, mediation efforts of weak third parties are more similar to negotiations than mediation efforts of strong third parties, due to the limited options of the third party steering the process (Fey & Ramsay 2010). To increase their leverage, and to share the costs of mediation, weaker third parties sometimes form coalitions (Böhmelt 2012 on interstate conflicts).

Closely linked to the power third parties hold is their credibility, i.e. their capacity to implement threats and promises they make. Therefore, third parties who are considered credible mediators are more likely to mediate conflicts (Maoz & Terris 2006). In line with this, a third party's reputation has an important impact on mediation onset: mediation offers from successful third parties are more likely to be accepted (Greig & Regan 2008). For mediator credibility, regime type also matters as the credibility of democratic third parties is at stake if they deceive the conflict states engaged in mediation. Hence, the pressure to conduct successful mediation is particularly high for democratic third parties. With a growing number of democracies in the global system, this effect increases, and democratic third parties are even more likely to be considered credible mediators (Bercovitch & Schneider 2000; Crescenzi et al. 2011; Beardsley & Lo 2013 – all on interstate conflicts). They are particularly likely to mediate when one of the interstate disputants is democratic (Melin 2011 on interstate conflicts). Moreover, the more democratic the least democratic state of a conflict dyad is, the more likely multiparty mediation becomes (Böhmelt 2012 on interstate conflicts).

Mediator bias also plays a role for mediation onset. Interestingly, both government- and rebel-biased mediators have a positive impact on mediation onset. However, governments are less likely to accept rebel-biased mediators, while rebel groups tend to accept government-biased mediators to send costly signals (Svensson 2007a). Beber (2012 on interstate conflicts) adds that biased third parties are generally more likely to mediate in a broad range of scenarios than unbiased mediators. The latter are more likely to use diplomatic conflict management tools, while the former are more likely to apply e.g. economic sanctions (Melin 2011 on interstate conflicts). Besides, mediator power is considered more important for the mediator choice than mediator neutrality (Bercovitch & Schneider 2000 on interstate conflicts).

Up until now, it has become apparent that a range of factors influences the utility the actors engaged in mediation ascribe to mediation. They range from conflict characteristics, to power and status differences between the conflict parties, to the identity of the mediator. These notions are crucial for addressing questions on mediation onset and provide the context in which this study is conducted. With regard to the posed research question, studies which address the impact of previous mediation efforts on subsequent mediation onset are most central. They are introduced in the following last section on mediation onset.

### ***2.1.5 Consecutive Mediation Efforts***

Many mediation efforts, particularly the first ones taking place in an intrastate conflict dyad, end without an agreement, and demand for further assistance, most likely due to the conflicts' high degree of protractedness (Greig & Diehl 2012). Additionally, if agreements in intrastate conflicts are reached, they are often reneged on within a short time period and need further assistance (Zartman 1995a). Thus, particularly intrastate conflicts regularly demand for consecutive conflict management efforts.

So far, scholars have not focused on the impact the different mediation outcomes have on the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset. Though dummy variables accounting for whether mediation has taken place in a dyad before (e.g. Greig & Regan 2008), or whether previous mediation has been successful (e.g. Greig 2005; Clayton 2013) are included in statistical models on mediation onset and mediation success at times – mostly indicating a

positive relation between previous mediation and subsequent mediation onset – studies which focus on the link between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset theoretically and empirically are rare. Due to the low number of studies which solely address mediation, research which accounts for other conflict management tools than mediation is included as well in the following subchapter. These studies provide valuable insights for this project, as they offer hints towards the consequences of e.g. failed conflict management. Ensuing, the impact previous conflict management outcomes have on the conflict parties is discussed, before the impact of the different conflict management outcomes on third parties is in focus. As almost all studies address interstate conflict management, it is indicated if a presented study is on intrastate conflict management only.

### 2.1.5.1 The Impact of Previous Mediation Efforts on the Conflict Parties

So far, research that addresses the impact of previous mediation efforts on subsequent mediation onset in theoretical arguments almost exclusively focuses on interstate conflicts. According to Wiegand and Powell (2011), challenger states consider their own and the target state's past wins and losses with a specific conflict resolution tool when calculating which conflict management tool to vouch for next. States which emerged as winners from conflict management are more satisfied with the conflict management tool employed, and are likely to opt for it again. However, since the likelihood of employing a particular conflict management tool is linked to both the challenger state's and the target state's preferences, the challenger state has to elect a conflict management tool the target state is likely to agree to as well. This holds especially true for binding conflict management tools, as their outcome has a more pronounced impact (Wiegand & Powell 2011). Furthermore, losers of past disputes are more likely to escalate their behaviour in current disputes than winners (Leng 1983).

States learn that they cannot rely on diplomacy to solve their interstate conflict if mediation fails. While failed mediation does provide information on the opponent, it also provides information

‘[...] about the utility of mediation itself as a dispute resolution mechanism. [...] [J]ust as successes on the battlefield heighten confidence in conflict as a continued strategy while battlefield failure undermines [it], the success and failure of mediation carries the same effect for the expected benefit of diplomacy’ (Greig 2010: 7).

Hence, failed mediation leads the conflict parties to believe that diplomacy is a waste of time, and the usage of violence necessary for altering the conflict. Especially a record of failed mediation efforts has a negative impact on subsequent mediation onset. Moreover, previous successful mediation tends to end wars while previous unsuccessful mediation reduces the likelihood of war termination by around 87 percent, as the conflict parties tend to rely on violence more heavily. Furthermore, failed mediation (measured in the breakdown of communication between the conflict parties) strengthens the position of hardliners. It thereby contributes to an increase in the conflict's violence-levels (Vüllers & Destradi 2013). Thus, '[s]ometimes, it may even be better to do nothing at all than to intervene ineffectively' (Greig 2010: 19). Contrarily to these notions, Greig and Diehl (2006) find that the conflict parties are likely to consider mediation as a conflict management tool again, as they have done so before – regardless of whether the previous effort failed or produced an agreement. During the previous effort, they might even have shared private information.<sup>10</sup> The authors conclude that 'any mediation or negotiation appears to be better than no effort at conflict management' (Greig & Diehl 2006: 379).

Besides, not only mediation efforts which have taken place in the same conflict before, but also those which have been undertaken in conflicts which are geographically close (Böhmelt 2015), or which have the same violence level (Böhmelt 2016), influence the conflict parties' decision on whether to engage in mediation. Geographic proximity has an impact on the conflict parties' likelihood of engaging in mediation, because information is transferred across disputes if a strong spatial link exists between the countries. A strong spatial link signals common cultural relationships, similar regional dynamics, and security issues which are alike. Thus, the actors involved in the different disputes rely on the experience others have made, particularly if a geographically close crisis has seen mediation recently (Böhmelt 2015). Additionally, the insights from conflicts with the same intensity-level are vital. Seeking to learn from crises with the same violence-level, conflict parties welcome information on the experiences others have made with mediation (Böhmelt 2016).

Overall, this section highlights an important gap in the literature, as the research which addresses the sequencing of conflict management efforts is rare. First, none of the studies

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<sup>10</sup> Greig and Diehl (2006: 361) note that one could easily argue for failed mediation efforts souring the atmosphere, thereby having a negative impact on subsequent mediation onset as well.

which have addressed the impact of previous mediation outcomes has focused on the impact the different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts. Vüllers and Destradi (2013) scrutinise intrastate conflicts when they consider the impact of failed mediation on conflict intensity, but also do not account for subsequent mediation efforts. Since most of today's conflicts are intrastate conflicts (Melander et al. 2016), this focus is necessary though, as the dynamics at play in intrastate conflict differ significantly from the dynamics at play in interstate conflict (e.g. Melin & Svensson 2009). Second, mediation is rarely addressed separately from other conflict management tools. Though addressing mediation efforts in line with other conflict management efforts has been demanded for (e.g. Diehl & Regan 2015), understanding the impact the different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts is an important step before analysing the link to other conflict management tools. Third, the presented studies differentiate between mediation outcomes rather roughly: they account for mediation success and mediation failure, but do not address the impact reneged on mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation efforts at all. Since agreements are often reneged on in intrastate conflicts, it is crucial to address the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation efforts – including reneged on agreements. Finally, the presented research underlines the necessity to explicitly scrutinise consecutive mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts, and to develop a theoretical argument which differentiates between the conflict parties. Results will provide for an understanding of the conditions which are conducive for subsequent mediation, which is important since mediation is often employed to manage intrastate conflicts (Greig & Diehl 2012).

### 2.1.5.2 The Impact of Previous Mediation Efforts on the Mediator

Third parties are likely to take the outcome of previous conflict management attempts into account when having to decide which conflict management tool to offer next. Particularly past failures lead to a change in the conflict management tool in subsequent engagements. In fact, the conflict management strategy will be escalated in the hope of engaging more successfully (Melin 2015). Besides, just like conflict parties, third parties do not only consider their own success rate, but also the success rate of other third parties who engaged in the same conflict before (Aydin 2010 on intrastate conflicts; Owsiak 2014; 2015).

If states have intervened militarily before, they are more likely to offer mediation if the conflict has not ended, because they are affected by the consequences of the civil war (Greig & Regan 2008). Melin and Svensson's (2009) research supports this notion with regard to interstate, but not with regard to intrastate conflicts. Besides, the outcome of the previous mediation effort does not have an impact on the time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on. Yet, with the number of conflict management efforts increasing, more time has to pass until mediation sets on again (Melin 2011). Hence, the success and failure of conflict management has an impact on the conflict management tools third parties choose to use, but not necessarily on the amount of time that passes until a third party engages in conflict management.

### ***2.1.6 Summary of the Literature on Mediation Onset***

This section presented research in which factors that have an impact on mediation onset are addressed. They range from characteristics describing the conflict dyad and the mediator, the relationship between the disputants and the third party, to characteristics of the conflict, such as conflict intensity, conflict duration, or battle velocity. The presented studies underline the importance of taking into account the rational nature of the conflict parties in this project, as the costs and benefits of continued conflict seem to be decisive for mediation onset.

Research which accounts for the impact of previous mediation efforts largely focuses on interstate conflict. Besides, scholars only differentiate between previous mediation success and previous mediation failure, or solely focus on whether previous mediation has been observed in a dyad. Few studies focus on the conflict management tool mediation exclusively, and therefore we

‘[...] know less than we should about the impact of failed mediations, the most common outcome. [...] If disputants learn from their interactions with one another, it makes sense to expect that at least some failed efforts at diplomacy will have negative consequences for the future relationship between the parties. Failed diplomacy may serve to ‘teach’ some disputants that they cannot resolve their dispute through dialogue and force them to rely upon more coercive means to settle their dispute’ (Greig & Diehl 2012: 190).

Thus, it is crucial to account for the consequences the different mediation outcomes have for subsequent mediation efforts. While Greig and Diehl (2012) highlight the importance

of focusing more on failed mediation efforts, a third category is drawn on in this project alongside mediation success and mediation failure – one that has been completely neglected so far: reneged on agreements. However, before this is done theoretically (chapter 3) and empirically (chapter 5 and 6), the literature on mediation success is presented to provide a basis for the second part of this project’s research question: how and why do previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation success?

## 2.2 Mediation Success

A commonly addressed question in peace and conflict studies is the effectiveness of conflict management tools (e.g. Fortna 2004a; Cortright 2007; Lektzian & Regan 2016). Due to this project’s focus on mediation, research on the conditions under which mediation is likely to be successful is presented in this section.<sup>11</sup> As has been highlighted in chapter 1, mediation success is defined in numerous ways. Yet, most scholars measure mediation success in whether or not an agreement is reached. If measured differently in the studies introduced in the following, e.g. by the kind of agreement reached, by agreement durability, or by whether the agreement contributed to a reduction of conflict intensity, it is indicated with the study presented.<sup>12</sup>

Generally, mediation is often offered when it is likely to be unsuccessful (Greig 2005). Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) argue that this is due to selection and process effects: mediated agreements are likely to be short-lived, as mediation is mostly employed in difficult-to-solve conflicts (selection effect). Yet, if mediation addresses the conflict issues, and thereby contributes to conflict resolution (process effect), mediated agreements are likely to last longer, particularly if reached between non-state actors, as mediators are able to influence non-state actors to a greater extent than states. In the ensuing subchapters, studies which have identified an impact on mediation success are introduced.

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<sup>11</sup> Basically, all variables included in the following discussion can be allocated to the contingency model, developed by Bercovitch et al. (1991), according to which the nature of the conflict parties, the dispute, and the mediator have an impact on the mediation context, which in return, just like the mediator’s strategies, have an impact on the mediation process. The mediation context and the mediation process influence each other as well, and ultimately, both have an impact on the mediation outcome.

<sup>12</sup> For an overview on the characteristics of successful mediators, see Bergmann (2014).

### ***2.2.1 Status and Power Asymmetries between Conflict Parties***

The relative strength of the rebel group has a crucial impact on mediation success. Relatively strong rebels are able to negotiate enforcement mechanisms, while they are equipped to defend themselves if governments renege. Hence, the commitment problem is reduced, which contributes to an increased likelihood of rebel groups agreeing to settlements. Thus, mediation success becomes more likely if rebel groups are relatively strong (Clayton 2013; Clayton & Gleditsch 2014). In these cases, rebel groups are also more likely to achieve power-sharing agreements, especially on political aspects (Gent 2011). Meanwhile, if governments have access to non-lootable resources, and are therefore relatively strong, they are likely to endure a conflict for longer, and will thus make fewer concessions if talks set on. Besides, if agreements are reached, stronger governments are likely to renege on them, as they can ‘afford’ conflict (Clayton 2015). Moreover, rebel groups which are weaker than the government they are fighting are less likely to enforce concessions in negotiations (Nilsson 2010). Power parity, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of negotiated settlements (Hultquist 2013), though stalemates do not increase the likelihood of agreement implementation (Findley 2013).

The number of conflict parties a government fights also has an impact on the power distribution at the bargaining table. With an increasing number of actors engaging in mediation, it becomes more difficult to reach agreements due to e.g. alliance shifts, incentives to hold out and not make concessions, or information asymmetries (Thyne 2012). Conflicts in which rebel groups receive troop support are also less likely to see peace agreements, because the government is unsure about the rebel group’s true capability (Sawyer et al. 2015). Additionally, if several actors have to sanction an agreement, reaching it becomes less likely, as it can be vetoed by more actors (Cunningham 2006).

Research on the inclusion of veto players<sup>13</sup> into peace agreements suggests that agreements last longer the more veto players are embraced by an agreement (Cunningham 2011, 2013). Thus, for a durable peace agreement, ideally all veto players should be included (Cunningham 2011), or at least those which could continue a war single-handedly

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<sup>13</sup> Veto players are defined as actors who can veto a decision which was made in favour of peace. They are not to be confused with spoilers. Civil war mediation has to deal with particularly many veto players – e.g. the government, the rebel group(s), and external states (if applicable). These actors can only be considered veto players if they can block an end of the war. Hence, they need to be sufficiently strong (Cunningham 2006, 2013).

(Cunningham 2013). Contrarily, Nilsson (2008) argues that it does not matter whether or not all warring parties are signatories to a peace deal because rebel groups factor in the likelihood of non-signatories challenging them violently when they sign an agreement. Instead, the inclusion of civil society actors is crucial for an increase in agreement durability, as it enhances the agreement's legitimacy (Nilsson 2012).

### ***2.2.2 Conflict Characteristics***

One crucial characteristic of conflicts is their intensity. Mediation processes which take place in high-intensity conflicts are likely to produce agreements, as the necessity to reach an agreement is underlined by the costs which accrue due to high-intensity conflicts (e.g. Bercovitch & Langley 1993; Bercovitch & DeRouen 2005). If the last battle before mediation set on was particularly costly, mediation success is likely as well, because the disputants fear a severe deterioration of their situation without an agreement (Greig 2001 on interstate conflicts).

Extending the understanding of conflict intensity from a focus on battle deaths to one-sided violence, Wood and Kathman (2014) find a curvilinear relationship between the level of civilian victimisation and the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement. Moderate levels of one-sided violence show the rebel group's resolve, while high levels of civilian victimisation mark a rapid shift in the power distribution, and an erosion of regime power, which might reduce the necessity for talks. The authors do not concentrate on mediated agreements alone, but include negotiated agreements into their analysis as well. Besides, Pospieszna and DeRouen (2016) find an increase in rebel one-sided violence once mediation sets on, which they explain with the strategic use of civilian victimisation, as rebel groups seek to underline their strength on the battlefield to derive concessions at the bargaining table by using one-sided violence.

The timing of mediation also has an impact on mediation success. If mediation takes place during early stages of a conflict, the conflict has not gotten out of hand yet. If it takes place during late stages, the conflict costs have become unbearable, and thus, a solution is pressing. In these cases, the solutions are likely to last longer (Greig 2001 on interstate conflicts). Svensson (2007a) adds that conflicts fought intensively over an extended time

period are more difficult to settle, while Walter (1997) notes that longer wars, just like more intensely fought wars, are more likely to end in agreements.

### ***2.2.3 Mediator Leverage and Mediator Identity***

But how are third parties supposed to contribute to successful mediation after all? Mediators are expected to assist the conflict parties in identifying their Zone of Agreement (ZoA). '[T]he ZOA consists of the set of outcomes that provide all crisis actors with more benefit than their BATNA' (Beardsley et al. 2006: 62). The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is made up of the set of options available to each conflict actor if no agreement is reached, i.e. the continuation of the conflict (Beardsley et al. 2006: 62). By sharing private information on each side's capabilities and resolve, mediators contribute to the conflict parties' overcoming the private information sharing problem (Walter 1997; Beardsley et al. 2006 on interstate conflicts). In fact, conflict parties are often unable to identify their ZoA without third-party assistance, as they are unaware of their joint consent on certain points, while they might reject agreements in the hope of settlements with better conditions (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005 on interstate conflicts). By sharing private information on the conflict parties' capabilities, third parties are expected to alter the conflict parties' reservation points in line with their relative capabilities (Clayton 2013). To boot, third parties can serve as security guarantors who intervene if one side does not comply with the terms noted down in an agreement (Walter 2002). Thereby, they can set the terms for handling future conflicts (Touval & Zartman 1989), and reduce the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997).

To receive and share private information on the conflict parties, and to contribute to an identification of the ZoA, mediators employ sticks and carrots. 'The ability to move a party in an intended direction' (Zartman 2008: 168) is understood as a third-party's leverage (Heemsbergen & Siniver 2011). The level of leverage a mediator holds over the conflict parties is vitally important for its success. It is determined by the mediator's capacities as well as by the conflict parties' perception of and interests in these capacities (Zartman & Touval 1996). Indeed, '[l]everage comes, first, from the parties' *need* for a solution [...] that the mediator can provide; second, from the parties' susceptibility to the shifting weight

that the mediator can either offer ('carrots'), or withhold ('sticks') (Touval 1992: 233).<sup>14</sup> Especially high-ranking officials are likely to hold a substantial degree of leverage over the conflict parties, as they are able to gather vital resources, and make use of their social influence (Bercovitch 2002). Thus, leverage is linked to the position an individual holds, or once held, and therefore to the third party's identity (Bercovitch 1992).

The success rate of mediators depends on the amount of information they hold on the conflict and the conflict parties as well as on the extent to which they can contribute to overcoming the commitment problem (Walter 2002; Beardsley 2013). In fact, capable third parties are able to ameliorate the commitment problem, enforce the conflict parties' commitment to bargaining, and to reach agreements. Particularly states with elaborate intelligence systems, and IGOs, especially the UN, hold vital information for the conflict parties, and are thus likely to be successful mediators (Savun 2009).<sup>15</sup> Moreover, IGOs are perceived as credible mediators since they are independent of their member states' interests to a certain extent (Frazier & Dixon 2006).

The UN mediates particularly often and is likely to be successful in its endeavours (Bercovitch & DeRouen 2005). It relies on its status for its legitimacy, because it 'is seen as the bastion of international morality' (Fretter 2002: 100), while '[m]uch of the leverage a UN mediator possesses is derived from the organization's power and preparedness to act' (Fretter 2002: 113). The UN 'is thought to represent the concerns of all peoples, be above politics and is seen by all as quite impartial' (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2005: 89).<sup>16</sup> To ensure that the mediated peace lasts, an interplay with other UN conflict management tools, i.e. peacekeeping (Beardsley 2013; DeRouen & Chowdhury 2016), or peacebuilding (Doyle & Sambanis 2000) is necessary. However, if peacekeeping troops are present during mediation efforts, the information flow and the conflict costs are reduced. Their presence decreases – or at least does not increase – the likelihood of reaching agreements (Greig & Diehl 2005; Tiernay 2015). Besides, the UN tends to promote stop-gap measures

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<sup>14</sup> Zartman (2008) identifies six different sources of leverage: (1) persuasion – the capability of portraying the future without a conflict as more favourable than the future with continued conflict; (2) extraction – the ability to receive an attractive alternative position from the conflict parties than conflict; (3) termination – the threat of withdrawing as a mediator; (4) limitation – the capability of blocking alternative options; (5) deprivation – the ability of taking away or withholding resources from one side and potentially even shifting them to the other side; (6) gratification – the capability of adding resources to the outcome. For more detailed information on the power mediators hold, see Carnevale (2002).

<sup>15</sup> Smith and Stam (2003) question the ability of third parties to contribute to overcoming informational differences.

<sup>16</sup> For more information on UN mediation and the leverage UN mediators hold, see Fretter (2002).

such as ceasefires (Beardsley 2013), which are counter-productive for mediation success, as they reduce the MHS and thereby the pressure on the conflict parties to end their dispute (Zartman 2008). Nevertheless, the UN's security guarantees are particularly trustworthy, because the UN has a reputational incentive to be honest and thus is expected to follow through with its promises (Svensson 2009). Interestingly, Regan (1996), and Regan and Aydin (2006) find that mixing conflict management strategies is generally conducive for reaching an agreement, and for reducing a conflict's duration, because the combined use of sticks and carrots each tool offers contributes to an information exchange beneficial for reducing civil war duration.

Regional IGOs hold a particular kind of leverage, as they share parts of the identity with the conflict state, and understand the conflict better than other third parties. Actually, the importance of regional organisations in mediation has been highlighted in Security Council Resolution 1809 (S/RES/1809 2008). Third parties sharing identity with the conflict actors is a critical commonality which is likely to contribute to mediation success (Leng & Regan 2003 on interstate conflicts; Block & Siegel 2011). Yet, regional IGOs mostly mediate particularly difficult-to-solve conflicts only: governments fear the mediator to be biased towards the rebel group, knowing that rebel groups are often supported by neighbouring states, which are also part of the organisation. Rebel groups on the other hand fear the organisation to be biased towards the government, a member of the regional IGO. Thus, only when the conflict parties have to engage in talks with regional IGOs, due to increasing conflict costs, will these talks set on. Agreements reached through mediation by regional IGOs are often fragile and likely to fail. Yet, considering the described selection effect, i.e. regional IGOs mostly mediating difficult-to-solve conflicts, regional IGOs are relatively successful mediators (Gartner 2011).<sup>17</sup>

African mediators are viewed critically by Khadiagala (2007), as they often have fewer resources at hand and are likely to be perceived as 'meddlers'. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that 'meddlers gradually learn to be mediators' (Khadiagala 2007: 10). Religious third parties on the other hand are attributed with the advantage of being perceived as legitimate peacemakers. They are respected, often admired, and, if elected to mediate, likely to be successful (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). Furthermore,

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<sup>17</sup> For a case study on mediation of the European Union (EU) between Serbia and Kosovo, see Bergmann and Niemann (2015). For an overview on EU mediation, see Bergmann et al. (2016).

NGOs are often connected to actors on the grassroots level, and thus might be able to understand the conflict dynamics well. Due to their weakness, they are often excluded from mediation, though they could contribute to sharing vital information (Dunn & Kriesberg 2002).

However, in many conflicts not only one, but several third-parties intervene – either at the same time or consecutively. If conducted in a coordinated fashion, multiple third-party mediation can have a positive impact as the combined third-party effort underlines the intervening actors' political will to solve the conflict. Mediators can also share resources, such as material costs and time. These coordinated processes are likely to increase the mediators' leverage (Crocker et al. 2003b). In fact, multi-track mediation efforts are likely to be more successful than single-track mediation, because mediators with muscle and unofficial track mediators work towards the same goal and combine their strength (Böhmelt 2010 on interstate conflicts).<sup>18</sup> However, if several third parties mediate but do not coordinate their efforts, multiparty mediation has a negative impact on the overall aim of conflict resolution (Crocker et al. 2002), because the organisational costs become too high, and mixed signals might be sent, which encourages the conflict parties to forum shop (Crocker et al. 2003b; Böhmelt 2011; 2012 on interstate conflicts). Actually, a coalition of largely democratic mediators should be most effective, because democratic third parties share a culture of peaceful conflict resolution. An inverted U-curved relationship between the mediators' coalition size and mediation effectiveness is discovered: the optimal size for a mediator coalition seems to be three. If more than three third parties build a coalition, coordination amongst the third parties becomes significantly more difficult (Böhmelt 2011 on interstate conflicts). Besides, a combination of powerful and pure mediation is most successful, as both types of mediation should complement each other (Svensson 2007b).<sup>19</sup>

Research has implied that both mediators with cultural ties as well as mediators who are particularly strong hold important leverage. Thus, Reid (2015) differentiates between capability leverage (material power) and credibility leverage (historical and cultural ties).

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<sup>18</sup> Track I diplomacy is conducted by the UN, other regional and international organisations, governments or international financial institutions. Track II diplomacy is undertaken by international NGOs, churches, academics, or private businesses. Track III diplomacy is conducted by actors from the grassroots (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 29).

<sup>19</sup> Pure mediation aims at building the confidence of the conflict parties, and at improving the relationship between the conflict parties. Power mediators use their capabilities to push and pull the conflict parties in a direction they prefer (Svensson 2007b: 229–230).

Mediators endowed with the former type of leverage are more likely to contribute to reaching agreements that last for a short time. They rely on directive strategies, and lure the conflict parties into signing an agreement by increasing the costs of the conflict parties' BATNA. However, an agreement reached through directive mediation might not address the underlying issues of a conflict, and conflict recurs eventually. On the other hand, mediators with credibility leverage are likely to produce agreements that are more durable, because these mediators make use of their context-knowledge. They influence the content of the talks, and are truly committed to the conflict's resolution.

Overall, mediators seek to intervene successfully (Bercovitch 2007) – if not for conflict resolution, then for reputational purposes (Hellman 2012). For third parties to reach their aim, they need to be operationally, politically, strategically, and diplomatically ready to mediate. They need to be culturally fit, and have the right relationship to the conflict parties for doing the job (Crocker et al. 2003). If a third party is truly ready to mediate, mediation can be a beneficial conflict management tool (Crocker et al. 2004). Hence, accounting for mediator identity and, coming along with mediator identity, mediator leverage is crucial. However, which impact does mediator bias have on mediation success?

### **2.2.4 Mediator Bias**

The importance of mediator neutrality is discussed divergently. If conflict parties realise that the mediator cannot be manipulated, they take a certain level of fairness and impartiality for granted (Gliessmann & Wils 2009). Furthermore, biased mediators are unable to share relevant insights into the conflict (Beber 2012 on interstate conflicts). Especially when assuming that mediation is a one-round game, mediators are most effective if they care about the issue at stake, have a moderate ideal point, and do not find conflict too costly. Biased mediators would be ineffective in these cases (Kydd 2006 on interstate conflicts).

Contrarily, e.g. Svensson (2009) argues that neutral mediators, who are primarily interested in ending a conflict, are likely to push the conflict parties towards reaching agreements at the expense of agreement quality. They are linked to agreements which do not include provisions for political power-sharing, third-party security guarantees, government-sided amnesties, or the repatriation of civilians. Biased mediators on the other

hand are likely to ensure that the interests of the side they are biased towards are met, and to derive concessions from their side to reach an agreement (Svensson 2009). Moreover, conflict parties are likely to trust a mediator who is biased to ‘their side’. These mediators are more likely to derive substantial concessions, and thereby more likely to mediate successfully (Kydd 2003; Favretto 2009). Additionally, insider partial mediators are more likely to reach agreements, because they bring vital indigenous resources to the mediation table. By contributing to a reduction of the private information problem, they can complement third parties (Svensson & Lindgren 2013).

Elaborating on the notion of bias, Savun (2008 on interstate conflicts) differentiates between a third party’s absolute and its relative bias towards a conflict party.<sup>20</sup> Relatively biased mediators are more likely to contribute to the conflict parties reaching an agreement. The same holds true for mediators who hold private information on the conflict actors, because they are more likely to ameliorate information asymmetries between them. They are able to share important information on the disputants’ reservation points, and thereby contribute to avoiding bargaining failure (Rauchhaus 2006).

In sum, the question of bias is likely to come up in intrastate conflict mediation, and it is essential to differentiate between government- and rebel-biased mediators. Government-biased mediators might help the rebel group to show its trustworthiness (Svensson 2007a; 2015) and commitment to conflict management (Svensson 2015). They are linked to government-sided amnesties and territorial power-sharing, while rebel-biased mediators are linked to agreements which contain security guarantees and political power-sharing (Svensson 2009; Svensson 2015).

### **2.2.5 Mediator Strategies**

Along with the leverage mediators hold come a range of strategies and tactics they can employ. Commonly, scholars differentiate between three kinds of mediation strategies: communication-facilitation (or facilitation), procedural (or formulation), and directive

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<sup>20</sup> According to the concept of relative bias, ‘the degree of bias a mediator has toward one of the disputants depends not only on the relationship between the mediator and the disputant but also on the mediator’s relationship with the other disputant’ (Savun 2008: 26). ‘Absolute bias between state A and state B captures the bias state A holds toward state B independently of the former’s relationship with state C’ (Savun 2008: 33).

(manipulation) strategies (Bercovitch 2007).<sup>21</sup> While facilitation allows the conflict parties to identify overlaps in their bargaining space, procedural mediation contributes to the identification of alternative options within this overlapping bargaining space. With directive mediation, third parties seek to alter the costs and benefits of potential agreements (Beardsley 2006). Directive mediation is used in eight percent of the civil wars which are mediated, while procedural strategies are used in more than half of the cases (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012).

The third party's ability to use the available mediation strategies – facilitation, formulation, and manipulation – depends on its leverage. The decision which strategy to employ is also influenced by a conflict's severity (Wall & Druckman 2003 on mediation by peacekeepers). Directive strategies (manipulation) are most likely to produce agreements, especially when it comes to resolving high-intensity and protracted conflicts. Mediators who employ these strategies are able to push and pull the conflict parties towards an agreement, e.g. by using sticks and carrots (Bercovitch & Regan 1999). However, agreements reached through directive mediation are mostly short-lived (Gartner & Bercovitch 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003; Quinn et al. 2009, 2013; Beardsley 2008, 2011 – all on interstate conflicts). These agreements are more likely to fail, since the mediator altered the perceived costs and benefits of the agreement by using sticks and carrots. Time-inconsistency problems might develop in the aftermath of bargains struck through directive mediation. With waning third-party influence, the utility of the agreement might reduce (Beardsley 2008 on interstate conflicts). The conflict parties may become unsatisfied with the agreement (Gurses et al. 2008). Additionally, rebel groups might radicalise if the mediator uses directive strategies only (Lustenberger 2012). Beardsley (2011 on interstate conflicts) describes the positive short-term and the negative long-term effect of mediation as the 'mediation dilemma'.

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<sup>21</sup> Communication-facilitation contains the following tactics: clarifying a situation, developing rapport with the conflict parties, providing relevant information, rehearsing each party, and clarifying what each side wants to communicate, while avoiding taking side. Tactics commonly employed when electing a procedural strategy are establishing protocol and an agenda (commonly moving from simple to more complex issues), separating the parties and creating a balance of powers by acting as a spokesperson for the weaker side, reducing tensions, keeping the discussions focused on the issue, and acting as a sounding board for propositions. Manipulation contains the following tactics: contributing to a party undoing a commitment it had made earlier, suggesting trade-offs, helping the parties to save face, contravening a prominent position, rewarding concessions, highlighting costs of non-agreement, claiming authorship for proposals, employing sticks and carrots, threatening to quit, and using ultimatums (Bercovitch 2007).

Mediators who employ facilitation or communication only are less likely to produce agreements. However, the agreements reached through facilitation or formulation are comparably durable (Beardsley et al. 2006; Haixa 2007; Carment et al. 2009; Quinn et al. 2009, 2013 on interstate conflicts), and conducive regarding transitional justice processes (Kirchhoff 2007). Nevertheless, a mix of mediation strategies is most likely to produce agreements (Ayres 1997; Zartman 2000; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003; Beardsley et al. 2006 – both on interstate conflicts; Eisenkopf & Bächtiger 2012), while third parties staying engaged for an extended period can contribute to lasting solutions without addressing the conflict's core issue (Arena & Pechenkina 2015).

Overall, specific third-party characteristics seem to be strongly linked to mediation success. While a mediator's leverage correlates with mediator identity, it also determines the strategies mediators are able to use, which, in turn, are linked to agreement durability. This knowledge is crucial in the light of the posed research question, as conclusions based on the transience of agreements will be drawn once the quantitative and qualitative analysis have been conducted in chapter 5 and 6. First, the literature which contains aspects of consecutive mediation in its arguments is presented in the following section though.

### ***2.2.6 Consecutive Mediation Efforts***

While chapter 2.1.4 showed that previous conflict management efforts have an impact on the choice of conflict management tools if conflict management becomes necessary again, and thereby on mediation onset, this subchapter presents the literature that addresses the question which impact previous conflict management efforts have on subsequent mediation success. Again, the focus lies on studies which do not only account for the impact of previous mediation efforts in their statistical models, but on studies which also provide theoretical arguments for why previous mediation has an impact on subsequent mediation success.

Generally, previous mediation seems to have a positive impact on subsequent mediation success (Maoz & Terris 2006). In conflicts which have seen many mediation efforts, the rifts between the conflict parties are likely to be very deep. The sunk costs are high in these cases, and mediation success is less likely (Bercovitch & DeRouen 2005). In fact, the first peacemaking-effort is often unsuccessful. Yet, these unsuccessful efforts are built up on,

and the later efforts have a direct impact on conflict resolution (Heldt 2009). Adding to this notion, Regan and Stam (2000: 24 on interstate conflicts) argue that '[m]ediation is a cumulative process with monotonically increasing returns; the greater the number of mediation attempts, the shorter the expected duration of the dispute'. However, their results show a curvilinear relationship between the amount of mediation and subsequent mediation success. They note that some conflicts continue for longer than initially expected after mediation has taken place, and argue that the expected linear effect is still likely to be observed if the same third party mediates repeatedly. Meanwhile, Greig (2001 on interstate conflicts) finds that multiple mediation events reduce the likelihood of mediation success. Not even the engagement of the same party has a significant impact on mediation success. He explains this with the selection effect, according to which conflicts which see mediation repeatedly are particularly difficult to solve.

Drawing on these notions, Böhmelt (2013 on interstate conflicts) argues for a curvilinear relationship between the accumulation of mediation and mediation success. Initial mediation efforts are unlikely to be successful, as they are characterised by uncertainty and complexity. Potential agreements are furthest away from the conflict parties' ideal point. Once a turning point has been reached, mediation is likely to be successful though, because the disputants are more receptive to the information provided through mediation. Turning points are reached quicker if the same third party mediates a conflict again. Böhmelt's results show that the turning point towards successful mediation, when accounting for the same mediator, lies at around ten, and otherwise at around 20 previous mediation attempts.

Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) argue that especially when the same third party mediates intra- and interstate conflicts, norms of interaction are established, and the disputants know what to expect from mediation. Meanwhile, information gathered on the participants during previous mediation efforts is used during consecutive mediation efforts as well. Though previous mediation success is conducive for subsequent mediation success, it is not a linear process, as 'mediation history alters the odds of future settlements but does not determine outcomes' (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006: 341): previously failed mediation has a negative impact on the likelihood of reaching ceasefires, while previously offered mediation has a negative impact on partial settlements. Previous full agreements are positively linked to full agreements, and previous mediation offers are negatively linked to partial settlements. In conflicts of low intensity, previous ceasefires are positively linked to

ceasefires, previous partial agreements are positively linked to partial settlements, and previous full agreements as well as previous ceasefires are positively linked to full settlements. Based on their findings, the authors highlight the necessity for differentiating between agreement type and conflict intensity when analysing the impact of previous mediation outcomes on mediation success. Moreover, they underline that an observed failure has a much more negative effect on subsequent mediation success than no previous mediation having occurred.

Tying up with Bercovitch and Gartner (2006), Mattes (2016 on interstate conflicts) states that partial agreements show the disputants' willingness of conflict resolution, and build the foundation for further talks. She notes that partial settlements are considered a screening device for political will to settle the dispute, and have a causal effect on the parties' interest in further settlements by changing international perception as well as domestic preferences and expectations. If partial agreements fail, the consequences are less severe. Therefore, partial settlements are strongly linked to comprehensive dispute solutions, peaceful negotiations, and, to a certain extent, a reduction of the overall conflict before all conflict issues are resolved.

Again, it becomes clear that previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation success, and on conflict resolution as a whole. However, few authors present a theoretical argument on why and how previous mediation outcomes matter. While Böhmelt's (2013 on interstate conflicts) research shows that a certain number of mediation efforts not producing agreements are likely to lead to mediation success eventually, Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) highlight the impact different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation outcomes. These studies provide a valuable basis on which to build up on, as they support the expectation that previous mediation efforts and their outcomes are linked to subsequent mediation success. Moreover, they highlight the importance of accounting for whether the third party engaged in recurrent mediation is the same as the one who mediated previously.

Nevertheless, the discussed studies leave several aspects unaccounted for: once more, a clear focus on intrastate conflicts is missing. If studies include intrastate conflicts, they do not distinguish between the conflict parties. Since governments might draw different conclusions from previous mediation outcomes than rebel groups – due to existing power

and status asymmetries – it is crucial to scrutinise the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation success separately from interstate conflicts. Besides, scholars mostly compare the impact of certain mediation outcomes to cases in which no previous mediation has been observed instead of to other mediation outcomes. However, this approach does not shed light onto the question which impact different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts. Finally, reneged on agreements remain excluded from the arguments and analyses, though their impact is likely to differ significantly from the impact of successful and failed mediation efforts. Hence, this project is an important contribution to the literature on international mediation, as it provides an understanding for how previous mediation outcomes influence each conflict actor's decision on subsequent mediation onset and success, while it accounts for reneged on agreements.

### ***2.2.7 Excursus: The Composition and Implementation of Peace Agreements***

Finally, the literature on peace agreement composition and implementation is introduced, since the impact a (reneged on) peace agreement has on subsequent mediation onset and success might differ, depending on the agreement's comprehensiveness. The previous section briefly touched upon the impact of peace agreement composition (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Mattes 2016 on interstate conflicts), which is largely unaccounted for in mediation research. While the impact previous mediation efforts have on subsequent mediation lies at the heart of this research, the content of peace agreements denotes the costs of reneging (Fortna 2003, 2004b), and points towards an answer to the question whether subsequent mediation success is likely to be observed (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006). Besides, the degree of agreement comprehensiveness and agreement implementation is likely to provide information on whether subsequent mediation is necessary (Joshi & Quinn 2015b). With these notions in mind, the existing literature on agreement composition, agreement implementation, and agreement durability, largely unrelated to mediation, but instead focused on conflict or peace duration, is introduced in this section. It is introduced since it provides valuable insights on peace agreement design and peace agreement implementation, which are drawn on in the theoretical argument on agreement comprehensiveness.

Conflict parties often have incentives to renege on agreements to renegotiate the agreement terms, while some agreements prove impossible to implement (Werner 1999). Thus, resolving the underlying conflict issues is insufficient for ensuring agreement implementation and duration. Instead, third-parties need to provide security guarantees for the demobilisation period, as negotiated settlements are likely to be rejected and war might continue otherwise (Walter 1999). Hence, the challenge for mediators does not only lie in resolving disagreements, but also in designing agreements both actors can commit to and comply with (Walter 2002). Indeed, agreements which include institutional guarantees for addressing security threats, which come along with centralisation of state power, prove to be rather stable (Hartzell 1999).

Theoretically, interstate conflict recurrence can be prohibited by including cost-increasing<sup>22</sup> terms and uncertainty-reducing<sup>23</sup> measures into agreements. While cost-increasing provisions contribute to upholding the status quo, uncertainty-reducing provisions increase the chances for peaceful negotiations. Empirically, uncertainty-reducing provisions do not reduce the hazard of conflict, while cost-increasing provisions do (Mattes 2008). This conclusion is challenged by Mattes and Savun (2010), who find that both cost-increasing and uncertainty-reducing provisions have a positive impact on the relationship between the conflict parties. They argue that carefully designed peace agreements address the commitment problem and the private information problem. Mattes and Savun (2009) add that political power-sharing is the most promising fear-reducing<sup>24</sup> measure.

Agreements need to be implemented for them to have a positive, lasting impact. The complete implementation of military power-sharing agreements has a positive impact on maintaining peace, because implementing these agreements signals the conflict parties' genuine commitment to peace. It shows the signatories' willingness to endure the costs associated with compromising their original war aims, while they withstand potential challenges from their own groups (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003). Besides, the extent to which an agreement is implemented also depends on a government's capacity to do so (DeRouen

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<sup>22</sup> Cost-increasing provisions include troop withdrawal, demilitarised zones, peacekeeping, guarantors, and arbitration (Mattes 2008: 324).

<sup>23</sup> Mattes (2008: 324) considers the following provisions as uncertainty reducing: exchange of information on manoeuvre, regular consultation, hotlines, surveillance, or verification by a third party.

<sup>24</sup> Fear-reducing provisions are e.g. third-party guarantees or power-sharing (Mattes & Savun 2009: 737).

et al. 2010). Especially the implementation of military and territorial provisions sends strong signals, as their implementation is more costly than the implementation of political pacts. Political pacts can easily be resolved even after their implementation, and thus do not necessarily increase the durability of peace (Jarstad & Nilsson 2008).<sup>25</sup> Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) support this notion theoretically, but do not find empirical support for it, which they explain with poor implementation rates overall. Meanwhile, Hartzell (2009) questions the stability of power-sharing agreements that contain military aspects, as political power-sharing seems to be more crucial since it gives rebel groups access to state power. The statistical results show that both military victory and political power-sharing have a positive impact on the duration of peace, though the impact of political power-sharing is more pronounced.

Furthermore, a higher number of policy areas addressed in an agreement increases agreement duration. Reforms across several policy areas are more costly to the government, who is not a unitary actor, than reforms in just one sector. With agreements which address several policy areas, the conflict parties accomplish a wider array of their socio-political objectives. The likelihood of violence recurring reduces within the first five years after talks, just like the necessity of additional talks. Besides, agreements are likely to be followed by further agreements (Joshi & Quinn 2015b). An inclusion of multiple power-sharing aspects in an agreement has a cumulative impact on the combatants' sense of security, as some provisions might work mutually reinforcing. Additionally, a higher number of power-sharing provisions reduces the likelihood of agreement failure, because even if one power-sharing provision is not implemented, others still are. Hence, these agreements do not necessarily fail because one provision is not implemented (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003). Besides, agreement complexity increases the costs of implementation, and thus improves agreement credibility. Hence, the more provisions the agreement contains, the better the design quality, and the longer the agreement lasts. Well-designed agreements even outperform the durability of peace after military victory (Badran 2014). Besides, if softer topics are addressed first, the conflict parties have more time to build trust, and

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<sup>25</sup> Jarstad and Nilsson's (2008) results show that most political pacts are implemented (75 % are fully implemented, one pact is partially implemented, eight pacts are not implemented). They are implemented within seven months on average. Moreover, three military pacts are not implemented while 34.5 % are fully implemented, and 55 % are partially implemented. On average, they are implemented within 12 months. 55 percent of the territorial pacts are fully implemented, 27 percent partially, and 18 percent not implemented. These are implemented within 18 months on average.

agreements are more likely to be reached (Öberg & Möller 2010), while agreements with finite duration are easier to negotiate (Bearce et al. 2015).

With a focus on comprehensive peace agreements (CPA), Joshi and Quinn (2015a) argue that the degree to which a CPA is implemented has an impact on CPA longevity. Implementing CPAs normalises the political relationship between the conflict parties, and solves the credible commitment problem as well as information uncertainties. It reduces the influence of spoiler groups who hope to take advantage of non-implementation. Wallensteen et al. (2009) underline the importance of agreement implementation by highlighting that governments will abandon agreements which are too costly, while rebel groups abandon agreements due to implementation delays. Contrarily to e.g. Badran (2014), who highlights the costliness of agreements positively, Wallensteen et al. (2009) note that less costly concessions of government military integration and autonomy increase agreement duration.

In sum, the literature on peace agreement composition and implementation highlights that not only reaching agreements is important, but that also the content of the agreements reached and their implementation have a decisive impact on agreement durability. Particularly insights on agreement comprehensiveness, gained from the studies presented in this section, are drawn on in the theoretical argument, because agreement comprehensiveness might be seminal for subsequent mediation efforts.

### ***2.2.8 Summary of Findings on Mediation Success***

Several different variables influence mediation success. The ones analysed so far have been presented in chapter 2.2. Again, it became clear how factors describing a conflict, such as conflict intensity, influence mediation success. But also the power distribution in a dyad is decisive for the likelihood of agreements being reached, while many of the studies included in this literature review focus on the mediator. They account for mediator identity, strength as well as mediator bias, and also analyse the impact different mediation strategies have on mediation success. Important implications can also be drawn from the literature on agreement comprehensiveness, as they provide insights on the question to which extent agreements are likely to last, while they touch on the question whether subsequent mediation is likely to set on, and if so, if it is likely to be successful.

Again, research which addresses consecutive mediation efforts is rare. A clear focus on intrastate conflicts is missing, though mediation in intrastate conflict differs significantly from mediation in interstate conflict (Melin & Svensson 2009). Moreover, renege on agreements have remained completely unaccounted for so far. Yet, previous research has shown a link between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation success – however largely without addressing the causal mechanisms between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation success. This research project addresses the link more explicitly. By disaggregating mediation outcomes further, a deeper understanding of how the different mediation outcomes influence subsequent mediation success will be gained. Thereby, this research addresses an important gap in the literature. The results will provide crucial policy implications, because to date little knowledge on the impact the different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts is available.

### **2.3 Summary of Key Notions in the Literature**

This chapter has shown that a wide variety of variables influences mediation onset and mediation success. Most scholars assume the conflict parties to be rational actors and draw on bargaining theory in their theoretical arguments (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014), while some theoretical arguments are based on learning theory (e.g. Melin 2015; Böhmelt 2016). Topics commonly addressed in the literature are mediator identity, leverage, and bias, and the effectiveness of mediation strategies; conflict intensity and conflict duration; as well as variables describing the conflict parties' relationship, such as the relative distribution of strength. Some studies also account for conflict management history, i.e. whether mediation or other conflict management efforts have been conducted in the dyad, and whether these efforts have been successful. Of these studies, many focus on mediation in interstate conflicts. Only in recent years, a clearer focus on intrastate conflict mediation has developed, and research which solely focuses on intrastate conflicts is conducted. Focusing on mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts separately from mediation efforts in interstate conflicts is considered crucial, because the power and status differences between intrastate conflict parties have a decisive impact on mediation in intrastate dyads (Melin & Svensson 2009).

With regard to consecutive mediation efforts, clear theoretical arguments accounting for the dynamics at play in intrastate conflict are currently missing. Though research shows a

link between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation efforts, sufficient explanations for how and why the different mediation outcomes have an impact on recurrent mediation are unavailable. Moreover, the different conclusions intrastate conflict actors are likely to draw have not been addressed, while renege on agreements have not been focused on at all. Hence, by asking how and why previous mediation outcomes influence the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, this project addresses important gaps in the literature on intrastate conflict mediation.

Table 1 summarises the findings presented in the literature review, which are considered most relevant for this research, as suggested by Bryman (2008: 86). Both findings on intra- and interstate mediation are included in the table. In the left column, the independent variables included in the presented studies are listed. The two columns following to the right indicate whether the impact on mediation onset and mediation success is positive (+), negative (-), curvilinear ( $\wedge/\cup$ ), or statistically insignificant (o). On the right, example studies are listed. The literature on agreement comprehensiveness is not included because it does not regard mediation onset and mediation success explicitly, but instead focuses on the duration of peace or the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Table 1. Summary of the impact of selected variables on mediation onset and mediation success

Independent variable	Impact on mediation onset	Impact on mediation success	Studies (examples)
<b>Mediator characteristics</b>			
Mediator leverage	+		Bercovitch & Schneider 2000; Maoz & Terris 2006; Melin 2011; Reid 2015
Shared culture	+		Bercovitch & Schneider 2000; Greig & Diehl 2006; Melin 2011; Owsiak & Frazier 2014
Mediator bias		+/-	Kydd 2003, 2006; Rauchhaus 2006; Savun 2008; Svensson

			2007a, 2009; Svensson 2015
<b>Mediation strategy</b>			
Communication/facilitation		+	Beardsley et al. 2006; Svensson 2007b
Procedural		+	Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Haixia 2007; Quinn et al. 2013
Directive/manipulation		+	Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Carment et al. 2009; Haixia 2007; Svensson 2007b; Quinn et al. 2009
<b>Mediation process</b>			
Sequencing of topics		+	Öberg & Möller 2010
Inclusion of all actors		+/o	Cunningham 2006, 2011, 2013; Nilsson 2008
<b>Disputant characteristics</b>			
Relative rebel strength	+	+	Bapat 2005; Clayton 2013, 2015; Clayton & Gleditsch 2014
Group change	-		Vüllers & Destradi 2013
<b>Conflict characteristics</b>			
Conflict intensity	+/o/∪	+	Aydin 2010; Bercovitch & Langley 1993; Greig 2015; Greig & Rost 2013; Greig & Diehl 2006; DeRouen et al. 2011; Ruhe 2015
Conflict duration	+/∩	-	Bapat 2005; Beardsley 2008, 2010; Böhmelt 2015; Clayton 2013; DeRouen et al. 2011; Greig & Diehl 2006, Svensson 2007a
Parallel conflict	-	-	Clayton 2013, 2015
External (military) support	+	+/o/-	Cunningham 2010; Fürstenberg 2015; Sawyer et al. 2015

## 2 Literature Review

<b>Conflict management history</b>			
Previous mediation	+	+	Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Clayton 2013, 2015; Clayton & Gleditsch 2014; Greig 2014; Greig & Diehl 2006; Maoz & Terris 2006; Terris & Maoz 2005
Previously failed mediation	-	-	Aydin 2010; Bercovitch & Gartner 2006, Greig 2010, 2010; Melin 2015; Wiegand & Powell 2011
Previous mediation success	+	+	Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Clayton 2013, 2015; Mattes 2016
Number of previous mediation efforts	-/+		Bercovitch & DeRouen 2005; Greig 2005
Number of previous mediation efforts <sup>2</sup>	∩	+	Böhmelt 2013; Regan & Stam 2000
Same third party has managed conflict before	+		Böhmelt 2013; Melin 2011

+ positive impact, - negative impact, ∩/∪ curvilinear, o no impact

*Source: own illustration, based on presented literature*

### **3 Consecutive Mediation Efforts in Theory**

Repeated mediation events are a common phenomenon in today's intrastate conflicts. However, little is known about the conditions under which consecutive mediation is observed (Beardsley 2010). Moreover, we do not know to which extent previous mediation success, mediation events which did not produce an agreement, and reneged on mediated agreements influence subsequent mediation events. Especially the degree to which the various mediation outcomes influence the government and the rebel group's decision making is unknown, as the literature review showed. Hence, a theoretical argument that is as parsimonious as possible, and as complex as necessary is developed in the following. It seeks to address the following research question: how and why do previous mediation outcomes influence subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success?

The theoretical argument presented in this chapter is based on rational choice theory and draws on bargaining theory – the most commonly used theory in mediation research (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014). This approach is particularly valuable for research on intrastate conflict mediation, as it provides explanations for each conflict actor's decision making, and enables the researcher to focus on each conflict parties' preferences separately, which, as the literature review pointed out, is crucial when focusing on intrastate conflicts, due to differences between the conflict parties (Melin & Svensson 2009).

#### **3.1 The Rationality of the Disputants**

According to rational choice theory, individuals are assumed to be rational actors. These rational actors are ideal types of real-world individuals (Eriksson 2011). They are self-interested, and make informed decisions, based on cost-benefit calculations, in order to maximise the utility of their actions. Hence, all rational actors come to the same conclusion when in the same situation, and when holding the same information (Fearon 1995; Reiter 2003; Parsons 2005). Different forms of rational choice theory exist. They vary with regard to the degree of rationality ascribed to the actor under scrutiny. While some consider individuals to be fully rational (e.g. Fearon 1995), others argue that the world is too

complex to be captured as a whole by individuals, and therefore assume actors to be boundedly rational (Simon 1995).

To be able to make informed decisions, all rational actors gather information on their available options until they hold all relevant information necessary for making decisions (Parsons 2005), or, if they are considered boundedly rational, at least until they hold enough information to be satisfied (Simon 1995) and the costs of collecting additional information become too high. Boundedly rational might simply stop collecting additional information once they believe that they hold enough information to estimate the costs and benefits of the available options. The more information rational actors hold on the options available, the more confident they are in the decision they make. Since the costs and benefits allocated to a particular option are not necessarily the real costs, scholars tend to speak of *expected* costs and *expected* benefits (Parsons 2005).

Drawing on the gathered information, a rational actor creates a transitive and complete preference order which guides their decision-making process. This preference ranking is independent of any budget constraints the individual might face, as it mirrors the preferences an individual has in theory. It is driven by the search for the option that has the highest utility for the individual (Anderton & Carter 2009; Eriksson 2011). The created preference order allows rational actors to choose one of the available options over the other(s). Rational actors will choose the option that is ranked highest, or at least as high as the alternative(s). Yet, as rational actors often only have scarce resources at hand, their set of available actions is constrained and the opportunity costs for opting for *a* instead of for *b* are taken into account when making a decision – always in light of the previously created preference order (Parsons 2005). Thus, at times, not the highest ranked option is chosen, but the option ranked highest under budget considerations.

The costs and benefits a rational actor allocates to a particular action are not necessarily consistent over time – though truly rational actors would hold all relevant information at the time of decision making, and thus would not need to re-calculate (Parsons 2005). Yet, to boundedly rational actors, sometimes the real costs and benefits of an action only become apparent after an option has been chosen. Hence, cost-benefit calculations have to be conducted anew, once additional information is available (Glaser 2010). Besides, the

context in which a decision is made might influence the preference ranking. As contexts change over time, so might an individual's preference order (Parsons 2005).<sup>26</sup>

In sum, rational actors seek to maximise the utility of their actions. They gather information on their available options to conduct cost-benefit calculations. Based on these cost-benefit calculations, they create a transitive preference order, which guides their actions. However, this preference order is not time consistent due to contextual changes, or additionally gathered information, which alter the utility ascribed to the available options.

Yet, rational choice theory is not undebated. The notion that individuals might not be able to grasp all aspects of the complex world they live in was already addressed (Simon 1995). Others question the assumed degree of self-interest individuals are supposed to hold, which strongly influences their preference order. Further arguments suggest that rational choice theory is not falsifiable, that it has not been rigorously empirically tested, that it is weak, hides behind mathematics, does not include cultural aspects, and does not contribute to understanding the real world (Eriksson 2011; Snidal 2013). Accounting for some of these notions, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory, according to which individuals are risk averse when it comes to gains they are highly likely to receive, but risk seeking when faced with sure losses, all the while calculating these gains and losses from a reference point – usually the status quo. Individuals moreover disregard components present in all available options. Hence, when the same option is present in different forms, inconsistent preference rankings are created. Moreover, Janis (1982) introduced the theory of groupthink, according to which individuals, when in a group, are concerned about the harmony and conformity in the group. Avoiding controversial solutions, not all alternative options are considered, hence, dysfunctional decisions are made at times, which speaks against the assumptions of rational choice theory.

Regardless of the criticism, rational choice theory is drawn on to analyse different topics in International Relations, i.e. the actual behaviour of actors, or normatively expected behaviour (Snidal 2013). Keohane (1984) draws on rational choice theory to analyse the conditions under which states cooperate. Tsebelis (1990), Kirschner (1997), and Drezner (1999) use it to analyse the imposition of sanctions. Fearon (1995) explains why wars take place and why ending them is difficult, despite the fact that they are cost-inefficient, and

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<sup>26</sup> This notion is debated amongst scholars who draw on rational choice (Reiter 2003).

Walter (1997, 2002) analyses how third parties can contribute to reaching peace in intrastate conflicts. Many scholars who analyse the onset and success of mediation assume conflict parties to be rational actors as well. They mostly draw on a particular form of rational choice theory – bargaining theory – (e.g. Beardsley et al. 2006; Greig 2015; Clayton 2015), which is introduced in the following subchapter. Together with rational choice theory, bargaining theory provides the underlying theoretical assumptions for this project, and thus can be considered the foundation of the ensuing theoretical argument.

### 3.2 Bargaining Theory

Bargaining theory, as developed by Fearon (1995), seeks to explain why states fight wars against each other. It assumes that violent conflict results from a disagreement over scarce resources between rational actors, caused by the private information problem, the commitment problem, and issue-indivisibility (explained below). Disputants are viewed as unitary actors, and thus principal-agent problems, which might be related to war, are ignored (Wagner 2000). Theoretically, rational actors should prefer settling their disputes at the bargaining table, without resorting to force. They should be able to reach agreements based on their true capabilities, because violent conflict is cost-inefficient: it is always more expensive than reaching an agreement at the bargaining table *ex ante* (Fearon 1995).

However, faced with the private information and the credible commitment problem, disputants resort to violent conflict. According to the *private information problem*, each conflict party strategically withholds or misrepresents private information on its true capabilities in the hope of striking a better bargain, assuming the other side does so, too. Hence, agreements might not be reached without resorting to force, as it is more difficult for the conflict parties to withhold or misrepresent private information about their true capabilities on the battlefield than at the bargaining table. Thus, through fighting, the conflict parties gather information on their opponent's true strength (Fearon 1995).

Particularly civil wars are marked by information asymmetries. Information on the rebel group is difficult to gather, while information on the government is more readily available (Greig 2015). Mostly, rebel groups are weaker than the governments they fight (Cunningham et al. 2009). Hence, rebel groups are particularly unlikely to reveal private information, as they fear the government's capability of misusing their revealed

information (Walter 1997). Meanwhile, information on the capabilities of the government is more readily available. Official numbers on a country's military capacity as well as its budget (constraints) are easily accessible (Walter 2009). While this information might not display the exact military capacity of the government, the picture the rebel group is able to paint of the government's strengths and weaknesses is most likely more precise than vice versa (Greig 2015). Thus, disagreements over scarce resources between governments and non-state actors are prone to become violent, as the private information problem is pronounced through information asymmetries, which are inherent in the conflict parties' status.

Third parties can contribute to solving the private information problem by providing private information on the conflict parties' true capabilities. Third parties are likely to have private information additional to the one the conflict actors hold, and are able to use sticks and carrots to gather further information. In fact, third parties who hold a considerable amount of information, i.e. states and international organisations (IOs) with leverage and an elaborate secret service machinery are more likely to mediate (Walter 2002). By sharing (or strategically withholding) the private information they have gathered, third parties aim at contributing to the conflict parties identifying an agreement within their bargaining range (Walter 1997).

The *credible commitment problem* adds to, and builds up on, the private information problem. Both conflict actors know that the other is likely to withhold or misrepresent private information. Thus, neither side can be sure that the struck bargain mirrors the true capability distribution in the dyad, which puts into question whether a bargain is a good bargain. Consequently, both sides always have incentives to renege on a reached settlement. This constantly present hazard, of each side giving in to the incentive of renegeing on a settlement to strike a better deal, thus, the problem of committing to peace, is described as the commitment problem (Fearon 1995).

Third parties might be able to contribute to the solution of the credible commitment problem (Fearon 1995). They can provide security guarantees which come into force if one conflict actor reneges on the struck bargain. The provided security guarantees might be included in the settlement and allow the third party to step in and protect the mostly more vulnerable rebel group if a government reneges. By assisting in the implementation

process, provided security guarantees might reduce the rebel group's fear of disarmament, and thereby increase the likelihood of both sides complying with the settlement terms (Walter 1997). With both sides being aware of the third party's presence, the likelihood of the agreement terms being implemented increases, as the involvement of a third party multiplies the costs of renewed war for the conflict parties (Walter 2002). Nevertheless, conflict parties will only agree to a settlement if it improves their status quo (Fortna 2004b).

While Fearon (1995) presented his argument on bargaining in the context of interstate conflicts, the credible commitment problem is particularly pronounced in intrastate conflicts. Rebel groups usually have to demobilise during the agreement's implementation phase. As a consequence, their military capacities are reduced, and they are unable to insist on the implementation of the agreement's terms, or to enforce further cooperation. They are unable to defend themselves against potential government attacks, and cannot penalise the government if it reneges. Therefore, rebel groups are likely to be reluctant to commit to laying down their weapons (Walter 1997).

Though governments might agree to bargain while a third party is still present, governments are likely to re-prioritise their options, i.e. when rebel groups demobilise. They might renege on mediated agreements when waning third-party pressure wanes (Beardsley 2008) – either to strike a better bargain or to win militarily. These time-inconsistency problems are particularly pronounced in intrastate conflicts, due to the vulnerability of the rebel group. Consequently, the conflict parties in intrastate conflict are highly unlikely to reach settlements in the first place. If they manage to reach an agreement, they are unlikely to uphold it, as they are likely to give in to the incentives of resorting to force (Walter 1997).

Besides, conflict parties might be unable to divide the issue at stake to strike a bargain. This problem of *issue indivisibility* is another reason states might go to war over. However, Fearon (1995) does not consider issue indivisibility to be a severe problem. While he admits that certain issues are indivisible and therefore actors might fight over them, he argues that most issues are highly complex, thus side-payments or issue-linkages can solve issue indivisibilities. The problem of issue indivisibility is therefore not included in the ensuing theoretical argument.

In sum, bargaining theory assumes that conflict parties are rational actors who have incentives to withhold or misrepresent private information, and are thus unable to solve their disputes through negotiations. Instead, fighting reveals their opponent's capabilities (Fearon 1995). Hence, these conflicts might only be solved with the assistance of a third party that holds additional information on the conflict parties' strengths and weaknesses, and is able to provide credible security guarantees (Walter 1997). The private information sharing problem and the credible commitment problem are particularly pronounced in intrastate conflicts, as these conflicts are marked by power and status asymmetries (see chapter 2). The assumption that conflict parties are rational actors, together with the private information and the credible commitment problem, alongside the expectation that a mediator is able to contribute to solving the named problems, build the basis of the theoretical argument which is introduced in the following, seeking to address the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success.

### **3.3 Consecutive Mediation Efforts in Intrastate Conflict**

Due to the conflict parties' assumed rational nature, mediation only takes place if it is the best alternative to continued conflict without mediation (Terris & Maoz 2005). Yet, the sole onset of mediation is neither a guarantee for reaching an agreement, nor for the conflict to end in the foreseeable future (Heldt 2009). As one mediation effort often attracts the attention of other third parties (Greig & Regan 2008), the following theoretical argument does not focus on the mediator, assuming that a third party will offer its services if the conflict parties want to address their dispute through mediation. Instead, each conflict parties' stance towards subsequent mediation onset and subsequent success is in focus, as the conflict parties' perspective on subsequent mediation efforts is expected to vary due to the conflict parties' status and power differences (Melin & Svensson 2009).

Moreover, the conflict parties are assumed to be boundedly rational actors, who consider conflict to be costly, and do not engage in it for the sake of engaging in conflict (Fortna 2004b). Their preference order of which conflict management tool is most preferred is likely to change over time, as additional information on the actual costs and benefits of an option becomes apparent once an option has been chosen (Parsons 2005), i.e. by engaging in mediation, additional information on the actual costs and benefits of mediation are

revealed. The conflict parties include this additionally gathered information into their cost-benefit calculation if they are faced with the question whether to engage in mediation again, and, once talks have set on, whether to share private information. Thus, when having to decide on whether to engage in a subsequent mediation effort and on whether to make concessions during subsequent mediation to reach an agreement, cost-benefit calculations are conducted anew, and each conflict actor updates its preference order.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, each conflict party is assumed to be a unitary actor, despite potential political cleavages being present within the government or the rebel group (Wagner 2000).

The ensuing theoretical argument is divided into arguments on subsequent mediation onset (chapter 3.3.1) and subsequent mediation success (chapter 3.3.2), as the motivations behind engaging in subsequent mediation efforts, and the rationale behind sharing information to reach an agreement are expected to differ (see e.g. Beardsley 2006). These chapters are further divided along the possible outcomes of the previous mediation effort: mediation ending without an agreement, partial mediation success<sup>28</sup>, and reneged on mediated agreements.

### ***3.3.1 Subsequent Mediation Onset***

Understanding the differences between the conflict parties' motivation for mediation is vitally important, as it allows for a more detailed understanding of the conditions under which mediation is likely to be observed (Bercovitch 1991). From the government's perspective, the most costly aspects of mediation are legitimising the rebel group (Clayton 2013),<sup>29</sup> and admitting that it is unable to solve its internal conflict without assistance (Melin & Svensson 2009). These two aspects are generally a hurdle to mediation onset from the government's perspective if mediation has not taken place before. However, this hurdle reduces once a dyad engages in mediation, as the government pays the costs of legitimisation and admitting its inability of solving the conflict without assistance when

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<sup>27</sup> Assuming bounded rationality acknowledges that the conflict parties are faced with a highly complex world. It allows for the assumption that conflict parties gather information on e.g. whether to engage in mediation to an extent they consider satisfactory. However, they are unlikely to be able to gather all existing information on mediation when engaging in it for the first time. Instead, they are likely to gather additional information on the utility of mediation over time, particularly when participating in it.

<sup>28</sup> As outlined in the introduction, only partial agreements are included into the theoretical argument and the empirical analysis, due to the assumption that subsequent mediation efforts might not be necessary anymore if a comprehensive agreement, which ends a conflict, is reached.

<sup>29</sup> Legitimacy is defined as 'the perception that an entity is a viable political entity' (Jo 2015: 27).

engaging in mediation with a rebel group for the first time (Ruhe 2015). In this case, the repeated onset of mediation becomes likely from the government's perspective (Clayton 2013). Nevertheless, the following question arises: how do previous mediation outcomes influence the government's cost-benefit calculation on subsequent mediation onset?

Rebel groups 'have plenty of reasons to enter into talks: diplomatic pressure, testing the waters, and respite and resupply, among others' (Hazen 2013: 24). Additionally, they receive legitimacy by engaging in mediation with the government and a third party (Clayton 2013). Though the first mediation effort between a rebel group and a conflict country's government is decisive with regard to legitimacy (Ruhe 2015), the rebel group's legitimacy is fostered with the onset of subsequent talks. Through increased and deepened interaction, its status is reaffirmed (Crescenzi & Enterline 2001). Besides, enduring talks might indicate an improvement of the relationship between governments and rebel groups (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006). Furthermore, mediation provides an international stage to rebel groups, and the opportunity of making political goals publicly known to a wider audience (Cunningham et al. 2009). Thus, rebel groups are expected to be generally interested in mediation (Clayton 2013). But does this hold true regardless of the previous mediation outcome?

#### 3.3.1.1 Previous Mediation Did Not Produce an Agreement

If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, both conflict parties are likely to return to the mediation table. While they had to calculate the expected costs and the expected benefits of mediation when deciding on engaging in the previous talks, they are able to ascribe the costs and benefits of mediation with more certainty after they have experienced them. Though the private information shared during the previous process was insufficient for identifying an agreement within the ZoA, and the third party might have been unable to provide credible security guarantees to contribute to overcoming the commitment problem, both conflict parties are likely to have made note of important benefits of mediation during the previous mediation effort.

One benefit both conflict parties are likely to ascribe to mediation with more certainty is the signalling capacity of mediation (Bercovitch 2007). By repeatedly engaging in mediation, both conflict parties signal their enduring commitment and interest in conflict management to the international community and the conflict country's population

(Bercovitch 2002; Kriesberg & Dayton 2012). If they did not reach an agreement during the previous mediation effort, the conflict parties' continued engagement in talks underlines their willingness to reduce the conflict's intensity. Staying engaged in talks, also after not reaching an agreement, governments seek to avert potentially stronger third-party intervention tools, such as military interventions, by allowing third parties to intrude into their internal matters as mediators (Zartman 1995b; DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012). The previous mediation effort is likely to have underlined the strong signalling capacity mediation has, despite the fact that it did not produce an agreement.

Second, and most importantly with regard to bargaining theory, although no agreement has been reached, the conflict parties are likely to have gathered some information on their opponent with the mediator's assistance (Greig & Diehl 2006). Hence, they value mediation for its information sharing capacity, and are likely to use the information gathered on their opponent to their strategic advantage in the future. Especially governments, which often hold less information about the rebel group's capacities than vice versa (Greig 2015), are likely to evaluate the smallest amount of information as worth engaging in talks for – particularly since the costs of legitimisation have been already paid through the previous talks. Thus, the costs of allowing a third party to intrude into internal matters are balanced out by the benefits the mediator provides – especially the ability to collect private information on the rebel group is decisive from the government's perspective.

A third benefit underlined by the previous mediation effort ending without an agreement is the conflict parties' ability to stay in control of the mediation outcome (Bercovitch 2011). Though third parties are able to apply pressure by using sticks and carrots to direct the conflict parties towards an outcome they prefer, mediators cannot force the disputants to make concessions. Hence, the conflict parties might use mediation to pursue 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998), i.e. by trying to win the international community over to their side while lobbying for military support, by convincing other third parties to share private information they hold on their opponent, or by preventing discussions on more stringent intervention tools than mediation. Thus, while mediation events which did not produce an agreement underline the signalling capacity of mediation, they also highlight the conflict parties' ability to stay in control while using the freedom mediation provides for other means. This is particularly important with regard to rebel cohesiveness. The

conflict parties' ability to stay in control of the outcome is likely to be a strong argument used by supporters of mediation against hardliners, who do not want to engage in talks. Thus, mediation which did not produce an agreement is likely to be followed by subsequent mediation onset, as neither the rebel group nor the government have anything to lose through subsequent mediation onset, particularly since the costs of legitimising the rebel group have been paid, and the conflict parties do not have to commit to signing an agreement before talks start.

Finally, if the previous mediation event was part of a larger process, subsequent mediation onset is likely, as the extent to which progress is made on the different agenda items is likely to depend on the agenda item's comprehensiveness as well as on the amount of private information which has been shared before. Thus, neither the rebel group nor the government is likely to overemphasise the costs of mediation which ended without an agreement if the mediation event took place within a larger process, as a certain number of mediation events ending without an agreement cannot be avoided (Heldt 2009). Only with the number of mediation events ending without an agreement accumulating too much, the conflict parties are likely to put the benefits of mediation into question (Greig 2010).

#### *Hypothesis 1*

Overall, both conflict parties are likely to agree to a subsequent mediation effort if the previous mediation effort did not result in an agreement. Through the previous mediation effort, both conflict parties have gathered additional information on the costs and benefits of mediation. Neither the government nor the rebel group had to pay unexpected costs, but instead benefitted from mediation in different ways. The government is likely to have realised that gathering private information on the rebel group during mediation efforts is possible, even if no agreement is reached. Hoping to gather further information on the rebel group, the government is likely to consider subsequent mediation onset beneficial. The same holds true for the rebel group, who seeks to gather additional information on the government's resolve to conflict, and its commitment to mediation. Through repeated interaction, i.e. consecutive mediation, the rebel group's status is fostered. The presented arguments are summarised in Table 2, and lead to the following hypothesis:

H1: *If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.*

Table 2. Summary of the argument on the impact of previous mediation ending without an agreement on subsequent mediation onset

Conflict party	Conflict parties' stance towards subsequent mediation onset	Likelihood of subsequent mediation onset
Government	+	+
Rebel group	+	

### 3.3.1.2 Previous Partial Mediation Success

After partially successful mediation efforts, both conflict parties are likely to engage in subsequent mediation. The information they have collected on the conflict management tool mediation during the previous mediation event confirmed the expected benefits of mediation, as *ex ante*, reaching agreements at the bargaining table is less costly than reaching agreements on the battlefield (Fearon 1995). Therefore, both conflict parties are likely to rank mediation high in their preference order again. Considering the opportunity costs for options that once were ranked higher, such as a return to violence, which is likely to be perceived negatively by the international community, and has proven to be more costly than reaching a settlement at the bargaining table, both conflict parties opt for mediation again.

To reach a partial agreement, each conflict actor must have shared a comparably high amount of private information during the previous mediation effort. As governments mostly hold less information on rebel groups than vice versa (Greig 2015), they are likely to consider gathering private information to be important. The engagement in subsequent talks promises receiving additional private information. Especially when taking part in a larger mediation effort, the government is likely to have built trust in the conflict management tool mediation and in the mediator's ability to encourage the rebel group to share private information. Though the government must have shared private information for reaching a partial agreement during the previous mediation effort, it nevertheless remained in control of the mediation outcome (Bercovitch 2011). Consequently, governments allocate the opportunity of gathering information on the rebel group to the

benefits that come along with mediation. As rebel groups generally hold more information on governments (Greig 2015), this argument holds true for rebel groups to a lesser extent.

While rebel groups are generally likely to engage in mediation, partial mediation success brings them closer to their political aims, and thus underlines the benefits of mediation. Particularly for non-state actors, concessions on aspects related to their political aims are vital (Clayton 2013). They are likely to have received concessions on their political aims if the previous agreement covered a wide range of topics (Joshi & Quinn 2015b). Especially if a mediator with leverage is engaged in the conflict, directive mediation might have been employed previously, and might be promised for a subsequent mediation event as well. Therefore, the rebel group is likely to hope for settlements the government might not have agreed to in bilateral negotiations. Consequently, especially if the conflict parties agreed to a larger process, the rebel group will appreciate a mediator's leverage, which seems to contribute greatly to the conflict parties reaching a political instead of a military solution.

The third party's ability to solve the credible commitment problem is underlined through partial agreements. With the previous agreement lasting, the mediator has been able to ensure that both conflict actors comply with the agreement terms. The government was rewarded for its decision to come to the bargaining table with a non-state actor. Its trust in the conflict management tool mediation increases, and it is likely to return to the mediation table to discuss outstanding issues, especially if the same third party remains engaged in the talks. The same holds true for the rebel group. Its security concerns are held at bay because the security guarantees included in the agreement seem to work, thus its trust in the mediator and its trust in conflict management tool mediation increases. Due to the government's commitment to the previously reached agreement, the rebel group is encouraged to return to the mediation table as well.

Furthermore, the rebel group's credentials of being a worthy negotiation partner are underlined in a more official manner if an agreement has been signed (Jo 2015). On the one hand, the rebel group seeks to consolidate this status by engaging in subsequent talks. On the other hand, the officially underlined status of the rebel group encourages the government to engage in further talks, as withdrawing the rebel group's legitimacy after an agreement has been signed becomes more costly, due to the international community's expectation of peaceful conflict resolution. Actors of the international community might

even threaten to withdraw e.g. aid payments if the conflict parties decide to abstain from further talks, and instead return to conflict. Thus, especially the government's BATNA would deteriorate if it decides to opt out of peace talks without e.g. all agenda items of a larger mediation process having been addressed.

The positive impact of previous partial mediation success is expected to be amplified with agreement comprehensiveness.<sup>30</sup> To reach a comparably comprehensive agreement, a higher amount of private information had to be exchanged. Reaching comparably comprehensive agreements is likely to underline the benefits of mediation, as through mediation, a wider range of policy issues was addressed (Joshi & Quinn 2015b). Moreover, more comprehensive agreements are likely to contain fear-reducing measures, such as third-party security guarantees, and cost-increasing measures, such as arbitration or troop withdrawal (Mattes 2008). With comprehensive agreements lasting, governments send costly signals when implementing the agreement, while rebel groups send costly signals when complying with settlement terms. Lasting agreements highlight the capability of mediation to produce working agreements. As both the government and particularly the rebel group are likely to have shared sensible information, which makes them more vulnerable, the benefits of credible security guarantees are highlighted. Hence, in the light of the private information and the commitment problem seemingly solved, both conflict parties are likely to evaluate the mediator's engagement as beneficial. The positive nature of mediation is particularly underlined by previous comprehensive agreements, as more information needed to be shared for the conflict parties to agree to a more comprehensive agreement, while the importance of security guarantees is reaffirmed. If a substantial amount of agreements has been reached, subsequent mediation onset might become unnecessary, though. The previous agreements might have already addressed all issues which needed to be accounted for through mediation.

### *Hypotheses 2a & 2b*

Governments and rebel groups are likely to opt for mediation again if the previous mediation effort was partially successful. The previous mediation effort producing a partial agreement has proven the mediator's capability of overcoming the credible commitment

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<sup>30</sup> Following Badran (2014) and Joshi and Quinn (2015b), agreements are considered more comprehensive the higher the number of provisions included in an agreement is.

problem and the private information problem. Moreover, particularly the government is unwilling to write off the costs paid so far as sunk costs. These effects are amplified with increasing agreement comprehensiveness, and hold the conflict parties at the mediation table. The presented arguments are summarised in Table 3 and the following hypotheses are derived:

*H2a: If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation onset is likely.*

*H2b: The more comprehensive the previous partial agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation onset.*

Table 3. Summary of the argument on the impact of previous partial mediation success on subsequent mediation onset

Conflict party	Conflict parties' stance towards subsequent mediation onset	Likelihood of subsequent mediation onset
Government	+	+
Rebel group	+	

3.3.1.3 Previously Reneged on Mediated Agreement

‘In civil wars, it is highly unlikely that either side would choose *not* to cheat if given the chance. Since everyone’s first preference is likely to be unilateral victory (and this preference is common knowledge), any attempt to signal otherwise will be disbelieved’ (Walter 2002: 25).

However, mediation promises to address the credible commitment problem as third parties are able to provide security guarantees. Trusting in the third parties’ capabilities to provide security guarantees, the conflict parties share private information. Yet, while an agreement might seem feasible in the presence of a third party, doubts about an agreement’s content might arise with the third party’s influence waning due to the time-inconsistency problem (Beardsley 2008). Though the private information problem seemed solved in the presence of the mediator, it might become apparent that it had not been resolved adequately during the implementation phase (Findley 2013). The cost-increasing measures included in the previous agreement were not sufficient. Ultimately, the private information shared is misused, and the previously reached mediated agreement is reneged on. Though both conflict parties are likely to blame each other for the collapse of an agreement, it is

worthwhile to theoretically differentiate between whether the rebel group or the government reneged on an agreement, as the reasoning behind the conclusions both actors draw is expected to differ, depending on who reneged on an agreement and which actor is in focus. However, regardless which side reneged, subsequent mediation onset is always less likely.

The negative impact of reneged on mediated agreements is likely to be underlined with agreement comprehensiveness. To reach comprehensive agreements, a high amount of private information needed to be exchanged, which was relatively costly for the conflict parties. With the previous agreement being reneged on, the costs of sharing private information were spent in vain. On top of that, the shared private information might have been misused when the agreement was reneged on. The hazards of the private information problem are strongly pointed out and the persistence of the credible commitment problem is highlighted. Thus, especially comprehensive agreements point towards the inability of mediators to solve the private information and the credible commitment problem.

*The Conflict Parties' Willingness to Engage in Subsequent Mediation after the Government Has Reneged on an Agreement*

Governments are unlikely to agree to a subsequent mediation event if they have reneged on an agreement. Though they might have considered the agreement beneficial in the presence of the third party, time-inconsistency problems might have arisen once mediation ended and the third party's presence waned (Beardsley 2008). After re-evaluating the information gathered during the previous mediation effort, the BATNA, i.e. continued conflict, seems preferable to the government. Contrasting its strength with the strength of the rebel group, the government might perceive the concessions made unnecessary, as it has the impression that the reached agreement does not mirror the power distribution in the dyad – instead, the rebel group gained too much (Fortna 2004b). The government reneged on the previously reached agreement, and pursued a military solution to the conflict.

If governments renege, they are not only likely to have gathered information on the relative distribution of strength in the dyad, but also on the costs and benefits of reneging, and on subsequent mediation. Costs they expect if they engage in mediation again are an increase in international pressure on their commitment to peaceful conflict management, and

demands for signing an agreement they this time comply with being underlined. Besides, governments might fear the mediator developing a bias towards the rebel group due to the reneged on agreement. Especially if the third party has leverage over the conflict parties, it might be able to stretch the government's reservation point, and thereby push it towards agreements the government does not want to sign. Moreover, as the reneged on agreement has highlighted the peril of the government reneging, the mediator is likely to ensure the inclusion of stronger security guarantees into possible future agreements, thereby closing possible doors to exit agreements, which is perceived as very costly by the government. Hence, the costs of subsequent mediation onset after the government has reneged on an agreement seem to be too high from the government's perspective. It is likely to opt against engaging in further talks.

The rebel group, on the other hand, is still likely to show an interest in subsequent mediation, hoping for the mediator's protection and good faith, as it was the government that reneged on the previous agreement (Svensson 2007a), while the mediator's security guarantees were insufficient. Yet, within the rebel group, voices of hardliners are likely to become louder, and questions of the value of mediation are likely to be asked with more vigour (Vüllers & Destradi 2013 on failed mediation). Since even supporters of mediation within the rebel group are likely to trust the mediator to a lesser extent than before, questioning the third party's capacity to provide credible security guarantees, rebel groups might try to embrace hardliners by arguing that subsequent mediation can be used for pursuing 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998). Though the expectation that mediation contributing to reaching a political solution is strongly reduced, rebel groups perceive mediation as beneficial despite the government reneging, because mediation provides them with e.g. an international stage on which they can voice their political aims (Cunningham et al. 2009).

Governments might only consider engaging in subsequent mediation onset if they reneged on an agreement of low comprehensiveness. In this case, they might have wanted to highlight their strength and capability to threaten the rebel group, thereby marking territory, and forcing the rebel group to share information for making progress during the subsequent mediation event. Moreover, a government reneging on an agreement of low comprehensiveness might have wanted to underline the third party's inability of intervening effectively into the internal matters of its country. By engaging in subsequent

talks, governments might want to signal their willingness to cooperate to the international community, while highlighting their independence and their status of being the sole legitimate actor to use force inside the country they govern. Thus, the government might renege on agreements of lower comprehensiveness to send a signal to the international community and to the rebel group, while considering subsequent talks.

The negative effect of renege on mediated agreements is more pronounced if agreements with higher comprehensiveness are renege on. The government's trust in the third party's ability to produce agreements which mirror the power distribution in the dyad is reduced. Moreover, implementing agreements that address a wide range of policy issues is very costly if the agreement does not mirror the power distribution in the dyad. Since the government expects the third party to try to reduce the government's leeway during subsequent talks, thereby reducing the extent to which it is in control of the subsequent mediation effort's outcome, one crucial benefit of mediation relinquishes. The government might fear that a subsequent agreement, which it does not want to sign, might be brokered. As the government expects the costs of mediation to increase, after it has renege on a comprehensive agreement, it is unlikely to agree to subsequent mediation onset.

Overall, governments are unlikely to engage in subsequent talks if they have renege on the previous agreement. Instead, they will opt for other conflict management tool. Only when the rebel group poses a substantial threat to the government, or if the conflict context changes, highlighting the inevitable necessity for mediation again, does the government consider re-negotiations. Rebel groups will remain interested in mediation, despite the government renege on a previously mediated agreement, as the benefits of mediation still outweigh the costs of it. As both conflict parties need to agree to subsequent mediation onset though, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely if the government has renege on an agreement. This effect is pronounced with increasing agreement comprehensiveness.

*The Conflict Parties' Willingness to Engage in Subsequent Mediation after the Rebel Group Has Reneged on an Agreement*

If the rebel group has renege on the agreement, the government is highly unlikely to agree to subsequent mediation. It renege has provided certainty for the government that the rebel group is an illegitimate, untrustworthy actor, with whom bargains cannot be struck

appropriately, as the rebel group does not credibly commit to them. Thus, the rebel group's reputation is damaged (Addison & Murshed 2002). As a consequence, the government is likely to deprive the rebel group of its previously endowed legitimacy by highlighting the rebel group's criminal nature and the impossibility of conducting serious talks with rebels. Rebel groups reneging thus re-establish the hurdle towards subsequent mediation onset, and substantially increase the costs that come along with subsequent mediation for governments.

Moreover, the expected benefits of mediation were not met from the government's perspective, as the security guarantees provided by the third party to overcome the commitment problem were not credible. The benefits the government expected to receive from allowing a third party to interfere into its domestic affairs did not pay off. Hence, the government is likely to use the private information on the rebel group gained through the previous talks to its advantage during continued conflict. It may argue for the necessity of third parties to provide other kinds of support for the fight against the rebel group, as mediation obviously did not contribute to conflict resolution, but instead allowed the rebel group to use the talks for pursuing 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998). This is expected to hold particularly true if more comprehensive agreements are reneged on. Though exiting larger mediation processes might be more difficult than exiting smaller processes due to the expectations of the international community, governments might use the reneged on agreement as a justification for more forceful third-party support against the rebel group. Besides, they might turn a blind eye towards rebel groups reneging on agreements that are not too complex, if they still consider mediation as more beneficial than continued conflict.

Meanwhile, rebel groups are likely to show a particular interest in re-negotiations if they have reneged on the previous agreement (Svensson 2007a; Cunningham et al. 2009). By reneging, rebel groups seek to signal their strength through sharing additional private information on the battlefield. They expect this information to be accounted for in subsequent mediation. Though reneging on an agreement might push the third party towards the government, rebel groups do not consider a government-biased mediator as too problematic, because they cannot be forced to agree to a proposed settlement (Bercovitch 2011; Svensson 2007a).

Nevertheless, the more comprehensive the reneged on agreement was, the more hardliners within the government see their stance against mediation supported. Hence, voices for fostering a military solution, potentially with third-party support, become louder, and the standing of mediation supporters within the government is likely to be challenged. Unless the rebel group is relatively strong, and the international community clearly rejects other conflict management methods, subsequent mediation does not set on, especially not if the previously reneged on agreement was rather comprehensive. Instead, other conflict management tools than mediation are likely to be ranked higher in the government's preference order than mediation, though the rebel group is still likely to consider it a viable option. Since both rebel group and government have to agree to subsequent mediation for it to set on, it is unlikely that subsequent talks are observed. This effect is expected to be more pronounced if an increasing number of agreements was reneged on, because over time the conflict parties gather information on each other's credibility (Addison & Murshed 2002) and the mediator's capability of implementing security guarantees.

*Hypotheses 3a & 3b*

By distinguishing between the two conflict actors, it has become apparent that governments are unlikely to agree to subsequent mediation onset: regardless of which side reneged on the previous agreement, governments are likely to opt for a return to the battlefield to defeat the rebel group militarily after a mediated agreement has been reneged on. Governments only agree to a return to the mediation table if the rebel group is relatively stronger than them, as mediation promises a positive-sum solution, and, if agreements are lasting, allows for a less costly exchange of information than continued conflict. On the other hand, rebel groups are still likely to consider mediation to be a preferable conflict management tool, because it holds benefits such as legitimacy, an international audience, and the promise of a political solution to the conflict. However, as both parties need to agree to mediation for it to set on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely. This argument is summarised in Table 4, and leads to the following hypothesis:

*H3a: If a previously reached mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely.*

Though even ‘the termination of a ceasefire is commonly seen as a breach of faith, and is likely to be followed by a severe confidence crisis’ (Höglund 2008: 177), the termination of more comprehensive agreements is likely to have more severe consequences. Particularly agreements of high comprehensiveness being reneged on challenge the third party’s ability of ensuring both conflict actors’ credible commitment to future mediation and agreements. More sensible information had been exchanged to reach a comprehensive agreement. Yet, this information has been misused by one of the conflict party that reneged on the mediated agreement. Furthermore, not even the cost-increasing measures included in the agreement seemed to have had an effect. Hence, the negative impact of reneged on agreements on the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset is expected to be underlined by increasingly comprehensive reneged on agreements. This expectation is summarised in the following hypothesis:

*H3b: The more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation onset.*

Table 4. Summary of the argument on the impact of previously reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset

Conflict parties	Conflict parties’ stance towards subsequent mediation onset	Likelihood of subsequent mediation onset
Government (after government reneged)	-	-
Rebel group (after government reneged)	+	
Government (after rebel group reneged)	-	-
Rebel group (after government reneged)	+	

#### 3.3.1.4 The Timing of Subsequent Mediation Onset

The amount of time which passes between a previous mediation effort and subsequent mediation onset is likely to be influenced by the previous mediation outcome. Though the previous mediation outcome does not influence the amount of time third parties take to intervene (Melin 2011), it is likely to influence the amount of time the conflict parties take for their decision to engage in subsequent talks. The extent to which the conflict parties ascribe costs and benefits to mediation is influenced by the previous mediation outcome, as

discussed in the previous subchapters. The conclusions drawn from the arguments presented in the previous subchapters are expected to be reflected in the amount of time that passes between a mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset. Thus, it is expected that the more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation, the less time has to pass until subsequent mediation onset is observed.

Based on the costs and benefits that come along with mediation, mediation is viewed most positively if the previous mediation effort produced a partial agreement. The decision to spend resources on engaging in mediation was rewarded with an exchange of private information, due to which a ZoA, within which the previous partial agreement lies, was identified. As the previous partial agreement lasts, the commitment problem seems to have been resolved, which is particularly relevant for rebel groups (Walter 2002). Moreover, the time-inconsistency problem did not arise, suggesting that both conflict parties decided to comply with the agreement terms, even when re-evaluating the private information received during the previous mediation effort in the aftermath of the previous mediation effort. Hence, mediation holds crucial benefits, and a timely engagement in subsequent mediation to discuss remaining conflict issues seems to be sensible to both conflict parties if the previous mediation effort produced a partial agreement.

If mediation did not produce an agreement, it is likely to be evaluated positively as well, though its benefits are not underlined as clearly as after partial mediation success. While some private information has been exchanged, which is especially crucial for the government as it mostly holds less knowledge on the rebel group's capabilities than vice versa (Greig 2015), not enough information for reaching an agreement was shared. Furthermore, the credible commitment problem was not overcome. This might encourage hardliners to question the effectiveness of mediation. Yet, as the previous mediation effort did not push the conflict parties to an agreement, hardliners might be calmed by supporters of mediation, who are likely to underline the voluntary nature of the process. These notions suggest that the decision to engage in subsequent talks takes more time after mediation did not produce an agreement than after partial mediation success, as the benefits of engaging in mediation are not as strongly highlighted. Though more time has to pass if mediation did not produce an agreement in comparison to previous partial mediation success, subsequent mediation is likely to set on eventually – without the conflict context having to change.

For the conflict parties to engage in mediation again after an agreement was reneged on, more time has to pass than after any of the other mediation outcomes, as reneged on mediated agreements sour the atmosphere between the disputants (Zartman 1995b). As argued above (chapter 3.3.1.3), governments are unlikely to engage in subsequent mediation, regardless of which side reneged on a previously mediated agreement. However, with time passing, circumstances and preferences might change (Parsons 2005). Particularly with changes in the conflict context, the government might consider mediation again: if the conflict costs increase, but military victory remains unlikely, mediation is likely to become a suitable conflict management tool for the government again. Besides, reneged on mediated agreements might also have an impact on the rebel group's readiness for talks. Though they are generally more likely to engage in mediation, they might need more time to convince hardliners of the benefits of mediation after an agreement has been reneged on. Hence, while subsequent mediation onset is generally unlikely if an agreement was reneged on, with the conflict context demanding for subsequent mediation onset, a subsequent mediation effort might be observed eventually. However, more time is expected to pass between a reneged on mediated agreement and subsequent mediation onset than after any of the other mediation outcomes, because reneged on mediated agreements underline the costs of mediation.

#### *Hypothesis 4*


The benefits of mediation quickly pull the conflict parties to the mediation table if a partial agreement is reached during the previous mediation effort. If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, this pull is still present, but less pronounced, and therefore more time passes until subsequent mediation sets on. If a mediated agreement was reneged on, rebel groups are still likely to be pulled to the mediation table. Since governments refrain from engaging in subsequent talks in these cases, the conflict costs need to increase again before the government considers subsequent mediation onset to be beneficial. Hence, most time might pass between reneged on agreements and subsequent mediation onset. Thus, overall, the amount of costs and benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation, based on the previous mediation outcome, is mirrored in the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on. This is formulated in the following hypothesis:

*H4: The more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation as a conflict management tool, the less time has to pass until it sets on again.*

3.3.1.5 Preliminary Conclusion on Subsequent Mediation Onset

The previous subchapters have outlined the impact previous mediation outcomes have on the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset. It became clear that distinguishing between the impact previous mediation outcomes have on the government and the impact these outcomes have on rebel groups is worthwhile. The consequences of the cost-benefit calculations each conflict party conducts with regard to subsequent mediation onset are summarised in Illustration 1.

Illustration 1. Subsequent mediation onset



*Source: own illustration*

Assuming that the conflict parties are (boundedly) rational actors, subsequent mediation onset is likely after mediation produced a partial agreement or ended without an agreement. These outcomes point out the benefits of mediation to both conflict parties, and they agree to subsequent mediation onset. However, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely after a mediated agreement has been reneged on, as reneged on agreements underline the costs of mediation – especially to the government.

These conclusions are also reflected in the amount of time which passes between the different mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset. With more benefits ascribed

to mediation, the conflict parties come to the conclusion that subsequent mediation onset is the preferred option to take within a short time. With fewer benefits and more costs ascribed to mediation, the conflict context needs to change before the conflict parties consider engaging in subsequent mediation onset beneficial again. Hence, more time has to pass until subsequent mediation sets on again. But if mediation does set on, which impact do previous mediation outcomes have on the success of subsequent mediation efforts?

### ***3.3.2 Subsequent Mediation Success***

Given the onset of subsequent mediation, it needs to be scrutinised whether previous mediation has an impact on subsequent mediation success. For mediators to draft an agreement both conflict parties are likely to sign and implement, a bargain that lies within the ZoA needs to be identified. For this, the sharing of private information is inevitable. Assuming that both conflict parties are rational actors who seek to strike the bargain best for them, withholding and misrepresenting private information is highly likely (Fearon 1995; Walter 2002). The decision on which private information to share is based on cost-benefit calculations. Accounted for in the calculation on whether to share private information is the extent to which the commitment problem seems to be overcome. This is indicated by the previous mediation outcome. A mediated agreement lasting implies that the commitment problem was addressed successfully. If no agreement was reached, the commitment problem is prevailing. If an agreement was reneged on, the commitment problem is strongly underlined. Taking these notions into account, the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation success is addressed in this subchapter.

#### **3.3.2.1 Previous Mediation Did Not Produce an Agreement**

A certain amount of mediation ending without an agreement might be unavoidable, because the disputants are unlikely to reach agreements with ease due to the rifts that were created during the conflict (Heldt 2009; Hewitt et al. 2012).<sup>31</sup> However, through mediation ending without agreements, information was exchanged, and norms of interaction were

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<sup>31</sup> Böhmelt (2013: 211 on interstate conflicts) notes that mediation success is likely after the same third party has mediated between nine and eleven times. If different third parties mediate, it is only likely to be successful after 20 mediation efforts have taken place.

established (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006). Though the exchanged information was not sufficient for reaching an agreement, it may eventually pave the way for subsequent mediation success (Regan & Stam 2000; Böhmelt 2013). Especially when embedded in a larger process, mediators are likely to draw on previously exchanged information (Böhmelt 2013).

Nevertheless, the previous mediation effort not producing an agreement showed the mediator's inability of adequately addressing the credible commitment problem. Yet, the mediator is likely to remain involved, underlining the desire to reach an end to the conflict. In fact, the third party is likely to have taken note of the negative impact of the continued presence of the credible commitment problem, especially on the more vulnerable rebel group (Walter 1997). Seeking to reach an agreement in subsequent mediation, third parties are hence likely to actively work towards reducing the credible commitment problem. Thereby, they seek to encourage the conflict parties to share private information, which, in turn, increases the level of trust the conflict parties have in the mediator, who is able to highlight the progress that is made when private information is shared. Moreover, mediators are likely to make use of their leverage, thus setting incentives for the conflict parties to share additional private information. Hence, despite the fact that both conflict parties are likely to bargain hard, seeking to hold a strategic advantage over their opponent, they are likely to share private information eventually.

Though the previous mediation effort not ending in an agreement did not reward the conflict parties for their previous engagement in talks, it also did not punish them. Thus, while mediation not producing an agreement does not strongly underline the benefits of sharing private information, it does not highlight any new costs of it either. The costs the credible commitment problem entails remain expected costs. If the third party manages to reduce the credible commitment problem, and to set incentives for sharing private information, the expected benefits of sharing private information are likely to outweigh the expected costs of it. Thus, subsequent mediation success is likely if the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement.

*Hypothesis 5*

Table 5 summarises the argument on how previous mediation ending without an agreement influences subsequent mediation success. With increasing trust in the mediator, due to the mediator’s continued commitment, the conflict parties are likely to share relevant private information during subsequent talks, as the benefits of sharing private information seem to outweigh the costs. This increases the likelihood of subsequent mediation success. Based on these notions, the following hypothesis is derived:

*H5: If the previous mediation effort ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation success is likely.*

Table 5. Summary of the argument on the impact of previous mediation ending without an agreement on subsequent mediation success

Conflict party	Conflict parties’ stance towards sharing private information	Likelihood of subsequent mediation success
Government	+	+
Rebel group	+	

3.3.2.2 Previous Partial Mediation Success

If the previous mediation event was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is also likely. To the conflict parties, the commitment problem seems to be solved and sharing private information worthwhile, as they are rewarded with agreements. The previous mediation effort has contributed to a change in the conflict parties’ relationship and in the relationship between the mediator and the conflict parties. The benefits of sharing private information at the mediation table, instead of on the battlefield, are underlined through the previous mediation outcome, which has highlighted mediation as a cost-efficient method of exchanging information, and, through exchanging information, reaching an agreement.

The actors engaging in subsequent mediation efforts are likely to build up on the private information shared during the previous mediation effort. Mediators are likely to tie subsequent talks neatly to the aspects exchanged during the previous mediation effort, underlining the progress that has been made. As the conflict parties are likely to be aware of the extent to which information exchanged in previous talks is used now, the benefits of

the previously shared information are not only underlined by the previous partial agreement, but also by the extent to which this information benefits progress during subsequent mediation. Mediators are likely to link issues discussed during previous talks to topics discussed during subsequent talks. These issue linkages are particularly likely to be noted if the previous agreement was more comprehensive, expecting that a wider range of topics has been discussed during previous talks.

Moreover, the lasting previous partial agreement underlines the third party's capability of reducing the commitment problem: neither the government nor the rebel group was able to misuse the previously shared private information by reneging on the previously reached agreement. Thus, the conflict parties' willingness of signing an agreement increases with previous agreements lasting. Besides, by committing to the previous agreement, the conflict parties send costly signals to each other, which are considered during subsequent mediation events. These effects are likely to be underlined by increasingly comprehensive agreements, as with more comprehensive agreements signed, the costs of the signals sent increase for the sender.

With agreements reached through mediation, both conflict parties' BATNAs become less attractive. This holds true even more when a more comprehensive agreement has been reached. On the one hand, especially governments are likely to be exposed to the expectation of internal and external actors to reach further agreements. The international community and the domestic society are likely to mount pressure on the government, diminishing its ability to walk away from talks without signing further agreements. Besides, with signing an agreement, the rebel group has been legitimised in a more official manner (Jo 2015). Striking subsequent bargains is therefore less costly. On the other hand, the rebel group is likely to seek addressing additional political aims in further agreements, especially once an agreement has been reached. Thus, while both conflict actors are still likely to bargaining hard, seeking to retain as much private information as possible, both also have strong incentives to share additional private information, as this provides for subsequent mediation success.

Especially once an agreement of higher comprehensiveness has been reached, working towards a subsequent agreement is sensible for the conflict parties. Though sharing private information becomes more perilous the more comprehensive the potential agreement is the

rewards also increase: agreements addressing a wider range of policy goals can be brokered, and eventually an agreement which ends the conflict might be reached. Particularly working security guarantees, which are likely to be included in a more comprehensive previous agreement, encourage the rebel group to share additional private information. Thus, subsequent mediation success is especially likely if the previous agreement was comparably comprehensive.

*Hypotheses 6a & 6b*

Previous partial mediation success underlines that mediation is a more cost-efficient way of exchanging private information than information exchanges on the battlefield. Moreover, the capability of the mediator to provide security guarantees which reduce the credible commitment problem highlighted the utility of mediation. Both conflict actors having made steps towards their political aims through private information sharing encourages them to consider sharing additional private information worthwhile, particularly if the previous partial agreement was rather comprehensive, as these agreements suggest that ending the conflict on terms acceptable to both sides is possible. With more private information shared the likelihood of subsequent mediation success increases. This argument is summarised in Table 6. Based on it, the following two hypotheses are derived:

*H6a: If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is likely.*

*H6b: The more comprehensive the previous agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation success.*

Table 6. Summary of the argument on the impact of previous partial mediation success on subsequent mediation success

Conflict party	Conflict parties' stance towards sharing private information	Likelihood of subsequent mediation success
Government	+	+
Rebel group	+	

### 3.3.2.3 Previously Reneged on Mediated Agreements

If mediation sets on despite the previous agreement being reneged on, neither side will share private information. Instead, the mediator has to convince the conflict actors that the credible commitment problem can be solved anew, though the previous agreement being reneged on points towards the opposite. Since this is going to be challenging, and the trust the conflict parties might have started to build up previously has been severely shuttered through the reneged on agreement, it is unlikely that a sufficient amount of private information for reaching an agreement is going to be shared. This effect is likely to increase the more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was, as more comprehensive agreements being reneged on are likely to have a more damaging impact.

#### *The Conflict Parties' Willingness to Share Private Information after the Government Has Reneged on an Agreement*

If mediation sets on despite governments having reneged on an agreement, governments are unlikely to share private information again. Instead, they are likely to underline that the previous bargain did not match the power distribution in the dyad, and demand for a more fitting agreement as well as additional private information on the rebel group. Especially if governments reneged on comprehensive agreements, they are likely to be convinced of their abilities to win the conflict militarily, as they are likely to have gathered this knowledge during the talks on the previously reached, more comprehensive agreement.

Moreover, the previous mediation effort showed how mediators can utilise information to draft agreements the government cannot, or does not want to, commit to. Thus, the government is even less likely to share private information during subsequent talks. Withholding information in subsequent mediation efforts is rational from the government's perspective, as it prevents it from being pushed towards directions it does not want to take, or raise expectations it is unable to fulfil, especially since it might be convinced of its relative strength. Thus, though the government agreed to subsequent mediation onset, possibly due to pressure from the international community, it is unlikely to commit to the peace process wholeheartedly. It will refrain from sharing private information.

Rebel groups are going to consider their fears with regard to governments making use of information they have shared confirmed. They are likely to perceive the government

reneging on an agreement as a breach of faith, interpreting its behaviour as a rather low commitment to the peace process. As the commitment problem is particularly pronounced for rebel groups (Walter 1997), they are likely to worry about their own security after the government has misused their previously shared private information. Thus, in the subsequent mediation effort, the rebel group is going to expect the mediator to not ask too much information of it, but instead use sticks and carrots on the government. Again, this information is unlikely to be sufficient for the mediator to identify a ZoA within which a peace agreement can be designed.

*The Conflict Parties' Willingness to Share Private Information after the Rebel Group Has Reneged on an Agreement*

If the rebel group reneged on a previously mediated agreement, the government is going to expect the mediator to take sides. By underlining the criminal nature of the rebel group, the government is likely to engage in mediation to sound out other conflict management options, but not to reach an agreement. After all, the rebel group does not seem to truly commit to the peace talks. Furthermore, the government does not want to be viewed as susceptible to pressure, and therefore will not give in to the rebel group's use of force. It is highly likely to stand firm, and thus to not share private information.

By reneging, the rebel group might have wanted to underline its strength in order to derive concessions from the government (Svensson 2007a; Pospieszna & DeRouen 2016). It is likely to stand strong on the notions which contributed to it reneging. If other issues are negotiated, it might consider sharing information, though only if it is under the impression that the government is sharing information to an adequate amount as well – considering it has recently underlined its strength on the battlefield. Moreover, the rebel group might have reneged out of security concerns, which the third party needs to address in subsequent talks. Until these concerns are addressed, the rebel group is likely to refrain from sharing private information. With both conflict parties standing firm, identifying a ZoA is likely to be difficult for the mediator. Consequently, subsequent mediation success is unlikely if the rebel group reneged on an agreement.

These notions are expected to be strongly underlined by agreements with a higher degree of comprehensiveness. The costs of sharing private information are highlighted, and the

inability of the mediator to provide working security guarantees is pointed out. Thus, if mediation sets on again, neither the rebel group nor the government is likely to share private information – especially not if agreements with higher comprehensiveness are reneged on. While this effect is expected to increase with a growing number of agreements being reneged on, it is expected to reduce if subsequent mediation takes place in the context of a larger process. Overall, subsequent mediation success is unlikely if the rebel group reneged on an agreement.

*Hypotheses 7a & 7b*

Both conflict parties are likely to stand firm, regardless which side reneged, though they have different reasons for it. Overall, a previously reneged on mediated agreement underlines the costs of sharing private information, as reneged on agreements reconfirm the likelihood of private information being misused. What would be necessary instead of cheap talk during a mediation effort following a reneged on mediated agreement are costly signals. However, they are unlikely to be sent during the mediation event following the reneged on agreement, because each conflict party expects any shared information to be misused. The presented arguments are summarised in Table 7. It becomes apparent that the conflict parties' likelihood of sharing private information to a degree sufficient for subsequent mediation success is reduced after an agreement has been reneged on.

With increasing agreement comprehensiveness, the credible commitment problem is strongly underlined, as the utility of reneging on an agreement, and using the private information shared, multiplies. The trustworthiness of the other side's resolve to use the shared information for peace only – especially as during civil wars, both sides expect the other to renege (Walter 2002) – is questioned to an even greater extent than before. Thus, if a comprehensive agreement is reneged on, both conflict parties are even more likely to refrain from sharing information in the future. Since sharing information is necessary for identifying ZoAs, and ultimately, for designing agreements both conflict actors can commit to, subsequent mediation success becomes less likely the more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was. Based on the outlined arguments, the following hypotheses are derived:

*H7a: If a previously reached agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.*

*H7b: The more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation success.*

Table 7. Summary of the argument on the impact of previously reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation success


Conflict party	Conflict parties' stance towards sharing private information	Likelihood of subsequent mediation success
Government (after government reneged)	-	-
Rebel group (after government reneged)	-	-
Government (after rebel group reneged)	-	-
Rebel group (after rebel group reneged)	-	-

#### 3.3.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion on Subsequent Mediation Success

It has become apparent that previous mediation outcomes do not only influence subsequent mediation onset, but also subsequent mediation success. Hence, mediation outcomes, as the shadow of the past, weigh heavily on future mediation efforts. They either confirm the solution of the credible commitment problem, and thus encourage the conflict parties to share additional private information, or strongly underline the perils of sharing private information, and thereby hinder subsequent mediation success.

Illustration 2 summarises the consequences of the presented arguments with regard to subsequent mediation success: subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are likely after mediation did not produce an agreement, just like after partial mediation success. However, subsequent mediation onset and its success are unlikely if a previously reached agreement was reneged on. These notions are more pronounced the more comprehensive the previously reached or reneged on agreement was.

Illustration 2. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success



Source: own illustration

### 3.4 Summary of Key Arguments

The theory chapter provides first answers to the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Assuming that the conflict parties are boundedly rational actors, who take into account recently gathered information for their cost-benefit calculations, it became clear that previous mediation outcomes have a divergent impact on subsequent mediation onset and success. Based on bargaining theory, testable hypotheses were derived from the presented argument. They are summarised in Table 8. Hypotheses 1 to 4 are on subsequent mediation onset, hypotheses 5 to 7 are on subsequent mediation success. They are tested in chapter 5 and 6.

All in all, the outlined argument highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the impact different mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Partial mediation success and mediation which did not produce an agreement can be considered as more beneficial for the continuation of mediation than reneged on agreements. Subsequent mediation success is expected to be more likely after the previous mediation effort produced a partial agreement or ended without an agreement. After a mediated agreement has been reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely. In sum, the presented arguments suggest that pushing the conflict parties towards

agreements they cannot, or do not want to implement, comes along with severe consequences for future mediation efforts.

Table 8. Hypotheses

H1	If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.
H2a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation onset is likely.
H2b	The more comprehensive the previous partial agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation onset.
H3a	If a previously reached mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely.
H3b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation onset.
H4	The more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation as a conflict management tool, the less time has to pass until it sets on again.
H5	If the previous mediation effort ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation success is likely.
H6a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is likely.
H6b	The more comprehensive the previous agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation success.
H7a	If a previously reached agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.
H7b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation success.

## 4 Methodology

Scholars have highlighted the benefits of both quantitative and qualitative research (e.g. Clayton 2014), especially when one source of data or analysis seems to be insufficient for adequately addressing a research question (Bryman 2008; Creswell & Clark 2011). The formative period of mixed methods research dates back to the 1950s (Creswell & Clark 2011), and at times, mixed methods research was described as a ‘third paradigm’ (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004: 15). The aim of mixed methods research is to further explain the findings derived with one method by mixing methods. Moreover, mixing methods increases the validity of the results – and if not the validity, then at least the credibility (Bryman 2008). Particularly in mediation research, mixing methods is helpful: case studies contribute to shedding light onto the process of mediation, while large-n studies assist in more general hypothesis-testing (Walton 2014).

There are different approaches to mixing methods. Most importantly, when mixing methods, researchers seek to address the same research question with different methods, while intertwining the results of the different approaches (Creswell 2014). Lieberman (2005) describes a systematic approach of mixing methods when he introduces nested analysis as a mixed methods approach. This concept is drawn on in the following for theory testing, as it is a compelling, systematic instruction for conducting quantitative and qualitative research.<sup>32</sup>

Overall, mixing methods is considered beneficial for this research project, as the results of both quantitative and qualitative analysis provide different insights on a topic which has not yet been researched on much. When mixing methods, the results of the statistical analysis are combined with the in-depth analysis of one or more cases contained within the larger sample (Lieberman 2005: 435–436). The statistical analysis shows the correlation of variables and can be generalised to a certain extent. While the results of the qualitative analysis cannot be generalised, the in-depth analysis of single cases, e.g. through process tracing as in this project, allows for an understanding of the causal mechanisms at play, and thereby might shed additional light onto aspects which had been neglected in the

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<sup>32</sup> As the following analyses set out to test the theoretical argument derived in chapter 3, nested analysis as a mixed methods approach with regard to theory testing is described in the following. Nested-analysis for model-building is only accounted for to the extent necessary for this project.

previous quantitative analysis (Creswell & Clark 2011: 8; Bennett & Checkel 2015: 20). The results of this research project are used to (dis-)confirm the validity of the theoretical argument (King et al. 1994: 100) presented in chapter 3.

#### **4.1 Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Methods Approach**

When mixing methods, the two analyses do not stand separate from each other. Instead, the results of both large-N (LNA) and small-N analysis (SNA) are supposed to inform and complement each other. The LNA allows for a comparably easy testing of alternative explanations. It provides guidance for the case selection of the SNA, while the SNA can improve the quality of the measurement of the variables and the model specification of the LNA, if an iterative process becomes necessary due to insufficient LNA results (Lieberman 2005: 436).

Contrarily to other mixed-methods approaches, e.g. the exploratory sequential design discussed by Creswell (2014), Lieberman (2005) suggests to always conduct the LNA before the SNA to test the robustness of the specified model. Depending on the results, the SNA is conducted to further build a model, or to further test the already established model. If the model was already robust in the LNA, and the SNA did not provide further crucial insights, the cycle of analysis ends. Otherwise, the insights from the SNA are used for anew LNA. This approach resembles the explanatory sequential design discussed by Creswell and Clark (2011) to a certain extent. Nevertheless, Lieberman's (2005) approach is followed in this project, because it recommends an iterative process if the results of the LNA are not robust, which the explanatory design does not provide for. Lieberman's (2005) approach therefore allows for intertwining quantitative and qualitative analysis to a greater extent.

'[T]he preliminary LNA can be understood as a more conventional hypothesis-testing analysis' (Lieberman 2005: 436), if the developed theory, the derived hypotheses, and the quality of the available data are comparably good. To be able to adequately test a theory, one 'should avoid the insertion of any control variables that do not have a clear theoretical justification [...]. Such variables are likely to soak up some of the cross-country variance, leaving less to be explained in the SNA, [...] [which they] weigh against the nested approach' (Lieberman 2005: 436). By conducting the SNA, the researcher seeks to address

questions which remained unanswered after the LNA, especially questions of causality. The SNA allows for an analysis of the causal order of events.<sup>33</sup> If the results of the LNA are not robust, the SNA works more towards model-building. Variables identified as crucial for the outcome in the SNA, which have not been accounted for in the LNA, are fed back into the statistical analysis (Lieberman 2005: 441–442).

The case for the SNA is selected in light of the previously conducted LNA. If the results of the LNA were robust, a case that is ‘on the line’, and thus well predicted, should be elected, because the purpose of the SNA is ‘to assess the strength of a particular [theoretical] model’ (Lieberman 2005: 444). Its aim is to assess whether the causal order of events outlined in the theoretical argument is true. If the results of the LNA are not robust, the SNA can contribute to model-building and the iterative process starts (Liebermann 2005: 443).

If results of the SNA do not support the theoretical argument, it needs to be scrutinised why that is the case. Do rare events determine the outcome but are only valid for this case? Have certain variables in the LNA been measured incorrectly? In these cases, the theoretical model is still assumed to be valid. If the SNA highlighted theoretical flaws which were not apparent after the statistical tests, what set out as theory-testing turns towards model (re-) building (Lieberman 2005: 444).

### 4.2 Research Design for the Large-N Analysis

Two datasets build the crucial basis for this research. With regard to mediation, the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) in Africa (Melander & von Uexkull 2011) dataset is drawn on. It is limited to third-party interventions in African intrastate conflicts between 1993 and 2007, and allows for a differentiation between third-party measures that include both or only one conflict party as well as third-party measures which take place face-to-face or indirect.<sup>34</sup> In general, the advantage of the MIC Africa dataset is the high level of

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<sup>33</sup> Lieberman (2005: 441) suggests conducting at least two case studies. This suggestion is deviated from in the following as only one case study is conducted. This is not considered to cause problems since also single case studies can provide valuable insights for theory-testing (Ulriksen & Dadalauri 2015: 228).

<sup>34</sup> Third party measures which address only one conflict party are e.g. bilateral talks between the third party and one of the conflict parties. These are excluded, since, according to the MIC Africa dataset, no reason to believe that the third party shared the information with the other conflict party exists. *Face-to-face talks* take place in the presence of a third party. Contrarily, when *indirect talks* take place, the third party meets the conflict parties separately, but shares the information gathered with both conflict parties.

disaggregation. It indicates the start and end date of each intervention event. Hence, as soon as a mediation event is interrupted, even if just by a day-long break, a new event is coded. This allows opening the ‘black box’ of mediation further, as the impact of mediation event outcomes – instead of only mediation process outcomes – can be accounted for.

Moreover, the dataset includes all third-party interventions in violent conflicts which took place on the African continent between 1993 and 2007 if they have reached the 25-battle-deaths mark.<sup>35</sup> The first three years after a conflict has ended are coded as well, which might be particularly interesting for analysing recurrent mediation, since, if subsequent mediation is observed, it is likely to be the case in the first years of the post-conflict phase. The MIC Africa dataset is preferred in comparison to other existing datasets, such as the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen et al. 2011), the International Conflict Management dataset (Bercovitch & Fretter 2004), or a dataset on mediation offer and acceptance (Greig & Regan 2008). Due to the disaggregation of mediation processes to mediation events, the inclusion of conflicts with comparably low levels of intensity as well as the inclusion of mediation events three years after the conflict has ended.

With regard to mediation outcomes, the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset version 2.0 (Harbom et al. 2006; Högbladh 2012b) is drawn on. It contains all peace agreements reached between 1975 and 2011, and provides information on the start and potential end date of a peace agreement, on the provisions accounted for in the agreement, the type of peace agreement reached as well as the signatories to the peace agreement. Since it includes peace agreements which were reached before 1993, it allows accounting for agreements reached and reneged on before the MIC Africa dataset starts.

Thus, the dataset compiled for this research covers the years 1993 to 2007. Additionally, it includes information on agreements which were reached between 1975 and 1993 as well. The time-frame is set by the MIC Africa dataset. The collected dataset contains conflict dyads which have seen at least one previous mediation event. Thus, the onset of the very first mediation effort observed in a dyad is not included in the compiled dataset, though its outcome is accounted for, when estimating the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. This is a crucial difference to existing mediation

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<sup>35</sup> The 25 battle-related deaths mark is used by the UCDP to identify disputes as conflicts they include in their dataset. For the definition on armed conflict used by the UCDP, see footnote, page 1.

research, which compares the likelihood of subsequent mediation success in dyads after e.g. mediation failure has been observed to the likelihood of subsequent mediation success in dyads which have not seen mediation before (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006). As the focus of this project lies on comparing the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation efforts, including conflict dyads in which no mediation has taken place before is not conducive.<sup>36</sup>

The collected dataset is organised on the conflict dyad-quarter of a year level.<sup>37</sup> In the compiled dataset, a conflict dyad is made up of one government and one rebel group (UCDP 2014). The quarterly level was chosen due to the research interest lying on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. As the longest mediation event ends three months after it has set on, disaggregating the data to e.g. the monthly level would lead to mistakes in the analysis of subsequent mediation success, as the outcome of these long mediation events would remain unaccounted for. Observations which are only precise on the annual level, as well as observations which span over several calendar years were dropped, as it is not precise enough for the level of disaggregation chosen. For every quarter of a year, the dataset indicates whether subsequent mediation set on in a particular dyad, and whether an agreement was reached through mediation. Overall, the dataset contains 43 dyads and 698 quarters.


Illustration 3 shows a map of the African continent. It provides an overview of the conflicts which are included in the quantitative analysis. Countries which are included in the dataset are coloured grey. In the textboxes next to the map, the name of the rebel group which is in conflict with the government of a particular country is listed, and the number of mediation events which the dyad has seen is noted. A list with written-out names of the rebel groups is included in the Appendix.

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<sup>36</sup> Information of the CWM dataset is included to account for dyads which have engaged in mediation prior to 1993. Thus, if a dyad has engaged in mediation before 1993, the first mediation event noted in the MIC Africa dataset is included in the analysis.

<sup>37</sup> In the compiled dataset, a conflict dyad is made up of one government and one rebel group (UCDP 2014). The quarterly level was chosen due to the research interest lying on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. As the longest mediation event ends three months after it has set on, disaggregating the data to e.g. the monthly level would lead to mistakes in the analysis of subsequent mediation success, as the outcome of these long mediation events would remain unaccounted for. Observations which are only precise on the annual level, as well as observations which span over several calendar years have been dropped, because the analysis is conducted on the quarter of a year level. Hence, the dropped data is not precise enough.

Illustration 3. Map of dyads included in dataset and number of mediation events setting on



Source: own illustration, based on information from MIC Africa dataset (Melander & von Uexkull 2011) and Graphatlas (2016)

#### 4.2.1 Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable, *subsequent mediation onset*, is extracted from the MIC Africa dataset. Due to the research interest lying on mediation, third-party measures in which both warring parties take part are included. Moreover, both direct and indirect talks are accounted for, because the third party is expected to share information in both cases. Since the focus of the presented theoretical argument lies on private information sharing, and one of the crucial roles assigned to mediators is the sharing of private information (Beardsley et al. 2006), limiting the analysis to only direct talks does not seem sensible for this research project. The variable which denotes subsequent mediation onset is created as a dummy variable. If subsequent mediation onset is observed in a given quarter according to the MIC

Africa dataset, the variable is coded 1. If subsequent mediation onset is not observed, the variable is coded 0. The onset of subsequent mediation was observed in 187 quarters, thus in 26.79 percent of the quarters included into the dataset.

The second dependent variable is *event time*, as is common when seeking to test the amount of time which needs to pass until an event occurs (Harrell 2001: 389). It is drawn on to analyse the amount of time, i.e. the number of quarters which pass between a previous mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset. Event time is analysed with survival analysis (see chapter 4.2.2.2). The dataset generated for survival analysis contains 224 observations, and is organised on the conflict dyad-event time level. As it draws on the MIC Africa dataset as well, it is limited to the years 1993 to 2007.

The third dependent variable, *subsequent mediation success*, measures whether or not a mediation event was successful. Due to the theoretical argument's focus on striking bargains, subsequent mediation success is measured in whether or not an agreement is reached in this project. As the MIC Africa dataset does not contain information on the success of an intervention, the Peace Agreement dataset is drawn on. While the dataset includes agreements reached through both negotiation and mediation, only agreements reached through mediation are included.<sup>38</sup> The variable is coded 1 if the Peace Agreement dataset indicates that an agreement was reached in a given quarter, and mediation took place in the same or the previous quarter. It is coded 0 in all other cases. Overall, subsequent mediation was successful in 41 quarters. Of the 43 dyads included in the dataset, subsequent mediation was successful in 22. In additional tests, long-term mediation success is accounted for. The variable is also based on a variable from the Peace Agreement dataset. It is coded 1 if a peace agreement ended a conflict in the following

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<sup>38</sup> Two of the peace agreements included in the compiled dataset were reached through negotiations according to the Peace Agreement dataset. These are a partial agreement on the management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Zaire) between the Government of the DRC and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) in April 2002, and the Yebibou Agreement between the Government of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT) in August 2005. However, according to the MIC Africa dataset, mediation took place in the same months the agreements were signed in, which leads to the assumption that mediation might have played a role for reaching the agreements. Hence, these agreements are included into the subsequent mediation success measure. Furthermore, agreements were reached in eight quarters in which no mediation took place according to the MIC Africa dataset. Yet, the Peace Agreement dataset indicates that they were reached with third-party assistance. Hence, they are kept in the dataset. While they are not considered for the subsequent mediation success variable, as they were not reached during mediation months, they are included into the variable that counts the number of agreements reached, into the variable which indicates whether or not an agreement has been reneged on, and into the variable which indicates the previous outcome of mediation.

year, and 0 if it did not. However, only nine of the 41 mediation successes terminated the conflict in the following year.

### 4.2.2 Independent Variables on Previous Mediation Outcomes

This project seeks to analyse the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Hence, the most important independent variables are those that measure the outcomes of previous mediation events. As outlined in the theory chapter, differentiating between previous mediation not producing an agreement, previous partial mediation success, and previously reneged on agreements is necessary. Hence, dummy variables are created to account for each of these outcomes. These variables are mutually exclusive.

The dummy variable accounting for previous mediation which did not produce an agreement (*previous no agreement*) is based on the measure of mediation success and reneged on mediated agreements. It is coded 1 if mediation ended in a given quarter, but did not produce an agreement, and no agreement was reneged on. This coding is carried forward until mediation set on again. The variable is coded 0 in all other quarters, i.e. if the previous mediation event produced an agreement, or an agreement was reneged on. Of the 698 observations included in the dataset, this variable is coded 1 in 516 quarters, thus in 74 percent of the observations.

The variable *previous partial mediation agreement* is based on the mediation success measure described above. The variable is coded 1 if mediation was partially successful in the previous quarter and if the agreement reached was not a full agreement according to the Peace Agreement dataset,<sup>39</sup> assuming that subsequent mediation is unnecessary in these cases, as suggested by Badran (2014). The variable is coded 1 until mediation set on again in a given dyad. In all other cases, hence, as soon as the agreement is reneged on, the variable is coded 0. The variable is coded 1 in 45 of the 698 observations in the dataset, thus in 6 percent of the observations.

The dummy variable *previous agreement reneged on* is based on the Peace Agreement dataset. It is coded 1 if the Peace Agreement dataset indicates that an agreement ended in

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<sup>39</sup> If an agreement is a full agreement, the dyads included in the peace agreement decided to settle the conflict's incompatibility according to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset.

the previous quarter. This coding is carried forward until mediation sets on again. It is coded 0 in all other cases. In the Peace Agreement dataset, agreements are coded as ‘ended’ if the implementation of an agreement failed, if the agreement is no longer fully implemented, if its validity is contested, or if a primary party to the agreement withdraws from it (Högbladh 2012a). The variable is coded 1 in 13 percent, thus in 94 quarters.

For additional tests, variables are generated which indicate whether mediation did not produce an agreement, was partially successful, or whether a mediated agreement was reneged on in the *previous year*, the *previous three years*, or the *previous five years*. Nevertheless, the assumption is that the very previous mediation outcome has the most decisive impact, as the impact of mediation outcomes diminishes over time (Greig 2010).

Moreover, three count variables (*sum no agreement*, *sum mediated agreement*, and *sum reneged agreement*), which indicate the number of times each of these mediation outcomes occurred overall in a dyad, are created, because the more often a particular mediation outcome is observed, the more pronounced the theorised impact is expected to be.<sup>40</sup> The highest number of mediation efforts not producing an agreement is 23 (Government of Sudan – Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A)), while the highest number of mediation successes in a dyad is 8 (Government of Sudan – SPLM/A). This suggests careful support for the presented argument that mediation ending without an agreement does not prohibit subsequent mediation success. The highest number of reneged on agreements is 6 (Government of Rwanda – Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR)).

To account for the comprehensiveness of the previous agreement (*comprehensiveness previous partial agreement*), a count variable is generated. It is based on the Peace Agreement dataset and the MIC Africa dataset. If mediation is coded successful, the comprehensiveness of an agreement is accounted for: the Peace Agreement dataset indicates whether an agreement contains provisions on managing government incompatibilities, territorial incompatibilities, justice issues, military provisions, security guarantees, or the way forward.<sup>41</sup> For example, of the 41 agreements included in the

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<sup>40</sup> Mediation which did not produce an agreement marks an exception, since an accumulation of mediation efforts ending without an agreement highlights the inability of third parties to contribute to reaching an agreement, and thereby underlines that mediation is unable to substantially change the conflict dynamics (Greig 2010).

<sup>41</sup> Provisions with regard to *government incompatibilities* are provisions on the right of the rebel group to transform into a political party, its integration into the civil service, elections or reforms concentrating on elections, the rebel group’s integration into the interim government, holding national talks to solve

dataset, 38 contain justice issues, and 37 contain military provisions, while 29 contain security guarantees.

Based on the information which kinds of provision are included in a partial agreement, the comprehensiveness variable is generated, following Badran (2014) as well as Joshi and Quinn (2015b).<sup>42</sup> It can take on values from 0 (no agreement) to 6 (agreement in which all categories are covered), as it counts how many of the above listed provisions are included in a particular peace agreement. These provisions are not ranked or weighted, due to the fact that certain provisions might be considered more important in some conflicts than in others. A lag of this variable is generated, and the coding is carried forward until mediation sets on again. 27 of the agreements contain four or five issues. In the agreements reached between the Government of Angola and UNITA, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), and the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, all issues were addressed. Almost all reached agreements included in the analysis contain military or justice provisions.

A variable on the comprehensiveness of reneged on agreements is generated as well (*comprehensiveness previously reneged agreement*). If the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset indicates that an agreement, regardless of whether full or partial, has ended, its comprehensiveness is accounted for. The variable can take on values from 0 (no agreement reneged on) to 6 (agreement which contains provisions allocated to six different categories reneged on). A lag of this variable is generated, and the coding is carried forward until mediation sets on again. Agreements which contain provisions on four different categories are reneged on most often.

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incompatibilities, or extensive power-sharing measures for the new government. Provisions on *military aspects* include ceasefire or cessation of hostilities, plans for creating a new national army, the integration of the rebel group into the existing army, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, or the withdrawal of foreign powers. Provisions on *territorial incompatibilities* are the autonomy for a disputed region, independence, a federal state solution, a referendum on independence, local power-sharing provisions, regional development for the disputed region, extended cultural freedoms, arrangements for border demarcation, or local governance. Provisions on *justice issues* are amnesty, the release of prisoners, the return of refugees, or a concept of national reconciliation. Provisions on *the way forward* refer to agreements that reaffirm a previous agreement, or outline a negotiation agenda on how to address the conflict's incompatibility. Provisions on *security guarantees* contain the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, and the establishment of a commission or committee to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement (Högbladh 2012b: 6–8). These security guarantees, particularly the deployment of a peacekeeping operation are considered to be 'strong third-party guarantees' (see e.g. Walter (1997); Doyle and Sambanis (2000); Fortna (2003); Mattes and Savun (2010)). They are most likely to contribute to a reduction of the security dilemma present in intrastate conflicts (Joshi et al. 2015).

<sup>42</sup> Badran (2014) differentiates between nine provisions, while Joshi and Quinn (2015b) differentiate between 21 provisions.

In additional tests, dummy variables on whether an agreement contains *security guarantees* or *military provisions* are added to the main model, assuming that these kinds of agreements are likely to address the credible commitment problem. Since *ceasefires* also play an important role (Fortna 2004b), they are accounted for in additional tests as well. These dummy variables are based on the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset, and take on the value 1 if an agreement contains security guarantees, military provision, or a ceasefire respectively. They take on the value 0 in all other cases.

### 4.2.3 Control Variables

As has been noted in the theory chapter, several other variables beside the variables on the previous mediation outcome are likely to influence subsequent mediation onset. Just like the theoretical argument, the specification of the statistical model is kept parsimonious. Thus, next to the already described crucially important variables, only variables which are important according to the theoretical argument are included (Best & Wolf 2010: 844). They are added to the analysis to account for the question whether the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable is spurious, as advised by Ray (2005).

As highlighted in the theoretical argument, and based on previous research, the relative strength of a rebel group is crucial for mediation to set on and for it to be successful (Clayton 2013). The variable *relative rebel strength* is coded based on the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009), which contains information on rebel groups between 1945 and 2011. The variable used here indicates whether the rebel group is stronger, weaker, or at parity with the government. While the original dataset provides a five-point-scale, Clayton (2013: 615) suggests to reduce the five-point-scale to a three-point-scale to avoid measurement error, and to account for the fact that only few rebel groups are stronger than the government they fight. Based on previous research, it is expected that conflicts in which the rebel group is relatively strong are more likely to see subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success (see chapter 2). In 82 percent of the quarters included in the dataset, the rebel group is weaker, in 15 percent at parity, and in 3 percent of the observations the rebel group is stronger than the government. This is the case in the conflict between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the Military

Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice, and the Government of Rwanda and the FPR.<sup>43</sup>

The legality, and coming along with it, the legitimacy of the rebel group is considered to be a crucial factor as well, especially for mediation onset. According to the literature, rebel groups are legitimised actors once mediation has taken place (Clayton 2013; Ruhe 2015). However, as outlined in the theoretical argument, governments might deprive rebel groups of the previously endowed legitimacy, depending on the previous mediation outcome. Since no data on rebel legitimacy as such exists, the NSA dataset is drawn on (Cunningham et al. 2009) to code a dummy variable which indicates whether the rebel group has a legal political wing (*rebel group political wing (legal)*). According to e.g. Jo (2015: 29–30), this is a valid method for capturing rebel legitimacy, as rebel groups with a political wing are more likely to be regarded as legitimate actors. The likelihood that agreements with rebel groups who have a legal political wing are reached increases due to their expected explicit interest in pursuing political goals. Included into the main model are only rebel groups who have a legal political wing, thus, rebel groups in which the political wing is recognised as a legal organisation. These groups are expected to hold a higher level of legitimacy than political wings which are not recognised as legal. In additional tests, rebel groups with political wings, regardless of whether the wing is recognised as legal or not, are included. While eleven of the rebel groups included in the dataset have a political wing, only six have a legal political wing. These are UNITA (Angola), the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) (Ivory Coast), the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Sierra Leone), the Cobras (Congo), the FRCI (Ivory Coast), and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) (Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)).

The amount of previous mediation which has taken place might be an indicator for the relationship between the conflict parties (Crescenzi & Enterline 2001; Bercovitch & Gartner 2006). It might indicate how much private information has been shared previously (Stein 1999), but also might underline a conflict's protractedness (Greig & Diehl 2012). Meanwhile, more previous mediation is likely to lead to further mediation onset and success. Yet, to keep in mind Böhmelt's (2013) argument, i.e. the likelihood of mediation

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<sup>43</sup> In almost all cases, the relative distribution of strength does not vary, but remains constant throughout the conflict. The only conflict dyad in which the coding does change is made up of the Government of Angola and UNITA. Initially, UNITA was at parity with the Government, but then became weaker (Cunningham et al. 2009).

reducing until a turning point (marked by the number of mediation events) is reached, a squared term of the variable is included into the model as well. The variable (*sum previous mediation events*) is based on the MIC Africa dataset and counts the number of times mediation onset has been observed.

It might make a decisive difference whether a mediation event is part of a larger mediation process, or whether it takes place in isolation. The results of the SNA strongly support this assumption. Therefore, and as a consequence of the iterative process suggested by Lieberman (2005), the variable *same process* is included in additional tests. It is coded 1 if mediation has been observed in the previous quarter, and the same third party was engaged in the event. This is the case in 14 percent of the quarters included in the dataset. The variable is coded 0 otherwise. If a mediation event is part of a larger process, the impact of the previous mediation outcome regarding subsequent mediation onset is presumed to be less severe, as the conflict parties have consented to mediation on several agenda items. While previous mediation success might still pave the way for subsequent mediation success, the costs associated with previous mediation not producing an agreement might be considered bearable. Besides, additional items are going to be discussed, and compromise might become possible via issue-linkages (Poast 2013). If a previously mediated agreement is reneged on in the course of a larger mediation process, the third party might be able to mitigate the negative impact of the reneged on agreement. Hence, subsequent mediation onset is expected to be particularly likely if a larger mediation process takes place. This variable was added to the LNA as a consequence of the iterative process, after its influence was detected during the SNA (chapter 6).

Three dummy variables are generated to account for the content of previous talks. The variables are based on the MIC Africa dataset. They are not mutually exclusive, as different topics can be discussed during the same talks. The first of the three variables takes on the value 1 if the previous talks were on *conflict behaviour*, e.g. talks that concerned the violence levels of the conflict or demilitarised zones. This is the case in 33 percent of the quarters. The second of these variables takes on the value 1 if the previous talks were on the conflict's *incompatibility*. This is the case in 30 percent of the quarters in the dataset. The third of these variables takes on the value 1 if talks were on *other issues* than conflict behaviour and the conflict's incompatibility, such as refugees, or preparatory talks for a potentially ensuing diplomatic effort. This is the case in 53 percent of the

quarters. Subsequent mediation success is considered particularly difficult to achieve if the talks are on conflict behaviour or the conflict's incompatibility, because a ZoA on topics of high importance needs to be identified.

The conflict intensity between mediation events is likely to play a decisive role for the conflict parties' perception of a 'ripe moment', and thus the necessity to hold (successful) talks (Höglund 2008). The variable *sum deaths between mediation events* is measured in battle deaths. For quarters in which the conflict does not see mediation, the number of battle deaths is accumulated until mediation sets on again. In quarters in which mediation takes place (but does not set on), the variable is replaced by the number of battle deaths counted in that quarter.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the variable shows the extent to which the conflict costs accumulate without mediation. Observations with only annual precision were dropped. For robustness tests, the more common measure of conflict intensity, battle deaths per quarter of a year, is included into the model. Both variables are based on the UCDP Georeferenced Event dataset (GED) version 4.0 (Croicu & Sundberg 2015).

In robustness tests, variables measuring *conflict duration* and *conflict duration squared* replace the variables on the amount of mediation which has been observed in a dyad so far. Both variables are based on the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Dyadic dataset version 4-2016 (Harbom et al. 2008; Melander et al. 2016).

Furthermore, as leadership change via irregular means might have an impact on mediation, the dummy variable *government irregular entry to power* is created, based on the Archigos dataset version 4.1 (Goemans et al. 2009). The variable is coded 1 if the government came into power via irregular means, or if it was imposed by a foreign power. It is coded 0 if the government did not come into power via irregular means.<sup>45</sup> The variable is coded 1 in 70 percent of the quarters.

In some conflicts, *peacekeeping* operations might be present. A dummy variable which indicates the presence of a peacekeeping operation is added to the model, assuming that it decreases the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent success, since the

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<sup>44</sup> This measure is generated in accordance with Greig's (2014) measure on total battle deaths. It is modified with regard to the counting of battle deaths once mediation has set on again.

<sup>45</sup> Werner (1999) finds that peace is likely to fail after violent leadership changes because the new leader might have the impression that renegotiating a better deal is possible.

hurting stalemate is reduced (Zartman 2000; Greig & Diehl 2005).<sup>46</sup> In 7 percent of the quarters, a peacekeeping operation is present.

Though private information sharing takes on a central role in the theoretical argument, the amount of private information shared cannot be tested in the quantitative analysis, because no data on private information sharing is available. Yet, it is assumed that more private information is shared once mediation sets on. Third parties often hold private information they can share, while they also encourage the conflict parties to share private information. Thus, particularly the previous mediation outcome, but also the measures on the amount of mediation which has taken place before and on whether a mediation event is part of a larger process suggest the extent to which private information could have been shared before. Consequently, what is accounted for in the model is the opportunity for private information sharing that mediation offers, rather than the information shared, as no data on the latter is available.

### ***4.2.4 Methods of Estimation***

To appropriately estimate the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent success as well as the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on, different methods of estimation need to be selected. To test the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset, probit models are used. To analyse the amount of time that needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on again, survival analysis with Cox specification is conducted. Subsequent mediation success is tested with the Sartori selection estimator.<sup>47</sup> The selected methods of estimation are elucidated in the following sub-chapters.

#### **4.2.2.1 Probit Models for Subsequent Mediation Onset**

The dependent variable for the analysis of subsequent mediation onset is a dummy variable. Hence, probit or logit models may be chosen. As the two methods of estimation produce almost similar results, the choice between logit and probit depends on what is

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<sup>46</sup> According to Zartman (2000), the presence of peacekeeping operations should reduce the likelihood of mediation onset, though, because they might contribute to a reduction of conflict severity, and thereby to a reduction of the mutually hurting stalemate.

<sup>47</sup> While the Sartori selection estimator allows for an analysis of both subsequent mediation onset and subsequent success, the less delicate probit models are used for the analysis of subsequent mediation onset.

more common in the field the conducted research belongs to (Best & Wolf 2010: 836). Since most scholars analysing mediation chose probit models as their method of estimation (e.g. Svensson 2009; Böhmelt 2015), the same is done in this project.

If the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the values of the variable are not distributed normally. Thus, conducting linear regression despite the binary dependent variable would lead to an incorrect interpretation of the results (Best & Wolf 2010: 829). Logit and probit models are forms of logistic regression. When using logit models, one assumes that the distribution of the error term is known, linear, and increasing around zero. In probit models one assumes that the error term is distributed standard normal (Best & Wolf 2010: 836). Probit models are estimated through a Maximum Likelihood Estimation in contrast to linear regression models, which are estimated with Least Square Estimation (Aldrich & Nelson 1984). Because the coefficients resulting from the analysis cannot be interpreted directly, as is the case when conducting linear regression, marginal effects are often used. They provide an answer to the question which explicit impact an increase or decrease of the independent variable has on the dependent variable (Best & Wolf 2010: 839).

While the dependent variable included in all probit models is subsequent mediation onset, the independent variables included in the main model are either previous mediation effort which did not produce an agreement, previous mediation effort which produced a partial agreement, or previous mediation effort which produced an agreement that was reneged on. Additionally, variables on a rebel group's legitimacy, relative rebel strength, conflict intensity between mediation events, the sum of mediation efforts which has been observed in a dyad so far, and a squared term of the latter variable are included. To account for the fact that subsequent mediation onset might be more likely in some dyads than in others, robust clusters on the dyad are used in additional tests.

#### 4.2.2.2 Survival Analysis for the Timing of Subsequent Mediation Onset

To be able to estimate the time that needs to pass until mediation sets on again after a particular mediation outcome has been observed, event history analysis is used. It allows 'studying the event rate at a given time conditional on the event not having occurred by that time' (Harrell 2001: 393). The data at hand is right-censored for some observations because the data ends at the end of 2007. In some cases, the event of interest has not

occurred by this time (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1999: 18), i.e. mediation has not set on again by the end of 2007. This type of censoring is called fixed type I censoring. Several dyads are also left-censored, as only mediation efforts from 1993 onwards are included into the dataset. Thus, certain time periods remain unaccounted for. This is called delayed entry or left-truncation (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1999: 20). Left-censoring is accounted for as much as possible: by referring to the CWM dataset, the amount of time which has passed since the end of mediation events prior 1993 in a conflict dyad is included in the dataset. As the Peace Agreement Dataset starts in 1975 as well, accounting for the outcome of mediation efforts prior to 1993 is possible. Hence, the problem of delayed entry is reduced to a certain extent.

Commonly estimated in event history analysis are single events, thus the single occurrence of a particular event, or events which are independent of each other. However, in the study at hand, the occurrence of repeated events is of interest. Assuming independence between repeated events within a dyad is highly likely to lead to wrong conclusions in this case (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 155), as the interdependence of events needs to be taken into account. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002) discuss different variance-corrected models, which allow for a more appropriate analysis of repeated events. Based on their discussion, a conditional model, initially suggested by Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981), abbreviated as PWP gap-time approach, is employed in the following, because this type of model seems to display the theoretical assumptions best, as outlined in the following.<sup>48</sup>

The PWP gap-time approach uses a Cox model, which has the advantage that no assumptions on the baseline hazard need to be made (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 88). Thus, instead of formulating a baseline hazard, such as the hazard of subsequent mediation onset being highest one quarter after partial mediation success has been observed, the analysis can be run without having to formulate an expectation like this. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 93) suggest that unless the focus of the research lies on learning more about the baseline hazard, Cox models should be used in survival analysis in general.

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<sup>48</sup> For a comparison of different models that allow taking into account the repeated occurrence of events, see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002).

When using the PWP gap-time approach, the focus does not lie on the overall elapsed time (the time that has passed since the dyad entered into the dataset), but on inter-event time (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn 2002: 1075). Thus, the focus lies on counting the time which has passed between the end of the previous event, i.e. once the previous mediation outcome has been observed and subsequent mediation onset (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1999: 310–311). Moreover, for an event to occur, a particular previous event needs to have occurred, as the order of events matters: i.e. for the fifth mediation event to set on, a fourth mediation event needs to have taken place. To account for the order of events, the model is stratified by mediation outcome. Stratifying ‘allows each strata to have *its own baseline hazard rate* while the coefficients are restricted to be the same across strata’ (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 160, emphasis in original). Thus, the analysis provides one result while taking into account that the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset might vary, depending on how many mediation efforts have previously not produced an agreement. It allows accounting for the change of risk sets depending on the sequencing of events.<sup>49</sup> For stratifying, the PWP gap-time model uses the Efron (1977) method.

What can be problematic when stratifying by the number of events is that the amount of observations reduces as the ranking of events increases (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn 2002: 1079). In fact, there are likely to be numerous dyads which encounter a second, or a third mediation effort, while the likelihood of dyads encountering a fifteenth or a twentieth mediation effort is comparably smaller. This might lead to the estimates being imprecise and unstable (Wei et al. 1989). A solution for this can be combining several higher level risk sets. The combination of risk sets needs to be explained theoretically or statistically. Another option is acknowledging and accepting that the standard error might be larger for these estimates because only few uncensored observations can be found in the higher level risk categories (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn 2002: 1079). The latter suggestion is followed because no sound theoretic explanation for combining certain risk sets is provided in the theoretical argument outlined in chapter 3.

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<sup>49</sup> Another option would be stratifying by mediation events. However, based on the theoretical argument, the accumulation of the same outcome further pronounces the effect a particular mediation outcome has on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Hence, it seems sensible to stratify on the sum of each different mediation outcome.

#### 4.2.2.3 The Sartori Selection Estimator for Subsequent Mediation Success

The theoretical argument in mind, it becomes clear that subsequent mediation success is more likely in some cases than in others. Thus, the likelihood of selecting into subsequent mediation needs to be accounted for, before the likelihood of subsequent mediation success can be estimated. Hence, the decision for using a two-stage model, which allows accounting for the described selection process, is theory-driven, as advised by Robson and Pevalin (2016).

The method of estimation for analysing subsequent mediation success is the Sartori selection estimator (Sartori 2003), though Heckman selection models (Heckman 1976) are often used in mediation research (e.g. Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009; Aduda & Bussmann 2016). However, when estimating the Heckman selection model, at least one additional variable needs to be included into the selection equation for the identified model to work. While the decision which additional variable(s) to include into the selection equation (or which variable to exclude from the outcome equation) should be based on the theoretical argument, this is often challenging (Sartori 2003: 112). With regard to the identified variables, it proves difficult to decide which variables do not have an impact on subsequent mediation success, but do have an impact on subsequent mediation onset.

An alternative to Heckman selection models is the Sartori selection estimator (Sartori 2003). When using the Sartori selection estimator, one assumes that '[t]he error term for an observation is the same in the two equations' (Sartori 2003: 112). Sartori argues that this is likely to be the case if the '(1) selection and the subsequent outcome of interest involve similar decisions or goals; (2) the decisions have the same causes; and (3) the decisions occur within a short time frame and/or are close to each other geographically' (Sartori 2003: 112). Based on the theoretical argument presented in chapter 3, the independent variables are expected to have the same effect on selection and outcome (see Table 9). Decisions are expected to have the same causes, while they occur within a short time period. Thus, the error terms are assumed to be identical to a degree acceptable for using the Sartori selection estimator. Nevertheless, Heckman selection models are run in robustness tests.

Included in the analysis with the Sartori selection estimator are the same variables as in the probit models: a variable on the previous mediation outcome (previous no agreement, previous partial agreement, or previously mediated agreement renege d on), rebel legitimacy, relative rebel strength, conflict intensity between mediation events, and a variable indicating the amount of previous mediation which has been observed in a dyad as well as a squared term of the latter variable. For the robustness tests with Heckman specification, the selection equation mirrors the selection equation of the Sartori model, while the variable indicating rebel legitimacy is excluded from the outcome equation, assuming that rebel legitimacy is provided through mediation onset. Thus, formal rebel legitimacy might be more decisive for subsequent mediation onset than for subsequent mediation success.

Table 9. Summary of key arguments

<b>Outcome previous mediation</b>	Gov't's stance towards mediation onset	Rebel group's stance towards mediation onset	<b>Subsequent mediation onset</b>	Gov't's stance towards sharing private information	Rebel group's stance towards sharing private information	<b>Subsequent mediation success</b>
<b>No agr. reached</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Partial Agreement</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Reneged on agr.</b>	-	+	-	-	-	-

### 4.3 Research Design for the Small-N Analysis

For the SNA, a case study is conducted. The case selection is based on the results of the LNA, as a case that is ‘on the line’ is suggested to be chosen by Lieberman (2005). Though the case selection is based on the results of the quantitative analysis, it is already presented in this chapter. Moreover, the variables accounted for in the qualitative analysis are described and the sources used for analysis are introduced. To conduct the case study, process tracing is used as it allows testing for causality. Ensuing, a brief illustration of how process tracing is conducted in this project is provided.

While the results of case studies cannot be generalised, case studies are likely to be equipped better for measuring the complex concepts outlined in theoretical arguments (George & Bennett 2005: 42–43; Bryman 2008: 57). They allow for a holistic analysis and are able to show whether the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument, especially with regard to sequencing, are valid. Moreover, variables which might have been neglected so far, but also have an impact on the outcome, can be identified (Bennett & Elman 2006: 250), and, in an iterative process, added to the LNA.

### 4.3.1 Case Selection

For the SNA, one (or more) case that is included in the dataset needs to be chosen according to the logic of nested analysis. Thus, of the 43 conflict dyads included in the SNA, a case that is ‘on the line’ is selected (Lieberman 2005: 437). It is analysed in more detail in the SNA than is possible in the LNA, to enrich the findings of the LNA, and to shed light onto the causal mechanisms at play (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 299).<sup>50</sup>

The dyads included in the dataset have been engaged in five mediation events on average. To be able to analyse a case in-depth, a case in which all outcomes of previous mediation addressed in the theoretical argument (mediation ending without an agreement, partial mediation success, and reneged on mediated agreements) can be observed, is chosen.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, when interested in studying a case in detail, it is sensible to choose a case which does not pose challenges to the researcher with regard to e.g. language (Lieberman 2005: 443). The conflict between Niger and the Coordinated Armed Resistance (CRA), which has seen five mediation events according to the MIC Africa dataset, is disregarded, as not all mediation outcomes are observed. The conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the FPR, which has seen five mediation events as well, was dismissed due to language reasons.<sup>52</sup> To increase the likelihood of finding a case which has seen all mediation outcomes, without it being an extreme case with regard to the amount of mediation observed, the presence of the three mediation outcomes and the national languages for the

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<sup>50</sup> For further discussions on case selection, see e.g. George and Bennett (2005), Seawright and Gerring (2008), or King et al. (1994).

<sup>51</sup> While the statistical analysis is seminal for the case selection, mediation efforts which have taken place before 1993 are included into the assessment of which case would be suitable for in-depth analysis. Hence, a case that has seen an average amount of mediation, in which all mediation outcomes have been observed, is selected.

<sup>52</sup> Though French, English, and Kinyarwanda are national languages in Rwanda, language difficulties with regard to the sources necessary for analysis were detected when first checking the availability of information.

cases which have seen six, seven, and eight mediation events, according to the MIC Africa dataset, were inspected. Of these cases, the dyad made up of the GoU and the LRA<sup>53</sup> proved to be most promising.<sup>54</sup> According to the MIC Africa dataset, eight mediation events have taken place in the dyad. During these, all possible mediation outcomes have been observed, and thus their impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success can be assessed. Besides, the languages (English, Luo, and Kiswahili) do not provide a hurdle for in-depth analysis.<sup>55</sup>

The results of the SNA allow for careful generalisation to cases which share the same characteristics (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 299). In-so-far as the results of the LNA support the theoretical argument, the results of the SNA are expected to add support to the theoretical argument as well, while providing a better understanding of the causal mechanisms outlined in the theory section. Analysing cases like this is particularly crucial in the logic of nested analysis, as the results provide a good starting point for research questions which address topics that have not been researched on much, like the research question of this project.

### 4.3.2 Variables

Just like in the LNA, three dependent variables are included in the SNA as well. These are *subsequent mediation onset*, *the timing of subsequent mediation onset*, and *subsequent mediation success*. Whenever the used sources note that a subsequent mediation event started, subsequent mediation onset is considered to be observed. For the amount of time which passes between a mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset, the dates sources indicate for the previous mediation outcome and for subsequent mediation onset are taken into account. Mediation is considered to be successful if it produced an agreement, as the theoretical argument focuses on whether a sufficient amount of private information for reaching an agreement was shared, and whether the credible commitment problem was reduced to an extent that allows the disputants to agree to a bargain.

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<sup>53</sup> In the following, the LRA and the Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM) are not differentiated between, because only few sources refer to the LRM, while it is unclear in some sources whether the authors refer to the LRA, the LRM, or both.

<sup>54</sup> The dyads made up of the Government of Ivory Coast and the FRCI (seven mediation events), and the Government of Burundi and the National Liberation Front (Frolina) (eight mediation events) were not chosen due to language reasons.

<sup>55</sup> Sources in which Luo, and especially Kiswahili, were spoken were used in the process of gathering background information on the conflict between the GoU and the LRA.

The key explanatory variables of interest regard the previous mediation outcome. These are divided into *previous mediation not producing an agreement*, *previous partial mediation success*, and *previously reneged on mediated agreement*. Mediation is considered not to have produced an agreement if no agreement was signed by the conflict parties in line with the mediation effort. It is viewed as partially successful if an agreement is reached that does not end the conflict. The comprehensiveness of the agreements is taken into account as well. For this, all mediated agreements reached between the GoU and the LRA are studied, and their comprehensiveness is scrutinised. An agreement is coded as reneged on if the terms of the settlement are disregarded by either of the conflict parties, which manifests in actions that violate the settlement.

Particularly important in the wake of the LNA, which is unable to account for private information sharing directly, information on *private information sharing* is included in the SNA whenever possible. Thus, if reports on the different mediation events provide insights into information that has been shared, or difficulties during mediation with regard to private information sharing, this is discussed explicitly in the analysis. The same holds true for (potentially lacking) *security guarantees* which are necessary for overcoming the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997). Thereby, the expected underlying causal mechanisms, namely, the costs and benefits the conflict parties are expected to allocate to mediation are sought to be addressed more explicitly in the SNA than in the LNA. Yet, it needs to be kept in mind that it often remains unclear which information the conflict parties have exchanged, as this information is often unavailable.

Furthermore, a set of additional variables is likely to have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, according to the theoretical argument and the results of the LNA.<sup>56</sup> The first one is the *legitimacy of a rebel group*, measured in whether the government considers the rebel group as a legitimate partner for talks. This measure is based on statements of the conflict country's government. *Relative strength of the rebel group* is considered to have an impact on mediation onset and mediation success (Clayton 2013). The qualitative measure for this is based on reports on the increasing or decreasing strength of the rebel group. To account for whether a *larger mediation process* takes place, it is checked whether an agenda has been established for mediation. For

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<sup>56</sup> These are the same variables as included in the main model of the LNA. The variable on whether a mediation event takes place in a larger process takes on a more prominent stand in the SNA than in the LNA though, as it can be measured with more clarity.

*conflict intensity*, the GED is drawn on again. Battle deaths and one-sided violence are summed up and aggregated to the monthly level, to have an impression on how conflict intensity varied over time. The *amount of previous mediation* is accounted for as well.

### 4.3.3 Sources

The SNA is based on various sources. The information gathered stems from academic research conducted with a focus on the conflict between the GoU and the LRA, NGO reports, newspaper articles, UN documents, and one interview. These sources are introduced in the following. Whenever the information included in sources differs, e.g. regarding the date, information that seems most reliable, based on additionally gathered information or consistency, is included in a timeline (see Appendix). The timeline is heavily drawn on for the analysis.

Several books and academic articles that relate to the conflict between the GoU and the LRA have been published. Most of them do not focus on mediation exclusively. Instead, single chapters are dedicated to one of the mediation processes which took place in the dyad. Thus, information is found in chapters that touch upon mediation, but mostly deal with other issues. These publications provide valuable insights. However, the exact timing of mediation events is not always noted.

Reports and policy briefs from NGOs such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, or the London-based NGO Conciliation Resources were consulted. They hold crucial insights on details of the conflict parties' position towards subsequent mediation, and on how the conflict parties viewed each other as well as details on the conflict and the mediation events in general. Particularly the Accord series, published by Conciliation Resources, proved to be a valuable source of information. Its briefings mostly contain short articles written by practitioners of different professions, or by participants of one or more of the mediation processes. These briefings provide vital information on the conflict between the GoU and the LRA.

Different news sources were drawn on as well. On the one hand, the homepage of the Daily Monitor, the largest Ugandan newspaper, was consulted. All articles which resulted from a search for 'LRA' and 'mediation', or 'LRA' and 'talks' were studied. The same process was repeated with the BBC News Africa page, though the search words were

‘LRA’ and ‘Uganda’. The East African, a Nairobi-based newspaper which focuses on the on-goings in Eastern Africa, was consulted as well. The search terms were ‘LRA’, ‘Uganda’, ‘mediation’, or ‘LRA’, ‘Uganda’, and ‘mediation’. When consulting BBC News Africa, the search terms were more general to receive a higher number of news feeds which might address on-goings related to mediation between the GoU and the LRA. The search was narrowed down further when searching for articles published in regional or national newspapers, because more articles are published on the LRA overall in these newspapers. The articles relevant for the analysis include terms like mediation or talks. The search was not restricted to articles which have been published in a particular time span for any of the three sources. The last search was conducted in May 2017.

All UN documents allocated to ‘LRA affected areas’ as well as documents which resulted from the search on ‘Uganda’ on the page of the UN Security Council (UNSC) were consulted. Again, the information relating to mediation is included in the timeline. However, a majority of the documents focuses on child soldiers and violence against civilians, and not on mediation events.

Finally, one semi-structured interview was conducted. While the initial intention was to conduct several interviews, both with experts and participants of the mediation events, it proved to be difficult to find contact details. Ultimately, eight interview requests were sent (via email), but remained unanswered. The interview which was conducted was held with a member of the mediation team of the Juba Talks. Based on the interviewee’s request, the interview was not recorded, but notes were taken during the conversation and a memorandum of the conversation was written afterwards. A summary of topics discussed in the interview, relevant for this research, can be found in the Appendix.

Overall, the used sources provide credible information. In cases where dates for mediation onset were unclear, the dates which were noted most often were included in the timeline. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that many articles have been written by participants or observers of the mediation efforts, which is likely to have influenced their perception of the on-goings. This might have an impact on the analysis, as the description of the events provided by the authors is relied on. For example, if they note a negative mood during talks, this is picked up in the analysis.

#### 4.3.4 Process Tracing

The method chosen to analyse the information gathered on the conflict between the GoU and the LRA is process tracing. Process tracing is a systematic approach for conducting qualitative research (Collier 2011: 823). It is defined as ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of [...] testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case’ (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 7).<sup>57</sup> Its aim is ‘the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest’ (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 6).<sup>58</sup> Thus, by examining single cases, within-case inferences about the claims on the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument can be made (George & Bennett 2005: 45). Hence, instead of solely showing whether or not variables correlate, as statistical studies do, process tracing seeks to show causation, and might increase the confidence in the significance of the correlations shown in statistical tests (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 20–21).

Different forms of process tracing exist. These range from a detailed narrative in which theory does not play a central role, to general explanations, in which causal mechanisms are not in focus, to analytical causal explanation. The latter form is used in the following case study. When using analytical causal explanation, instead of rendering the conflict’s on-going in detail, the presented analysis is deliberately kept as parsimonious as possible, with a focus on mediation. Thus, if causal mechanisms are not rendered in the case description, this is either due to the researcher’s inability to realise that events are relevant, or due to the unavailability of information which allow the tracing of causal mechanisms to an appropriate extent (George & Bennett 2005: 210–212).<sup>59</sup> With regard to the conducted research, aspect relevant to the conflict parties’ cost-benefit calculation on whether to engage in subsequent mediation, and on whether to share private information should talks set on, are in focus.

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<sup>57</sup> ‘[T]he causal effect is the expected value of the change in outcome if we could run a perfect experiment in which only one independent variable changes’ (George & Bennett 2005: 138).

<sup>58</sup> Process tracing is understood in diverse ways. However, the following description of process tracing is aimed at drawing a rather consistent picture to provide clarity on the approach followed here. For general discussions on process tracing, see e.g. Beach and Pedersen (2013), or Bennett and Checkel (2015).

<sup>59</sup> Process tracing and historical explanation are related, but not similar. While historical explanation tends to not make hypotheses explicit, process tracing has the hypotheses derived from the theoretical argument at the core. It is conducted to falsify hypotheses (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 8–9). Process tracing differs from the congruence method insofar as it seeks to investigate causal mechanisms, while the congruence method seeks to investigate correlation (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 4–5).

Process tracing ‘allows for an in-depth and context sensitive analysis [...]’ (Ulriksen & Dadalauri 2015: 229). To be able to account for a case’s context, and to take into account possible alternative explanations, including control variables is inevitable. Thereby, one seeks to provide insights into the question why a particular outcome occurs, though the main variable of interest might not take on the value expected in the theory. Hence, testing alternative hypotheses becomes possible, and the validity of the analysis increases (George & Bennett 2005: 80–81, 217).<sup>60</sup> Moreover, researchers are sensitised to equifinality, and thereby might be able to avoid confirmation bias (George & Bennett 2005: 207, 215, 217). Especially with regard to mediation, contextual factors are decisive for the conflict parties’ interest in subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, as they influence their cost-benefit calculation. E.g., regardless of the benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation, they are unlikely to agree to mediation onset unless the conflict becomes too costly and unilateral victory impossible, as they are expected to rank military victory higher than mediation (e.g. Walter 2002). Thus, events which are relevant for the conflict parties’ relationship are included in the narration to provide a context for the analysis, all the while allowing the consideration of alternative explanations.

Process tracing enables the researcher to observe different causal mechanisms. While some processes might be linear, in others, several conditions might converge, or causal chains, which lead to a particular outcome through sequencing, might be predominant. In the latter case, it is crucial to identify key events. Particularly when the occurrence of an event depends on policy makers, this is vital, as their decisions are likely to be context-dependent. With the help of these kinds of before-and-after research designs, it becomes possible to estimate whether an independent variable is causally linked to a particular outcome (George & Bennett 2005: 207, 215, 217). Hence, the analysis conducted is divided into several time periods, which are analysed separately, before a joint conclusion is drawn. The time periods are assorted according to events that mark turning points, here, the end of a mediation process, mounting international pressure, or, during the Juba Talks, discussions on different agenda items being finalised.

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<sup>60</sup> Structural and agent-based explanations need to be accounted for in the analysis. The former ‘can be material, institutional, or normative, for example, and [the latter] [...] can be motivated by rational calculations of material interests, cognitive biases, emotional drives, or normative concerns’ (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 23).

Hypotheses can only be considered as supported if all aspects of the causal chain outlined are identified in the analysis (a so-called ‘smoking-gun test’) (George & Bennett 2005: 207, 215, 217). In the theoretical argument, often several causal mechanisms are displayed, leading to one hypothesis. Due to information scarcity, a hypothesis is considered supported through a smoking-gun test if clear evidence for at least one of the causal mechanisms leading to a particular outcome is detected. For example, the rebel group underlining its security guarantees after an agreement has been reneged on, and therefore, refraining from sharing additional private information, is considered smoking-gun evidence for hypothesis 7a, according to which subsequent mediation success is unlikely if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on, though not all aspects outlined in the theoretical argument on the link between reneged on agreements and subsequent mediation success are identified in the analysis.

If not enough evidence to conduct a smoking-gun test is available, a hoop test might be conducted. Hoop tests can be conducted if evidence of the explanatory factor and the dependent variable are present, but causal mechanisms cannot be traced (Collier 2011: 827). In the ensuing analysis, this would be the case if e.g. the previous mediation event was partially successful, and subsequent mediation onset is observed. Thus, hoop tests do not support hypotheses but affirm the relevance of them (Collier 2011: 825). In the following, results of hoop tests are considered as (careful) support for a hypothesis. The extent to which each hypothesis is supported is accounted for in the discussion of the results (chapter 7). The kinds of tests conducted are highlighted, and, in a table, it is indicated whether conducting a smoking-gun or a hoop test was possible.

If evidence contradicts the assumed causal mechanisms outlined, the validity of the theoretical argument is questioned. Yet, as long as causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument are not contradicted, hypotheses cannot be rejected. Thus, hypotheses are not rejected due to lacking information. Instead, the results are considered unclear. Generally, it is crucial to address the degree of uncertainty that remains once process tracing has been conducted (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 19, 31), to have a clear idea of the validity of the results.

As the outlined theoretical argument is based on rational choice theory, the preference order of potential options of action needs to be drawn from an actor’s previous rhetoric and

actions. The fact that preferences might change over time needs to be accounted for (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 32). The changes of the GoU's and the LRA' preferences orders are particularly crucial for the analysis, as the conflict parties decide for or against subsequent mediation onset and private information sharing due to changes in their preference orders. The preference order, i.e. whether engaging in subsequent mediation or sharing private information during subsequent talks and thereby working towards subsequent success is ranked highest and therefore complied with, is derived from the statements and actions of the two conflict parties whenever possible.

The analysis starts with the first mediation event in 1994, as the research interest lies on the impact of previous mediation outcomes on the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. The last information included into the timeline is dated to May 2017. The main focus of the analysis lies on the years between 1994 and 2008. These are the years during which mediation took place. By the time the Juba Talks ended in 2008, the GoU had repeatedly made clear that it did not want to engage in additional talks with the LRA. Thus, though the years following the Juba Talks are included into the timeline, little variance is detected in the GoU's preference order with regard to subsequent mediation onset.

Overall, process tracing seems to be a valid method for the SNA. It does not only allow for identifying correlations, but also for identifying causal mechanisms if sufficient information is available (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 20–21). As the SNA follows the LNA, it is particularly interesting to scrutinise whether the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument can be detected in the case study. Hence, the aim of the case study is to provide insights into whether the previous mediation outcome(s) has an impact on the conflict parties' likelihood of ascribing costs or benefits to mediation, and thereby leading them to (not) engage in a subsequent mediation event. Moreover, the question whether the previous mediation outcome has an impact on the costs and benefits both conflict parties ascribe to sharing private information in order to reach agreements, is addressed.

#### **4.4 Summary of Key Notions on Methodology**

The chosen mixed-methods approach is considered beneficial for analysing the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation

success, because it incorporates the benefits of both quantitative and qualitative research. Moreover, nested analysis as a mixed-methods approach allows for conducting research in an iterative process. It enables drawing conclusions from the LNA for the SNA. If the SNA has provided crucial insights, which had not been accounted for in the LNA, it also allows returning to the LNA in order to include the measures which the SNA has pointed towards. Thus, for the case under scrutiny, the degree of internal validity increases.

In the LNA, three different statistical estimation methods are used. To account for the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset, probit models are used, which allow the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables, such as subsequent mediation onset. For the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on again, survival analysis, namely, the PWP-gap-time approach is used. For assessing the likelihood of subsequent mediation success, the Sartori selection estimator is employed, which is a two-stage approach that accounts for the fact that subsequent mediation events can only be successful if subsequent mediation actually takes place. It allows an inclusion of the same variables into the onset and success equation. While the results of the LNA provide a general impression of the extent to which the variables included in the models influence each other, crucial aspects of the theoretical argument, such as private information, remain unaccounted for. Especially in view of the lack of available data on the amount of private information shared, mixing methods is inevitable when seeking to test the theoretical argument. Hence, the SNA follows the LNA – as subscribed by Lieberman (2005).

For the SNA, the conflict between the GoU and the LRA is chosen. It is analysed with process tracing, which allows for an identification of the causal mechanisms at play. Thus, although the results cannot be generalised to the same extent as the results of the LNA, the SNA complements the LNA, and provides clearer insights into one specific case, especially regarding the importance of security guarantees necessary for overcoming the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997). The case study also provides knowledge on the role the mediator plays for overcoming the private information sharing problem. Since little has been published on the content of the discussions held during the mediation events, less knowledge than hoped for is available for analysing the extent to which the conflict parties ascribe costs and benefits to mediation in light of the previous mediation outcomes though. Nevertheless, the SNA sheds light onto aspects the LNA cannot account for in detail. A joint discussion of the LNA and the SNA follows in chapter 7.

## 5 Quantitative Analysis

In this chapter, the results of the LNA are presented, seeking to provide answers to the question how and why previous mediation outcomes influence subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. The chapter is divided into two parts of analysis. First, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset, and the amount of time which passes between a particular mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset are under scrutiny with probit and Cox models. Second, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success is analysed with the Sartori selection estimator. Finally, these results are discussed and summarised to highlight which impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Concisely, the extent to which the derived hypotheses are supported is delineated. Alternative explanations and limitations of the quantitative analysis are discussed at the end of each subchapter.

For each previous mediation outcome, several statistical tests are conducted to display the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. The preferred model specification includes variables on the different previous mediation outcomes (mediation did not produce an agreement, partial mediation success, reneged on mediated agreement), rebel legitimacy (accounted for by whether the rebel group has a legal political wing), relative rebel strength, conflict intensity between mediation events, the amount of mediation which has taken place in a dyad up to the point under analysis, and a squared term of the latter variable.

In robustness tests, additional variables are included into the models to test if the results of the preferred model specification hold. Moreover, the measure of rebel legitimacy is replaced by a variable which indicates whether the rebel group has a political wing, regardless of its legality. Additionally, the variables which count the number of previous mediation efforts are replaced by variables on conflict duration. The conflict intensity measure is replaced by the more standard measure of conflict intensity (battle deaths). Variables on the content of previous mediation, and on the content of previous agreements, are added to the preferred model specification. Moreover, when the focus lies on the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation success, it is not only

tested whether an agreement is reached, but also which impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent long-term mediation success.<sup>61</sup>

## **5.1 Results for Subsequent Mediation Onset**

For subsequent mediation to set on, several conditions need to be fulfilled. For one, a third party needs to be interested in acting as a mediator. Second, the conflict parties need to accept a third party's offer of help, or request mediation (Greig & Regan 2008). Depending on which conflict actor is in focus, this is more or less likely, as argued in chapter 3. Assuming that a third party will be available if both conflict parties seek to engage in mediation, the focus of the interpretation of the results lies on the conflict parties' decision making – as in the theoretical argument. However, due to limitations in the available data, it is not possible to decipher which conflict actor signals an interest in mediation or rejects mediation at which point in time. Hence, the results of the LNA merely show whether or not both conflict actors agreed to the onset of subsequent mediation at a given point in time.

### ***5.1.1 Previous Mediation Did Not Produce an Agreement***

According to the theoretical argument, mediation which did not produce an agreement has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset, as mediation which did not produce an agreement highlights the benefits of mediation, while it does not point towards new costs that outweigh these benefits. This argument is summarised in hypothesis 1. Table 10 shows the results of the statistical analyses. The results show that previous mediation which did not produce an agreement has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset: the coefficient is positive in all models. The results are marginally significant in the preferred model specification (model 1). If the previous mediation event did not produce an agreement, the conflict parties come to the conclusion that engaging in subsequent mediation is beneficial, and thus subsequent mediation onset is observed.

The statistical significance of the results increases if one of the mediation outcomes during the previous year was mediation which did not produce an agreement (model 3), which

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<sup>61</sup> The main models were tested for multicollinearity. However, the Variance Inflation Factor is never larger than ten, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem (Backhaus et al. 2016: 108; Aldrich & Nelson 1984: 49).

suggests that mediation outcomes in the not too distant past have an impact on the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset. The coefficient turns negative when expanding the observation period to the previous three or five years, though these results are statistically insignificant. The same holds true when accounting for the number of mediation events which did not produced an agreement in the dyad (see Appendix).

Table 10. The impact of previous mediation which did not produce an agreement on subsequent mediation onset

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.2360 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2917* (0.144)		
No agreement previous year			0.5146** (0.113)	0.4351** (0.127)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2256 (0.157)	0.2155 (0.176)	0.2013 (0.160)	0.2044 (0.178)
Relative rebel strength	0.0287 (0.114)	0.0735 (0.129)	0.0642 (0.116)	0.0976 (0.131)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2075** (0.028)	0.1861** (0.031)	0.1775** (0.028)	0.1574** (0.032)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0047** (0.001)	-0.0050** (0.001)
Same process		2.1596** (0.194)		2.1120** (0.194)
Constant	-1.4834** (0.189)	-1.8185** (0.219)	-1.5595** (0.168)	-1.7914** (0.190)
Log-Likelihood	-351.194	-266.164	-342.490	-262.339
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is 6.4 percent more likely compared to other previous mediation outcomes. If a mediation effort did not produce an agreement during the previous year, subsequent mediation onset is 14.5 percent more likely. These results of the calculation on substantial effects underline

the positive impact of recent mediation which did not produce an agreement on subsequent mediation onset.

When controlling for whether the subsequent mediation event takes place in the context of a larger process, the level of significance increases, while the coefficient remains positive (model 2): the fact that the subsequent mediation event is included in a process has a positive, strongly significant impact on subsequent mediation onset. It is highly likely that the conflict parties committed to a larger process, during which some mediation events not producing an agreement is an expected outcome, considering the difficulty for the conflict parties to reach agreements on topics violent conflict is fought over. The same holds true if mediation which did not produce an agreement was observed during the previous year (model 4).

Additional results (see Appendix) further support the notions of the preferred model specification, as the coefficient is positive across models. However, the results are mostly marginally significant only, while some lack statistical significance. For example, if variables on the government receiving troop support from a third party, the presence of a peacekeeping operation, or previous talks having taken place on the conflict's incompatibility are added to the model, the results of the main variable of interest remain marginally significant. The same holds true when the variables included in the model are replaced by alternative measures (i.e. conflict intensity, rebel legitimacy, and conflict duration). If the topics discussed during previous talks are accounted for, the results remain robust as well. The coefficient of the variable indicating that previous mediation did not produce an agreement remains positive, but turns statistically insignificant if the government coming into power via irregular means is accounted for.

Overall, the results show support for the presented argument and the first hypothesis. Subsequent mediation onset is likely after previous mediation did not produce an agreement. These mediation events seem to underline the benefits of mediation, such as the voluntary nature of the process, the ability to signal the willingness to manage a conflict to domestic and international audiences, and especially the capability of gathering information on the opponent. These findings stand contrary to one strand of existing research, which denotes a negative impact of mediation that did not produce an agreement on the likelihood of mediation onset (Bercovitch & Gartner 2006; Greig 2010). In fact, this

negative impact was only observed when not only mediation during the previous quarter did not produce an agreement, but when mediation during the previous three or five years did not produce an agreement, or when the overall number of mediation events not producing an agreement was accounted for in the analysis. Nevertheless, these results were statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the presented results support another strand of existing research which argues that a certain amount of mediation events not producing an agreement might be unavoidable, due to the existing deep rifts between the conflict parties (Heldt 2009). Thus, once conflict parties have engaged in talks, they are likely to do so again – even after mediation did not produce an agreement.

### ***5.1.2 Previous Partial Mediation Success***

Previous partial mediation success is expected to have a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset, as it underlines the benefits of mediation, according to the theoretical argument outlined in chapter 3. With the previous partial agreement lasting, the ability of mediation to identify bargains within the ZoA, due to private information sharing, becomes apparent. Mediation seems to be able to address the private information sharing and the credible commitment problem. Therefore, the conflict parties are likely to engage in subsequent mediation, as previous mediation produced a partial agreement (hypothesis 2a). The positive effect of mediation is expected to be more pronounced with higher levels of previous agreement comprehensiveness (hypothesis 2b).

Indeed, the positive impact of partially successful mediation becomes apparent in Table 11. The results of the preferred model specification are displayed in model 1. Previous partial mediation success is positively and statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation onset. Actually, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset increases by 16.6 percent if the previous mediation effort was partially successful. This supports hypothesis 2a. The same holds true when controlling for mediation which did not produce an agreement (model 3), which suggests that, when compared to reneged on mediated agreements only, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset becomes even more pronounced, as subsequent mediation onset is 30.2 percent more likely in these cases.

When controlling for whether the subsequent mediation event takes place within a larger process, the coefficient remains positive, but turns statistically insignificant (model 2).

Hence, the fact that both conflict parties might have agreed to a larger process in the past seems to be more decisive for subsequent mediation onset than previous partial mediation success. Adding mediation which did not produce an agreement to the model again (model 4), while controlling for whether the subsequent event takes place within a process, the results are statistically significant on the five-percent level with regard to previous partial mediation success. They are positive and significant on the one-percent level with regard to previous mediation which did not produce an agreement. While this finding provides further support for hypotheses 1 and 2a, it also yields first indications of support for hypothesis 3a (on previously reneged on mediated agreements).

Table 11. The impact of previous partial mediation success on subsequent mediation onset

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset	(5) Mediation onset
Previous partial agreement	0.5283* (0.206)	0.2003 (0.240)	0.9357** (0.240)	0.5619* (0.277)	
Previous no agreement			0.5108** (0.149)	0.4508** (0.168)	
Sum mediated agreements					-0.1852** (0.050)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2711 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.2355 (0.177)	0.2984 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)	0.2603 (0.178)	0.3119 <sup>†</sup> (0.160)
Relative rebel strength	0.0094 (0.117)	0.0549 (0.131)	0.0354 (0.116)	0.0817 (0.130)	0.1934 (0.128)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2015** (0.027)	0.1783** (0.031)	0.2120** (0.028)	0.1879** (0.031)	0.2066** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0061** (0.001)	-0.0046** (0.001)
Same process		2.1264** (0.194)		2.1094** (0.194)	
Constant	-1.3142** (0.155)	-1.5683** (0.175)	-1.7947** (0.213)	-1.9978** (0.241)	-1.3220** (0.157)
Log-Likelihood	-349.740	-267.932	-343.568	-264.113	-344.991
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Interestingly, and as presumed in the theoretical argument, the coefficient of previous partial mediation success turns negative, but remains statistically significant, when exchanging the previous partial mediation success variable with a variable that counts the amount of agreements which have been reached before (model 5). With an increasing number of agreements reached, the likelihood of an agreement embracing the most pressing conflict issues increases. The necessity for subsequent mediation onset decreases in these cases. Hence, this result does not contradict the theoretical argument.

Robustness tests further support the findings of the preferred model specification. When including variables on the government's irregular entry to power, the government receiving troop support, the presence of peacekeeping troops, the topics discussed during previous mediation, or using an alternative measure for rebel legitimacy, the coefficient of the variable indicating previous partial mediation success remains positive. The results are statistically significant.

The presented findings support hypothesis 2a. Mediation onset is more likely after previous partial mediation success. Apparently, the conflict parties do not consider their preference order with regard to the position mediation holds as faulty after previous mediation produced a partial agreement. Therefore, subsequent mediation is likely to set on. According to the theoretical argument, subsequent mediation onset is expected to be even more likely if agreements with increasing comprehensiveness were reached. But does agreement comprehensiveness really make a difference?

Table 12 shows the results of the preferred model specification, taking into account agreement comprehensiveness (model 1). It becomes clear that agreement comprehensiveness as such is not statistically linked to subsequent mediation onset, though the coefficient is positive. This result holds, regardless of the model specification. However, the coefficient of the variable accounting for the previous agreement's comprehensiveness turns negative when controlling for whether the previous agreement named outstanding issues. It remains statistically insignificant, though. Robustness tests further support the result of the preferred model specification (see Appendix). Thus, though subsequent mediation onset is linked to previous partial mediation success, as the results of Table 11 show, the degree of comprehensiveness of previous partial agreements does not seem to matter. As not even the direction of the coefficient remains constant

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throughout the tests run, hypothesis 2b, which assumed a positive link between the comprehensiveness of previously reached agreements and subsequent mediation onset, is considered not supported.

Table 12. The impact of previous partial mediation success on subsequent mediation onset by agreement comprehensiveness

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agreement	0.0326 (0.060)	0.0957 (0.061)	0.0111 (0.066)	-0.0864 (0.080)
No agreement prev. year		0.5539** (0.116)		
Previous agreement contains ceasefire			0.1446 (0.183)	
Previous agreement contains outstanding issues				0.6573** (0.234)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2346 (0.157)	0.2185 (0.161)	0.2286 (0.158)	0.2736 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)
Relative rebel strength	0.0141 (0.115)	0.0645 (0.116)	0.0180 (0.116)	0.0171 (0.117)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2016** (0.027)	0.1735** (0.028)	0.2010** (0.027)	0.2052** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0047** (0.001)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)
Constant	-1.2807** (0.153)	-1.5936** (0.170)	-1.2981** (0.154)	-1.3388** (0.156)
Log-Likelihood	-352.838	-341.297	-352.528	-348.892
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

In sum, it becomes clear that previous partial mediation success has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset. This finding supports hypothesis 2a. Partial mediation success seems to underline the benefits of mediation to both conflict parties, as both are likely to engage in a subsequent mediation effort. The third party solved the private information sharing and the commitment problem to a degree that enabled the disputants to sign a

lasting partial agreement. Thus, when having to decide on whether to engage in subsequent mediation, both conflict parties are likely to do so. However, the comprehensiveness of a reached agreement is not statistically linked to subsequent mediation onset, and hypothesis 2b is not supported. This might be explained by the fact that partial mediation success has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset regardless of the degree of comprehensiveness: the benefits of mediation seem to be underlined by any type of agreement reached. Hence, the cost-benefit calculations of the conflict parties are altered by the sole fact that an agreement was reached. Moreover, the results suggest that the comprehensiveness of the previously reached partial agreement is not decisive for subsequent mediation onset.

### ***5.1.3 Previously Reneged On Agreements***

Reneged on mediated agreements are unaccounted for in existing research on mediation. In the theoretical argument presented in chapter 3, the negative impact of reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset was highlighted: as reneged on mediated agreements underline the costs of mediation, other conflict management tools are likely to be ranked higher, especially in the government's preference order, regardless of which side reneged on an agreement (though the causal mechanisms behind not engaging in subsequent mediation differ, see chapter 3). Therefore, hypothesis 3a notes a negative relation between previously reneged on mediated agreements and subsequent mediation onset.

The results displayed in Table 13 support hypothesis 3a. In the preferred model specification (model 1), the coefficient of the main variable of interest is negative, and the result is statistically significant on the one-percent level. In fact, subsequent mediation onset is 16.5 percent less likely if the previously reached agreement was reneged on. The coefficient remains negative and the results statistically significant when including agreements which were reneged on during the last three or five years. The results are statistically insignificant when accounting for agreements reneged on during the previous year (see Appendix). With regard to substantial effects, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset reduces by 12.6 percent (if agreements reneged on during the previous three years are accounted for), or 15.1 percent (if agreements reneged on during the previous five years are accounted for). Interestingly, the statistical significance of the

negative effect of reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset does not reduce with time passing, as it does when mediation which did not produce an agreement, or partial mediation success are accounted for. This suggests that especially reneged on agreements have a lasting negative impact on subsequent mediation onset, which should not be underestimated.

Table 13. The impact of previously reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset	(5) Mediation onset
Previous agreement reneged	-0.7167** (0.184)	-0.4091* (0.195)			
Sum reneged agreements			-0.4914** (0.081)		
Comprehensiveness prev. reneged agreement				-0.1811** (0.041)	-0.1198** (0.045)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2219 (0.159)	0.2142 (0.176)	0.3790* (0.165)	0.2049 (0.159)	0.2019 (0.177)
Relative rebel strength	0.0510 (0.115)	0.0796 (0.130)	0.4114** (0.142)	0.0535 (0.116)	0.0859 (0.130)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2127** (0.028)	0.1851** (0.031)	0.2637** (0.031)	0.2182** (0.028)	0.1899** (0.031)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0068** (0.001)	-0.0061** (0.001)	-0.0061** (0.001)
Same process		2.0974** (0.194)			2.0883** (0.194)
Constant	-1.2766** (0.154)	-1.5524** (0.174)	-1.6947** (0.177)	-1.2926* (0.155)	-1.5654** (0.175)
Log-Likelihood	-344.545	-265.931	-330.453	-342.253	-264.465
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

Additional robustness tests also support the findings of the preferred model specification (see Appendix). Regardless of the variables added to the model, e.g. the type or content of the reneged on agreement, the results remain significant on the one- or five-percent level.

Only when replacing the variable which denotes that a previously mediated agreement was reneged on with a variable that accounts for whether an agreement which is part of a process was reneged on during the previous year, the result turns statistically insignificant. The coefficient remains negative, though. Overall, the conducted tests provide sound support for hypothesis 3a: subsequent mediation onset is less likely after a previously mediated agreement was reneged on.

The comprehensiveness of reneged on agreements is accounted for in model 4 and 5 of Table 13. Model 4 shows the results of the preferred model specification. The coefficient of the comprehensiveness variable is negative and the results are statistically significant on the one-percent level. This suggests that the more comprehensive a previously reneged on agreement was the less likely subsequent mediation onset becomes, which yields support for hypothesis 3b. In fact, subsequent mediation onset is 14.4 percent less likely if an agreement covering five topics was reneged on in comparison to agreements which cover one topic, and 16.7 percent less likely if agreements were reneged on which covered six in comparison to one topic. When controlling for whether the subsequent mediation effort takes place in the context of a larger process (model 5), the coefficient remains negative, and the results are significant on the one-percent level. Thus, the more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was, the more likely the conflict parties are to reconsider their preference order. They put mediation on a lower ranking in their preference order, which causes them to choose other conflict management tools than mediation in the future.

All in all, it becomes apparent that previously reneged on agreements have a negative impact on subsequent mediation onset. The conflict parties seem to draw the conclusion that engaging in mediation bears more costs than benefits, and that either continued conflict or using another conflict management tool is more beneficial than engaging in mediation again. This effect is more pronounced the more comprehensive the previous agreement was. Hence, support for hypothesis 3a and 3b is noted. The results strongly underline the necessity of carefully designing peace agreements, as reneged on agreements have severe negative effects and might prohibit future mediation.

#### **5.1.4 The Timing of Subsequent Mediation Onset**

According to the presented theoretical argument, the outcome of a mediation event has a decisive impact on the amount of time which needs to pass until the next mediation effort starts. It is expected that most time needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on if a mediated agreement was renegeed on, because the conflict parties consider the costs of engaging in mediation again as too high in the aftermath of a renegeed on mediated agreement. Only if the conflict context forces them to engage in mediation will they consider it again. In comparison, less time has to pass if the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, as it highlighted benefits of mediation, such as information gathering, while staying in control of the mediation outcome. The least amount of time needs to pass after partial mediation success. If a partial agreement has been reached through mediation, the third party was able to solve the credible commitment and the private information sharing problem, which the conflict parties ascribe to the benefits of mediation. As these benefits are more pronounced after partial mediation success than after mediation which did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation is expected to set on even more quickly. These notions are summarised in hypothesis 4.

To test how much time passes between the outcome of a previous mediation effort and subsequent mediation onset, the method of estimation needs to be changed. Instead of using probit models, as in the previous three subchapters, survival analysis is used in this subchapter. Hence, the dependent variable is no longer subsequent mediation onset, but the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on. The dataset used has been edited to be suitable for survival analysis (as described in chapter 4). Therefore, the number of observations included in the dataset is 224 for this subchapter.

In Illustration 4, the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are displayed.<sup>62</sup> The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are the result of the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier survival function and show ‘the survival distribution without making any assumptions’ (Harrell 2001: 400). The solid line in Illustration 4 shows how long a dyad survives without subsequent mediation setting on if the previous mediation event ended in a partial agreement. The dashed line shows the survival time of full agreements. The dotted line shows the same for previous

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<sup>62</sup> The dyad made up of the Government of Angola and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) is excluded, as it is an extreme outlier.

mediation which ended without an agreement, and the dashed-dotted line shows the survival time for reneged on mediated agreements.

Illustration 4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for subsequent mediation onset




Illustration 4 shows that the hazard of subsequent mediation onset is lowest for dyads in which a mediated agreement was reneged on from the immediate quarter following the previous mediation outcome. Only two years after an agreement was reneged on, dyads which have reached a full agreement have a lower hazard of subsequent mediation onset. While the latter finding can be explained with the conflicts in these dyads having ended and subsequent mediation onset becoming unnecessary – e.g. the conflict between the Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) ended with a peace agreement signed on November 16, 2003 – dyads in which an agreement was reneged on are still in conflict. For example in the conflict between the Government of Chad and the MDJT, or in the conflict between the Government of Angola and UNITA, mediation was only observed again after 13 quarters. In fact, the hazard of mediation onset after a mediated agreement was reneged on increases after every quarter for the first nine months, but remains constant for the next five quarters, after which it increases again. Thus, the more time passes, the more likely

subsequent mediation onset becomes if the previous agreement was reneged on. But for it to set on, substantially more time has to pass than after other mediation outcomes.

Dyads in which mediation produced a partial agreement have the highest hazard of subsequent mediation onset (aside from the first quarter in which dyads that have reached a full agreement face the highest hazard of subsequent mediation onset). For example, mediation set on within two quarters after a partial agreement between the Government of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was reached in 2003. Mediation also set on within three months after the Government of Ivory Coast and MPCJ reached an agreement in 2003. This matches the theoretical argument, according to which a continuation of talks is highly likely within a short time period after partial mediation success. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset in these cases increases drastically after the first and second quarter, while the hazard of subsequent mediation onset after full agreements were reached remains constant after the first six months.

The hazard of mediation onset following mediation efforts which did not produce an agreement is constantly higher than the hazard of subsequent mediation onset after reneged on agreements, but lower than the hazard of mediation onset following partial mediation success. It increases with each quarter during the first year, and remains rather constant during the second and third year after a mediation event did not produce an agreement. For example, mediation set on within the first quarter after the previous event did not produce an agreement between the Government of Congo and the Ninjas, or within the first three quarters between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A.

If the previous mediation event did not produce an agreement, mediation sets on in the subsequent quarter in 44 percent of the dyads. 84 percent of the dyads in which mediation did not produce an agreement have seen mediation in the subsequent year. If the previous mediation event produced a partial agreement, subsequent mediation onset is observed in the following quarter in 52 percent. 87 percent of these dyads see mediation in the following six months. If the previous mediation event produced a full agreement, 53 percent of the dyads see subsequent mediation onset in the following quarter, and 82 percent see subsequent mediation onset in the following six months. If the previous agreement was reneged on, only 12 percent of the dyads see subsequent mediation onset in the following quarter. 35 percent see mediation in the following six months. Actually, it

takes two years until 88 percent of the dyads in which a previous agreement was reneged on engage in mediation again. Thus, it becomes apparent that the amount of time which passes between the outcome of a previous mediation effort and subsequent mediation onset is highest after an agreement has been reneged on, and lowest after partial mediation success, as expected in the theoretical argument.

Overall, the descriptive results of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates support hypothesis 4. The least amount of time until subsequent mediation sets on is observed in dyads in which a partial agreement was reached during the previous mediation effort. Comparably more time needs to pass after mediation did not produce an agreement, while most time has to pass after reneged on mediated agreements (excluding full agreements) until subsequent mediation onset is observed. To further investigate how much time needs to pass until mediation sets on, the results of the semi-parametric Cox models are presented in Table 14. As described in chapter 4, the PWP gap-time approach is used to account for the amount of time which needs to pass until mediation sets on after partial mediation success, mediation which did not produce an agreement, and reneged on agreements respectively.<sup>63</sup>

The results displayed in Table 14 show the coefficients of the PWP gap-time approach. If the coefficient is positive, the hazard rate for mediation is high, and therefore the time a dyad takes until mediation sets on again lower. If the coefficient is negative, the duration until mediation sets on in a dyad is higher, and therefore the hazard of subsequent mediation onset lower.

The results basically mirror the findings of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, though they largely lack statistical significance. The least amount of time needs to pass after mediation was partially successful (Tmodel 2). This is supported by robustness tests (see Appendix). For example, when including variables on previous mediation which did not produce an agreement as well as previous partial mediation success into one model, the coefficients for both variables are positive and significant on the five-percent level. The

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<sup>63</sup> To test for the overall fit of the model derived, the Cox-Snell residuals are most commonly used (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004: 120). The test for Cox-Snell residuals is run without stratifying the model. It becomes clear that the results of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard are very similar to the Cox-Snell residuals, which suggests that the model fits the data well. This seems to be particularly true for models which include a variable on previously successful mediation. As the dyad made up of the Government of Angola and FLEC-FAC is an outlier with regard to the amount of time that passed after previous mediation did not produce an agreement, it is excluded in the following tests. Particularly the model which accounts for previous mediation which did not produce an agreement fits the data better without the dyad.

coefficient of the variable indicating previous partial mediation success is higher, though. This effect only turns around when accounting for the outcome of the previous year. If this is done, the hazard for subsequent mediation onset is higher after previous mediation which did not produce an agreement. This is most likely the case because most dyads in which a partial agreement has been reached before, which deem subsequent mediation necessary, have engaged in it swiftly again, as the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates suggest. Besides, the hazard of subsequent mediation onset increases with agreement comprehensiveness (model 3).

Table 14. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset

	(1) Hazard of mediation onset	(2) Hazard of mediation onset	(3) Hazard of mediation onset	(4) Hazard of mediation onset	(5) Hazard of mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.2797 (0.206)				
Previous partial agreement		0.5217 <sup>†</sup> (0.267)			
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agreement			0.1129* (0.055)		
Previous agreement reneged				-0.4636 (0.348)	
Comprehensiveness prev. reneged agr.					-0.1108 (0.083)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.1762 (0.214)	0.3796 (0.237)	0.3285 (0.233)	0.3818 (0.258)	0.3799 (0.258)
Relative rebel strength	-0.1125 (0.195)	0.0360 (0.180)	0.0830 (0.182)	0.0455 (0.181)	0.0491 (0.181)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0006* (0.000)	-0.0008** (0.000)	-0.0007** (0.000)	-0.0005** (0.000)	-0.0005** (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2519** (0.067)	0.2255** (0.042)	0.2266** (0.042)	0.2136** (0.039)	0.2146** (0.039)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0083* (0.004)	-0.0053** (0.002)	-0.0052** (0.002)	-0.0046** (0.002)	-0.0046** (0.002)
Log-Likelihood	-549.197	-548.987	-644.899	-644.892	-644.899
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	223	223	223	223	223

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

If an agreement was reneged on, the hazard of subsequent mediation onset reduces (model 4). This finding is supported by robustness tests, which provide marginally significant results that bear negative coefficients (see Appendix). The results support the notion that most time needs to pass between a reneged on mediated agreement and subsequent mediation onset. Interestingly, the coefficient turns positive when accounting for agreements which have been reneged on during the previous three years, suggesting that, with a sufficient amount of time passing, mediation becomes an option again. The result is marginally significant. The coefficient of the variable accounting for the comprehensiveness of the previously reneged on agreement is negative, but again statistically insignificant (model 5).

Taking the results of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates together with the results of the Cox models displayed in Table 14 and the robustness tests, support for hypothesis 4 can be noted. The results are particularly pronounced for the analysis on previous partial mediation success: dyads in which a partial agreement has been mediated face the highest hazard of subsequent mediation onset. This supports the expectation that previous mediation success contributes to the conflict parties evaluating mediation positively. Dyads in which a mediated agreement was reneged on face the lowest hazard of subsequent mediation onset.

### ***5.1.5 Additional Findings***

The additional variables included into the preferred model mostly lack statistical significance. However, when excluding the variables on the amount of mediation which has taken place in a dyad from the model (see Appendix), the other variables partly reach statistical significance (further discussed below). The findings on the variables included in the preferred model specification are briefly summarised and related to existing research in this subchapter. Of the variables included in robustness tests, only the results of the variable indicating whether the mediation event is part of a larger process is included in this section. The impact of all other variables included in robustness tests is not discussed in this subchapter, because they are not considered to be as key for the analysis as the variables included in this section.

Rebel groups which have a *legal political wing* are positively and (partly) statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation onset. This result suggests that governments are more likely to engage in talks with rebel groups who are legally recognised. This finding matches previous research (e.g. Clayton 2013; Ruhe 2015), according to which the likelihood of mediation onset increases if rebel groups are legitimised. The alternative measure for the rebel group's political wing, which includes both legal political wings and illegal political wings of rebel groups, is not statistically significant (see Appendix).

*Relatively strong rebel groups* are also positively and (partly) statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation onset. This finding further supports previous research on relative rebel strength, according to which relatively stronger rebel groups are able to force governments to the mediation table, since the latter perceives the former as a substantial threat (Clayton 2013; Clayton & Gleditsch 2014; Greig 2015).

The variable which describes *conflict intensity between mediation events* provides little clarity. The coefficient is positive in some model specifications, but negative in others, and mostly lacks statistical significance. The same needs to be noted for the more common measure of battle deaths. No sound conclusions can be drawn from these results. The results suggest that conflict intensity is not as crucial for subsequent mediation efforts as for general mediation onset. Future research needs to further disentangle this notion.

The *sum of previous mediation events* is jointly significant. The squared term is negative, the count variable positive. Hence, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset reduces the more mediation has taken place in a dyad, but increases again once a turning point is reached. This suggests that after the initial euphoria about mediation onset, and after rebel groups have been legitimised, the disputants might start to question the mediator's ability to encourage peace. Only if this turning point is overcome, subsequent mediation onset is likely again. The variables on conflict duration are not statistically significant.

The variable accounting for whether a potential mediation event is part of a larger process (*same process*) is positive and statistically significant in all conducted tests. This finding supports the theoretical expectation that subsequent mediation onset is more likely if a mediation event is part of a larger process, due to the conflict parties' commitment to the mediation effort. These results provide important insights into the dynamics at play

between mediation events when a larger mediation process takes place, and should be accounted for more extensively in future research.

### 5.1.6 Discussion and Preliminary Conclusion

The results presented in this subchapter largely support the hypotheses on subsequent mediation onset. They underline that the conflict parties are likely to take the costs and benefits which accrued during the previous mediation effort, accumulated in the previous mediation outcome, into account when making a decision on whether or not to engage in subsequent mediation. Hence, previous mediation outcomes can be considered seminal for subsequent mediation onset. The results of the previous subchapters are summarised in Table 15. A ✓ indicates that a hypothesis is supported. A ✕ indicates that a hypothesis was not supported or rejected.<sup>64</sup>

Table 15. Summary of results on subsequent mediation onset

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Supported?</b>
H1	If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓
H2a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓
H2b	The more comprehensive the previous partial agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation onset.	✕
H3a	If a previously reached mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely.	✓
H3b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation onset.	✓
H4	The more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation as a conflict management tool, the less time has to pass until it sets on again.	✓

<sup>64</sup> For simplicity, no differentiation in the symbols regarding hypotheses which are not supported and hypotheses which are rejected is made.

Subsequent mediation onset is likely if previous mediation did not produce an agreement (hypothesis 1). In these cases, the conflict parties experienced the benefits of mediation to a certain extent. Though neither the private information nor the credible commitment problem was solved, the conflict parties are likely to acknowledge the benefits the presence of a third party has, e.g. the signalling capacity of mediation, and the gathering some information on their opponent – if only on the opponent's resolve to conflict.

Subsequent mediation onset is also likely after partial mediation success (hypothesis 2a). The third party was able to contribute to the conflict parties overcoming their private information sharing and the commitment problem, as expected by Fearon (1995) and Walter (1997, 2002). Since reaching agreements at the mediation table is less costly than reaching agreements on the battlefield (Fearon 1995), the conflict parties are likely to engage in subsequent mediation. The conflict parties seem to draw this conclusion regardless of the comprehensiveness of the previously reached agreement. Therefore, hypothesis 2b is not supported by the statistical tests conducted. Consequently, the sole existence of an agreement seems to be the decisive factor for the conflict parties' cost-benefit calculations on subsequent mediation onset. More comprehensive agreements do not put additional weight to the benefits of mediation.

If a mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely (hypothesis 3a). The reneged on agreement underlined the mediator's inability to solve the credible commitment problem, and thereby the costs of sharing private information. Previously shared information is likely to be misused when third parties are unable to provide credible security guarantees. The costs of mediation outweigh the benefits of it, and subsequent mediation onset becomes unlikely. This effect is more pronounced the more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was (hypothesis 3b), as more information was exchanged to reach these agreements, and therefore the costs of mediation are more strongly underlined through reneged on comprehensive agreements.

It became clear that partial mediation success highlights the benefits of mediation most, while reneged on mediated agreements point out the costs of it. Based on these notions, hypothesis 4 expects less time to pass until subsequent mediation sets on the more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation. Especially the descriptive results of the conducted survival analysis support this notion. Statistically significant support in the Cox models

might be lacking due to the stratification method, as only few dyads have seen e.g. a high number of mediation events producing reneged on mediated agreements.

In sum, it becomes apparent that previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset. Through the statistical analysis, this link was uncovered. Nevertheless, it remains unclear to which extent the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument mattered, as it was not possible to test the extent to which the private information and the credible commitment problem were solved from each conflict actor's perspective. To shed further light onto these causal dynamics, a case study is conducted in chapter 6. First, however, the question whether the impact of previous mediation outcomes carries forward to subsequent mediation success is addressed in the ensuing quantitative subchapter.

## **5.2 Results for Subsequent Mediation Success**

To test whether previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation success, the method of estimation needs to be changed. As explained in chapter 4, a two-stage approach needs to be used to account for the fact that not all dyads have selected into subsequent mediation: only dyads in which subsequent mediation set on are included in the estimation whether mediation success is observed. Hence, the Sartori selection estimator (Sartori 2003) is used for the analyses of mediation success.<sup>65</sup>

### ***5.2.1 Previous Mediation Did Not Produce an Agreement***

If previous mediation did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation success is expected according to the theoretical argument (hypothesis 5). Though mediation might not always produce an agreement, the information exchanged during mediation efforts which do not produce agreements is drawn on during subsequent mediation. It enables the mediator to identify a ZoA, and to compose an agreement both conflict parties can agree to.

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<sup>65</sup> The first stage (mediation onset) is neglected in the interpretation of the results as they are largely similar to the ones presented in the previous subchapter.

**Table 16. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement**

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.2395 <sup>†</sup> (0.125)	0.1963 (0.186)	0.2895* (0.141)	0.2034 (0.197)		
Sum no agreement					-0.0230 (0.021)	-0.2041** (0.054)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2133 (0.157)	0.0581 (0.223)	0.1803 (0.174)	-0.0129 (0.232)	0.2357 (0.158)	0.1533 (0.233)
Relative rebel Strength	0.0429 (0.113)	0.2916* (0.140)	0.0660 (0.128)	0.3977* (0.169)	-0.0366 (0.123)	-0.0907 (0.200)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0005 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2044** (0.027)	0.0914* (0.039)	0.1728** (0.030)	0.0553 (0.042)	0.2104** (0.028)	0.1721** (0.046)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0051** (0.001)	-0.0010 (0.002)	-0.0053** (0.001)	0.0004 (0.002)
Same process			2.1244** (0.192)	0.6683** (0.188)		
Constant	-1.4942** (0.188)	-2.4352** (0.276)	-1.7723** (0.215)	-2.5711** (0.304)	-1.1761** (0.173)	-1.5876** (0.295)
Log-Likelihood	-442.10		-358.02		-436.43	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	103.04 (6)		189.38 (7)		104.98 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

The results presented in Table 16 show that previous mediation which did not produce an agreement is not statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success (model 1). The coefficient is positive and therefore points in the direction expected by the theoretical argument.<sup>66</sup> The results remain statistically insignificant when accounting for whether the event is part of a larger process (model 2) as well as in robustness tests (see Appendix). Substantial effects, calculated based on model 1, show that subsequent

<sup>66</sup> The same result is found when testing the impact of mediation which did not produce an agreement on subsequent long-term mediation success – mediation producing an agreement which lasted for at least five years (see Appendix).

mediation success is 7.6 percent more likely if previous mediation did not produce an agreement.

The results suggest that previous mediation not producing an agreement does not have a statistically significant impact on subsequent mediation success. Instead, other factors besides previous mediation not producing an agreement are more decisive for subsequent mediation success. For example, the variable on relative rebel strength is positive and statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success in model 1 and model 2, which suggests that subsequent mediation success is more likely when rebel groups are relatively strong (Clayton 2013). The results also suggest that subsequent mediation success is more likely if a mediation event is part of a larger process (model 2). Particularly the fact that the previous mediation effort was part of a larger mediation process seems to be more decisive for subsequent mediation success than previous mediation which did not produce an agreement. This might be the case because if a mediation effort takes part in context of a larger process, the conflict parties might have shown a greater commitment to mediation, and thus might be more willing to work towards subsequent mediation success in order to address other agenda items. The benefits of mediation might hence be more strongly underlined by the scope of a mediation process than by the previous mediation outcome.

When including a variable which counts the number of times mediation did not produce an agreement (model 3), the coefficient is negative and the result statistically significant on the one-percent level. The result suggests that with an increasing amount of mediation ending without an agreement, the conflict parties lose faith in the third party's ability to identify a ZoA, and to provide credible security guarantees. Besides, they might realise that their opponent uses the process to pursue 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998). If subsequent mediation sets on in these cases, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.

Overall, hypothesis 5 is not supported. Though the coefficient is positive, the results are statistically insignificant. One explanation for the insignificant result might be that mediation events not producing agreements might be followed by subsequent mediation efforts which do not produce agreement until a turning point is reached, at which a sufficient amount of information has been exchanged, trust has been built, and provided security guarantees are considered credible, as suggested by Böhmelt (2013). The link

between previous mediation not producing agreements and subsequent mediation success is analysed further in the case study.

### ***5.2.2 Previous Partial Mediation Success***

Previous partial mediation success is expected to be linked to subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 6a), as the conflict parties are likely to have gathered additional information on the benefits of working towards an agreement through the previous partial success. This effect is likely to be more pronounced the more comprehensive the previously reached partial agreement was (hypothesis 6b), because the benefits of sharing private information are underlined even more when more comprehensive agreements are reached. Building up on the amount of information shared during previous partially successful mediation, and acknowledging the benefits of sharing private information, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success is therefore expected to increase with increasing agreement comprehensiveness.

Model 1 of Table 17 shows that previous partial agreements have a positive impact on subsequent mediation success: subsequent mediation success is 24.5 percent more likely if a partial agreement has been reached previously. The result is statistically significant on the one-percent level. When accounting for whether the event takes place in a larger process, (model 2), the link between previous partial mediation success and subsequent mediation success remains statistically significant. Even when estimating the impact of previous partial mediation success on long-term mediation success, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant on the one-percent level (see Appendix). When including partial agreements reached during the previous year into the analysis, the coefficient remains positive, but the results are only marginally significant (model 3). Hence, the very previous mediation outcome having produced a partial agreement seems to be more decisive for subsequent mediation success than partial agreements reached longer ago.

When previous mediation which did not produce an agreement is added to the model as well (Table 18, model 1), the results of the preferred model specification are further underlined. Substantial effects denote that subsequent mediation success after a partial agreement has been reached is 45.9 percent more likely than after an agreement has been

renege on, while subsequent mediation success is 27.3 percent more likely after previous mediation did not produce an agreement in comparison to previously renege on mediated agreement. This result does not only shed light onto the impact previous partial agreements and mediation which did not produce an agreement have on subsequent mediation success, but also on the impact previously renege on mediated agreements have. The latter's impact is analysed in-depth in the subsequent subchapter.

Table 17. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.5300** (0.206)	0.6523** (0.249)	0.2049 (0.230)	0.5379* (0.260)		
Partial agreement previous year					0.2732 <sup>†</sup> (0.161)	0.3768 <sup>†</sup> (0.219)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2592 (0.158)	0.1402 (0.226)	0.1961 (0.175)	0.0809 (0.237)	0.2426 (0.157)	0.1250 (0.225)
Relative rebel strength	0.0201 (0.115)	0.2574 <sup>†</sup> (0.146)	0.0442 (0.130)	0.3477* (0.169)	0.0106 (0.115)	0.2520 <sup>†</sup> (0.143)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum prev. mediation events	0.1995** (0.027)	0.0906* (0.040)	0.1672** (0.030)	0.0561 (0.042)	0.1990** (0.027)	0.0867* (0.040)
Sum prev. mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)	-0.0051** (0.001)	-0.0012 (0.002)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)
Same process			2.0955** (0.192)	0.6218** (0.189)		
Constant	-1.3203** (0.155)	-2.3257** (0.237)	-1.5249** (0.172)	-2.4221** (0.248)	-1.2989** (0.153)	-2.2899** (0.233)
Log-Likelihood	-439.47		-358.23		-441.97	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	105.99 (6)		190.74 (7)		103.21 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Robustness tests support the findings of the preferred model specification (see Appendix): the coefficient is almost always positive and the results range between statistical

significance on the five- and one-percent level.<sup>67</sup> For example, when accounting for the presence of a peacekeeping operation, the government's irregular entry to power, the topics discussed during the previous mediation event, or when using the alternative measures for conflict intensity and rebel legitimacy, the coefficient of the main variable of interest remains positive and statistically significant.<sup>68</sup> Overall, the presented results provide sound support for hypothesis 6a.

Model 2 of Table 18 shows that the likelihood of subsequent mediation success increases with an increasing number of agreements reached in the past. The benefits of sharing private information, and working towards an agreement, have been underlined repeatedly. Thus, the conflict parties do not ascribe expected costs and benefits to sharing private information any longer, but they are relatively sure of the costs and benefits sharing information comes along with. This result further supports the theoretical argument presented in chapter 3, and, with it, hypothesis 6a.

Model 3 of Table 18 shows that the comprehensiveness of previously reached partial agreements is not statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success. The coefficient is negative, which stands contrary to hypothesis 6b. This does not change in robustness tests, in which the coefficient is sometimes positive and sometimes negative. When controlling for whether the previous agreement contained security guarantees or a ceasefire, the results remain statistically insignificant as well (see Appendix). While expected otherwise in the theoretical argument, an explanation for this finding might be the increasing difficulty to identify agreements that lie in the ZoA with increasing agreement comprehensiveness. Comparably easy topics might have been addressed during previous mediation efforts. Hence, more difficult issues are likely to be discussed the more comprehensive the previous mediation outcome was. The likelihood of subsequent mediation success decreases, as a number of mediation events which do not produce agreements are needed to exchange a sufficient amount of private information before subsequent mediation success is observed again.

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<sup>67</sup> Only when using the Heckman instead of the Sartori selection estimator, the results turn statistically insignificant, which might be due to an unsuitable model choice. The direction of the coefficients remains the same.

<sup>68</sup> Interestingly, when the previous agreement was a final agreement, the coefficient is negative, though not statistically significant. This finding underlines the decision of excluding final agreements from the variable included in the preferred model specification, as subsequent mediation is expected to be unnecessary after final agreements are reached. If mediation does set on in these cases, most likely more difficult issues have to be negotiated.

Table 18. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.9475** (0.240)	1.3105** (0.363)				
Previous no agreement	0.5199** (0.150)	0.7814** (0.293)				
Sum previous agreements			-0.1828** (0.049)	0.1941* (0.075)		
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agr.					0.0344 (0.035)	-0.0173 (0.056)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2814 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)	0.1878 (0.231)	0.2698 <sup>†</sup> (0.160)	0.0439 (0.227)	0.2089 (0.157)	0.0683 (0.223)
Relative rebel strength	0.0502 (0.114)	0.3067* (0.145)	0.2280 <sup>†</sup> (0.129)	0.1142 (0.171)	0.0327 (0.114)	0.2775* (0.139)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2101** (0.028)	0.0852* (0.041)	0.2000** (0.027)	0.0566 (0.042)	0.1994** (0.027)	0.0880* (0.039)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0040** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)
Constant	-1.8125** (0.213)	-3.0491** (0.369)	-1.3550** (0.155)	-2.1904** (0.207)	-1.3084** (0.154)	-2.2487** (0.233)
Log-Likelihood	-431.35		-425.00		-443.26	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	112.58 (7)		113.30 (6)		101.83 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Overall, it becomes clear that partial agreements reached during the previous mediation event have a positive impact on subsequent mediation success. Indeed, the benefit of sharing private information and working towards an agreement as well as the realisation that the third party's security guarantees are working, seem to have a positive impact on the likelihood of subsequent mediation success, given the onset of subsequent mediation. These findings support hypothesis 6a. However, the comprehensiveness of the previously reached agreement does not seem to have a decisive impact on subsequent mediation success. Thus, the results do not support hypothesis 6b.

**5.2.3 Previously Reneged On Mediated Agreements**

According to the theoretical argument, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success reduces if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on (hypothesis 7a). If a mediated agreement was reneged on, the private information shared during previous mediation was misused, and the third party’s inability to solve the credible commitment problem by providing security guarantees was underlined. The costs of reaching an agreement become apparent. Thus, given the onsets of a subsequent mediation event, the conflict parties are unlikely to work towards reaching another agreement.

Table 19. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after previously reneged on mediated agreements

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement reneged	-0.7362** (0.184)	-0.5787 <sup>†</sup> (0.302)	-0.4310* (0.195)	-0.4600 (0.314)		
Agreement reneged previous year					-0.4877* (0.220)	-0.1699 (0.313)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2010 (0.158)	0.0688 (0.224)	0.1746 (0.175)	0.0013 (0.234)	0.2168 (0.157)	0.0748 (0.223)
Relative rebel strength	0.0690 (0.114)	0.3081* (0.142)	0.0700 (0.130)	0.4073* (0.170)	0.0702 (0.115)	0.2932* (0.145)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2111** (0.028)	0.0902* (0.039)	0.1727** (0.030)	0.0555 (0.041)	0.2054** (0.027)	0.0907* (0.039)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0052** (0.001)	-0.0011 (0.002)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)
Same process			2.0617** (0.192)	0.6178** (0.190)		
Constant	-1.2898** (0.153)	-2.2536** (0.231)	-1.5049** (0.172)	-2.3778** (0.245)	-1.3161** (0.153)	-2.2702** (0.231)
Log-Likelihood	-357.39		-357.39		-441.35	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	111.34 (6)		190.74 (7)		104.74 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Model 1 of Table 19 indicates that the likelihood of subsequent mediation success reduces if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant on the ten-percent level. Substantial effects suggest that the likelihood of subsequent mediation success reduces by 22.6 percent if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on. The conflict parties seem to draw the conclusion that the costs of mediated agreements outweigh the benefits of sharing private information, and hence do not work towards an agreement, or consent to a proposed settlements during subsequent mediation events. When accounting for the mediation event being embedded in a larger process (model 2), the coefficient remains negative, but the result is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the negative impact of agreements reneged on in the context of a larger mediation process is mitigated to a certain extent. The same can be observed when agreements reneged on during the previous year are included in the calculation (model 3).

Robustness tests show consistency with regard to the negative coefficient (see Appendix). The significance levels of the results vary, though. The result of the main variable of interest is statistically insignificant in the Heckman and the Sartori model when including variables on whether previous mediation was on conflict behaviour or on the conflict's incompatibility, when the reneged on agreement was an agreement to have a peace process, or when the previous event was part of a larger process.<sup>69</sup> The results are marginally statistically significant when the alternative measure for rebel legitimacy is used, when the government's irregular entry to power is accounted for, or when the variables on the amount of previous mediation are excluded. They reach the five-percent level of significance when previous talks were on other topics than the incompatibility or conflict behaviour, when overall conflict intensity is accounted for, or when the government receives troop support.

When accounting for whether the previously reneged on agreement contained security guarantees, the coefficient is negative, but the results are statistically insignificant (Table 20, model 1). Considering the theoretical argument, this finding is very interesting, because the negative impact of reneged on security guarantees does not seem to significantly reduce the likelihood of the conflict parties sharing private information during subsequent

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<sup>69</sup> When changing the dependent variable to long-term mediation success, the coefficient is negative, but statistically insignificant as well (see Appendix).

mediation efforts. However, with an increase in the number of agreements reneged, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success reduces significantly (Table 20, model 2). The conflict parties no longer allocate expected costs to private information sharing, but instead allocate costs with more certainty. They are less likely to share private information the more agreements have been reneged on in the past.

Table 20. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after previously reneged on mediated agreements

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement reneged	-0.1254 (0.423)	-0.3780 (0.698)				
Prev. reneged agr. cont. sec. guaran.	-0.6943 (0.442)	-0.2615 (0.709)				
Sum reneged agreements			-0.5139** (0.082)	-0.2843** (0.096)		
Comprehensiveness prev. reneged agr.					-0.1838** (0.041)	-0.1758* (0.078)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.1929 (0.159)	0.0556 (0.226)	0.3712* (0.165)	0.1778 (0.229)	0.1859 (0.159)	0.0534 (0.225)
Relative rebel strength	0.0769 (0.114)	0.3102* (0.143)	0.4585** (0.143)	0.4878** (0.177)	0.0736 (0.114)	0.3141* (0.142)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2145** (0.028)	0.0929* (0.040)	0.2668** (0.031)	0.1074* (0.045)	0.2160** (0.028)	0.0925* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0069** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)
Constant	-1.3040** (0.154)	-2.2582** (0.231)	-1.7496** (0.179)	-2.4315** (0.258)	-1.3078** (0.154)	-2.2592** (0.233)
Log-Likelihood	-433.82		-419.90		-432.58	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	112.94 (7)		126.78 (6)		115.10 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

Taken together, the presented results support the notion that reneged on agreements reduce the likelihood of subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 7a). Though the level of significance varies across models, the coefficient is always negative, and the results are mostly at least marginally significant. According to the theoretical argument, the comprehensiveness of the previously reneged on agreement also influences the likelihood of subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 7b). But is that really the case?

Model 3 (Table 20) shows the link between increasing agreement comprehensiveness and the reducing likelihood of subsequent mediation success. The result is statistically significant on the five-percent level, and replicated in robustness tests (see Appendix). They support hypothesis 7b, and suggest that the conflict parties allocate higher costs to mediation if agreements of higher comprehensiveness are reneged on. To reach these agreements, the conflict parties had to share a higher amount of information. If agreements with higher comprehensiveness are reneged on, their opponent makes use of the previously shared private information aside the bargaining table. The credible commitment problem is strongly underlined, and the costs of sharing private information are experienced.

In sum, given the subsequent onset of mediation, reneged on mediated agreements have the negative impact on subsequent mediation success expected in chapter 3. Reneged on agreements underline the credible commitment problem, and thereby highlight the hazards of sharing private information, causing the conflict parties to refrain from sharing additional private information during subsequent mediation events. The conflict parties therefore rank sharing private information lower than keeping information secret, even if this means that no agreement can be reached during the subsequent mediation event.

#### **5.2.4 Additional Findings**

The variables included into the preferred model specification largely lack statistical significance. Though this changes when excluding the variables on the amount of previous mediation from the equation on subsequent mediation onset, this does not hold true for the subsequent mediation success equation: the results of the control variables remain largely statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, interesting results are noted for some variables.

When the variable which notes whether a *larger mediation process* takes place is accounted for, the third party's ability to hold the conflict parties at the table, and to

encourage them to share private information, becomes apparent. In fact, mediation events which are part of a larger process are positively and statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success.

The fact that *rebel groups* have a *legal political wing* does not significantly influence subsequent mediation success. Though rebel groups with political wings might have clearer set out political aims, and might be more acquainted with lobbying for their agenda, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success is not significantly affected. The coefficient of the variable is positive in all models, though. Furthermore, *relative rebel strength* is positively and statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success in several models. This result supports the notion that relatively strong rebel groups are able to challenge governments and derive concessions from them. Meanwhile, they do not have to fear defection to the same extent as weak rebel groups, as they have the capability to defend themselves (Clayton 2013).

A *conflict's intensity between mediation events* is not statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation success. The results suggest that conflict intensity between mediation events does not have a decisive impact on subsequent mediation success – neither does the alternative measure for conflict intensity. Furthermore, the variables which count the *amount of mediation which has taken place in a dyad* lack joint statistical significance. While the simple count variable is positive and statistically significant in all models, the squared term of the same variable is sometimes negative, sometimes positive, but always statistically insignificant. Thus, no sound conclusion can be drawn from these results for the impact the amount of previous mediation in a dyad has on the likelihood of subsequent mediation success.

### **5.2.5 Discussion and Preliminary Conclusion**

This subchapter has presented the results of the Sartori selection estimator on the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation success. According to the theoretical argument, different mediation outcomes have a diverging impact on subsequent mediation success. The results, summarised in Table 21, underline the importance of accounting for these differences when analysing the likelihood of subsequent mediation

success. Again, a ✓ indicates that a hypothesis is supported, and a ✗ indicates that a hypothesis was either not supported or rejected.<sup>70</sup>

Previous mediation not producing an agreement was expected to have a positive impact on subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 5). While the coefficient was positive in all models, the results largely lacked statistical significance. Only when the variable denoting previous partial mediation success was added to the estimation, clear support was found. However, no robust support for the expectation that the perceived benefits of mediation encourage private information sharing, which would enable subsequent mediation success, was noted. Possibly, a curvilinear relationship, as suggested by Böhmelt (2013), is at play in these cases, and the number of mediation events which did not produce agreements needs to be accounted for, instead of solely focusing on the very previous mediation outcome.

Table 21. Summary of results on subsequent mediation success

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Supported?</b>
H5	If the previous mediation effort ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✗
H6a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✓
H6b	The more comprehensive the previous agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation success.	✗
H7a	If a previously reached agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.	✓
H7b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation success.	✓

According to the theoretical argument, previous partial agreements underline the benefits of sharing private information. As a consequence, the conflict parties are more likely to share information during subsequent mediation events, which enables the mediator to identify a bargain within the disputants' ZoA. Subsequent mediation success can be observed. This argument, summarised in hypothesis 6a, was supported in the statistical

<sup>70</sup> For simplicity, again, no differentiation in the symbols regarding hypotheses which are not supported and hypotheses which are rejected is made.

analysis. The comprehensiveness of the previous agreement has not been found to have an impact on subsequent mediation success, though. Hence, hypothesis 6b was not supported.

Subsequent mediation success is less likely if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on (hypothesis 7a). The private information sharing and the credible commitment problem were underlined by the reneged on agreement. Given the onset of subsequent mediation, the conflict parties are expected to share additional information only reluctantly, if at all. The statistical tests supported this notion. Moreover, with increasing agreement comprehensiveness, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success diminished further (hypothesis 7b).

Overall, the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation success is underlined. However, it needs to be noted that the analysis was able to account for the impact previous mediation outcomes have on private information sharing only indirectly, as no data on the information exchanged during subsequent talks is available. The qualitative analysis sheds more light on the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument. Nevertheless, the results of the LNA are crucial, as they provide a general picture on the positive and negative impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation success.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

In this chapter, the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success has been estimated with quantitative analyses. Probit models were specified to estimate the link between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset. To analyse how much time needs to pass between a previous mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset, survival analysis, namely the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and the PWP-gap-time approach in the form of Cox models, have been used. To test for the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation success, a two-stage approach, the Sartori selection estimator, was used.

The results of the statistical analyses are summarised in Table 22. While it was not possible to analyse the stances each conflict party takes towards subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after a particular mediation outcome, the consequences of each side's decision were estimated. They are shown in the columns headed 'subsequent

mediation onset’ and ‘subsequent mediation success’. If boxes are highlighted in grey, the results of the statistical analysis support the theoretical argument.

Mediation events which do not produce an agreement are positively and statistically significantly linked to subsequent mediation onset, but not to subsequent mediation success. For the latter part of the argument, no statistically significant support was found, though the coefficients of the variable were positive, and therefore pointed towards the anticipated direction. Partial agreements are positively linked to subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. However, agreement comprehensiveness does not have an impact on subsequent mediation efforts (not displayed in table). If a previously mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are less likely, even more so when agreements of higher comprehensiveness are reneged on (not displayed in table), as argued in the theoretical argument.

Table 22. Summary of statistical results

<b>Outcome previous mediation</b>	Gov’t’s stance towards mediation onset	Rebel group’s stance towards mediation onset	<b>Subsequent mediation onset</b>	Gov’t’s stance towards sharing private information	Rebel group’s stance towards sharing private information	<b>Subsequent mediation success</b>
<b>No agr. reached</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Agreement</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Reneged on agr.</b>	-	+	-	-	-	-

The presented results are crucial for mediation research. They reject the notion that mediation failure, i.e. mediation which did not produce an agreement, has a negative impact on subsequent mediation efforts, as feared by e.g. Greig (2010), and Bercovitch and Gartner (2006). Though this negative impact is uncovered when a high number of mediation events do not produce agreements, mediation events not producing agreements as such are positively linked to subsequent mediation onset. Though the results largely lack

statistical significance for the link towards subsequent mediation success, the coefficient is always positive.

Furthermore, this research underlines the importance of accounting for renege on mediated agreements, a mediation outcome which has been neglected in mediation research so far, especially as an independent variable. The results of the LNA point out the negative impact of renege on mediated agreements for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. These findings underline the importance of designing lasting peace agreements, instead of rushing towards agreements which the conflict parties cannot commit to due to time-inconsistency problems. Thus, accepting that mediation does not produce an agreement quickly might be more worthwhile with regard to overall conflict management than reaching agreements which are prone to being renege on.

The LNA has confirmed the assumed link between mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. However, it was not possible to trace the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument to the desired extent, due to a lack of data. The ensuing SNA is able to step in to account for the not yet tested causal mechanisms. Keeping existing research and the results of the LNA in mind, further insights on the link between previously renege on mediated agreements and subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are vital. Meanwhile, the SNA might provide explanations for why some of the hypotheses were not supported in the LNA.

## 6 Qualitative Analysis

In the logic of nested analysis as a mixed methods approach, the qualitative analysis follows the quantitative analysis. Conducting a case study at this point in the research is considered crucial for estimating the validity of the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument. Table 22 shows that the hypotheses on the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success were (mostly) supported by the quantitative analysis. However, identifying which role the private information and the credible commitment problem played during a subsequent mediation effort, and differentiating between the rebel group's and the government's position are vital parts of the theoretical argument which were impossible to test in the quantitative analysis due to a current lack of quantitative data, in particular on private information sharing. The ensuing qualitative analysis seeks to account for this lack of depth by examining the already tested hypotheses in more detail.

### 6.1 Conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army

The conflict between the GoU and the LRA has been going on for thirty years. It started shortly after Yoweri Museveni became president through a coup carried out by the National Resistance Army (NRA) against then-president Tito Okello in 1986 (Lucima 2002: 89).<sup>71</sup> After Museveni became president, many soldiers of the Acholi tribe from northern Uganda, who used to be part of the national army under Okello, regrouped. They first supported Alice Auma Lakwena, leader of the Holy Spirit Movement, in her fight against Museveni. After Museveni's troops successfully fought the Holy Spirit Movement back in 1987, former Acholi soldiers started to follow Joseph Kony, also an Acholi, who had set up his own movement, the LRA (Allen & Vlassenroot 2010: 6–10).

The aims of the LRA discussed in the literature are divergent. They range from overthrowing Museveni, establishing a state based on the Ten Commandments, defending the Acholi, to ensuring that the interests of the neglected northern Ugandans are addressed (Hendrickson & Tumutegereize 2012: 6). The LRA is notorious for its use of one-sided

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<sup>71</sup> The LRA was called Holy Spirit Mobile Forces II initially, but was renamed LRA in 1992 (Lucima 2002: 89). The NRA was renamed Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in 1995. The UPDF are the government forces of Uganda (Global Security 2015).

violence, amongst others against the Acholi population, which it justified with the need to chase out the evil within the Acholi (Allen & Vlassenroot 2010: 10).

Up to 2008, which marks the end of the Juba Talks, the LRA had abducted between 20,000 and 70,000 adults and children, killed more than 100,000 people, while more than 1.5 million people had been internally displaced (Schomerus 2008: 92; Chothia 2015).<sup>72</sup> Throughout the conflict, the LRA has never been an existential threat to the GoU. Nevertheless, the GoU has been unable to set an end to the LRA roaming Uganda and its neighbouring countries, despite the fact that several military and diplomatic operations have been conducted (Schomerus 2008: 92).

## **6.2 Mediation between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army**

The mediation efforts which took place between the GoU and the LRA are summarised in Table 23. The first two processes were led by Betty Bigombe, who was a Ugandan State Minister during her first mediation effort. During her second mediation effort, she held a position at the World Bank. Due to her close links to the Ugandan government, her capabilities of truly mediating the conflict might be questioned, particularly with regard to her first mediation effort, during which she considered herself to be in the difficult situation of trying to facilitate the talks while representing the GoU (O'Kadamari 2002: 40–41). However, the GoU's delegation was not only made up of her, but comprised also other GoU representatives in her two mediation efforts, and both the GoU and the LRA regarded her as the mediator. Hence, both mediation efforts led by Bigombe are included in the analysis.

The following Juba Talks, which are the longest and most prominent mediation effort between the LRA and the GoU, took place between 2006 and 2008. The Juba Talks were led by Riek Machar, who was Vice President of the autonomous region Southern Sudan from August 2005 until July 2011. Sudan was strongly affected by the LRA at the time, because the latter also roamed Sudan. While Sudan initially supported the LRA, and the GoU supported the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a Sudanese

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<sup>72</sup> Bussmann (2016) finds that the weaker conflict party – the LRA – tended to be more likely to use one-sided violence in northern Uganda, especially 'if militarily under pressure' (Bussmann 2016: 479).

rebel group, the GoU, and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) eventually agreed to relinquish the support of each other's rebel groups (Schomerus 2012: 63; Okello 2002a).

The Mombasa Talks were held in secret during a standstill of the Juba Talks. They were led by the NGO Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) Pax Christi, and were supposed to encourage the continuation of the Juba Talks.<sup>73</sup> Though the Juba Talks set on again at the end of the Mombasa Talks, the agreement reached during the Mombasa Talks were completely ignored during the Juba Talks (Interview 2016). Overall, none of the mediation processes produced a lasting agreement.

Table 23. Overview of mediation processes between the GoU and the LRA

<i>Time</i>	<i>Mediator</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
1993–1994	Betty Bigombe	Gulu Ceasefire – immediately reneged on (1994)
2004–2005	Betty Bigombe	No agreement
2006–2008	Riek Machar (Juba Talks)	Agreements on all agenda items reached in the course of the Juba Talks, but reneged on when Kony failed to sign the Final Peace Agreement (2008)
2007	IKV Pax Christi (Mombasa Talks)	Agreement (2007) – supposed to be picked up at Juba Talks, but ignored once Juba Talks continued

### **6.2.1 1994 – 1995: The First Bigombe-led Mediation Process**

The first ever face-to-face meeting between the GoU and the LRA, called the Pagik meeting, takes place on November 25, 1993. Initiated by Betty Bigombe, this first mediation effort aims at reducing the suffering of northern Ugandans. The LRA delegation is made up of middle-range officers who highlight the LRA's interest in further talks, but underline that former officers of the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) should be excluded.<sup>74</sup> During the talks, the LRA delegation wonders if they are covered by the amnesty law, but also highlights that it does not want to be considered defeated due to its engagement in talks. Bigombe agrees that the past should be left at rest, and confirms that the LRA is covered by the amnesty law, that no former UPDA soldiers are going to take

<sup>73</sup> IKV Pax Christi and Machar disagreed over the question who should mediate the conflict. While Machar led the Juba Talks, IKV Pax Christi had expected to play a more prominent role (Interview 2016).

<sup>74</sup> The UPDA is a rebel group which formed after Okello was overthrown. In May 1988, a peace accord between the NRA and the UPDA was signed (Lamwaka 2016: 60, 257).

part in future talks, and that neither side is the victor of the war. Both sides voice their concern about the possibility that a third party might sabotage the peace process. Overall, the Pagik meeting is considered to have built confidence. However, Bigombe is under pressure and criticised for having given in too much. While the population supports the peace process, the NRA is unsure whether Museveni supports it, as he does not do so openly, and also does not give the NRA direction on how to behave (O’Kadameri 2002: 37–38).

Though no agreement has been reached during the Pagik-Meeting, both parties consent to further talks. These take place on January 11, 1994, after a meeting scheduled for the previous day does not take place due to security issues. Kony attends the meeting, which leads to face-to-face talks between Kony and Bigombe on the same day. During the talks, Kony seeks to clarify his motivation for the rebellion, and announces that he wants to leave the bush. Due to a reduction of attacks, the security level in northern Uganda is comparably high (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).

On January 22, 1994, the Atoo Hill Talks take place. The LRA underlines its interest in reaching an agreement anew and voices security concerns. Two days later, the next meeting takes place at Lakwatimer Primary School. A ceasefire agreement is negotiated. However, the NRA officers repeatedly offend the LRA by stating that the peace talks are about negotiating the LRA’s surrender. The LRA informs Bigombe that its delegation is not going to come to Gulu for additional talks. Nevertheless, a ceasefire agreement, called the Gulu Ceasefire, is drafted and signed by both sides on February 2, 1994 at a meeting at Tegot-Atto (O’Kadameri 2002: 37–41). The Gulu Ceasefire highlights the necessity for ending the violence with immediate effect. Moreover, it prescribes the LRA to regroup and inform the NRA about the progress of regrouping (Gulu Ceasefire 1994).

On February 6, 1994, Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, visits Gulu. While he had not supported Bigombe’s mediation efforts publicly before, he now declares that mediation with the LRA has taken place. He claims that intelligence indicates towards the LRA using the talks for building up military strength. Hence, he demands the LRA to surrender within seven days, otherwise military action against them will be pursued. As the LRA does not follow the ultimatum, the Gulu Ceasefire collapses (O’Kadameri 2002: 41; Allen 2006: 48), for which both conflict parties blame each other (Branch 2005: 18; Finnström 2008:

89). The war between the GoU and the LRA enters into a second phase (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 25), during which the conflict's intensity increases drastically. It is marked by the LRA's continuous abduction of children and civilian victimisation. For example, in April 1994, the LRA massacres 200 civilians (Okello 2002a, 2002b; Accord 2010: 24).

Referring these events back to the theoretical argument, it becomes clear that subsequent mediation onset was not hindered by the previous mediation event (the Pagik meeting) not producing an agreement. Hoop tests confirm that both conflict parties seemed to consider mediation beneficial enough to consent to a subsequent event. When Bigombe picked up information exchanged before, especially the LRA's security concerns during subsequent mediation, a smoking-gun tests shows how the benefits of mediation are underlined for the LRA, as the information it had shared during the previous mediation effort were taken into account during subsequent mediation, which had encouraged the LRA to return to the mediation table. These findings support hypothesis 1, according to which subsequent mediation onset is likely after mediation did not produce an agreement.

Moreover, and despite the security concerns voiced by the LRA, the Gulu Ceasefire was reached. By addressing the LRA's security concerns during the talks, and acknowledging its needs during subsequent mediation efforts, the mediator was able to identify an agreement within the ZoA. The information exchanged during the previous mediation effort, which did not produce an agreement, contributed to setting a foundation for subsequent mediation success, as the narration of the LRA's concerns was picked up. This is considered a 'smoking-gun', as the LRA is likely to have gotten the impression that sharing information has an effect, and therefore shared additional information, which led to the Gulu Ceasefire. Though the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on immediately, this finding supports hypothesis 5, according to which subsequent mediation success is likely after mediation did not produce an agreement.

### **6.2.2 1995 – 2003: Other Third Party Conflict Management Efforts**

In the aftermath of the Gulu Ceasefire collapse, not only the conflict between the LRA and the GoU intensifies but the relation between Sudan, which supports the LRA, and Uganda deteriorates as well (Royo 2008: 11). Nevertheless, Museveni and Bigombe declare the

war against the LRA over at the end of 1995 (Branch 2005: 19), though the conflict continues with a high level of civilian suffering in 1996 (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 29; Okello 2002a).

To reduce the conflict's intensity, different third parties offer their services. For example, elders try to arrange meetings between the GoU and the LRA, but are eventually killed by the LRA (O'Kadameri 2002: 41). Moreover, in 1997, indirect talks between the GoU and the LRA take place through the faith-based NGO Sant'Egidio, following the LRA's abduction of 152 girls from St Mary's College in September 1996. The LRA agrees to the release of the Aboke girls in return for a ceasefire. However, the GoU does not agree to the deal and the talks break down (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 26; Okello 2002a; Lucima 2002: 91). A parallel process starts, led by the head of the NGO Equatoria Civic Fund, who asks the Carter Center to facilitate the talks (Obita 2002: 42–43). However, Museveni disregards the idea of talks, while Sant'Egidio becomes increasingly impatient due to the lack of progress (Obita 2002: 44; Okello 2002a).

In 1998, Ugandans in the diaspora continuously try to work towards a peaceful solution of the conflict. In December 1999, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the GoU sign the Nairobi Peace Accord (Okello 2002a), in which the two countries declare to stop supporting each other's rebel groups and to exchange prisoners. Moreover, the agreement allows the UPDF to set up base in Sudan to pursue the LRA (Schomerus 2012: 63). The LRA was meant to be included in the talks initially, but does not take part in direct negotiations (Okello 2002a; Haarhaus 2009: 3; Dolan 2005: 85). In 2000, the Carter Center continues its effort of initiating peace talks between the GoU and the LRA (Okello 2002a). While Kony is interested in peace talks, though supposedly calling Museveni the 'Hitler of Africa', Museveni rejects the idea and repeatedly calls the LRA bandits (Borzello 2015). Meetings between the LRA and the Acholi Religious Leader Peace Initiative<sup>75</sup> are interrupted by UPDF attacks (Dolan 2009: 98).

In June 2001, in the context of an implementation meeting for the Nairobi Peace Agreement, the GoU issues a demilitarised zone to allow LRA movement as a confidence-building measure (Lucima 2002: 93). Nevertheless, the LRA is added to the U.S. terrorist watch-list (International Crisis Group 2010: 2), and launches attacks again in February

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<sup>75</sup> The Acholi Religious Leader Peace Initiative is an interfaith NGO, based in northern Uganda, which seeks to promote conflict transformation.

2002 (Accord 2010: 4). The GoU starts the military operation Operation Iron Fist in March 2002, and is supported by Sudan in its endeavour to defeat the LRA. UPDF soldiers receive training from U.S. soldiers (Accord 2010: 4). The GoU passes the Anti-Terrorism Act, which makes LRA membership a legal offense, and increases the difficulty of holding peace talks (Dolan 2010: 8). In the meantime, LRA violence against civilians increases again (Accord 2010: 4).

In August 2002, Museveni offers a temporary ceasefire to the LRA, stating his interest in talks (BBC News 2002a). However, the LRA wants an appropriate ceasefire to be issued before talks can start, and demands for a neutral mediator (BBC News 2002b). As the LRA continues to insist on these demands, and the GoU is only willing to issue a ceasefire if the LRA assembles in designated areas, talks do not set on (BBC News 2002c). Instead, heavy fighting between the LRA and the UPDF is observed in October (Okello 2002a), LRA abductions increase again (Dolan 2010: 8), and the Red Cross leaves northern Uganda in February 2003 after it has been attacked by the LRA (BBC News 2003b).<sup>76</sup> In March 2003, new attempts for peace talks fail (Ross 2003a, 2003b; BBC News 2003c): the GoU wants to hold talks outside of Uganda, and wants the LRA to assemble in designated areas. As the LRA does not trust the UPDF due to concerns about its own security, it does not agree to the GoU's demands (BBC News 2003a; Schomerus 2012: 64).

In light of the theoretical argument, the years following the first Bigombe-led mediation effort underline the negative implications of the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire for subsequent mediation onset. Though various third parties tried to initiate mediation processes, no face-to-face talks took place, as mutual consent to engage in mediation was lacking. The extent to which the LRA highlights its security concerns and its mistrust towards the GoU provides information for a hoop test. Information for a smoking-gun test is lacking, as the sources do not clearly indicate whether the LRA's concerns are based on the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire. Nevertheless, the LRA concerns were a decisive hindrance for subsequent mediation onset. None of the third parties interested in mediating between the GoU and the LRA was able to address these concerns sufficiently. As expected in the theoretical argument, the LRA continuously tried to engage in talks, but highlighted the importance of appropriate security measures. Smoking-gun tests also support the expectations that

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<sup>76</sup> The parallel conflict between the GoU and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) II ends in December 2002, when both sides sign a comprehensive peace agreement (Baaré 2008: 31).

governments do not engage in subsequent talks if they renege on an agreement: the GoU revoked the Gulu Ceasefire agreement before it was implemented, emphasising its strength, the illegitimacy of the LRA, and the unnecessary of making steps towards to the LRA. Besides, international pressure was on a bearable level, and thus the costs of engaging in mediation, namely, acknowledging the LRA as a credible negotiation partner, and, as a consequence of engaging in mediation, sharing private information to reach an agreement, possibly too high. The utility of mediation seemed to be too low for the GoU. Since both conflict parties need to agree to mediation for it to set on, subsequent mediation onset was not observed.

Overall, the reneged on Gulu ceasefire pointed out the inability of mediation to contribute to overcoming the commitment problem, and instead reaffirmed it. As expected in the theoretical argument, the LRA showed more interest in subsequent mediation than the GoU, though it continuously highlighted its security concerns. The GoU considered the LRA as bandits, and disregarded them as mediation partners on several accounts. This finding supports hypothesis 3a, according to which subsequent mediation onset is unlikely after a mediated agreement was reneged on, because the private information shared previously has been misused and the established trust was crushed anew. Though rebel groups are likely to show a continued interest in mediation if governments renege, governments opt for their BATNA: continued conflict.

### ***6.2.3 2004 – 2005: The Second Bigombe-led Mediation Process***

In the course of 2003, the GoU asks the U.S. for logistical and informational support in its fight against the LRA (BBC News 2003d), and in December, Museveni refers the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) after a visit of the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, to Uganda in November. Egeland describes the situation as a humanitarian emergency. His statement increases international attention on the ongoing conflict (S/PV.5525 2006). The ICC opens investigations in January 2004 (Accord 2010: 24). The military operation Operation Iron Fist II is launched in March 2004 to fight the LRA in Sudan (Accord 2010: 24). Kony's offers for talks are rejected by the UPDF, as they are considered 'insincere' (Irin News 2004a).

In April 2004 Uganda is put on the agenda of the UNSC due to Egeland's visit to northern Uganda. Donor pressure to end the conflict increases. As a response, Museveni sends delegates to New York, to lobby against the deployment of peacekeeping troops, seeking to avoid an outside military intervention (Schomerus 2008: 98). Besides, Museveni states his readiness for talks with the LRA (Irin News 2004c). One month later, Bigombe agrees to mediate peace talks, this time backed by Museveni, the UN, the UK, the Netherlands, local officials, and aid agencies (Allen 2006: 78; Accord 2010: 24; Dolan 2010: 84).

When Bigombe travels to Juba to meet Kony in May 2004, the meeting does not take place, because Kony has not been informed about it (Allen 2006: 78; Allen & Vlassenroot 2010: 16–17). Bigombe repeatedly tries to initiate talks in the following months (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4). Meanwhile, the LRA, which's size has supposedly decreased significantly, wants the GoU to publicly announce its support of the peace talks, as it is evident that the GoU prefers a military solution to the conflict (Irin News 2004b; BBC News 2004). Eventually, the GoU issues a ceasefire to allow the LRA to regroup for Bigombe's second mediation effort to start (Accord 2010: 24; Dolan 2010: 8).

In November and December 2004, Bigombe mediates talks between the GoU and the LRA. The LRA-delegation is headed by Sam Kolo, a high-ranking LRA commander. Museveni is openly sceptic about the talks, and UPDF commanders surmise that the LRA uses the talks for breathing space after Operation Iron Fist II had exacted many victims. The LRA, on the other hand, wants to be taken seriously. It does not want to make use of the Amnesty Act as this would imply guilt (Allen 2006: 78). Nevertheless, the number of rebels applying for amnesty increases in 2004 (Dolan 2010: 8). During the mediation effort, the GoU sets the deadline for the completion of talks to the end of 2004 and reduces the size of the safe zones, stating its doubts about the LRA's true commitment to the talks (Accord 2010: 24; Allen 2006: 78; Schomerus 2012: 64; Irin News 2004b). The deadline is not perceived well by the LRA due to the pressure it puts on the talks (International Crisis Group 2005a: 1). Its trust in the peace process reduces and it attacks the UPDF, which attacks the assembly area with helicopter gunships (Allen 2006: 81; Schomerus 2012: 64).

In February, the GoU declares an 18-day truce to allow the continuation of talks with the LRA (Schomerus 2012: 64). However, two members of the LRA delegation, Onon Kamdlu and Sam Kolo, surrender to the UPDF (BBC News 2005a; International Crisis

Group 2005a: 1; Accord 2010: 25; Schomerus 2012: 64), which increases the mistrust and doubts of the LRA towards mediation and the UPDF (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4). As a consequence, no high ranking LRA member takes part in the talks anymore, and the UPDF takes over the ceasefire zone (Allen 2006: 81). The LRA responds with an increased level of civilian victimisation (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1). Nevertheless, Otti, the LRA's second in command and a key supporter of the peace talks, states that the LRA is still interested in talks, but does not trust Bigombe anymore, and therefore does not want her to mediate any longer (Schomerus 2012: 65).

Talks basically break down, though Bigombe and Kony are still in touch. They discuss ceasefire modalities and obstacles the LRA sees with regard to peace agreements (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4). Amongst others, Kony highlights the necessity for a ceasefire to contain provisions for the LRA's physical security after a ceasefire has been reached, and the LRA's livelihood (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1), while the GoU announces an increase of military actions (BBC News 2005b).

In July 2005, the ICC issues five sealed arrest warrants, which are unsealed in October. Joseph Kony, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Vincent Otti are accused of severe human rights violations (Accord 2010: 25). Bigombe predicts that the arrest warrants will increase the difficulty of talks (Allen 2006: 187). Nevertheless, she prepares a draft peace proposal, which she presents to Museveni in September.<sup>77</sup> He accepts it as a starting point. Yet, Bigombe is unable to present it to Kony due to logistical challenges which arise with the ICC arrest warrants (International Crisis Group 2006: 8). In November, at a meeting of the UNSC, Allan Rock, Canada's ambassador to the UN, suggests to make use of the full measures of the UN Charter if the conflict parties are unable to end the conflict by diplomatic means (Perrot 2010: 194–195). Meanwhile, Otti underlines the LRA's continued interest in talks (International Crisis Group 2006: 5).

Tying these notions up with the theoretical argument, the amount of time which needed to pass between the renege on Gulu Ceasefire and subsequent mediation onset is conspicuous. Ten years passed before the second Bigombe-led mediation effort started. This matches the theoretical argument, according to which subsequent mediation only sets on after a long time if a previously mediated agreement was renege on. Information on

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<sup>77</sup> Information on the content of the peace proposal was not uncovered.

the utility of mediation, gathered through reneged on mediated agreements, underlined the costs of mediation. Thus, additional information, which highlighted the benefits of mediation, needed to be accumulated first, which was expected to take time, according to the theoretical argument. In fact, smoking-gun evidence supported the theoretical argument, summarised in hypothesis 4. Only with international pressure on the GoU increasing, discussions around third-party military interventions, and thus, the costs of continued conflict rising, the benefits the GoU ascribed to mediation outweighed the costs of it after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on. Betty Bigombe mediated again – this time supported by the GoU and other international actors. Yet, with Betty Bigombe, a relatively weak mediator who might have been biased towards the GoU was chosen. This is not uncommon in intrastate conflicts, in which governments tend to expect rebel groups to send costly signals by agreeing to government-biased mediators (Svensson 2007a). Besides, electing a weak mediator allowed the GoU to hedge its commitment to the peace process to a certain extent, which might happen if a conflict party is unsure about the other side's resolve to mediation (Beardsley 2009).

Meanwhile, the victims Operation Iron Fist II demanded and the loss of LRA members which applied for amnesty increased the LRA's need for mediation anew. Thus, the benefits of renewed mediation were highlighted to the LRA, as sustaining the rebellion to the same extent as before became difficult. Despite having lobbied for other third parties to mediate between 1994 and 2004, underlined security concerns, and an exclaimed interest in mediation outside of Uganda, thus, the costs the LRA associated with Bigombe mediating seeming relatively high, the LRA agreed to her leading another mediation effort, expecting benefits such as a reduced conflict intensity from mediation. Being under pressure militarily due to Operation Iron Fist II, the LRA sent a costly signal to the GoU by agreeing to Bigombe's mediation offer. Once mediation had set on, the issued ICC arrest warrants further pronounced the importance of continuing talks to the LRA.

These findings do not contradict hypothesis 3a, according to which subsequent mediation onset is unlikely if a mediated agreement was reneged on previously. Instead, evidence sufficient for hoop tests was available: while the LRA remained interested in mediation throughout, due to the benefits it provides, the GoU only considered mediation again after the conflict context changed, and the costs of engaging in mediation seemed to be more manageable than the costs of other, more forceful third-party interventions. By engaging in

mediation with a third party which might be government-biased, the GoU agreed to mediation but tried to ensure that it remains in control of the process and the outcome, thereby utilising the benefits it expected of government-biased mediation.

While subsequent mediation set on despite the LRA's security concerns, subsequent mediation success was not observed. This was expected in the theoretical argument, because reneged on mediated agreements strongly underline the costs of sharing private information and the prevalence of the commitment problem. Smoking-gun tests showed that security concerns, underlined by the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire, were persistent during subsequent talks. The LRA's inability to trust the GoU was further pointed towards when Sam Kolo surrendered, and the LRA clearly stated that it does not trust Bigombe. Besides, the GoU setting a deadline for the talks, and reducing the safe zones, coupled with Bigombe's inability to address these issues sufficiently, the LRA considered sharing private information as too costly, while the GoU considered it unnecessary due to its position. Thus, though the conflict dynamics had changed, the costs that had come along with sharing private information in the past contributed to the LRA's reluctance to sharing private information during subsequent mediation, while the GoU expected the LRA to make concessions, as anticipated in the theoretical argument. These findings support hypothesis 7a, according to which subsequent mediation success is unlikely after a mediated agreement has been reneged on, because reneged on mediated agreements strongly underline the costs of private information sharing as well as the prevalence of credible commitment problem.

#### **6.2.4 2006 – 2008: *The Juba Talks***

In December 2005, LRA representatives meet members of the NGO IKV Pax Christi in Nairobi, while they are also in contact with Riek Machar (Schomerus 2012: 187). There are first signs that Machar might mediate between the GoU and the LRA, though Kony asks IKV Pax Christi to mediate as well (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10). In February 2006, Otti and Machar talk on the phone, and a small delegation, made up of members of the LRA and of IKV Pax Christi, flies to Juba for a face-to-face meeting with Machar

(Schomerus 2012: 187).<sup>78</sup> They agree that if the LRA does not decide for GoSS-mediation, the GoSS will force the LRA to leave Southern Sudan (Atkinson 2010: 210). In April, a second meeting between Otti and Machar takes place at a location decided on by the LRA. In May, Machar finally meets Kony. During this meeting, Machar hands over an envelope with USD 20,000 to Kony, supposedly to buy food, for which he is accused of bribery (Schomerus 2012: 71).

Though Museveni had initially ruled out the option of renewed talks, and in May 2006, Uganda's representative to the UN calls the LRA a terrorist organisation (S/PV.5415 2006: 2), Museveni agrees to a renewed mediation effort when he learns that the LRA is interested in talks. He reaffirms the LRA's safety during mediation, but also sets August 1, 2006 as a deadline for the conclusion of talks. Meanwhile, international pressure to end the conflict in northern Uganda continuously increases due to the unsealed ICC arrest warrants (Atkinson 2010: 212–213; Schomerus 2012: 72).

In the beginning of June 2006, a LRA delegation travels to Juba (Schomerus 2012: 74), while the GoU rejects sending a delegation, proclaiming its interest in finding a military solution to the conflict (Atkinson 2010: 214). However, at the end of June, the GoU decides to send a delegation, which arrives in Juba in the beginning of July (Schomerus 2012: 74).<sup>79</sup> Museveni offers amnesty to the LRA, including to those accused by the ICC, which the LRA spokesperson rejects, highlighting that the parties engaging in mediation are equal (BBC News 2006e). Meanwhile, Kony announces that he will not engage in further talks if the international community supports Uganda in its effort of taking out the LRA militarily (BBC News 2006d).

Nevertheless, on July 14, 2006, the Juba Talks begin. The parties agree on the following agenda: (1) the cessation of hostilities, (2) a comprehensive political solution, (3) justice and accountability, (4) Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR), and (5) a permanent ceasefire (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10). Several third parties, amongst others the EU, the U.S., and Canada, observe the Juba Talks. Yet, the GoU is not interested in talks under the auspices of the UN, as this would increase the LRA's political status,

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<sup>78</sup> Sudan is one of the countries which have not ratified the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. Hence, Machar was able to meet up with LRA members prosecuted by the ICC without having to hand them over to the ICC.

<sup>79</sup> Information on the reasons for why the GoU's standpoint changed several times on whether or not to send a delegation was not uncovered.

while the LRA is in favour of an internationalisation of the talks, amongst others due to an expected increase in security (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 15, 19, 26).

Several mediation events take place in July and August 2006. While the LRA wants to negotiate a ceasefire first, the GoU wants to move on to other agenda items, arguing that the LRA has used ceasefires to remobilise in the past (BBC News 2006c; BBC News 2006g). The LRA lists the grievances it perceives, e.g. the GoU's abuse of democratic principles, or land grabbing (Schomerus 2012: 15–16). In the beginning of August 2006, the LRA declares a unilateral ceasefire (BBC News 2006a; Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5), which the GoU does not reciprocate. Instead, the UPDF continues its military actions against the LRA, and underlines its unwillingness to cease hostilities during mediation. It basically considers the LRA defeated, and wants to negotiate the latter's surrender. The LRA rejects sharing its exact location, while it states that it is not going to lay down weapons without a working ceasefire in place. The LRA considers the Juba Talks as the opening of a political process (Omach 2006: 18–19; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11; Schomerus 2012: 96–97).

On August 12, 2006, the LRA's third highest commander, Raska Lukwiya, is killed by the UPDF. This causes a short break in the talks, and the usage of harsher language. The LRA feels betrayed by Machar and asks for another mediator, e.g. from South Africa. The GoU does not agree to this suggestion, but instead threatens to intervene into the DRC, where the LRA has withdrawn to (BBC News 2006a; International Crisis Group 2007: 7; Atkinson 2010: 215).

Regarding the onset of the Juba Talks in light of the theoretical argument, the impact of the previous mediation outcomes for subsequent mediation onset needs to be addressed. The Juba Talks set on after the second Bigombe-led mediation effort did not produce an agreement. During the Bigombe-led mediation process, it became clear that mediation allowed the disputants to remain in control of the mediation outcome. Though Bigombe expected the onset of subsequent talks to become more difficult in the wake of the unsealed ICC arrest warrants, the LRA considered the benefits of mediation as high enough to rank it above conflict without mediation. Especially when it became clear that a third party which was more likely to provide security guarantees might mediate, the LRA continuously underlined its interest in subsequent mediation onset. The collected

information on the extent to which the LRA considered subsequent mediation onset beneficial was not sufficient for a smoking-gun test, because it remained unclear which exact benefits the LRA ascribed to mediation in the aftermath of the second Bigombe-led mediation effort. However, the available information was considered sufficient for a hoop test, which supported the notion that rebel groups are likely to engage in subsequent mediation onset after mediation did not produce an agreement.

The GoU remained unconvinced of engaging in talks with the LRA after the second Bigombe-led mediation process. It still did not perceive the LRA to be a credible negotiation partner, and only once clear arrangements for subsequent mediation onset had been made between Machar and the LRA, the GoU agreed to talks – potentially due to the knowledge that refusing to engage in subsequent talks would cause a further increase of international pressure. Besides, previous mediation had underlined the signalling capacity of mediation, which was crucial for the GoU, as it wanted to avert more robust interventions. Again, the information was insufficient for conducting a smoking-gun test. Nevertheless, the fact that the GoU agreed to the Juba Talks only a few months after the second Bigombe-led process did not produce an agreement was considered sufficient information for a hoop test. Overall, these findings support hypothesis 1, according to which subsequent mediation onset is likely after a mediation event did not produce an agreement, because the conflict parties are likely to consider the benefits of mediation, such as its signalling capacity, as sufficient enough for agreeing to subsequent mediation onset.

The first mediation events of the Juba Talks were unsuccessful. Though the LRA's third highest commander was killed, talks went on. This suggests that the LRA ascribed enough benefits to mediation to continue engaging in it, though security concerns were remaining. Presumably, the GoU realised that despite mediation, it would not have to issue ceasefires or share private information unwillingly, while mediation allowed it to signal its good-will. This suggests hoop test evidence for the benefits the GoU ascribed to mediation, which supports hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 stated that subsequent mediation onset is likely if previous mediation did not produce an agreement. For smoking-gun evidence, the benefits the GoU ascribed to mediation would need to be clearer and explicitly linked to the previous mediation outcome.

Subsequent mediation success was not observed during the initial mediation events of the Juba Talks. Machar was unable to address the LRA's security concerns. The LRA even asked for another mediator when the GoU did not want to issue a ceasefire and Raska Lukwiya was killed. In fact, the LRA did not share the information it was expected to share – i.e. its location, and its progress in disarming. The GoU also did not share private information. Instead, due to its relative strength, it stood strong. Identifying a ZoA therefore was impossible during the initial stages of the Juba Talks. Actually, the analysis points towards the conflict dynamics having had a decisive impact on Machar being unable to identify an agreement, as they underlined the rift between the conflict parties. On-going fighting questioned the mediator's capacity to ensure the LRA's safety. Thus, the latter preferred to keep information private, which led to Machar being unable to locate a bargain within the ZoA.

#### *6.2.4.1 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (Agenda Item 1)*

Eventually, with the LRA highlighting its interest in peaceful conflict resolution, talks resume (Schomerus 2012: 96), and on August 26, 2006, the first agreement, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH), is signed (Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12). In the CoH agreement, the LRA and the GoU underline the necessity for reconciliation on all levels, agree to cease hostilities, and for the LRA to assemble in designated areas within three weeks. The assembly of the LRA is monitored and safety is guaranteed by the SPLA. The LRA is allowed to leave the assembly areas undisturbed if peace fails. Moreover, a Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) is established, which reports to Machar (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities 2006).<sup>80</sup>

The CoH agreement is reneged on immediately by both sides, partly because it is not very specific (e.g. the assembly areas are not clearly demarcated), and partly deliberately (e.g. the GoU surrounds the assembly areas with helicopters) (Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12). In fact, the LRA states that it signed the CoH agreement quickly to ensure the continuation of talks, while the GoU did not expect the LRA to assemble, and thus considered signing not to have consequences. Nevertheless, once the

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<sup>80</sup> The CHMT is made up of senior SPLA military officers appointed by the GoSS, two representatives of the GoU and the LRA each, and two senior military officers appointed by the AU (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities 2006).

CoH agreement is signed, international actors are more willing to support the Juba Talks (Schomerus 2012: 98–99).

In September 2006, the LRA moves into the DRC for the first time. While the DRC's president Kabila wants the LRA to leave, Museveni threatens to enter the DRC if the LRA is not removed (Accord 2010: 25). Besides, parts of the LRA gather in the assembly areas named in the CoH agreement. Otti claims that even him and Kony have been there, but had to leave due to the bad conditions: supposedly, no clean drinking water, food, or medical assistance was provided (Schomerus 2012: 105).

What is important to note in light of the theoretical argument is that subsequent mediation set on after the previous events did not produce an agreement, for which evidence sufficient for a hoop test is available. The exact benefits the conflict parties allocated to mediation are unclear though. Besides, an agreement was reached during the subsequent mediation effort. This event is considered smoking-gun evidence for hypothesis 5, according to which subsequent mediation success is likely if the previous agreement did not produce an agreement: the conflict parties had gathered information on the relevance of reaching an agreement, and on the likelihood of their opponent committing to it during previous talks. Especially the GoU had gathered enough knowledge on the LRA to not expect it to comply with the agreement terms, while the latter signed for the continuation of talks. Coupled with the international attention on the talks, the benefits of sending a signal, which is perceived as costly to the international community, seemed to be crucial to both conflict parties. Thus, they signed the CoH agreement.

#### *6.2.4.2 Mediation on a Comprehensive Political Solution (Agenda Item 2)*

On September 25, 2006, the next round of talks begins. In focus is agenda item 2, a comprehensive political solution (Schomerus 2012: 106–109). During the talks, the GoU accuses the LRA of having moved away from the assembly area, and explains that it might have to use military action against the LRA again (Grainger 2006). This accusation, together with the LRA's complaint of having been chased away from the assembly area by the UPDF, is scrutinised by the CHMT in the beginning of October. As the LRA is not assembled, the UPDF continues military action against the LRA, and Museveni gets in

touch with the U.S. to lobby for military support to fight the LRA (Schomerus 2012: 112–115).

On October 21, 2006, Museveni attends the Juba Talks. Museveni's visit turns out to be a disaster, as the LRA delegation does not want to shake hands with him, but wants him to apologise for the harm he has caused northern Ugandans. Observers start to wonder whether the GoU delegation truly represents Museveni. As a consequence of Museveni's attendance of the Juba Talks, Otti orders the LRA to stay hidden, and remain absent from the assembly areas (Schomerus 2012: 58, 98, 122; BBC News 2006b). Meanwhile, the UN Juba Initiative Fund is created to address previous problems with regard to financing the talks. The fund silences doubts on the legitimacy of the peace process, which had arisen due to the ICC arrest warrants (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12; Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 16).

On November 1, 2006, the first addendum to the CoH agreement is signed. It extends the ceasefire and recommends the conflict parties to implement the terms of the CoH agreement. The LRA is expected to assemble within one week, and to provide information on members who are still in Uganda to the mediator. The SPLA is supposed to ensure the LRA's safety in the assembly areas. Moreover, the addendum lists which kind of behaviour is considered a violation of the CoH agreement, i.e. attacks against each other or civilians, the failure of the LRA to assemble, the removal of food or other services from the assembly areas, the acquisition of arms in Southern Sudan as well as other acts the CHMT or the mediator might consider a violation of the CoH agreement (CoH Addendum 1 2006).

On November 6, 2006, the LRA presents a position paper on agenda item 2. It starts with the acknowledgement that both LRA and GoU seek to end their conflict without arms. Moreover, the LRA demands for safety and protection regulations, an assembly area in northern Uganda, and the responsibility of donors and local leaders for the rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery of the war-affected areas. The LRA suggests holding a referendum on whether the population agrees to a transition to federalism. It underlines the necessity for children of LRA members to receive education and for an Equal Opportunities Act to be issued, according to which northern Uganda should be rebuilt. The GoU rejects most suggestions immediately. Two days later, the LRA leaves the Juba Talks

due to a newspaper article which states that, according to the UPDF, the LRA violated the CoH agreement and is not committed to the Juba Talks (Schomerus 2012: 123–124).

On November 12, 2006, Kony meets Egeland in person. Egeland is accompanied by Machar, other members of the mediation team, representatives of the GoU, and representatives of the civil society. Amongst others, Egeland reports to the UNSC that the LRA is concerned about its own security (S/PV.5525 2006; BBC News 2006f). By the end of November, the LRA voices its dissatisfaction with Machar's mediation and the concern that Machar might be biased towards the GoU again. Additionally, it does not want to engage in further talks until the UPDF has left Southern Sudan, fearing for its own security. The LRA wants to continue talks in another country. Fighting between the UPDF and the LRA outside of the safe-zones is observed in November and December (Schomerus 2012: 126–127; Accord 2010: 24).

On December 4, 2006, Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's former president, is appointed UN Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas. He is tasked to contribute to ending the conflict. His appointment is regarded as a UN commitment to treat the dispute as a political and regional conflict (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12; Schomerus 2012: 130). On December 12, Otti and Kony meet with a team of legal advisors. During the meeting, Kony states that, to him, the peace talks resemble previous failed efforts, as troop movement can be noted while talks take place. Nevertheless, he voices his commitment to the talks (Schomerus 2012: 131–132).

On December 14, 2006 the Juba Talks continue, and two days later, the second addendum to the CoH agreement is signed. The CoH agreement is supposed to be reviewed again on March 1, 2007. Moreover, the LRA is supposed to assemble in safe-zones within one month, and to provide information on LRA troops in Uganda to Machar, who continues to provide logistical support and services at the assembly area (CoH Addendum 2 2006; Schomerus 2012: 132). Meanwhile, first signals that Kony might not be interested in signing any agreement are noted (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 19). In January 2007, the LRA is not welcome in Southern Sudan anymore, and the President of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir, states his impatience with the LRA. He announces military action against the LRA if no peaceful solution is found (Atkinson 2010: 215; Schomerus 2012: 161). As a reaction to Kiir's statement, the LRA walks away from the talks and refuses to

return to Juba due to security concerns. The LRA demands for an increase in daily allowances and a change of venues (Accord 2010: 25; Ochieng 2007a; Schomerus 2012: 161; Riley 2008; Atkinson 2010: 215).

In February 2007, no mediation takes place, but the LRA is said to have moved into the Central African Republic (CAR), while LRA troop movement is also recorded in Southern Sudan and the DRC (Accord 2010: 25). The LRA rejects a renewal of the CoH agreement a few days before it runs out (Atkinson 2010: 215–217), and insists on a change of venue due to doubts of the GoSS impartiality. It suggests relocating the Juba Talks to Kenya or South Africa. The suggestion is discarded to avoid forum shopping (BBC News 2007a). Meanwhile, the U.S. announces the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Schomerus 2012: 162), which supports the suspicion that the GoU wants to find a military solution to the conflict (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 13). In March, Chissano meets Kony in the DRC, and announces that talks will restart in April (Schomerus 2012: 164; Accord 2010: 25).

Viewing the discussions on and around agenda item 2 in light of the theory section, two notions become apparent with regard to subsequent mediation onset. First, several mediation events set on after mediation did not produce an agreement repeatedly. Second, subsequent mediation set on again despite the CoH agreement having been reneged on. The former notion supports hypothesis 1, which expects the onset of subsequent talks after mediation did not produce an agreement. However, the amount of available information sufficed for a hoop test only, because it is unclear which exact conclusions the conflict parties drew from the previous mediation outcome. Though the second notion contradicts hypothesis 3a on first sight, according to which subsequent mediation onset is unlikely if an agreement was reneged on, evidence clearly depicts that the conflict parties had agreed to the CoH agreement with the private information that neither side was going to commit to the agreement terms. Thus, the agreement was signed to increase international support for the Juba Talks, and to ensure its continuation. As neither side expected the other to comply with the agreement terms, both are unlikely to have shared vital private information which could have been misused by their opponent. Thus, hypothesis 3a does not need to be rejected. Nevertheless, Kony highlighted that the reneged on CoH agreement reminded him of previous peace talks, i.e. the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire, while

he remained interested in talks despite these negative impressions, as expected in the theory section.

While the reneged on CoH agreement did not prohibit the continuation of talks, it underlined the rift between the conflict parties. Evidence, sufficient for a smoking-gun test, shows that, as expected, security concerns were underlined by reneged on agreements, because reneged on agreements underline the persistence of the credible commitment problem. Particularly in the aftermath of the reneged on CoH agreement, the LRA mistrusted the mediator, who it perceived as government-biased, and did not feel safe – neither in the assembly areas nor in Southern Sudan where mediation took place. Besides, the GoU started lobbying for military support from the U.S. The continued conflict hindered the conflict parties from building trust amongst each other. These notions support hypothesis 7a, according to which subsequent mediation success is unlikely after an agreement has been reneged on.

#### *6.2.4.3 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Solution (Agenda Item 2), and on Justice and Accountability (Agenda Item 3)*

From March 31 until April 6, 2007, the Mombasa Talks are held under the auspices of IKV Pax Christi. They are conducted in secret, with the aim of reigniting the Juba Talks, and producing an agreement which is supposed to be transferred to the Juba Talks (Interview 2016). However, the Mombasa Talks reduce Machar's control, and are widely considered damaging for the peace process (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 23), because they increase the split within the LRA between supporters and opponents of the peace talks (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11).

On April 14, 2007, the third addendum to the CoH agreement is signed. The deadline for the LRA to assemble is moved to June of the same year. Moreover, instead of having two assembly areas, having only one is agreed upon now (CoH Addendum 3 2007), which the LRA had demanded for previously (Schomerus 2012: 168). Besides, the LRA's daily allowances are increased from USD 70 to USD 120 (Among 2007).

On April 26, 2007, substantive talks restart. Kony has largely replaced the former LRA delegation with new members, as he does not trust it anymore after its engagement in the Mombasa Talks (Schomerus 2012: 168). The agreement reached during the Mombasa

Talks is completely ignored in Juba, possibly due to the discordance between IKV Pax Christi and Machar about who should be the lead mediator (Interview 2016). UN representatives are unhappy with the initiative IKV Pax Christi has undertaken (Schomerus 2012: 168). Though Kony underlines that he is not going to sign an agreement unless the ICC arrest warrants are dropped (BBC News 2007b), an agreement on comprehensive solutions to the problems of northern Uganda is reached on May 2. It states that the GoU is supposed to encourage development in northern Uganda, that the rule of law needs to be strengthened, and access to justice improved. Moreover, it underlines the equality of all people living in Uganda. LRA members willing and qualified can be integrated into the Ugandan national armed forces and other security agencies, while children of LRA members are supposed to benefit from an education initiative, just like all other children of war-affected areas. Besides, the need for security provisions for LRA members in the transition period is highlighted (Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 2007).

The Juba Talks officially restart on June 1, 2007 (Schomerus 2012: 169). The two delegations often meet without Machar (Ochieng 2007a), and progress with regard to agenda item 3 (justice and accountability) is made. However, a meeting between the GoSS, the GoU, and representatives from the DRC, during which a military solution to the LRA problem is discussed creates confusion on the GoU's interest in peace through mediation (Schomerus 2012: 169). Nevertheless, the agreement on general principles of accountability and reconciliation is signed on June 29, 2007. It notes the use of formal and informal justice and reconciliation mechanisms, while truth-telling and -seeking are promoted. The LRA is supposed to be removed from the terrorist list, if it abandons its rebellion, ceases fire, and its members submit to DDR programs (S/2007/435). Otti expects the Juba Talks to last for another year, and the LRA states its readiness to hand over rebels that have committed atrocities to the judiciary, while it demands the GoU to do the same with UPDF soldiers (Matsiko et al. 2007). In the meantime, the GoU and the DRC set the deadline for the LRA to leave the DRC to September 2007. Afterwards, military action is supposed to follow. The peace deal is openly supported by the U.S. (Accord 2010: 26).

On September 5, 2007, Museveni calls Kony a trickster and the whole peace process a circus, when he meets U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer. The latter approves of Museveni's plan to start a military operation should the peace process fail (Schomerus 2012: 175). On October 1, AFRICOM is officially launched, which fuels the suspicion that

the U.S. support the GoU militarily in its fight against the LRA (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 13). On October 4, the LRA delegation meets Museveni in Kampala, and the CoH agreement is extended until January 2008 (CoH Addendum 4 2007; Schomerus 2012: 176–177), and later again until mid-March 2008 (CoH Addendum 5 2008). Nevertheless, the UN fund’s donors set the deadline for the conclusion of the talks to the end of January (Baaré 2008: 24).

Rumours about a split within the LRA become known at the end of 2007, but are rejected by the LRA (BBC News 2007b). Questions on Otti’s whereabouts are responded to with the explanation that he is under arrest. His death is confirmed in the beginning of 2008 (BBC News 2008d). He was killed on October 8, 2007, supposedly because Kony did not trust him anymore after the Mombasa Talks had taken place. His death causes a rift within the LRA. Supposedly, Otti was the only one able to talk with Kony properly. He seems to have been the voice of reason and has received a lot of credit for the progress of the peace talks (Ochieng 2007b; Schomerus 2012: 178).

Outlined in the theoretical argument is the expectation that subsequent mediation is likely to set on if the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement (hypothesis 1). Again, hoop tests indicated support for the hypothesis. In fact, the conflict parties not only agreed to subsequent mediation onset in the larger framework of the Juba Talks, but they even agreed to a separate mediation process, the Mombasa Talks. This suggests that the conflict parties had gathered enough information on mediation to consider it as worth engaging in additional talks for, but were unsatisfied with the progress of the Machar-led mediation. Especially since the Mombasa Talks were held in secret, the conflict parties were likely to have expected gathering private information on their opponent, as, through secret talks, no signal to the international community could be sent. However, clear causal mechanisms cannot be detected due to a lack of information on each conflict parties’ decision-making process. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported through a hoop test, but not through a smoking-gun test.

The Mombasa Talks producing an agreement, and the Juba Talks setting on again provide evidence for a hoop test, which supports hypothesis 2a, according to which subsequent mediation onset is likely after partial mediation success, because successful mediation underlines the benefits of engaging in talks. During the Mombasa Talks, the conflict

parties seemed to have gathered important information on each other – be it e.g. holding talks to appease the international community, or knowledge on each other's strength and resolve. The gathered information apparently made subsequent mediation onset seem beneficial to both the GoU and the LRA.

The agreements on agenda item 2 and 3 were reached after previous mediation repeatedly did not produce a settlement. Hence, private information conducive for identifying a ZoA was exchanged, and the subsequent successful events built up on the previous mediation events. In fact, the LRA's security concerns were addressed in the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Situation, while topics outlined in the LRA's position paper were revived as well. This is considered smoking-gun evidence for information being exchanged during mediation events which do not produce agreements being picked up and build up upon during subsequent mediation. Hence, support for hypothesis 5, according to which subsequent mediation success is likely to follow previous mediation which did not produce an agreement, is noted.

#### *6.2.4.4 Agreement on Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration, and a Permanent Ceasefire (Agenda Item 4 and 5)*

On January 30, 2008, the Juba Talks finally resume and the CoH agreement is extended (CoH Addendum 5 2008). Moreover, on February 19, the Annex to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation is signed. It outlines how the agreement is supposed to be implemented. Amongst others, the GoU is supposed to establish a body which deals with the conflict's history as well as human rights violations, public and private hearings are supposed to be conducted, truth-telling promoted, witness protection installed, and recommendations for a prevention of future conflict made, while a High Court is supposed to be installed (Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 2008). However, two days after the annex to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation is signed, the LRA delegation walks out of talks due to disagreements over the proportion of positions it is supposed to receive in the government and the military (Oluka 2008). Nevertheless, the implementation protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions is signed on February 22 (Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 2008), and Museveni sets the deadline for the end of the war to the end of February (BBC News 2008a).

On February 23, an Agreement on DDR (agenda item 4) is reached. A CHMT is supposed to record LRA members who want to join the UPDF, agencies for the reintegration are supposed to be established, and disarmament is supposed to be guided by the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Standards (Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 2008). Moreover, the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire is signed (agenda item 5) (Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire 2008), and on February 29, 2008, the Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms is signed. It lists which agreements are part of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), and outlines an implementation schedule, among others (Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms 2008). With agreements on all agenda items reached, the FPA is complete (Accord 2010: 26).

While the atmosphere in Juba is euphoric, the last agreements have not been confirmed by Kony (Schomerus 2012: 229), and on March 1, 2008, it is supposedly known that Kony is not going to sign the FPA unless the ICC charges are dropped (BBC News 2008b). The CoH agreement is extended until March 28, with the expectation that the FPA will have been signed by then (CoH Addendum 6 2008). Ultimately, the signing ceremony of the FPA is scheduled for April 10, 2008. However, Kony does not show up (Atkinson 2010: 220). On May 10, 2008, he demands renegotiations on the third agenda item, and shortly thereafter the withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants. While Machar continues to push for an agreement, the GoU's frustration increases, and LRA attacks intensify again. Several attempts to hold meetings with Kony do not materialise as Kony does not show up, supposedly out of security concerns (Schomerus 2012: 238–240). The fragile ceasefire is on the verge of collapsing (International Crisis Group 2008: 1). In August, the GoU rejects Chissano's suggestion of further talks, after the latter had been approached by the LRA (BBC News 2008c). The U.S. State Department adds Kony to the Specially Designated Nationals list, which allows the U.S. to increase military actions against the LRA (Schomerus 2012: 243).

The theoretical argument expected mediation to set on again quickly after previous mediation was successful, because partial mediation success underlines the benefits of engaging in talks (hypothesis 4). However, a long break in the talks needs to be noted after the agreement on general principles of accountability and reconciliation was signed on June 29, 2007, and the CoH agreement was extended several times. While a hoop test

would suggest a dismissal of hypothesis 4 because of the long break in talks, evidence suggests that Otti's death and the split in the LRA were more important than the previous mediation outcome for the break in talks. Hence, the LRA did not decide for a break in talks because of previous partial mediation success, but due to a change in the conflict's context. Thus, the results do not question hypothesis 4.

Once mediation set on again, subsequent mediation success was quickly observed. The conflict parties must have exchanged a sufficient amount of information during previous mediation events to be able to reach agreements on agenda item 4 and 5 in a short amount of time. Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement provides information sufficient for a hoop test. It supports hypothesis 1, according to which subsequent mediation onset is likely if previous mediation did not produce an agreement. It also supports hypothesis 5, according to which subsequent mediation success is likely to be observed once mediation sets on again, if previous mediation did not produce an agreement. More detailed information on the costs and benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation and private information sharing would be necessary for a smoking-gun test.

Besides, the quick onset and success of subsequent mediation in the last phase of the Juba Talks provided information for a hoop test, which indicates that previous partially successful mediation encourages subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 2a) in a timely manner (hypothesis 4), while subsequent mediation success is also likely (hypothesis 6a). The findings also support hypothesis 6b: with increasing agreement comprehensiveness, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success increased. The conflict parties seemed to have realised their ability to successfully negotiate all agenda items, and the mediator must have drawn on previously gathered information, as the agenda items mediated last address rather delicate matters. Due to the previous engagement, the identification of a ZoA for the remaining agenda items became possible. Yet, little information on the extent to which each previous mediation outcome influenced subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success was available, and thus, only hoop tests were conducted on hypothesis 2a, 4, 6a, and 6b.

### **6.2.5 After the Juba Talks**

Despite the progress made during the Juba Talks, the GoU begins to implement its plan of military action against the LRA on December 1, 2008. Though this plan is officially denied, the GoU sends troops to the DRC (Kazooba 2008; Atkinson 2010: 220–221). On December 14, Operation Lightning Thunder, a joint military operation between the Ugandan army, the DRC, and the GoSS, supported by the U.S., the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), and AFRICOM starts. The LRA responds with an increase in massacres and large-scale abductions (Haarhaus 2009: 1; Accord 2010: 26; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 13).

Operation Lightning Thunder continues sporadically throughout 2009, but its name is dropped in March 2009 (Accord 2010: 26; International Crisis Group 2010: 1). Though Machar and the LRA are interested in a continuation of mediation, talks do not set on again (Schomerus 2012: 245). In July 2009, Chissano's assignment as Special Envoy to LRA-Affected Areas ends (Security Council Report 2009). In 2011, the U.S. sends troops to fight the LRA. The troops are not supposed to engage in combat, but to provide information and advice partner nation forces (BBC News 2009). Meanwhile, Kony continuously shows interest in a renewal of talks (Weseka 2014), but up until June 2017, no additional diplomatic initiative has taken place. Instead, the LRA mainly roams the DRC and the CAR (Security Council 2016). In May 2017, the U.S. and the GoU start withdrawing their troops from the CAR, announcing the defeat of the LRA. Kony is still alive, though supposedly very ill. The GoU wants to join its troops with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) to continue having an eye on the LRA (Ocungi 2017; Musisi 2017).

Based on the theoretical argument, subsequent mediation onset was expected to be unlikely if an agreement was reneged on, because reneged on agreements underline the hazards of sharing private information, while they highlight the prevalence of the credible commitment problem (hypothesis 3a). These negative implications were expected to amplify by more comprehensive agreements, as more private information needs to be shared to reach these kinds of agreements (hypothesis 3b). With Kony's signature missing under the FPA, the agreements reached during the Juba Talks remain unimplemented. Indeed, mediation between the GoU and the LRA has not set on again since 2008. Smoking-gun tests support what the theory expected, namely, governments rejecting

further mediation offers, pursuing other conflict management options, and rebel groups underlining their interest in subsequent mediation onset after a mediated agreement was reneged on. While the LRA repeatedly uttered its interest in subsequent mediation onset, the GoU used the Juba Talks, and especially the end of it, to lobby for military support. Due to the joint military operation, it became clear that the international community did not expect a negotiated settlement anymore. Thus, the GoU did not have an incentive to engage in subsequent mediation any longer. The usage of other, more forceful conflict management tools further supports previous research, according to which third parties are more likely to escalate their conflict management strategy if their previous effort failed (Melin 2015).

These findings support hypothesis 3a, as subsequent mediation did not set on. Sound conclusions with regard to hypothesis 3b cannot be drawn, though. The only other agreement which was supposed to end a mediation process was the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire, which was less comprehensive than the FPA. However, for mediation to set on again after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on, the conflict context needed to change first, i.e. for the GoU to consider subsequent mediation onset as beneficial, international pressure needed to increase to an extent that continued conflict became too costly. Hence, the Gulu Ceasefire agreement and the FPA seem to have had the same deteriorating impact on the GoU's decision to engage in talks. It is unclear whether the GoU would consider talks again if the conflict context were to change. Accounting for the recent end of the military pursuit of Kony due to the LRA's perceived weakness, the conflict context is unlikely to change to an extent that makes subsequent mediation onset necessary soon from the Gou's perspective, though.

### 6.3 Discussion

The SNA provided valuable insights into the dynamics at play between consecutive mediation efforts. It allowed for a more detailed testing of the causal mechanisms which had to be neglected in the LNA due to a lack of data. Particularly, it showed which conclusions the conflict parties drew. These conclusions strongly affected their cost-benefit calculation, the ranking of mediation and of sharing private information in their preference order, and thereby the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success.

### ***6.3.1 Subsequent Mediation Onset and Subsequent Mediation Success after Mediation Did Not Produce an Agreement***

Subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are likely after previous mediation did not produce an agreement, according to the theoretical argument (hypothesis 1 and 5). It became clear that the Juba Talks were the GoU's response to the international community's demands for a peaceful solution to the conflict, and that it used the Juba Talks for lobbying for military support to fight the LRA. These 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998) allowed the GoU to evaluate mediation as beneficial, since it enabled the GoU to collect information on the LRA, while it showed political goodwill though pursuing its own aims. Furthermore, the LRA was generally in favour of mediation, as mediation provided it with an international stage on which it was able to make its aims known, while it received daily allowances during the Juba Talks. In fact, talks might not have continued as long without these benefits (Interview 2016). In general, whenever mediation did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset was observed (hypothesis 1). However, the extent to which the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument were at play in the case under scrutiny is unclear, as not enough information for in-depth analysis was available.

Regarding hypothesis 5, expecting subsequent mediation success (any kind of agreement being reached) if previous mediation did not produce an agreement, it became clear that particularly when private information the LRA had shared on security issues were picked up and accounted for in subsequent mediation events, agreements were reached. For example, Bigombe picked up the LRA's security concerns during her first mediation effort, which led to the Gulu Ceasefire. Moreover, during the Juba Talks, the number of assembly areas was reduced from two to one after the LRA repeatedly underlined its concerns with having two assembly areas. To which extent the demands of the GoU were accounted for in subsequent mediation events was unclear due to missing information. Furthermore, it was unclear to which extent the causal mechanisms outlined in the theory section were supported regarding other agreements due to a lack of information on the extent to which the conflict parties drew on previously exchanged information. At the same time, since several mediation events did not produce an agreement, mediation not producing agreements sometimes also bred subsequent mediation not producing agreements. This

evidence does not speak against hypothesis 5 though, as the hypothesised causal mechanisms were not refuted.

Overall, these findings tie up with previous research in various ways. First, mediation events not producing an agreement cannot be avoided, because a certain amount of information needs to be exchanged before a peace deal can be reached (Heldt 2009; Böhmelt 2013). Second, the importance of security concerns being addressed appropriately was underlined repeatedly by the LRA, which stands in line with the expectation that rebel groups are particularly vulnerable – a fact third parties can account for by providing security guarantees (Walter 1997). Third, both conflict parties utilised mediation for its signalling capacity (Bercovitch 2007). Especially the GoU sought to avert more robust intervention measures by engaging in mediation.

While these findings tie up well with existing research, they shed light onto the conclusions the GoU and the LRA drew when a mediation effort did not produce an agreement. These results contradict Greig's (2010) findings (on interstate conflict mediation), according to which mediation which did not produce an agreement has a negative impact on subsequent mediation onset. They show that the amount of benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation and private information sharing after mediation has not produced an agreement is sufficient for them to consider subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success as better than their BATNA.

### ***6.3.2 Subsequent Mediation Onset and Subsequent Mediation Success after Partial Mediation Success***

Subsequent mediation onset is likely to be observed after partial mediation success, as the conflict parties are expected to evaluate mediation as beneficial enough to engage in it again (hypothesis 2a). Once subsequent mediation has set on, its success is likely as well (hypothesis 6a), assuming that the conflict parties consider sharing private information as beneficial due to the previous success. The likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success is expected to be further increased the more comprehensive the previous partial agreement was (hypotheses 2b and 6b), since more comprehensive agreements are assumed to underline the benefits of private information sharing to a greater extent.

In the mediation efforts between the GoU and the LRA, both conflict parties were aware of the importance of signing an agreement, as it signalled their willingness to engage in conflict management to the international community. Hence, they signed the CoH agreement at the beginning of the Juba Talks, and subsequent mediation set on (Schomerus 2012: 98–99). With the ICC arrest warrants predefining the concessions the GoU was able to make on the security of high-ranking LRA personnel – even the initial amnesty offers of the GoU could not be upheld – the extent to which the GoU shared substantially important private information was limited. Mediation allowed it to remain in control of the mediation process and the mediation outcome. Thus, mediation held many benefits for the GoU. Especially when an agreement was produced, the international community was pleased with the progress made during the Juba Talks, and the hazard of more robust intervention measures employed was reduced. The GoU evaluated mediation as beneficial, particularly after partial mediation success, and thus, subsequent mediation set on. This supports hypothesis 2a, according to which subsequent mediation onset is likely if previous mediation produced a partial agreement, as the partial agreement reached previously underlined the benefits of mediation.

The analysis suggested that though the LRA did not gather substantial additional private information on the GoU, it nevertheless considered mediation as beneficial, because its security concerns were addressed in the reached agreements. Hence, mediation did not only have signalling capacity, but also contributed to a reduction of the credible commitment problem. As security concerns were the most important hindrance to the talks from the LRA perspective, agreements which took these concerns into account were likely to have contributed to the LRA ranking mediation high in its preference order. Its continued engagement in mediation after partial mediation success thus supports hypothesis 2a.

The results of the SNA did not indicate a difference between the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset after more or less comprehensive agreements (hypothesis 2b). The timing of subsequent mediation onset differs – depending on agreement comprehensiveness – as subsequent mediation onset was observed quicker towards the end of the Juba Talks, where more comprehensive agreements were reached. Nevertheless, as hypothesis 2b does not address the timing of subsequent mediation onset, and no difference in the overall likelihood of subsequent mediation onset after agreements of low or high

comprehensiveness were reached can be noted, no support for hypothesis 2b was noted. As the causal mechanisms cannot be rejected, since no information contradicting the causal mechanisms outlined in the theory was available, hypothesis 2b cannot be falsified in the SNA.

The results on the link between previous partial mediation success and subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 6a) were mixed. While subsequent mediation onset was observed whenever a mediation event was successful, subsequent mediation events did not produce agreements in the first half of the Juba Talks. This contradicts hypothesis 6a, according to which subsequent mediation success follows mediation events which produce an agreement. At the end of the Juba Talks, mediation success was observed after partial mediation success, though. Apparently, a sufficient amount of information had been exchanged previously, thus, enabling the conflict parties to reach agreements within their ZoA. This supported hypothesis 6a. As partial mediation success was mainly observed towards the end of the Juba Talks, and mediation often ended without an agreement though the previous mediation event produced a partial agreement, no sound conclusion for the link between previous partial mediation success and subsequent mediation success was drawn.

Furthermore, according to the theoretical argument, subsequent mediation success is expected to be particularly likely with increasing agreement comprehensiveness (hypothesis 6b). Information gathered during previous mediation events was expected to be drawn on, while additional private information was expected to be shared once subsequent talks set on. In fact, the more comprehensive the previously mediated agreement was, the more likely subsequent mediation success was anticipated. While the results suggest support for the hypothesis, especially towards the end of the Juba Talks, it was not clear whether the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument were decisive for the finding, or whether the changed delegation and reduced coordination with Kony lead to reaching agreements quickly.

Overall, the expected positive link between previous partial mediation success and subsequent mediation efforts was reaffirmed by the qualitative analysis. However, not enough information on the conflict parties' cost-benefit calculation was available to evaluate the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument in the desired detail.

Nevertheless, the results shed light on the positive implications partial mediation success has for subsequent mediation efforts.

### ***6.3.3 Subsequent Mediation Onset and Subsequent Mediation Success after Previously Reneged on Mediated Agreements***

According to the theoretical argument, subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success are unlikely if a previously mediated agreement was reneged on. This argument, summarised in hypotheses 3a and 7a, was tested with regard to subsequent mediation processes and subsequent mediation events: two agreements concluding a process were reneged on (the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on by the GoU in 1994, and the FPA was considered reneged on because Kony failed to sign it), and one agreement concluding an event was reneged on (the CoH agreement). Whether the degree of comprehensiveness of a reneged on agreement had an impact on subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 3b) was only tested concerning mediation processes outcomes: the Gulu Ceasefire was of comparably low comprehensiveness, and the FPA of comparably high comprehensiveness. As only the CoH agreement was reneged on in the course of a larger mediation process, the consequences of the CoH agreement being reneged on were not compared to the consequences of other agreements which were reneged on in the course of a larger process. Hence, 3b and 7b were analysed only with regard to mediation process outcomes.

To the GoU, reneged on agreements highlighted the LRA's illegitimacy, and thereby the costs and inappropriateness of mediation. When the GoU reneged on the Gulu Ceasefire, it pursued military actions in the aftermath. During the first mediation effort, Museveni never considered the LRA as an equal negotiation partner, and in the aftermath of the first Bigombe-led mediation attempt, he claimed the war against the LRA to be over, perceiving the GoU as militarily stronger and unchallenged. Thus, after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset was not observed for ten years, until the conflict context changed due to an increase in international pressure.

When the CoH agreement was reneged on, the GoU misused the private information gathered during the Juba Talks and deceived the LRA by bombing the safe zones. Furthermore, with Kony failing to sign the FPA, the Juba Talks remained the last

mediation effort observed between the GoU and the LRA until June 2017. In the aftermath of Kony failing to sign the FPA, the GoU underlined the LRA's illegitimacy, and disregarded all subsequent mediation demands by the LRA. Throughout the Juba Talks, the GoU had gathered a sufficient amount of information to consider the LRA as militarily weaker, and its own BATNA – a military operation against the LRA, with the support of amongst others the U.S. – as more beneficial. Thus, the pressure on the GoU to engage in subsequent talks reduced. As a consequence, mediation was no longer ranked high enough in the GoU's preference order to be considered a viable conflict management option for the GoU. These notions suggest that the GoU used the reneged on agreement to justify its refusal to engage in talks again, while it also used it to mobilise other kinds of conflict management. These notions provided support for hypothesis 3a.

While the negative impact of reneged on agreements which conclude mediation processes on the GoU's willingness to engage in subsequent mediation seemed to be severe, the same conclusion were not drawn for the LRA. As expected in the theoretical argument, the LRA continuously showed an interest in mediation, even when the GoU reneged on an agreement. The consequences of the GoU reneging simply were the LRA's pronounced demands for security guarantees, as expected in the theory section. Indeed, by Kony failing to sign the FPA, he sought to point out the necessity for renegotiations, instead of averting from mediation completely. As the GoU did not agree to subsequent mediation whenever an agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation was not observed, though. These notions were expected in the theoretical argument and are considered support for hypothesis 3a.

Whether the comprehensiveness of reneged on agreements has a decisive impact on subsequent mediation onset remained unclear (hypothesis 3b). On the one hand, the consequences of the missing FPA, in comparison to the reneged on CoH agreement, suggested a support for the hypothesis. While mediation continued almost as scheduled after the CoH agreement was reneged on, no renegotiations on the FPA took place when Kony failed to sign it. However, when the CoH agreement was reneged on, four agenda items were still scheduled for discussion. The conflict parties had agreed to a larger process and, additionally, had not expected each other to comply with the terms of the CoH agreement. Though the reneged on CoH agreement soured the atmosphere, talks continued.

Contrarily, the FPA marked the end of the Juba Talks. It was a comprehensive agreement which addressed all agenda items.

When comparing the consequences of the reneged on FPA to the consequences of the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire, both agreements after which no additional agenda items were to be addressed, no difference can be noted, as both were followed by military operations. Mediation onset after the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire was only observed after a change in the conflict's context. Thus, when comparing mediation process outcomes, no difference in the consequences can be noted, as mediation neither set on after the FPA was reneged on, nor did it set on for a long time after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on. Thus, no clear support for hypothesis 3b is detected, as it is unclear whether the comprehensiveness of the reneged on agreement, the remaining agenda items, or other variables were decisive for mediation not setting on again after the agreement was reneged on. Meanwhile, evidence also did not contradict the outlined causal mechanisms.

Reneged on mediated agreements were expected to have a negative impact on subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 7a). The analysis suggested that especially the LRA delegation drew conclusions from reneged on agreements for its behaviour during the Juba Talks. In fact, a member of the LRA delegation drew parallels to the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire when discussing security and the GoU's behaviour (Schomerus 2012: 60). Thus, the impact of reneged on mediation agreements seemed to be enduring for a considerable amount of time. This became apparent repeatedly, as the LRA continuously underlined its security concerns. Indeed, the mediation efforts which followed the Gulu Ceasefire were unsuccessful. Additionally, the fact that the first agreement of the Juba Talks was reneged on within a short time period decreased the credibility of the Juba Talks (Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12). It showed the inability of the mediator to credibly guarantee security, and underlined the rifts between the conflict parties, which was picked up by the LRA in its demands for security guarantees. This also had consequences for the implementation of additional agreements. Though several addendums to the CoH agreement were signed, the LRA did not assemble, fearing the GoU to make use of the gathered private information again. These notions support hypothesis 7a. Hypothesis 7b was not tested, as the comprehensiveness of reneged on agreements after which mediation set on again did not vary (both the Gulu Ceasefire and the CoH agreement were agreements of low comprehensiveness).

Overall, the negative implications of renege on agreements became clear. On the one hand, the conflict parties were less likely to engage in subsequent talks, which highlighted the difficulties renege on agreements pose for subsequent mediation onset. Particularly the GoU opted for other conflict management tools – namely, military operations – in the aftermath of renege on mediated agreements. On the other hand, once mediation set on after a mediated agreement had been renege on, the conflict parties were affected by the previously renege on agreement. Especially the LRA repeatedly underlined its security concerns. As a consequence, brokering subsequent agreements became more difficult and subsequent mediation success less likely.

#### ***6.3.4 The Timing of Subsequent Mediation Onset***

The previous sections showed that former mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset. Do they also affect the amount of time which passes until subsequent mediation onset is observed? According to the theoretical argument they do: the more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation, based on the previous mediation outcome, the less time needs to pass before subsequent mediation onset is observed (hypothesis 4). This became apparent in the case study as well.

Focusing on mediation event outcomes, the hypothesis was not supported. When mediation events produced partial agreements, subsequent mediation onset followed quickly. With increasing agreement comprehensiveness during the Juba Talks, this observation was underlined. The conflict parties seemed to ascribe a high amount of benefits to mediation, which made rearranging their preference order, and thus averting from mediation unnecessary. The benefits that were most pronounced, as outlined in the previous analysis, were the signalling effect of signed agreements, and the ability of addressing security concerns.

Moreover, mediation mostly set on quickly after a mediation event did not produce an agreement. Though breaks during the Juba Talks of sometimes even months were observed, and it was unclear whether subsequent mediation was going to take place, the LRA always returned to the mediation table, while the GoU did not question the continuation of the Juba Talks once they had set on.

After the CoH agreement was reneged on, mediation continued without a noticeable break, contrary to the hypothesis. This underlined the importance of mediation events being embedded in larger talks. Though the conflict parties' trust in the mediator reduced, and the mistrust in the disputant's respective opponent increased, subsequent mediation set on quickly after the CoH agreement was reneged on. The fact that the disputants had agreed to the Juba Talks seemed to mitigate the negative consequences of the CoH agreement to a certain extent.

When focussing on mediation process outcomes, the hypothesis is supported. It took ten years until subsequent mediation set on after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on. Evidence suggests that a change in the conflict's context was necessary before both conflict parties agreed to subsequent mediation onset. Meanwhile, by June 2017, no subsequent mediation effort has set on since Kony failed to sign the FPA. Thus, reneged on mediation process outcomes seem to increase the amount of time that needs to pass until subsequent talks start.

The answer to the question whether the timing of subsequent mediation onset is influenced by previous mediation outcomes depends on whether the outcome of mediation events or the outcome of mediation processes is in focus. With regard to *mediation event outcomes*, subsequent mediation onset was observed quickly after comprehensive agreements have been reached. The amount of time which needed to pass after mediation which did not produce an agreement ranged from an immediate onset of subsequent talks, two months passing without subsequent mediation setting on. Subsequent mediation onset after the CoH agreement was reneged on was observed within a comparably short time as well. Hence, hypothesis 4 is not supported with regard to the impact of mediation event outcomes on the timing of subsequent mediation onset.

The results were clearer when focusing on *mediation process outcomes*: when Bigombe failed to broker an agreement during her second effort, the LRA seemed to question her ability to mediate a settlement, but not the conflict management capacity of mediation. Thus, subsequent mediation onset with another mediator was observed rather quickly. Mediation processes producing reneged on mediated agreements were evaluated much more negatively. The GoU opted for other conflict management tools whenever a mediated agreement was reneged on – regardless which side reneged. Hence, only through a change

in the conflict's context, subsequent mediation set on after the Gulu Ceasefire was reneged on. The difference in the amount of time which passed after the different mediation process outcomes and subsequent mediation onset was considered as support for hypothesis 4.

Overall, the support for hypothesis 4 underlined the consequences of the different mediation outcomes for subsequent mediation onset. Not only was subsequent mediation less likely after an agreement had been reneged on, the amount of time which needed to pass until subsequent mediation onset was observed was also significantly longer, especially compared to partial mediation success. This suggests that pushing for an agreement might not be conducive for conflict management in the form of mediation when the hazard of agreements being reneged on is high.

### ***6.3.5 Additional Findings & Alternative Explanations***

When analysing the impact of mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset, several findings, additional to the ones presented above, were discovered. They are outlined in this subchapter to account for equifinality, as it is crucial to take note of the influence other variables might have on the outcome of interest when conducting process tracing (George & Bennett 2005: 215–217). Again, factors which have had an impact on the GoU's and on the LRA's willingness to engage in subsequent mediation, and their likelihood of sharing private information, and thereby working towards subsequent mediation success, are distinguished.

*International pressure* seems to have been crucial for the GoU's engagement in mediation. While Museveni did not fully support Bigombe's first mediation effort, he encouraged the second effort after Uganda had been put on the agenda of UNSC and donors demanded for action. As pressure did not reduce when the second Bigombe-effort did not produce an agreement, and no alternative solution presented itself, Museveni eventually agreed to the Juba Talks after Kony committed to subsequent mediation. While the LRA was continuously interested in mediation, the intensity with which it asked for third-party support increased when the ICC arrest warrants were issued. The issued ICC arrest warrants also lead to mediation taking place in a country which had not ratified the Rome Statute: Sudan. Hence, international pressure had an impact on both conflict parties' decision making regarding subsequent mediation onset.

The impact of international pressure on subsequent mediation success is less clear. While the CoH agreement was supposedly signed to signal the conflict parties' commitment to the talks to the international community (Schomerus 2012: 98–99), a clear connection between international pressure and the signing of other agreements was not identified. Nevertheless, the ICC arrest warrants had a noticeable negative impact on subsequent mediation success (Greig & Meernik 2014; Interview 2016). They prohibited Kony's engagement in the Juba Talks as he feared for his own safety. Besides, they hindered the GoU from making valid amnesty offers to the LRA, as the international community had made clear that regardless of these offers, the arrest warrants would remain in place.

Via international pressure, *conflict intensity* had an impact on the GoU's cost-benefit calculations regarding the question whether to engage in subsequent mediation. With conflict intensity increasing, particularly with news about the LRA abducting children and victimising civilians, international pressure on the GoU to manage the conflict increased, as the conflict was put on the UNSC agenda. This contributed to the GoU agreeing to the second Bigombe-led process and the Juba Talks, which set on in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The fact that especially the second Bigombe-led process set on when the conflict was relatively intense is also uncovered in Illustration 5, in which conflict intensity measured in battle-related deaths and victims of one-sided violence, based on the UCDP GED (Croicu & Sundberg 2015) is displayed. A direct link between conflict intensity and subsequent mediation onset is not revealed.<sup>81</sup>

The conflict parties used especially the Juba Talks for '*devious objectives*' (Richmond 1998). During the Juba Talks, it had become clear that if mediation did not end the conflict, military action would follow, supported by the U.S. – an option the GoU had continuously lobbied for. Thus, the costs and benefits the GoU allocated to mediation included not only the conflict management capacity of mediation, but also the ability to engage in discussions with third parties on other more forceful conflict management tools, should peaceful efforts fail. To the LRA, the Juba Talks provided the opportunity to receive daily allowances, without which talks might not have continued for two years (Interview 2016). Thus, subsequent mediation onset might have been influenced by the '*devious objectives*' (Richmond 1998) each conflict party pursued.

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<sup>81</sup> For an illustration on the overall conflict intensity, see Appendix.



*Mediator identity* played an important role for subsequent mediation onset, and particularly for subsequent mediation success. While a change in mediators was crucial for subsequent mediation onset after the second Bigombe-led mediation effort, it was even more important for the LRA's willingness to share private information, especially since the LRA did not feel secure during the second Bigombe-led talks. Additionally, Machar was accused of being biased towards the GoU at some point by the LRA. In line with this, the LRA demanded for a change in mediators, which was not accommodated. The LRA continued engaging in talks despite its wish for another mediator. The identity of the mediator was also crucial for the GoU's willingness to engage in mediation. The GoU most likely would not have agreed to mediation by a stronger third party, or one with a clear bias towards the LRA (Beardsley 2009 on the prevalence of weak mediators; Svensson 2007a on government- and rebel-biased mediators). Hence, the issues the LRA had with the mediator might have been to the benefit of mediation overall.

The *cohesiveness of the LRA* played a vital role for subsequent mediation success at the final stages of the Juba Talks. While the LRA delegation initially seemed to be in contact with Kony regularly, the LRA delegation appointed after Otti's deaths in October 2007 consulted less frequently with him. Though this led to initial mediation success, and though a stronger inclusion of Kony into the discussions on agenda items 3, 4, and 5 might have slowed the process, an agreement he might have been willing to sign might have been produced despite the ICC arrest warrants in place if the LRA would have been more cohesive and the delegation in closer contact with him. The fact that both conflict parties were represented by delegations which did not include their key decision makers often made talks more difficult, which mirrors the principal-agent problem.

Of the other control variables listed in the methodology chapter, neither *rebel legitimacy* nor the *LRA's strength* seem to have had a decisive impact on subsequent mediations onset or subsequent mediation success. On the one hand, the LRA was unable to substantially challenge the GoU militarily throughout the conflict. On the other hand, the GoU continued to view the LRA as illegitimate, especially until the Juba Talks set on. Though this rhetoric reduced during the Juba Talks, it was picked up again quickly once the Juba Talks ended, and Kony failed to sign the FPA. Thus, the legitimacy the LRA might have received during the mediation efforts was revoked after it reneged on the FPA.

All in all, it becomes apparent that additional to the different mediation outcomes discussed in the previous sections, especially international pressure, the cohesiveness of the LRA, and the scope of the mediation processes contributed to the decision making of the conflict parties on whether to engage in subsequent mediation and on whether to share private information during subsequent talks. While particularly the impact of international pressure on mediation onset is well documented in existing research (e.g. Beardsley 2011), and rebel group cohesiveness is accounted for by research on splinter groups (e.g. Vüllers & Destradi 2013) and spoilers (e.g. Stedman 1997; Heger & Jung 2015), the scope of the mediation process remains unaccounted for in existing mediation research, but should be focused on in future research.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

The SNA provided crucial additional insights into the validity of the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument. Being able to distinguish between the government and the rebel group underlined how the impact of different mediation outcomes varies depending on which conflict actor is in focus. These findings are particularly vital with regard to reneged on mediated agreements, the mediation outcome neglected so far in existing research. The results of the SNA are summarised in Table 24. A ✓ indicates that the hypothesis is supported by a hoop or smoking-gun test. A × indicates that the hypothesis was either rejected or not supported. ×/✓ note that both indicators speaking for and against a hypothesis were found. ? states that the results are unclear, while – indicates that a hypothesis was not tested.

In the conflict between the GoU and the LRA, subsequent mediation onset, and, to a certain extent, subsequent mediation success are likely after a mediation effort did not produce an agreement (hypotheses 1 and 5). Both conflict parties considered their BATNA as less beneficial than the continuation of talks if mediation did not produce an agreement. With the accumulation of private information resulting from mediation events that did not produce agreements, subsequent mediation success was observed eventually, though not during every mediation effort which followed mediation that did not produce an agreement.

Table 24. Summary of results on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Supported?</b>
H1	If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓
H2a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓
H2b	The more comprehensive the previous partial agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation onset.	✗
H3a	If a previously reached mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely.	✓
H3b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation onset.	?
H4	The more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation as a conflict management tool, the less time has to pass until it sets on again.	✓
H5	If the previous mediation effort ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✗/✓
H6a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✗/✓
H6b	The more comprehensive the previous agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation success.	✓
H7a	If a previously reached agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.	✓
H7b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation success.	–

If an agreement was reached, subsequent mediation always set on (hypothesis 2a). The comprehensiveness of previously reached agreements does not seem to be linked to subsequent mediation onset. As no information contradicting the causal mechanisms of hypothesis 2b was found, the hypothesis is considered unsupported, but not rejected.<sup>82</sup> Mediation events following partial agreements sometimes ended without an agreement,

<sup>82</sup> As noted by Bennet and Checkel (2015: 19, 31), hypotheses only need to be rejected when clear evidence against the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument is detected. Otherwise, the hypotheses are considered unsupported.

and sometimes produced agreements. Hence, mixed support for hypothesis 6a was detected. Subsequent mediation success was particularly likely to be observed after comprehensive agreements have been reached previously (hypothesis 6b).

If mediated agreements which concluded a mediation process were reneged on, subsequent mediation onset was unlikely, which supports hypothesis 3a. Especially the GoU drew the conclusion that other conflict management tools – military operations – were more viable than the onset of subsequent mediation. The same cannot be concluded with regard to mediation events, as subsequent mediation onset followed despite the reneged CoH agreement being reneged on. With regard to the comprehensiveness of reneged on agreements, no clear support for hypothesis 3b was detected. If mediation set on despite the previously mediated agreement being reneged on, subsequent mediation success was unlikely. As the LRA considered all agreements after which subsequent mediation onset was observed to be reneged on by the GoU, it strongly underlined its security concerns during the subsequent mediation efforts. Since the mediators were unable to address these concerns in the mediation events following reneged on agreements, subsequent mediation success was never observed during these events. This supports hypothesis 7a. Hypothesis 7b was not tested, as no variance in the comprehensiveness of reneged on mediated agreements after which mediation did set on was observed.

Hypothesis 4 is dedicated to the amount of time which needs to pass between different mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset. It was supported when focusing on the outcome of mediation processes: the amount of time which needed to pass between mediation processes not producing an agreement and subsequent mediation onset was much shorter than the amount of time which needed to pass after reneged on mediated agreements and subsequent mediation onset. The conflict parties ascribed more benefits to mediation if a mediation process did not produce an agreement in comparison to a mediation process producing a reneged on agreement. In the latter case, the conflict context needed to change for subsequent mediation holding enough benefits to be considered. Since no mediation process produced a lasting agreement, previous partial mediation success was not included in the analysis. When focussing on the outcome of mediation events, no clear difference between the amounts of time that needs to pass until a subsequent mediation event set on was drawn.

The extent to which the different causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument are supported by the results of the SNA is summarised again in Table 25. Table 25 indicates whether it was possible to trace causal mechanisms regarding the GoU or the LRA in the case study. When highlighted in dark grey, the analysis supports the expected link with a smoking-gun test. If a box is coloured in light grey, the analysis supports the link with a hoop test. If a box is coloured in white, testing the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument was not possible due to missing information. In sum, hypothesis 1, 2a, 2b, 3b, 6a, and 6b were tested with hoop tests only, while hypothesis 3a, 4, 5, and 7a were tested with smoking-gun and hoop tests.

Table 25. Summary of case study results

<b>Outcome previous mediation</b>	GoU's stance towards subsequent mediation onset	LRA's stance towards subsequent mediation onset	<b>Subsequent med. onset</b>	GoU's stance towards sharing private information	LRA's stance towards sharing private information	<b>Subsequent med. success</b>
<b>No agr. reached</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Partial Agreement</b>	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Reneged on agr.</b>	-	+	-	-	-	-

It becomes apparent that the hypotheses on subsequent mediation onset are supported, and information on the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument on the GoU's and the LRA's behaviour was available. However, the information only allowed for a smoking-gun test with regard to the impact of reneged on agreements on subsequent mediation onset. When focusing on the likelihood of subsequent mediation success, the lack of information becomes more pronounced. While information on the LRA's stance towards sharing private information and subsequent mediation success was more readily available, detecting the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument with regard to the GoU interestingly proved to be more difficult, because fewer publications with a focus on the GoU were available.

Overall, the SNA underlines the severe negative impact of reneged on mediated agreements, particularly for subsequent mediation onset. The results highlight the importance of addressing the consequences of non-lasting agreements for subsequent conflict management attempts. In fact, they suggest that ending mediation without an agreement offers the opportunity for further conflict management, which eventually might be successful. Reneged on agreements provide for a return to violent conflict management, though. This becomes particularly clear in the case under scrutiny, as both the reneged on Gulu Ceasefire and the reneged on FPA were followed by military action. This effect is mitigated if an agreement is reneged on in the context of a larger mediation process, which demands for further research in the future. Besides, the analysis highlighted that differentiating between the conflict parties when analysing the impact of mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation efforts provides for important insights into the factors that influence the decision making of governments and rebel groups.

## 7 Joint Discussion of Large-N Analysis and Small-N Analysis

The results of the LNA and the SNA underline the importance of differentiating between mediation outcomes when seeking to understand the occurrence of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Though many scholars have researched on the likelihood of mediation onset and mediation success, the question which impact *previous* mediation outcomes have on the occurrence of *subsequent* mediation onset and subsequent mediation success has been neglected so far. However, as mediation is observed more than once in many intrastate conflicts, this study is an important addition to existing mediation research.

The theoretical argument of this research draws on bargaining theory. Hence, the conflict parties are assumed to be (boundedly) rational actors who make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations. Conflict is expected to be more costly to them than peace. Thus, they do not engage in conflict for its own sake (see e.g. Fortna 2004b). When faced with the question of whether to engage in subsequent mediation, and, given the onset of subsequent mediation, whether to share private information during subsequent talks, conflict parties are expected to weigh the costs and benefits of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. To do so, they draw on their previous experiences with mediation and private information sharing: it is assumed that each mediation outcome underlines certain costs and benefits of engaging in mediation, of private information sharing, and through the sharing of private information, of reaching an agreement and committing to it, and are thus seminal for the conflict parties' decision-making progress.

The hypotheses derived from the theoretical argument presented in chapter 3 are summarised in Table 26. A ✓ indicates that the derived hypothesis is supported, a ✕ indicates that the hypothesis was either rejected or not supported. ✕/✓ note that both indicators speaking for and against a hypothesis were found. A ? states that the results are unclear, while – indicates that a hypothesis was not tested. Overall, the expected positive impact of previous mediation which did not produce an agreement (hypotheses 1 and 5), and of previous partial mediation success (hypotheses 2a, 6a, and 6b) on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success become apparent. Moreover, the

expected negative impact of previously reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success (hypotheses 3a, 3b, 7a, and 7b) is underlined.

Table 26. Summary of the results of the LNA and the SNA

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Supported in LNA?</b>	<b>Supported in SNA?</b>
H1	If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓	✓
H2a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓	✓
H2b	The more comprehensive the previous partial agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation onset.	✗	✗
H3a	If a previously reached mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely.	✓	✓
H3b	The more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement, the less likely subsequent mediation onset.	✓	?
H4	The more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation as a conflict management tool, the less time has to pass until it sets on again.	✓	✓
H5	If the previous mediation effort ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✗	✗/✓
H6a	If the previous mediation effort was partially successful, subsequent mediation success is likely.	✓	✗/✓
H6b	The more comprehensive the previous agreement, the more likely subsequent mediation success.	✗	✓
H7a	If a previously reached agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely.	✓	✓
H7b	If the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement, subsequent mediation onset is likely.	✓	–

To address the question how and why previous mediation outcomes influence subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, nested analysis as a mixed-methods approach was used. It allowed for including the LNA and the SNA into one research

design. Thereby, this research benefitted from the advantages of the different methods. While the LNA provided for a more general assessment of the hypotheses derived in chapter 3, the SNA allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the expected causal mechanisms. Besides, through the iterative process proposed by nested-analysis as a mixed methods approach, it was ensured that factors which need to be included in the research on subsequent mediation events were addressed in the LNA and the SNA. The preliminary results of the SNA pointed towards the importance of accounting for whether a mediation outcome is observed as part of a larger process, which was consequently picked up and included into the final LNA.

The results of the SNA and the LNA are summarised in the right-sided columns of Table 26. Hypothesis 1 is supported by both the LNA and the SNA. Hence, fears of the damage mediation which does not produce an agreement might cause (e.g. Greig 2010) are thrust aside by the analyses. Instead, and as outlined in the theoretical argument, mediation which did not produce an agreement is likely to be followed by subsequent mediation onset. While the LNA provides general support for the hypothesis, the SNA confirms this finding with a hoop test: whenever mediation between the GoU and the LRA ended without an agreement, subsequent mediation set on – regardless of whether a mediation event or a mediation process ended without an agreement. Hence, the conflict parties gathered enough information on mediation to evaluate it as beneficial enough for its subsequent onset. The conflict parties remained in control of the outcome, and also gathered information on their opponent. Moreover, the rebel group was legitimised, and thus, the highest hurdle towards subsequent mediation onset was taken. While rebel groups are generally expected to be interested in mediation, which also becomes apparent throughout large parts of the SNA, these benefits are of particular importance for the government's decision to engage in subsequent mediation.

The impact of previous mediation ending without an agreement on subsequent mediation success is less clear (hypothesis 5). According to the theoretical argument, subsequent mediation success is more likely if the previous mediation event did not produce an agreement. The results of the LNA do not support this expectation, though. While the coefficient is positive, the results lack statistical significance. The SNA sheds further light onto this result: subsequent mediation success is one possible consequence of previous mediation not producing an agreement; however, it is not the only outcome of subsequent

mediation. Conducted hoop tests suggest that subsequent mediation success is, at times, not observed because neither a sufficient amount of private information has been exchanged during the subsequent mediation event, nor has the commitment problem been resolved. Therefore, the conflict parties are unable to agree to a settlement. Only once a turning point is reached, and a sufficient amount of information has been exchanged, subsequent mediation success can be observed (Heldt 2011; Böhmelt 2013). Several of these turning points have been identified in the SNA, partly through smoking-gun, partly through hoop tests: during her first mediation effort, Bigombe drew on private information shared during a previous mediation event. She addressed the security concerns the LRA had voiced, and thereby managed to broker an agreement. Furthermore, during the Juba Talks, the LRA continuously requested having only one instead of two assembly areas. When several mediation events ended without an agreement, this demand was accounted for in a subsequent agreement. The information exchanged during former mediation events eventually lead to subsequent mediation success.

Partial mediation success underlines the benefits of engaging in mediation and sharing private information even more than mediation which does not produce an agreement. Hence, subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 2a) and subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 6a) were expected if the previous mediation event produced a partial agreement. Both LNA and SNA support hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 6a. While the results of the LNA are statistically significant, only hoop test were conducted in the SNA, as not enough information to evaluate the exact causal mechanisms was available. The hoop tests on hypothesis 2a support the hypothesis without any restrictions, while the hoop tests on hypothesis 6a partly support it and partly provide unclear results, because not all subsequent mediation events are successful. The causal mechanisms are not contradicted, though.

According to the theoretical argument, it is not only the previously reached partial agreement that has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Instead, the previous agreement's comprehensiveness is expected to have an impact on subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 2b) and subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 6b) as well, because the positive implications drawn from previous partial mediation success are amplified by more comprehensive agreements. Thus, a solution to the credible commitment problem is particularly crucial when sensible

information is exchanged – a necessity for reaching more comprehensive agreements. If these agreements last, and the credible commitment problem seems to be resolved, the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success increases, according to the theoretical argument. However, neither the LNA nor the SNA support this notion with regard to subsequent mediation onset. Though the statistical results point towards the expected direction, statistical significance is lacking in the LNA. The same can be noted for the SNA: subsequent mediation always set on after previous partial mediation success. The extent to which the comprehensiveness of the previous partial agreement mattered remains unclear though. The LNA also suggests that a link between agreement comprehensiveness and subsequent mediation success does not exist. The coefficients are sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but never statistically significant, which again indicates that generally reaching an agreement is more decisive for subsequent mediation success than agreement comprehensiveness. Meanwhile, hoop tests in the SNA suggest that subsequent mediation success was more likely if previous mediation produced more comprehensive agreements. This finding might have been fuelled by a change in the LRA delegation, though, and thus needs to be treated carefully. Overall, agreement comprehensiveness does not seem to be too decisive for subsequent mediation onset, while no general pattern of its impact on subsequent mediation success was identified.

If an agreement is reneged on, the costs of engaging in mediation and of sharing private information are underlined. Therefore subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 3a) and subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 7a) were expected to be less likely. This argument is supported by both LNA and SNA. Robust statistical results point out the profound negative impact of reneged on agreements on subsequent mediation efforts, especially on subsequent mediation onset. The SNA sheds further light onto the causal mechanisms outlined in the theoretical argument with smoking-gun tests: after agreements were reneged on, the LRA highlighted its security concerns. In line with the expected general preference of rebel groups for mediation, the LRA continued to show an interest in subsequent mediation onset nevertheless. Meanwhile, the GoU opted for military operations and highlighted the illegitimacy of the LRA in the aftermath of reneged on mediated agreements. Hence, subsequent mediation did not set on after the Gulu Ceasfire and the FPA were reneged on. The detected negative impact of reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation onset might only be mitigated through larger

mediation processes both conflict parties have committed to, which the reneged on CoH suggests, after which mediation continued. If larger mediation processes come along with substantial benefits, in the case of the Juba Talks e.g. the international appreciation of the continuation of talks, daily allowances, and a platform to sound out support for alternative conflict management tools, subsequent mediation is likely to set on.

If subsequent mediation sets on despite the fact that a mediated agreement has been reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely, according to the LNA. Again with a smoking-gun test, the SNA highlights how especially the LRA drew the conclusion that the provided security guarantees were not credible, and committing to subsequent agreements was not feasible. For example, despite several addendums to the CoH having been signed, the LRA did not assemble again after the GoU had tried to attack it in the assembly area. During subsequent mediation, it continuously underlined its security concerns, and, at times, also asked for another mediator. Thus, subsequent mediation success is unlikely if a previously mediated agreement has been reneged on recently. In this case, the costs of sharing private information and the persistence of the credible commitment problem are underlined too strongly.

The negative impact of previously reneged on mediated agreements is emphasised the more comprehensive the previously reneged on mediated agreement was – both with regard to subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 3b) and subsequent mediation success (hypothesis 7b). To reach more comprehensive agreements, more private information needs to be exchanged. If it is misused by the opponent, and the agreement reached does not last, the consequences of the credible commitment problem are underlined. Mediation and sharing private information are considered to have costly consequences in this case. The LNA supports this notion with regard to subsequent mediation onset, while a hoop test in the SNA suggests that, regardless of how comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was, the consequences of renegeing are always severe. If a mediation process produced an agreement that was reneged on, and no larger process the conflict parties are committed to takes place in the meantime, subsequent mediation only sets on again due to changes in the conflict context – in the case under scrutiny due to increasing international pressure on the disputants, especially on the GoU. With regard to subsequent mediation success, the LNA provides support for the notion that the more comprehensive the previously reneged on agreement was, the less likely subsequent mediation success is

observed. The hypothesis was not tested in the SNA as by June 2017, mediation has not set on again since the FPA was reneged on.

The presented results underline that the previous mediation outcome is linked to the extent to which the conflict parties allocate costs and benefits to mediation and to private information sharing. According to the theoretical argument, this is mirrored in the amount of time which needs to pass between a particular mediation outcome and subsequent mediation onset (hypothesis 4). Both the results of the LNA and the SNA support this notion: most time needs to pass between reneged on mediated agreements and subsequent mediation onset, while the least amount of time needs to pass after previous partial mediation success. Meanwhile, the SNA suggests that the difference between the amount of time that needs to pass after previous partial mediation success and previous mediation not producing an agreement is not as pronounced in comparison to previously reneged on mediated agreements.

Evaluating the theoretical framework elected for this research, it becomes clear that bargaining theory was well-suited to address the research question of this project. While other theoretical approaches, such as learning or prospect theory might provide other valuable insights into the topic, bargaining theory allowed accounting for the two most crucial hurdles when it comes to peaceful conflict management (Fearon 1995), which both can be addressed through mediation (Walter 1997): the private information and the credible commitment problem. Retrospectively, drawing on this theory to test how previous mediation outcomes change the cost-benefit calculation of each conflict party with regard to subsequent mediation efforts was feasible. The theory allowed for developing an argument on how and why previous mediation outcomes either solve the private information and the credible commitment problem, or underline their severity, thereby encouraging or discouraging subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success.

Using nested analysis as a mixed-methods approach provided insightful answers to the posed research question. Both the LNA and the SNA shed light onto the dynamics between previous mediation outcomes, and subsequent mediation onset as well as subsequent mediation success. While the results of the LNA, namely models with probit, Cox, and Sartori specification, contributed to the identification of a pattern which can be generalised

to African intrastate conflict mediation, the results of the SNA provided insights into the causal mechanisms at play during consecutive mediation efforts between the GoU and the LRA. The results of the SNA, derived through process tracing, highlighted the importance of security guarantees for the LRA. Particularly, the results showed how the LRA ascribed the costs of mediation to the mediator when it had the impression that the third party was biased or unable to reduce the credible commitment problem, but continued to consider mediation as a conflict management tool ranked highly in its preference order nevertheless. The results of the SNA also displayed how the GoU changed positions with regard to the LRA's legitimacy depending on the previous mediation outcome. Moreover, it showed how the GoU continuously calculated the expected benefits of other conflict management tools, i.e. military operations supported by third parties. Overall, the SNA allowed for an actor-disaggregated analysis, which was crucial for adequately testing the theoretical argument, and thereby accounting for the differences between the disputants engaged in intrastate conflict.

Nevertheless, a lack of data on the information which is exchanged during mediation is an important limitation to both the LNA and the SNA. With regard to the SNA, the lacking data reduces the number of smoking-gun tests that were conducted. No protocols on the information exchanged during the mediation efforts between the GoU and the LRA were available. Though a number of publications on the mediation events were accessible, it often remained unclear which particular information was shared during the different mediation events. This is unsurprising, considering that keeping the exact information exchanged during talks behind closed doors is a common praxis in mediation. Information on the conflict parties' preference order regarding conflict management would have been a crucial addition as well, but was inaccessible. This affected not only the SNA but also the LNA. Possibly, this gap could be addressed with interviews. However, due to the nature of the data sought, obtaining it is likely to be difficult, assuming that the necessary information is kept private by the conflict parties to have strategic advantages when interacting with other actors in the international system.

Though endogeneity might be at play as the conflict parties might seek to ensure that mediation continues for other reasons than conflict resolution, it does not seem to question the presented results, as the impact of upstream events on subsequent mediation efforts is analysed. Actually, the conflict parties cannot be sure that subsequent mediation sets on if

they foster a particular mediation outcome, though they might try to do so. For example, the case study suggests that the Juba Talks went on for an extended period because the conflict parties considered engaging in mediation, without intending to make progress towards a particular mediation outcome, as beneficial at some point (Schomerus 2012; Interview 2016). Therefore, a certain amount of mediation not producing agreements might have been caused by the conflict parties' interest in the continuation of talks, while the CoH was supposedly signed to satisfy the international community (Schomerus 2012: 98–99). However, expecting the continuation of talks, and behaving in a particular fashion to achieve this outcome, is also a gamble, as neither conflict actor can be sure that their opponent will reciprocate. Consequently, while endogeneity might challenge the results of the analysis of mediation events during the Juba Talks to a certain extent, it does not challenge the results of the analysis of mediation processes.

Overall, this project greatly contributed to mediation research. Benefitting from a mixed-methods approach, it was able to show how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. In doing so, the positive impact of previous partial mediation success and of mediation which did not produce an agreement was underlined, while the negative impact of renege on agreements was pointed out – a mediation outcome, which scholars had not included as an explanatory variable in mediation research prior to this study. Besides, the importance of accounting for governments and rebel groups separately when analysing intrastate conflict mediation was highlighted. Thus, this project does not only have important implications for mediation research, but for research on intrastate conflicts more generally.

## 8 Conclusion

‘[P]ast behavior and policies affect current and future behavior’ (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012). Hence, this project addressed the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success – a question which has been largely neglected in existing mediation research. It is crucial though, as many intrastate conflicts see more than one mediation effort. For examples, several mediation processes took place between the GoU and the LRA (which were studied in-depth in this project), or between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, while different third parties have tried to mediate the as of April 2018 ongoing Syrian civil war since 2011. Particularly protracted conflicts like the Syrian civil war underline the importance of learning more about the extent to which previous mediation efforts influence subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Research like this provides a better understanding of factors conducive for successful conflict management.

The impact of previous mediation outcomes is rarely focused on by mediation researchers. In fact, when reviewing the literature on mediation in inter- and intrastate conflicts (chapter 2), it became apparent that a gap exists: studies rarely explicitly address consecutive mediation efforts. Researchers that do account for the impact of previous mediation outcomes in the same or in similar conflicts often do not focus on mediation exclusively, but account for several conflict management tools at the same time, while they mainly analyse interstate disputes (e.g. Greig 2010; Wiegand & Powell 2011; Melin 2015; Böhmelt 2013, 2015, 2016). Though the named studies all find that previous conflict management outcomes have an impact on subsequent conflict management efforts, no study has addressed the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts thoroughly in a theory-driven empirical analysis. Hence, the consequences different mediation outcomes have for the decisions governments and rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflict have to make when faced with the question whether to engage in a subsequent mediation effort, and whether to work towards an agreement should subsequent talks set on had not been addressed prior to this study. As intrastate conflicts differ significantly from interstate conflicts, due to the differences in status and power between intrastate conflict disputants, it is indispensable to address the topic explicitly and separately from consecutive mediation efforts in interstate conflicts.

When reviewing the mediation literature, it also became apparent that scholars so far have differentiated between two mediation outcomes only: mediation failure, i.e. mediation not producing an agreement, and mediation success, most commonly understood as mediation producing an agreement (e.g. Clayton 2013). Meanwhile, almost 50 percent of the agreements reached in intrastate conflicts between 1975 and 2011 were renegeed on, according to the Peace Agreement dataset (Harbom et al. 2006; Höglbladh 2012b). These renegeed on agreements are not accounted for when the outcome of previous mediation efforts is scrutinised in existing mediation research. Assuming that renegeed on agreements have a diverging impact on the decisions of governments and rebel groups on whether to engage in a subsequent mediation effort from mediation which did not produce an agreement and partial mediation success, and – should subsequent mediation set on – on whether to work towards subsequent mediation success, this project introduces a relatively common mediation outcome to mediation research, which scholars so far have not regarded as an explanatory variable: renegeed on mediated agreements.

Seeking to address the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success, a theoretical argument was developed in chapter 3, which guided this research. The argument was based on bargaining theory, the most commonly used theoretical foundation in mediation research (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014). The core of this project's argument was built on the expectation that, though *ex post* it is would be less costly to reach an agreement without resorting to force, conflict takes place due to the private information problem – rational actors withholding or misrepresenting information e.g. on their true strength – and the credible commitment problem – each actor having the incentive to deviate from a struck bargain (Fearon 1995). Moreover, this project expected third parties to be able to contribute to conflict resolution aside the battlefield. By sharing private information on the conflict parties' true strength and weaknesses, and by providing security guarantees to the conflict parties, mediators assist the conflict parties in overcoming the private information and the credible commitment problem (Walter 1997, 2002).

In this project, the conflict parties were assumed to be boundedly rational actors. Hence, they were expected to collect information on the costs and benefits of engaging in subsequent mediation before agreeing to it, and on the costs and benefits of sharing private information, should subsequent talks set on. Drawing on the collected information, the

conflict parties were assumed to create a preference order in which their available options are ranked according to the costs and benefits they ascribed to each option. One source of information on the costs and benefits of mediation is the previous mediation effort the conflict parties have engaged in. Consequently, when creating their preference order, the conflict parties were expected to include the recently gathered information on mediation. In this project, it was assumed that the previous mediation outcome summarises the extent to which a mediator was able to solve the private information and the credible commitment problem. Hence, this research considered previous mediation outcomes to be seminal for the conflict parties' calculation of costs and benefits subsequent mediation efforts bear.

The mediation outcomes included in this project were mediation not producing an agreement, partial mediation success, and reneged on mediated agreements. Partial mediation success was observed when an agreement did not settle the whole conflict, according to the Peace Agreement dataset (Harbom et al. 2006; Höghbladh 2012b).<sup>83</sup> A mediated agreement was considered reneged on if one or more signatories contested the agreement, if one or more signatories were no longer part of the agreement, i.e. due to withdrawing from it, or if the implementation of an agreement failed (Höghbladh 2012a: 5). Moreover, the comprehensiveness of the reached or reneged on agreements was accounted for, assuming that the effect of a particular outcome increases the more comprehensive an (reneged on) agreement is. The causal mechanisms which were assumed to link a previous mediation outcome to subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success according to the theoretical argument are delineated in the following paragraphs.

If a mediation effort did not produce an agreement, both the government and the rebel group engaged in a conflict were expected to decide for subsequent mediation onset, and, if subsequent mediation has set on, work towards its success. Though the private information and the credible commitment problem were not resolved during the previous mediation effort, benefits of mediation, such as its signalling capacity, and the fact that the conflict parties remain in control of the mediation outcome, were underlined by mediation ending without an agreement, as the conflict parties were not forced to sign an agreement, while no costs that outweigh the benefits of mediation were uncovered. Thus, the conflict parties were expected to come to the same conclusion as before: they agree to subsequent

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<sup>83</sup> Full agreements were excluded from the measure of previous mediation success, assuming that the necessity for subsequent talks reduces if a full agreement has been reached (Joshi & Quinn 2015b).

mediation onset. The third party, being aware of the unresolved commitment problem, was expected to work towards providing security guarantees during subsequent talks to a greater extent than before, encouraging the conflict parties to share private information. Combining all information gathered during previous talks, enriched with further information gathered during the subsequent mediation effort, the likelihood of subsequent mediation success was expected to increase if the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement in this project.

If a partial agreement was reached during the previous mediation effort, the government and the rebel group were expected to decide for subsequent mediation onset and, given the onset of subsequent talks, work towards subsequent mediation success. The conflict parties were rewarded for sharing private information during the previous mediation effort when the partial agreement was reached. The agreement lasting confirmed that the credible commitment problem has been overcome. Hence, if a partial agreement was reached, the conflict parties were expected to rank mediation high enough in their preference order for it to set on again. Due to the rewards that came along with sharing private information during the previous mediation effort, the conflict parties were expected to share private information again during subsequent mediation, and thereby work towards subsequent mediation success. With increasing comprehensiveness of a previous agreement, the benefits of mediation were expected to be underlined more clearly, and thus, subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success even more likely to be observed according to the theoretical argument.

If a mediated agreement was reneged on, the government was expected to decide against subsequent mediation onset, while the rebel group was expected to decide for it. Assuming that both conflict parties – especially the government – prefer military over mediated solutions when in conflict with rebel groups (e.g. Walter 2002) – unless rebel groups are able to seriously challenge them militarily (Clayton 2013) – a reneged on agreement was assumed to provide the grounds for governments to reason against mediation and to pursue a military solution instead, possibly with international support. To rebel groups, the benefits of mediation still outweighed the costs of it, despite the reneged on agreement strongly underlining the persistence of the commitment problem and the costs of sharing private information. However, as both conflict actors have to decide for mediation for it to set on, subsequent mediation onset was expected to be unlikely if a mediated agreement

had been reneged on. Should subsequent mediation set on nevertheless, neither the government nor the rebel group were expected to share additional private information, as the consequences of the previously reneged on mediated agreement have shown how private information can be misused. Hence, even if mediation sets on after a mediated agreement has been reneged on subsequent mediation success was not expected to be observed. With increasing agreement comprehensiveness, the implications of reneged on agreements were assumed to amplify.

The extent to which the conflict parties ascribe costs and benefits to mediation, as described above, was expected to not only become visible in the overall likelihood of subsequent mediation onset, but also in the amount of time which needs to pass until subsequent mediation sets on. Thus, it was assumed that the more benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation due to the previous mediation outcome, the less time needs to pass until subsequent mediation onset is observed – hence, mediation was expected to set on most quickly after a partial agreement was reached. Most time was expected to pass between a mediated agreement being reneged on and subsequent mediation onset.

The presented arguments were tested with nested analysis as a mixed-methods approach (Lieberman 2005). This project's research design was presented in chapter 4: the operationalisation of the variables needed for this project and the data drawn on were described, the case selection for in-depth analysis presented, and the methods of estimation introduced. For the quantitative analysis, probit models were used to estimate the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset. Survival analysis with Cox specification was used to analyse the amount of time which needs to pass until mediation sets on again after a particular mediation outcome. To scrutinise the likelihood of subsequent mediation success, the Sartori selection estimator was used. The quantitative analysis was limited to mediation in African intrastate conflicts between 1993 and 2007 due to data availability. The case under scrutiny in the qualitative analysis was the conflict between the GoU and the LRA. It was selected because the conflict has seen an average amount of mediation efforts, while all mediation outcomes were observed. Process tracing was conducted, which was heavily based on scholarly publications, policy briefings, authored by participants of the mediation process, and news reports.

Mixing methods was considered to be crucial for addressing this project's research question for three reasons. First, little information on the impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success is available yet. Thus, the aim was to provide results which can be generalised to mediation in African intrastate conflicts with the quantitative analysis on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the results of the case study were to provide in-depth knowledge on the causal mechanisms at play in the selected case. Second, no quantitative data on the information shared during mediation was available. Hence, it was not possible to conduct the quantitative analysis as in-depth as would have been necessary to test the theoretical arguments thoroughly. Thus, conducting a case study, for which more fine-grained information was collected, was an important addition. Third, in the theoretical argument, the impact the mediation outcomes have on the government and the rebel group respectively was outlined, and a strong emphasis was put on the different conclusions each conflict actor draws regarding subsequent mediation efforts. The quantitative data currently available does not allow for a differentiation between the conflict actors to the same extent as qualitative data does. Hence, the qualitative analysis was crucial to account for the differences between the conflict actors. Overall, mixing methods was necessary for gathering insights on the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success.

The results of the quantitative analysis were presented in chapter 5. The results support the expected negative impact of renege on agreements on subsequent mediation onset: the conflict parties seem to be less likely to engage in subsequent mediation if a mediated agreement was renege on. Given the onset of subsequent talks despite a renege on mediated agreement, subsequent mediation success is also unlikely to be observed. Moreover, the positive impact of partial agreements on both subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success became apparent: if a partial agreement was reached during the previous mediation effort, the conflict parties are likely to engage in subsequent talks, and work towards an agreement during the subsequent mediation effort. Furthermore, the results indicate that previous mediation which did not produce an agreement has a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset as well: the conflict parties decide for mediation again if the previous mediation effort did not produce an agreement. The likelihood of subsequent mediation success does not increase if mediation sets on

again in these cases. Finally, the statistical results show that most time needs to pass after a mediated agreement has been reneged on until subsequent mediation sets on again. Thus, in sum, the results strongly underline the negative impact of reneged on mediated agreements on subsequent mediation efforts, while they highlight the positive impact of previous partial agreements, and of mediation which did not produce an agreement, thereby quietening those who fear the negative impact of mediation failure (e.g. Greig 2010).

The results of the qualitative analysis were presented in chapter 6. First, a brief overview of the conflict between the GoU and the LRA was provided, before the impact of the different previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success was analysed. The results strongly underline the negative impact of reneged on agreements on the conflict parties' preference order. While the LRA continued to show an interest in mediation – regardless of whether it reneged on an agreement itself or whether the GoU reneged on an agreement – the GoU preferred a military solution, and, when the LRA reneged on a full agreement, succeeded in lobbying for international military support to fight the LRA. Furthermore, the results dismiss the fear that mediation which did not produce an agreement has negative consequences for subsequent mediation onset (Greig 2010), as subsequent mediation always set on when a previous mediation effort ended without an agreement. Mediation success was observed in some, but not all mediation efforts that followed mediation which did not produce an agreement. Subsequent mediation always set on after a partial agreement was reached, and at times also produced another agreement. Besides, a significant difference in the amount of time between the different mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation onset was observed. While subsequent mediation set on relatively quickly after partial mediation success and mediation which did not produce an agreement respectively, it took a lot longer until mediation set on again after an agreement which was the result of a larger mediation process was reneged on.

Overall, the case study provided crucial insights which enrich the knowledge on consecutive mediation efforts, and are an important addition to the quantitative results of chapter 5. Besides the more detailed understanding of the link between previous mediation outcomes and subsequent mediation efforts, the case study also underlines that differentiating between government and rebel group in theoretical arguments and empirical

tests is vitally important, as, due to the status and often also power difference between the conflict parties, governments draw different conclusions from an event than rebel groups (Melin & Svensson 2009). In the case under scrutiny, this became particularly apparent when the impact of reneged on mediated agreements was in focus. Moreover, the case study points out that differentiating between mediation processes and mediation events, and between mediation processes with an elaborate agenda in comparison to small mediation processes, is crucial for the analysis of mediation onset and mediation success, because they presuppose a different kind of commitment of the conflict parties to mediation.

The results were jointly discussed in chapter 7, in which the key challenges to the analysis were also raised. While the results largely underline the importance of scrutinising the impact of previous mediation outcomes on subsequent mediation efforts, and show that the different mediation outcomes vary in their impact on subsequent mediation efforts, a lack of data on the information exchanged during mediation, and on the topics covered, neither allowed the quantitative nor the qualitative analysis to be as in-depth as hoped for. While this is unsurprising because the details exchanged during talks are mostly kept secret, the causal mechanisms outlined in the theory section were not scrutinised as thoroughly as expected when the project started. Nevertheless, the results of the mixed methods analysis largely go hand in hand, and provided crucial first answers to a so far unaddressed research question.

The results of this project hold important policy implications for intrastate conflict mediation. First, the results suggest that reneged on agreements have far more severe consequences for subsequent mediation efforts than mediation ending without an agreement. Though mediators strive towards brokering agreements, and the international community watches mediation processes carefully in the hope of third parties managing a conflict successfully, the results of this project suggest that mediation ending without an agreement is more conducive to overall conflict management than short-lived agreements, since mediation which does not produce an agreement does not endanger subsequent mediation onset. Though reached agreements add to a third party's track record positively, this track record might topple when agreements are reneged on, which becomes apparent when looking at two different mediation efforts Kofi Annan has led: he successfully brokered a power-sharing agreement to end post-election violence in Kenya. Mwai Kibaki

and Raila Odinga agreed to share power after an Annan-led mediation effort in 2008, despite having underlined their unwillingness to share power prior to the effort (Khadiagala 2009: 440; Lindenmayer & Kaye 2009: 12). While Annan was praised for his strategic approach in the Kenyan mediation effort on the one hand, he was criticised when the ceasefire he had brokered in the Syrian civil war was violated quickly after it had been reached in 2012 on the other hand (Lynch 2012). This example shows that mediators need to ensure that conflict parties are embracing the steps taken when crucial turning points are reached, both for their own reputation and for the sake of successful conflict management. In fact, accepting mediation failure to possibly broker an agreement which might be more lasting in the next round of talks might increase the likelihood of successful conflict management in the long run.

Second, when brokering agreements, third parties need to ensure that agreements are designed in such a way that the commitment of the conflict parties to these agreements is encouraged. By supporting the conflict parties in the implementation phase, they can reduce each conflict actor's fear of their opponent renegeing on an agreement. This is particularly crucial for rebel groups, who often have to lay down their weapons at the end of a peace process, which makes them vulnerable (Walter 2002). By providing security guarantees to the conflict parties, thus reducing the rebel groups' fear of being targeted once weapons are laid down, third parties can encourage rebel groups (and governments) to commit to an agreement (Walter 1997). Moreover, by supporting the conflict parties in the implementation phase, and thereby increasing implementation rates, third parties can contribute to further reducing the likelihood of agreements being renegeed on (Hampson 2005). For example, DDR programs are typically not administered by the government of a conflict country. Instead, IOs and NGOs implement DDR programs: at the end of Liberia's second civil war, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was brokered in 2003, which provided for DDR. Together with the Liberian National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, and the UN Mission in Liberia, several organisations, amongst others the World Food Program, the UN Development Program, Action Aid, and the World Health Organization, were responsible for the implementation of the DDR program for adult rebels, while UNICEF coordinated the DDR program for child soldiers (Hanson 2007, Child Soldiers International 2008). Other actors than only bodies of the conflict country's government taking an active role in DDR programs can

contribute to improving the rebel group's safety, ensuring that rebels do not have to hand over weaponry to those they have been fighting, which improves the success rates of DDR programs (Banholzer 2014).

The results of this research show that by ensuring that an agreement lasts, the conflict parties are likely to opt for mediation again if additional talks become necessary, as the benefits of previous mediation are underlined by the lasting agreement. This became apparent when a new wave of protests started after the Kenyan presidential elections in 2017. Raila Odinga, who had engaged in the Annan-led mediation effort in 2008, asked for mediation to settle the conflict. His opponent Uhuru Kenyatta vehemently rejected mediation initially. Nevertheless, Secretary General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development Mukhisa Kituyi engaged in dialogue with Kenyatta and Odinga separately (Otinga 2018), and the UN sent Nigeria's former president Olusegun Obasanjo to Kenya to mediate the conflict (Otieno & Onyango 2018). In March 2018, Kenyatta and Odinga met, agreed that dialogue was necessary, and publicly shook hands (Mbula et al. 2018). This indicates that Odinga, who had engaged in mediation before, considered mediation a viable conflict management tool, after Annan had brokered a working power-sharing agreement in 2008. Hence, by not only ensuring that the conflict parties embrace an agreement, but by designing agreements the disputants can commit to, and by assisting in the implementation of these agreements, third parties are able to ensure that mediation remains an option if further talks become necessary.

Third, the results not only provide advice to mediators, but also to the conflict parties. At times, rebel groups renege on agreements to underline their strength, expecting their strength to be accounted for when talks continue (Pospieszna & DeRouen 2016 on one-sided violence). While this is a rational decision, the results of this research show that rebel groups renegeing on agreements provide ground for governments to decide against further talks. And thus, instead of engaging in subsequent mediation, governments opt for other conflict management tools, mostly for military operations. Thus, if rebel groups want to continue talks, they should seek to communicate their strength via other means than an increase in violence to not provide governments who seek other conflict management options than mediation with reasons they can use to justify the necessity for further military engagement – as in the case under scrutiny in this project. Meanwhile, as governments prefer military solutions to intrastate conflicts (Walter 2002), they lobby for

military solutions though talks take place. However, a continuous lobbying for military support questions the government's commitment to talks, and raises suspicions on the rebel group's side – as the example of the LRA and the GoU shows. Hence, once mediation has set on, the government's commitment to mediation is crucial to allow the rebel group to share private information during talks, which in turn is necessary for mediation success. Consequently, both sides refraining from using mediation for 'devious objectives' (Richmond 1998) is decisive for successful conflict management through mediation.

Besides these policy implications, this project also opens up interesting avenues for future research. First, focusing more on reneged on agreements in mediation research is crucial. Aspects that might provide particularly interesting insights are the location an agreement was reneged on at. Research like this would tie up with Greig's (2014, 2015) studies on mediation onset, and would allow for an understanding of the question whether the consequences of reneged on agreements are more or less severe for subsequent mediation depending on where an agreement was reneged on. In line with Greig's (2014, 2015) reasoning, agreements being reneged on further away from strategic locations might provide grounds for the government to opt against further talks, if the governments seeks a reason for ending mediation. Agreements being reneged on close to e.g. the capital might convince the government to engage in further talks, fearing the rebel group might be relatively strong, and thus able to seriously challenge the government (Clayton 2013). Moreover, applying ripeness theory (Zartman 1985) to scrutinise the impact of battle velocity and battle intensity on subsequent mediation onset (Greig 2014, 2015) after an agreement has been reneged on would add to existing knowledge on the impact conflict intensity has on mediation onset.

Second, analysing the impact reneged on agreements have on third-party behaviour and overall conflict management is important. As Melin (2015) pointed out in a study on conflict management efforts in interstate conflicts, third parties escalate their choice of conflict management strategy if a conflict management effort fails. Do third parties do the same in intrastate conflicts? And which impact do the different mediation outcomes have on conflict management in intrastate conflicts overall? While this research suggests that governments prefer a military solution to a conflict if a mediated agreement is reneged on, systematically analysing the impact of the different mediation outcomes on overall conflict management would provide important information for conflict managers. Furthermore, the

case study suggests that the impact of the different mediation outcomes on one-sided third-party support varies. For example, reneged on mediated agreements might encourage one-sided military support to the government. This is not only suggested by the case under scrutiny in this project. The example of the conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF also illustrates the effect. The Lomé Agreement was reached in 1999, but conflict continued in 2000 (Bell 2000: 366), and the RUF took several hundred UN peacekeepers hostage. This led to a change of strategy from the international community, which decided for more robust military measures after the peacekeepers were taken hostage. Ultimately, the conflict ended by other means than mediation in 2002 (Crawford-Garret 2012: 111; BBC News 2017). Scrutinising the dynamics at play, particularly between reneged on mediated agreements and one-sided third-party support, would thus shed crucial light onto the behaviour of third parties.

Third, scrutinising the impact of different aspects of mediation on subsequent mediation efforts, such as the mediation strategy used, would provide additional knowledge on consecutive mediation efforts. For example, Annan used external leverage during his Syria mediation effort. Though the usage of directive mediation ensured that a ceasefire was reached in 2012, the agreement was quickly violated (Lundgren 2016). It is unclear which consequences the application particularly of directive mediation, which reduces the extent to which the conflict parties are in control of the mediation outcome, has for the conflict parties' decision on subsequent mediation efforts. Hence, future projects could evaluate whether the strategies a mediator uses have an impact on the costs and benefits the conflict parties ascribe to mediation. Such research would provide mediators with information on the impact their behaviour has on the conflict parties' decision making. This would not only contribute to the literature on consecutive mediation, but also to the literature on mediation strategies, which so far has largely focused on the likelihood of reaching agreements and on the longevity of agreements reached with different mediation strategies (e.g. Beardsley et al. 2006; Quinn et al. 2006).

Fourth, further research is necessary to disentangle the conditions under which the previous mediation outcome is decisive. As this research implies, the negative impact of reneged on agreements is mitigated if a larger mediation process takes place. In fact, the Syria mediation efforts further support this notion. For example, the ceasefire Annan had brokered with heavy international pressure in 2012 was soon violated. Nevertheless, a

number of subsequent mediation efforts set on (Lindgren 2016). This shows that, at times, subsequent mediation does set on despite the previously reached agreement being renegeed on. Systematically analysing the conditions under which subsequent mediation onset is likely despite a mediated agreement being renegeed on would provide crucial knowledge about the conditions under which subsequent mediation onset is possible.

Fifth, this research showed that differentiating between mediation events and mediation processes as well as between mediation processes with elaborate agendas and mediation processes with smaller agendas is important. Accounting for this in future research is necessary, as more can be learnt not only about the sequencing between mediation efforts, but also about the sequencing during mediation efforts. While existing research has accounted for whether the same third party mediates repeatedly (Böhmelt 2013), addressing the scope of mediation efforts explicitly, and acknowledging whether mediation process or mediation event outcomes are under scrutiny is crucial. This research suggests that the commitment of the conflict parties might be strongly influenced by the scope of a mediation process. The negative impact of renegeed on agreements can be mitigated easier in the context of a larger mediation process, while the conflict parties might not expect all mediation efforts to produce an agreement if an elaborate agenda was established. Future research should thus further disentangle the impact of mediation event and mediation process outcomes on subsequent conflict management.

Finally, this research has underlined the benefits of differentiating between rebel groups and governments theoretically and empirically. While this is particularly difficult in quantitative research, disaggregating data to the actor level not only with regard to e.g. conflict intensity, as is done e.g. in the GED (Croicu & Sundberg 2015), but also with regard to decisions on mediation onset and information sharing during mediation would allow for a crucial, more disaggregated analysis on the conclusions conflict parties draw. Thereby, it would provide for a ‘better understanding of mediation incidence [which] might well translate into more efficient mediation’ (Beardsley & Greig 2009: 3). Besides, not only mediation research, but also research on other aspects of intrastate conflicts, such as e.g. reconciliation, would benefit from an actor-disaggregated analysis.

All in all, this research has addressed two important gaps in the literature, and thereby provided important implications for mediators. By differentiating between mediation

outcomes in the explanatory variable, and laying out the consequences the different mediation outcomes have for subsequent mediation efforts, this project underlined that past mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation efforts – a notion which research on mediation in interstate conflict had suggested, but which had not been tested as rigorously before, especially not with a focus on intrastate conflicts. Moreover, this project has accounted not only for the impact of previous mediation success and previous mediation which did not produce an agreement, but also for previously reneged on mediated agreements, a mediation outcome so far completely neglected in existing research. By scrutinising the impact of reneged on agreements, this project has pointed out the negative impact of reneged on agreements on subsequent mediation efforts, and strongly underlined the importance of agreement longevity. Thereby, it showed that failed mediation efforts are in fact not the mediation outcome researchers and practitioners need to be too anxious about, as Greig (2010), and Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) suggested, because subsequent mediation onset is still likely in these cases. Instead, it is the mediation outcome researchers have so far completely neglected which has devastating implications for subsequent mediation efforts: reneged on agreements.

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## Appendix

### Names of rebel groups included in the dataset

#### *Angola*

FLEC-FAC: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda

UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

#### *Burundi*

CNDD: National Council for the Defence of Democracy

CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy

Frolina: National Liberation Front

Palipehutu-FNL: Palipehutu-National Forces of Liberation

#### *Chad*

CNR: National Council for Recovery

FNT: National Front of Chad

MDD: Movement for Development and Democracy

MDJT: Movement for Democracy and Justice

UFDD: Union of Forces for Democracy and Development

#### *Democratic Republic of the Congo*

CNDP: National Congress for the Defence of the People

MLC: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy

#### *Ivory Coast*

FRCI: Republican Forces of Ivory Coast

MJP: Movement for Justice and Peace

MPCI: Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire

MPIGO: Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West

## Appendix

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### *Liberia*

LURD: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy  
MODEL: Movement for Democracy in Liberia

### *Niger*

CRA: Coordinated Armed Resistance  
FLAA: Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak  
UFRA: Union of the Forces of Armed Resistance

### *Rwanda*

FPR: Rwandan Patriotic Front

### *Sierra Leone*

AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  
RUF: Revolutionary United Front  
WSB: West Side Boys

### *Somalia*

ARS/UIC: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts  
SRRC: Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council  
USC/SNA: United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance

### *Sudan*

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement  
NDA: National Democratic Alliance  
NRF: National Redemption Front  
SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army  
SLM/A-MM: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minawi  
SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

### *Uganda*

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

*Appendix*

Table A1. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.2579* (0.127)	0.2501 <sup>†</sup> (0.128)	0.2388 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.1996 (0.126)
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.2447 (0.158)	0.2099 (0.159)	0.2237 (0.157)	0.2067 (0.156)
Relative rebel strength	0.0094 (0.116)	0.0294 (0.114)	0.0285 (0.115)	0.0335 (0.114)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0002 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2062** (0.028)	0.2062** (0.028)	0.2077** (0.028)	0.2177** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0061** (0.001)
Government receives troop support	0.2596 (0.184)			
Peacekeeping		0.1353 (0.212)		
Previous mediation on incompatibility			0.0308 (0.119)	
Government irregular entry to power				0.3895** (0.126)
Constant	-1.4970** (0.190)	-1.5009** (0.191)	-1.4952** (0.195)	-1.7651** (0.211)
Log-Likelihood	-350.202	-350.990	-351.160	-346.224
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A2. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset*	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset	(5) Mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.0490 (0.118)	0.2360 (0.185)			
No agreement prev. three years			-0.1421 (0.131)		
No agreement prev. five years				-0.2072 (0.134)	
Sum no agreement					-0.0251 (0.021)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2862 <sup>†</sup> (0.149)	0.2256 (0.175)	0.2336 (0.157)	0.2364 (0.158)	0.2435 (0.158)
Relative rebel strength	0.2242* (0.104)	0.0287 (0.192)	0.0072 (0.116)	0.0019 (0.117)	-0.0301 (0.122)
Sum deaths between mediation events	0.0004* (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events		0.2075** (0.055)	0.2055** (0.028)	0.2065** (0.028)	0.2095** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>		-0.0057* (0.003)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0052** (0.001)
Constant	-1.0170** (0.168)	-1.4834** (0.230)	-1.1656** (0.183)	-1.1100** (0.186)	-1.1759** (0.173)
Log-Likelihood	-398.184	-351.194	-352.398	-351.798	-352.182
Significance	0.0048	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* robust cluster on dyad

Appendix

Table A3. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset*	Mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.2174 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2323 <sup>†</sup> (0.129)	0.2270 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2174 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2282 <sup>†</sup> (0.137)	0.0512 (0.118)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2294 (0.158)	0.2248 (0.157)		0.2341 (0.157)	0.1061 (0.164)	0.2924 <sup>†</sup> (0.153)
Rebel group pol. wing			0.1214 (0.121)			
Relative rebel strength	0.0250 (0.116)	0.0277 (0.115)	0.0585 (0.112)	0.0524 (0.114)	-0.0495 (0.123)	0.2207* (0.106)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)		0.0005* (0.000)	0.0004* (0.000)
Conflict intensity				0.0067 (0.004)		
Sum previous mediation events	0.2094** (0.028)	0.2078** (0.028)	0.2107** (0.027)	0.1977** (0.027)	0.5552** (0.055)	
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0054** (0.001)	-0.0331** (0.004)	
Previous med. on confl. behaviour	0.2924* (0.117)					
Previous med. on other topics		0.0156 (0.117)				
Conflict duration						-0.0005 (0.005)
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>						0.0000 (0.000)
Constant	-1.5829** (0.195)	-1.4889** (0.194)	-1.5280** (0.193)	-1.5220** (0.190)	-1.8881** (0.208)	-1.0022** (0.194)
Log-Likelihood	-348.088	-351.185	-351.709	-350.307	-288.481	398.166
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0204
Observations	698	698	698	698	638	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* without dyad 641

Appendix

Table A4. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after partial mediation success

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset*	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset
Previous partial agreement	0.5776** (0.194)	0.6723** (0.198)	0.5283* (0.238)			
Partial agreement prev. year				0.2839 <sup>†</sup> (0.162)		
Partial agreement prev. three years					0.1410 (0.132)	
Partial agreement prev. five years						0.1313 (0.126)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)		0.3405* (0.151)	0.2711 (0.186)	0.2542 (0.158)	0.2526 (0.159)	0.2532 (0.159)
Relative rebel strength		0.2160* (0.106)	0.0094 (0.209)	-0.0014 (0.117)	0.0014 (0.117)	-0.0002 (0.117)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events		0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events			0.2015** (0.052)	0.2013** (0.027)	0.2016** (0.027)	0.2017** (0.027)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>			-0.0057* (0.002)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)
Constant	-0.6613** (0.053)	-1.0337** (0.142)	-1.3142** (0.253)	-1.2930** (0.153)	-1.2944** (0.154)	-1.2954** (0.154)
Log-Likelihood	-401.287	-392.573	-349.739	-351.467	-352.416	-352.446
Significance	0.0031	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

\* robust cluster on dyad

*Appendix*

Table A5. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after partial mediation success

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset*	Mediation onset
Previous partial agreement	0.5036* (0.205)	0.5340* (0.208)	0.4985* (0.207)	0.5246* (0.206)	0.4126 <sup>†</sup> (0.222)	
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agr.						0.0113 (0.064)
Prev. agr. contains sec. guarantees						0.1730 (0.188)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)		0.2730 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.2739* (0.159)	0.2684 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.1487 (0.165)	0.2275 (0.158)
Rebel group pol. wing	0.1562 (0.121)					
Relative rebel strength	0.0467 (0.114)	0.0096 (0.117)	0.0072 (0.118)	0.0070 (0.117)	-0.0568 (0.125)	0.0191 (0.116)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0005* (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2057** (0.027)	0.2014** (0.027)	0.2038** (0.028)	0.2027** (0.028)	0.5441** (0.055)	0.2014** (0.027)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0330** (0.004)	-0.0056** (0.001)
Previous med. on on incompatibility		-0.0270 (0.120)				
Previous med. on conflict behaviour			0.2895* (0.117)			
Previous med. on other topics				0.0512 (0.114)		
Constant	-1.3800** (0.162)	-1.3064** (0.158)	-1.4270** (0.163)	-1.3425** (0.167)	-1.7239** (0.174)	-1.3010** (0.155)
Log-Likelihood	-350.357	-349.714	-346.703	-349.639	-288.180	-352.418
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	638	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* without dyad 641

*Appendix*

Table A6. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after partial mediation success

	(1) Mediation onset	(2) Mediation onset	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset	(5) Mediation onset
Previous partial agreement	0.5229* (0.207)	0.5408** (0.207)	0.5310* (0.209)	0.5678** (0.206)	0.6734** (0.198)
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.2514 (0.157)	0.2900 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)	0.2735 <sup>†</sup> (0.160)	0.2774 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.3425* (0.154)
Relative rebel strength	0.0209 (0.116)	-0.0108 (0.118)	0.0094 (0.117)	0.0296 (0.116)	0.2164* (0.107)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)		0.0004** (0.000)
Conflict intensity				0.0083 <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	
Sum previous mediation events	0.2142** (0.028)	0.2000** (0.028)	0.2018** (0.028)	0.1940** (0.027)	
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0062** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0055** (0.001)	
Conflict duration					0.0006 (0.005)
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>					-0.0000 (0.000)
Government irregular entry to power	0.4085** (0.126)				
Government receives troop support		0.2360 (0.183)			
Peacekeeping			-0.0188 (0.213)		
Constant	-1.6532** (0.190)	-1.3083** (0.155)	-1.3139** (0.155)	-1.3727** (0.156)	-1.0427** (0.179)
Log-Likelihood	-344.33	-348.92	-349.74	-348.04	-392.56
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002
Observations	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A7. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after renegeed on mediated agreements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset
Agreement renegeed prev. three years	-0.5053** (0.149)					
Agreement renegeed prev. five years		-0.6092** (0.142)				
Prev. final agr. renegeed			-0.8595** (0.231)			
Prev. full agreement renegeed				-0.8458** (0.253)		
Prev. agr. (part of a process) renegeed					-1.1152** (0.255)	
Prev. agr. to have peace process ren.						-1.7063** (0.325)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.3361* (0.160)	0.4025* (0.163)	0.2616 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.2801 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)	0.1351 (0.160)	0.1429 (0.160)
Relative rebel strength	0.1085 (0.120)	0.1599 (0.124)	-0.0135 (0.116)	0.0091 (0.116)	0.1076 (0.117)	0.1227 (0.118)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2185** (0.028)	0.2259** (0.028)	0.2088** (0.028)	0.2083** (0.028)	0.2322** (0.028)	0.2440** (0.029)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0062** (0.001)	-0.0065** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0065** (0.001)	-0.0068** (0.001)
Constant	-1.3470** (0.156)	-1.3750** (0.159)	-1.2182** (0.154)	-1.2622** (0.154)	-1.4104** (0.158)	-1.4763** (0.159)
Log-Likelihood	-346.932	-343.149	-345.007	-346.674	-342.410	-337.001
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A8. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after renegeed on mediated agreements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset
Agr. contains sec. guaran. renegeed	-0.8045** (0.192)				-0.8340** (0.195)	
Agr. contains sec. guaran. renegeed prev. year		-0.3887 <sup>†</sup> (0.236)				
Ceasefire renegeed			-0.7708** (0.189)			
Ceasefire renegeed previous year				-0.5455* (0.229)		
Comprehensiveness prev. renegeed agr.						-0.2131** (0.043)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2029 (0.159)	0.2324 (0.157)	0.2053 (0.159)	0.2248 (0.158)	0.1790 (0.161)	0.2364 (0.160)
Relative rebel strength	0.0538 (0.116)	0.0356 (0.115)	0.0473 (0.115)	0.0510 (0.116)	0.0549 (0.116)	0.0211 (0.118)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2183** (0.028)	0.2062** (0.028)	0.2149** (0.028)	0.2099** (0.028)	0.2164** (0.028)	0.2187** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0061** (0.001)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0060** (0.001)
Peacekeeping					0.2157 (0.214)	
Government receives troop support						0.5066** (0.193)
Constant	-1.2891** (0.155)	-1.2898** (0.153)	-1.2734** (0.154)	-1.3034** (0.153)	-1.2978** (0.155)	-1.2909** (0.156)
Log-Likelihood	-343.10	-351.56	-343.64	-342.59	-342.59	-338.85
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A9. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after renegeged on mediated agreements

	(1) Mediation onset <sup>*1</sup>	(2) Mediation onset <sup>*2</sup>	(3) Mediation onset	(4) Mediation onset	(5) Mediation onset
Previous agreement renegeged	-0.7167** (0.233)	-0.7096** (0.187)			-0.6429** (0.183)
Agr. (part of a process) renegeged prev. year			-0.1688 (0.295)		
Agr. to have peace process ren. prev. year				-1.1434* (0.524)	
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2219 (0.161)	0.1955 (0.163)	0.2172 (0.158)	0.1805 (0.159)	0.2055 (0.157)
Relative rebel strength	0.0510 (0.178)	0.1301 (0.144)	0.0335 (0.119)	0.0938 (0.119)	0.0532 (0.115)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2127** (0.053)	0.2002** (0.028)	0.2040** (0.028)	0.2123** (0.028)	0.2204** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0059* (0.002)	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0062** (0.001)
Government irregular entry to power					0.3451** (0.126)
Constant	-1.2766** (0.216)	-1.3294** (0.176)	-1.2952** (0.156)	-1.3772** (0.159)	-1.5498** (0.186)
Log-Likelihood	-344.545	-338.334	-352.819	-350.386	-340.723
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	679	698	698	698

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

<sup>\*1</sup>robust cluster on dyad

<sup>\*2</sup>without dyad 127

*Appendix*

**Table A10. Probit models for subsequent mediation onset after renege on mediated agreements**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset	Mediation onset
Previous agreement renege	-0.6573** (0.186)	-0.7295** (0.186)	-0.7607** (0.192)	-0.5701** (0.173)	-0.7346** (0.184)	-0.7103** (0.184)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2249 (0.159)	0.2257 (0.159)	0.2272 (0.159)	0.3073* (0.154)	0.2237 (0.159)	
Rebel group pol. wing						0.1010 (0.121)
Relative rebel Strength	0.0468 (0.117)	0.0522 (0.115)	0.0586 (0.116)	0.2299* (0.106)	0.0670 (0.115)	0.0808 (0.113)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0005** (0.000)		-0.0000 (0.000)
Battle deaths					0.0080 <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	
Sum previous mediation events	0.2134** (0.028)	0.2128** (0.028)	0.2111** (0.028)		0.2076** (0.027)	0.2163** (0.028)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0059** (0.001)		-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0061** (0.001)
Conflict duration				-0.0024 (0.005)		
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>				0.0000 (0.000)		
Prev. mediation on conflict behaviour	0.2276 <sup>†</sup> (0.119)					
Prev. mediation on incompatibility		-0.0581 (0.122)				
Prev. mediation on other topics			-0.0949 (0.120)			
Constant	-1.3665** (0.163)	-1.2596** (0.158)	-1.2244** (0.168)	-0.8842** (0.178)	-1.3260** (0.156)	-1.3231** (0.161)
Log-Likelihood	-342.733	-344.431	-344.235	-392.414	-342.919	-345.168
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	698	698	698	698	698	698

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

Appendix

Table A11. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1) Hazard of mediation onset*	(2) Hazard of mediation onset	(3) Hazard of mediation onset	(4) Hazard of mediation onset	(5) Hazard of mediation onset
Previous no agreement	0.2797 <sup>†</sup> (0.169)				0.3060 (0.207)
No agreement prev. year		1.2613** (0.236)			
No agreement prev. three years			-0.6570** (0.252)		
No agreement prev. five years				-1.0755** (0.274)	
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.1762 (0.156)	0.0550 (0.214)	0.1297 (0.213)	0.1850 (0.213)	0.1611 (0.217)
Relative rebel strength	-0.1125 (0.210)	-0.0968 (0.193)	-0.0940 (0.192)	-0.1167 (0.192)	-0.0777 (0.193)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0006** (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0005* (0.000)	-0.0005 <sup>†</sup> (0.000)	-0.0008** (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2519** (0.060)	0.2284** (0.069)	0.2449** (0.066)	0.2380** (0.066)	0.2532** (0.069)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0083* (0.004)	-0.0071 <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	-0.0090* (0.004)	-0.0091* (0.004)	-0.0092* (0.004)
Same process					0.8709** (0.172)
Log-Likelihood	-400.46	-384.92	-398.25	-394.34	-387.79
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	223	223	223	223	223

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* robust cluster on dyad

Appendix

Table A12. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset after partial mediation success

	(1) Hazard of mediation onset*	(2) Hazard of mediation onset	(3) Hazard of mediation onset	(4) Hazard of mediation onset	(5) Hazard of mediation onset
Previous partial agreement	0.5217* (0.219)				0.3187 (0.274)
Partial agreement prev. year		0.7695** (0.235)			
Partial agreement prev. three years			0.2573 (0.215)		
Partial agreement prev. five years				0.3227 (0.210)	
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.3796 <sup>†</sup> (0.215)	0.4138 <sup>†</sup> (0.230)	0.3565 (0.239)	0.3820 (0.239)	0.3074 (0.236)
Relative rebel strength	0.0360 (0.214)	-0.0479 (0.181)	-0.0242 (0.187)	-0.0281 (0.186)	0.0745 (0.177)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0008** (0.000)	-0.0007** (0.000)	-0.0007** (0.000)	-0.0007** (0.000)	-0.0009** (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2255** (0.042)	0.2264** (0.041)	0.2225** (0.042)	0.2247** (0.042)	0.1967** (0.042)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0053** (0.002)	-0.0058** (0.002)	-0.0053** (0.002)	-0.0054** (0.002)	-0.0043* (0.002)
Same process					0.6877** (0.168)
Log-Likelihood	-549.20	-546.00	-550.26	-549.80	-540.87
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	223	223	223	223	223

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* robust cluster on dyad

Appendix

Table A13. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset after partial mediation success

	(1) Hazard of mediation onset	(2) Hazard of mediation onset	(3) Hazard of mediation onset <sup>*1, *2</sup>
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agreement	0.1129* (0.055)		
Comprehensiveness prev. reneged agr.		-0.1108 (0.059)	
Previous partial agreement			0.6915* (0.272)
Previous no agreement			0.5355* (0.221)
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.3285 (0.211)	0.3799 (0.269)	0.2232 (0.168)
Relative rebel strength	0.0830 (0.219)	0.0491 (0.184)	-0.1201 (0.222)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0007** (0.000)	-0.0005** (0.000)	-0.0005** (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2266** (0.041)	0.2146** (0.042)	0.2605** (0.059)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0052** (0.002)	-0.0046** (0.001)	-0.0082* (0.003)
Log-Likelihood	-548.99	-644.89	-398.48
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	223	223	223

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

<sup>\*1</sup> robust cluster on dyad

<sup>\*2</sup> Stratified by sum of mediation which did not produce an agreement

Appendix

Table A14. The hazard of subsequent mediation onset after renegeed on agreements

	(1) Hazard of mediation onset <sup>*</sup>	(2) Hazard of mediation onset	(3) Hazard of mediation onset	(4) Hazard of mediation onset	(5) Hazard of mediation onset
Prev. agreement renegeed on	-0.4636 <sup>†</sup> (0.245)				-0.4304 (0.345)
Agreement renegeed previous year		0.5598 (0.366)			
Agreement renegeed previous three years			0.5099 <sup>†</sup> (0.265)		
Agreement renegeed previous five years				-0.3264 (0.287)	
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.3818 (0.267)	0.4632 <sup>†</sup> (0.251)	0.4003 (0.247)	0.4781 <sup>†</sup> (0.250)	0.3747 (0.253)
Relative rebel strength	0.0455 (0.183)	0.0206 (0.182)	0.0115 (0.183)	0.0574 (0.180)	0.1018 (0.177)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0005** (0.000)	-0.0005* (0.000)	-0.0004* (0.000)	-0.0005** (0.000)	-0.0007** (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2136** (0.042)	0.2224** (0.039)	0.2247** (0.039)	0.2228** (0.039)	0.1913** (0.039)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0046** (0.001)	-0.0046** (0.002)	-0.0044** (0.002)	-0.0051** (0.002)	-0.0042** (0.001)
Same process					0.7130** (0.164)
Log-Likelihood	-644.90	-644.80	-643.98	-645.23	-635.55
Significance	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Observations	223	223	223	223	223

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A15. Sartori selection estimator analyses and Heckman selection models on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1) <sup>*</sup>		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.2365 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2788 (0.286)			0.0531 (0.118)	0.0746 (0.182)
No agreement previous year			0.5243** (0.113)	0.2006 (0.174)		
Rebel group political wing (legal)	0.2270 (0.156)		0.2026 (0.159)	0.0258 (0.223)	0.2891 <sup>†</sup> (0.149)	0.0542 (0.220)
Relative rebel strength	0.0288 (0.115)	0.4171* (0.193)	0.0738 (0.115)	0.3050* (0.144)	0.2168* (0.105)	0.4018** (0.140)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0004* (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)
Sum prev. mediation events	0.2071** (0.028)	0.0009 (0.192)	0.1750** (0.028)	0.0779 <sup>†</sup> (0.041)		
Sum prev. mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	0.0011 (0.006)	-0.0046** (0.001)	-0.0014 (0.002)		
Constant	-1.4846** (0.189)	-1.8146 (2.029)	-1.5714** (0.168)	-2.3768** (0.247)	-1.0106** (0.168)	-2.1740** (0.255)
Log-Likelihood	-441.68		-432.75		-489.67	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	8.0 (5)		116.84 (6)		14.64 (4)	
Significance	0.1563		0.0000		0.0055	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

\* Heckman model

Appendix

Table A16. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.0545 (0.118)	0.0853 (0.183)	0.2544* (0.128)	0.2334 (0.189)	0.2212 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.1693 (0.189)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2983 <sup>†</sup> (0.154)	0.0778 (0.229)	0.1937 (0.159)	0.0179 (0.226)	0.2172 (0.158)	0.0780 (0.223)
Relative rebel strength	0.2123* (0.106)	0.3781** (0.146)	0.0431 (0.113)	0.3038* (0.141)	0.0430 (0.114)	0.27360 <sup>†</sup> (0.145)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0004* (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events			0.2026** (0.027)	0.0876* (0.040)	0.2064** (0.027)	0.0908* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>			-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0016 (0.002)	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)
Conflict duration	-0.0006 (0.005)	-0.0072 (0.012)				
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)				
Peacekeeping			0.1724 (0.211)	0.3685 (0.282)		
Prev. mediation on conflict behaviour					0.2811* (0.117)	0.3360 <sup>†</sup> (0.173)
Constant	-0.9925** (0.193)	-2.0612** (0.314)	-1.5126** (0.192)	-2.4995** (0.282)	-1.5939** (0.194)	-2.5361** (0.283)
Log-Likelihood	-489.45		-441.23		-438.57	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	14.69 (6)		102.79 (7)		107.43 (7)	
Significance	0.0237		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A17. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.2393 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.2438 (0.191)	0.2328 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.1934 (0.187)	0.2188 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	0.1832 (0.186)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2146 (0.157)	0.0499 (0.223)			0.2217 (0.157)	0.0989 (0.224)
Rebel group pol. wing			0.1202 (0.120)	-0.0573 (0.185)		
Relative rebel strength	0.0387 (0.113)	0.2881* (0.143)	0.0729 (0.111)	0.3018* (0.137)	0.0658 (0.112)	0.3263* (0.141)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)		
Conflict intensity					0.0063 (0.004)	-0.0047 (0.008)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2053** (0.027)	0.0955* (0.040)	0.2079** (0.027)	0.0925* (0.039)	0.1939** (0.026)	0.0808* (0.039)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0052** (0.001)	-0.0015 (0.002)
Prev. mediation on incompatibility	0.0356 (0.119)	0.2631 (0.172)				
Constant	-1.5020** (0.195)	-2.5655** (0.296)	-1.5429** (0.192)	-2.4202** (0.281)	-1.5262** (0.189)	-2.4570** (0.277)
Log-Likelihood	-440.89		-442.28		-441.68	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	102.85 (7)		102.41 (6)		103.84 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A18. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after mediation did not produce an agreement

	(1) <sup>*</sup>		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.2254 (0.137)	0.1944 (0.198)	0.2685* (0.131)	0.2262 (0.202)	0.2037 (0.125)	0.1902 (0.187)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.0985 (0.163)	-0.0410 (0.229)	0.3721* (0.162)	0.0385 (0.248)	0.2084 (0.155)	0.0149 (0.227)
Relative rebel strength	-0.0214 (0.120)	0.2222 (0.143)	-0.1948 (0.138)	0.3706 <sup>†</sup> (0.201)	0.0493 (0.113)	0.3156* (0.144)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0005* (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.5542** (0.054)	0.3177** (0.067)	0.1974** (0.028)	0.0731 <sup>†</sup> (0.043)	0.2154** (0.028)	0.0927* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0331** (0.004)	-0.0193** (0.004)	-0.0051** (0.001)	-0.0009 (0.002)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)
Previous partial agreement			5.9809 (95.117)	1.1663** (0.286)		
Gov't irregular entry to power					0.4013** (0.125)	0.1187 (0.189)
Constant	-1.9163** (0.207)	-2.7021** (0.293)	-1.3475** (0.208)	-2.6026** (0.313)	-1.7911** (0.211)	-2.5434** (0.297)
Log-Likelihood	-368.74		-464.27		-436.61	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	131.85 (6)		97.74 (7)		110.55 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	638		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

\* without dyad 641

*Appendix*

Table A19. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1) <sup>*1</sup>		(2)		(3) <sup>*2</sup>	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.5288* (0.206)	0.5127 (0.459)	0.6630** (0.199)	0.7669** (0.244)	0.4267† (0.220)	0.5966* (0.266)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2706† (0.159)		0.3399* (0.151)	0.1472 (0.224)	0.1448 (0.164)	0.0392 (0.232)
Relative rebel strength	0.0097 (0.117)	0.3807* (0.193)	0.2110* (0.106)	0.3720** (0.144)	-0.0360 (0.122)	0.1989 (0.149)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0005* (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2015** (0.027)	-0.0207 (0.172)			0.5437** (0.054)	0.3105** (0.067)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	0.0015 (0.005)			-0.0329** (0.004)	-0.0191** (0.004)
Constant	-1.3146** (0.155)	-1.4293 (1.949)	-1.0259** (0.143)	-2.1844** (0.207)	-1.7481** (0.175)	-2.5945** (0.259)
Log-Likelihood	-439.14		-482.79		-367.22	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	8.87 (5)		24.99 (4)		132.53 (6)	
Significance	0.1142		0.0001		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		638	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

\*<sup>1</sup> Heckman model

\*<sup>2</sup> without dyad 641

Appendix

Table A20. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.5057* (0.206)	0.6541** (0.250)	0.5387** (0.206)	0.6670** (0.250)	0.5055* (0.206)	0.6436* (0.252)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2525 (0.156)	0.1001 (0.229)	0.2789 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)	0.1664 (0.235)	0.2627 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.1608 (0.226)
Relative rebel strength	0.0321 (0.115)	0.2808 <sup>†</sup> (0.149)	-0.0007 (0.118)	0.2310 (0.160)	0.0211 (0.117)	0.2398 (0.149)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2127** (0.028)	0.0936* (0.040)	0.1980** (0.027)	0.0916* (0.040)	0.2016** (0.027)	0.0898* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0061** (0.001)	-0.0021 (0.002)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)
Gov't irregular entry to power	0.4179** (0.126)	0.1451 (0.190)				
Gov't receives troop support			0.2448 (0.183)	0.2453 (0.262)		
Prev. mediation on conflict behaviour					0.2806* (0.117)	0.3443* (0.175)
Constant	-1.6692** (0.191)	-2.4638** (0.274)	-1.3143** (0.156)	-2.3287** (0.239)	-1.4335** (0.163)	-2.4503** (0.247)
Log-Likelihood	-433.69		-438.48		-435.91	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	112.49 (7)		107.78 (7)		110.19 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A21. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agr.	0.0097 (0.086)	-0.0333 (0.118)	0.0327 (0.111)	0.1707 (0.133)	0.0359 (0.035)	-0.0153 (0.056)
Prev. agr. contains security guarantees	0.1348 (0.426)	0.0863 (0.555)				
Prev. agr. contains ceasefire			0.0060 (0.523)	-0.9633 (0.636)		
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2083 (0.157)	0.0667 (0.224)	0.2219 (0.157)	0.0529 (0.222)	0.2286 (0.158)	0.0784 (0.230)
Relative rebel strength	0.0340 (0.114)	0.2795* (0.139)	0.0201 (0.114)	0.2576 <sup>†</sup> (0.143)	0.0109 (0.116)	0.2674 <sup>†</sup> (0.155)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.1993** (0.027)	0.0881* (0.039)	0.1986** (0.027)	0.0849* (0.039)	0.1980** (0.027)	0.0876* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)
Gov't receives troop support					0.2374 (0.182)	0.1876 (0.261)
Constant	-1.3097** (0.154)	-2.2510** (0.233)	-1.2924** (0.154)	-2.2106** (0.237)	-1.3011** (0.155)	-2.2561** (0.234)
Log-Likelihood	-443.21		-441.94		-442.40	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	101.90 (7)		100.66 (7)		103.55 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A22. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.6660** (0.199)	0.7663** (0.244)			0.5472** (0.210)	0.5984* (0.256)
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agr.			0.0632 <sup>†</sup> (0.034)	0.0085 (0.055)		
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.3445* (0.155)	0.1696 (0.232)	0.2913 <sup>†</sup> (0.154)	0.0811 (0.229)	0.2585 (0.160)	0.1088 (0.229)
Relative rebel strength	0.2104 <sup>†</sup> (0.108)	0.3485* (0.151)	0.2188* (0.107)	0.3720* (0.145)	0.0200 (0.115)	0.2661 <sup>†</sup> (0.146)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0004** (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Conflict duration	0.0006 (0.005)	-0.0067 (0.012)	-0.0000 (0.005)	-0.0082 (0.012)		
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)		
Sum previous mediation events					0.1989** (0.027)	0.0891** (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>					-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)
Peacekeeping					0.0063 (0.214)	0.2292 (0.283)
Constant	-1.0328** (0.179)	-2.0756** (0.288)	-1.0109** (0.178)	-1.9892** (0.285)	-1.3205** (0.155)	-2.3466** (0.239)
Log-Likelihood	-482.59		-487.67		-439.11	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	25.13 (6)		17.92 (6)		105.96 (7)	
Significance	0.0003		0.0064		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A23. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous partial agreement	0.5041* (0.204)	0.6288* (0.249)	0.5758** (0.205)	0.6919** (0.248)	0.5309* (0.207)	0.6042* (0.254)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)			0.2657 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.1760 (0.227)	0.2630 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.1278 (0.226)
Rebel group pol. wing	0.1551 (0.120)	0.0089 (0.187)				
Relative rebel strength	0.0571 (0.113)	0.2790* (0.141)	0.0400 (0.115)	0.2863 <sup>†</sup> (0.146)	0.0173 (0.115)	0.2508 <sup>†</sup> (0.146)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)			-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Conflict intensity			0.0080 <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	-0.0030 (0.008)		
Sum previous mediation events	0.2038** (0.027)	0.0925* (0.040)	0.1912** (0.026)	0.0819* (0.039)	0.1998** (0.027)	0.0947* (0.041)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)	-0.0054** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0022 (0.002)
Previous med. on incompatibility					-0.0198 (0.119)	0.1785 (0.175)
Constant	-1.3876** (0.161)	-2.3344** (0.244)	-1.3756** (0.156)	-2.3567** (0.239)	-1.3116** (0.159)	-2.3808** (0.245)
Log-Likelihood	-439.87		-438.00		-438.77	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	105.16 (6)		108.20 (6)		105.75 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A24. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after partial mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous final agreement	0.0982 (0.227)	-4.0097 (101.146)				
Prev. agr. (part of a process) reneged			0.1040 (0.201)	0.5437* (0.245)		
Prev. agr. to have peace process ren.					0.4187 (0.493)	2.5752 (0.000)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2114 (0.157)	0.0683 (0.223)	0.2313 (0.158)	0.1480 (0.228)	0.2241 (0.157)	0.1080 (0.225)
Relative rebel strength	0.0312 (0.113)	0.2952* (0.138)	0.0143 (0.115)	0.2699 <sup>†</sup> (0.145)	0.0243 (0.114)	0.3079* (0.142)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2001** (0.027)	0.0809* (0.040)	0.1994** (0.027)	0.0891* (0.040)	0.1978** (0.027)	0.0981* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0013 (0.002)	-0.0055** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0054** (0.001)	-0.0020 (0.002)
Constant	-1.2940** (0.153)	-2.2330** (0.232)	-1.2771** (0.154)	-2.3354** (0.236)	-1.2819** (0.152)	-2.3984** (0.241)
Log-Likelihood	-440.50		-441.59		-438.28	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	100.90 (6)		101.09 (6)		101.69 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A25. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after renege on agreements

	(1)		(2) <sup>*1</sup>		(3) <sup>*2</sup>	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement renege	-0.4771** (0.167)	-0.4700 (0.303)	-0.7217** (0.184)	-0.5193 (0.546)	-0.7249** (0.187)	-0.5160 <sup>†</sup> (0.304)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)			0.2166 (0.159)		0.1769 (0.163)	0.1158 (0.236)
Relative rebel strength			0.0536 (0.116)	0.4116* (0.199)	0.1379 (0.142)	0.2657 (0.185)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events			-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events			0.2125** (0.028)	0.0323 (0.157)	0.1997** (0.028)	0.0738 <sup>†</sup> (0.041)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>			-0.0059** (0.001)	0.0001 (0.005)	-0.0054** (0.001)	-0.0012 (0.002)
Constant	-0.5639** (0.054)	-1.5581** (0.081)	-1.2782** (0.154)	-1.9461 (1.263)	-1.3335** (0.175)	-2.1693** (0.266)
Log-Likelihood	-495.52		-434.83		-424.95	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	8.14 (1)		10.26 (5)		103.87 (6)	
Significance	0.0043		0.0681		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		679	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

<sup>\*1</sup> Heckman model  
<sup>\*2</sup> without dyad 127

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Table A26. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after reneged on agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement reneged	-0.7469** (0.187)	-0.4930 (0.311)	-0.6803** (0.187)	-0.4671 (0.312)	-0.7841** (0.193)	-0.6709* (0.315)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2086 (0.159)	0.0586 (0.224)	0.2055 (0.159)	0.0827 (0.223)	0.2072 (0.159)	0.0529 (0.227)
Relative rebel strength	0.0638 (0.114)	0.2986* (0.144)	0.0679 (0.115)	0.2862* (0.145)	0.0754 (0.115)	0.3204* (0.145)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2120** (0.028)	0.0951* (0.040)	0.2119** (0.028)	0.0897* (0.040)	0.2089** (0.028)	0.0899* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0021 (0.002)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)
Prev. mediation on incompatibility	-0.0522 (0.121)	0.1995 (0.176)				
Prev. mediation on conflict behaviour			0.2159 <sup>†</sup> (0.119)	0.2954 <sup>†</sup> (0.179)		
Prev. mediation on other topics					-0.1046 (0.120)	-0.1837 (0.176)
Constant	-1.2691** (0.158)	-2.3300** (0.242)	-1.3788** (0.161)	-2.3617** (0.241)	-1.2295** (0.166)	-2.1585** (0.247)
Log-Likelihood	-433.98		-432.85		-434.39	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	111.10 (7)		114.31 (7)		111.59 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A27. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after reneged on agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement reneged	-0.7331** (0.185)	-0.5693 <sup>†</sup> (0.301)	-0.7573** (0.184)	-0.5910* (0.300)	-0.5666** (0.173)	-0.5649 <sup>†</sup> (0.313)
Rebel group pol. wing	0.0958 (0.121)	-0.0618 (0.185)				
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)			0.2015 (0.159)	0.1060 (0.225)	0.3105* (0.155)	0.0994 (0.230)
Relative rebel strength	0.0978 (0.111)	0.3197* (0.139)	0.0846 (0.113)	0.3388* (0.143)	0.2230* (0.107)	0.3854** (0.148)
Sum deaths between mediation events	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)			0.0005** (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)
Conflict intensity			0.0077 <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	-0.0038 (0.008)		
Sum previous mediation events	0.2147** (0.027)	0.0916* (0.039)	0.2052** (0.027)	0.0822* (0.039)		
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0016 (0.002)		
Conflict duration					-0.0024 (0.005)	-0.0080 (0.012)
Conflict duration <sup>2</sup>					0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)
Constant	-1.3365** (0.160)	-2.2402** (0.237)	-1.3350** (0.155)	-2.2848** (0.234)	-0.8749** (0.177)	-1.9420** (0.283)
Log-Likelihood	-435.33		-433.78		-483.56	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	110.27 (6)		113.07 (6)		24.86 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0004	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A28. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after renege on agreement

	(1)		(1)		(1)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Comprehensiveness prev. renege agr.	-0.1822** (0.041)	-0.1834* (0.078)	-0.1817** (0.041)	-0.1791* (0.078)	-0.1888** (0.042)	-0.1845* (0.078)
Prev. ren. agr. contains ceasefire	0.0523 (0.169)	-0.3065 (0.276)				
Prev. ren. agr. cont. sec. guaran.			0.0878 (0.177)	-0.1206 (0.265)		
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.1835 (0.159)	0.0494 (0.225)	0.1831 (0.159)	0.0440 (0.225)	0.1633 (0.161)	0.0114 (0.228)
Relative rebel strength	0.0726 (0.114)	0.3122* (0.141)	0.0758 (0.114)	0.3170* (0.141)	0.0732 (0.114)	0.3242* (0.143)
Sum deaths between mediation events	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2156** (0.028)	0.0874* (0.040)	0.2158** (0.028)	0.0900* (0.040)	0.2139** (0.028)	0.0889* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)
Peacekeeping					0.2186 (0.210)	0.4149 (0.282)
Constant	-1.3113** (0.155)	-2.2002** (0.237)	-1.3196** (0.156)	-2.2366** (0.237)	-1.3149** (0.155)	-2.2948** (0.236)
Log-Likelihood	-431.59		-432.20		-431.44	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	114.27 (7)		115.22 (7)		115.26 (7)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

Appendix

Table A29. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after reneged on agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Prev. final agr. reneged	-0.8705** (0.231)	-0.6499 <sup>†</sup> (0.385)				
Prev. agr. (part of process) ren.			-1.1174** (0.255)	-4.3274 (95.614)		
Prev. agr. to have peace process ren.					-1.7069** (0.325)	-315.3367 (0.000)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2503 (0.158)	0.0908 (0.225)	0.1138 (0.160)	-0.0112 (0.227)	0.1205 (0.160)	0.0149 (0.227)
Relative rebel strength	0.0031 (0.114)	0.2585 <sup>†</sup> (0.140)	0.1297 (0.115)	0.3750** (0.144)	0.1442 (0.115)	0.3733* (0.145)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2062** (0.027)	0.0912* (0.039)	0.2293** (0.028)	0.1066** (0.040)	0.2414** (0.028)	0.1082** (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0064** (0.001)	-0.0023 (0.002)	-0.0066** (0.001)	-0.0023 (0.002)
Constant	-1.2296** (0.154)	-2.2200** (0.231)	-1.4262** (0.157)	-2.3817** (0.237)	-1.4918** (0.158)	-2.4078** (0.237)
Log-Likelihood	-435.79		-431.24		-426.86	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	110.10 (6)		115.58 (6)		127.73 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A30. Sartori selection estimator analyses for subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success after reneged on agreement

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous agreement reneged	-0.5546** (0.172)	-0.5628 <sup>†</sup> (0.311)	-0.6524** (0.184)	-0.5667 <sup>†</sup> (0.303)	-0.8345** (0.194)	-0.6342* (0.302)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2935 <sup>†</sup> (0.150)	0.0684 (0.221)	0.1994 (0.157)	0.0315 (0.227)	0.2338 (0.160)	0.0775 (0.233)
Relative rebel strength	0.2335* (0.105)	0.4158** (0.141)	0.0713 (0.113)	0.3262* (0.145)	0.0361 (0.117)	0.3030 <sup>†</sup> (0.159)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.000)
Sum previous mediation events			0.2188** (0.028)	0.0911* (0.040)	0.2108** (0.028)	0.0889* (0.040)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>			-0.0061** (0.001)	-0.0018 (0.002)	-0.0058** (0.001)	-0.0017 (0.002)
Gov't irregular entry to power			0.3530** (0.126)	0.1011 (0.190)		
Gov't receives troop support					0.4247* (0.188)	0.2889 (0.267)
Constant	-0.9366** (0.140)	-2.0913** (0.200)	-1.5722** (0.186)	-2.3466** (0.268)	-1.2807** (0.155)	-2.2683** (0.233)
Log-Likelihood	-483.89		-430.92		-432.52	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	24.47 (4)		118.38 (7)		114.34 (7)	
Significance	0.000.1		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

Appendix

Table A31. Sartori selection estimator analyses for conflict termination in year following subsequent mediation success

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Previous no agreement	0.2432 <sup>†</sup> (0.126)	-0.2554 (0.297)				
Previous partial agreement			0.5087* (0.206)	1.1108** (0.348)		
Previous agreement renege					-0.7162** (0.184)	-3.5385 (225.445)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2324 (0.157)	0.3705 (0.474)	0.2737 <sup>†</sup> (0.158)	0.5877 (0.493)	0.2285 (0.158)	0.3933 (0.483)
Relative rebel strength	0.0288 (0.114)	-3.6995 (120.607)	0.0088 (0.117)	-3.7744 (80.461)	0.0504 (0.115)	-3.7205 (124.846)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0005 (0.001)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2066** (0.027)	0.0768 (0.070)	0.2017** (0.027)	0.0765 (0.073)	0.2119** (0.028)	0.0522 (0.070)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0056** (0.001)	-0.0010 (0.002)	-0.0057** (0.001)	-0.0011 (0.003)	-0.0059** (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.002)
Constant	-1.4896** (0.189)	1.3885 (120.607)	-1.3127** (0.155)	1.0442 (80.461)	-1.2755** (0.154)	1.3751 (124.846)
Log-Likelihood	-381.39		-377.85		-375.24	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	104.29 (6)		107.07 (6)		111.64 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, <sup>†</sup> p<0.1

*Appendix*

Table A32. Sartori selection estimator analyses for conflict termination in year following subsequent mediation success

	(1)		(2)	
	Mediation onset	Mediation success	Mediation onset	Mediation success
Comprehensiveness prev. renege on agreement	-0.1809** (0.041)	-1.3474 (55.820)		
Comprehensiveness prev. partial agreement			0.0278 (0.036)	0.1323 <sup>†</sup> (0.074)
Rebel group pol. wing (legal)	0.2118 (0.159)	0.3845 (0.482)	0.2288 (0.157)	0.4545 (0.479)
Relative rebel strength	0.0528 (0.116)	-3.7159 (124.086)	0.0122 (0.116)	-3.8838 (146.445)
Sum deaths betw. mediation events	0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.001)
Sum previous mediation events	0.2174** (0.028)	0.0536 (0.070)	0.2097** (0.028)	0.0500 (0.071)
Sum previous mediation events <sup>2</sup>	-0.0060** (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.002)	-0.0062** (0.001)	0.0001 (0.003)
Constant	-1.2913** (0.155)	1.3669 (124.086)	-1.3023** (0.155)	1.3180 (146.445)
Log-Likelihood	-372.95		-410.78	
Wald-Chi <sup>2</sup>	115.62 (6)		102.33 (6)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000	
Observations	698		698	

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, † p<0.1

Interview with a member of the mediation team of the Juba Talks

**Dissertation: You Always Meet Twice? Consecutive Mediation Efforts in African Intrastate Conflicts**

**Case Study: Mediation between the GoU and the LRA**

**Interview guideline for the interview with a member of the mediation team of the Juba Talks**

Place: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you very much for agreeing to this interview. Before we start, I would like to provide you with some other information on the context of this interview:

As you know from the emails we have exchanged, I am a PhD student at the University of Greifswald. In my research, I focus on mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts. In particular, I am interested in if and how previous mediation efforts have an impact on subsequent mediation efforts. I concentrate on mediation processes in African intrastate conflicts, and focus especially on the mediation processes between the Government of Uganda and the LRA, which is why I highly value the opportunity of talking about the mediation processes between the Government of Uganda and the LRA with you.

I do not receive external funding for any work I do regarding my PhD, but am an employee of the University of Greifswald.

*Appendix*

Questionnaire for interview with member of the mediation team

(Questions identifying the interviewee have been deleted from the questionnaire provided below)

<b>Question</b>	<b>Follow-up questions (if not already addressed)</b>	<b>Interest</b>
When did your involvement in the conflict resolution process between the GoU and the LRA in Uganda start?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Get to know more about interviewees background</li> </ul>
In your opinion, what contributed to the GoU considering mediation prior to the Juba Talks?	Did factors such as <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- discussions on peacekeeping forces</li> <li>- conflict intensity</li> <li>- increased international pressure</li> </ul> play a role?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GoU's decision to engage in mediation</li> </ul>
Did either the LRA or the GoU refer to previous mediation processes when it came to whether or not subsequent mediation should take place?	Did the outcome of previous mediation processes matter? Did previous interactions matter? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- behaviour of LRA/GoU during talks/prior to talks</li> <li>- mediator identity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence of previous mediation outcomes on decision to engage in mediation</li> </ul>
Do you have the impression that legitimizing the LRA through mediation was a hurdle for the GoU when it came to the Juba Talks?  Can a rebel group be deprived of legitimacy if the government is unsatisfied with how mediation went?	Did the GoU perceive the LRA as a legitimised group after previous mediation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Importance of rebel legitimacy</li> </ul>
Do you have insights on the reasons why the GoU and the LRA shared information or made decisions?	Did <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- security issues</li> <li>- previous mediation outcomes/processes</li> </ul> play a role?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decision-making process</li> <li>• Impact of previous mediation</li> </ul>

Summary of interview with a member of the mediation team

The interview with a member of the mediation team of the Juba Talks took place on February 19, 2016. Due to the interviewees request, it was not tape-recorded. The summary below is based on notes taken during the interview and a memorandum of the conversation written after the interview. The interview was conducted as a semi-structured interview. Question exposing the identity of the interviewee were excluded from the questionnaire.

During large parts of the interview the interviewee talked about the events leading to the Juba Talks. The role and identity of the mediator was elaborated on at various times during the interview, especially regarding the quarrels between Riek Machar and IKV Pax Christi. Since the mediators are not the focus of this research, the insights shared during the interview are not elaborated on here.

With regard to the Juba Talks, the interviewee highlighted that the GoU's delegation was led by Rugunda, who is a very experienced diplomat, while the LRA delegation faced numerous power struggles. Adding to the lack of experienced diplomats, these power struggles made talks more difficult. Moreover, the Juba Talks were considered a source of income, hence, it was sensible for the LRA to keep on talking. Actually, the payments might have been the true reason for why the Juba Talks continued for so long, according to the interviewee.

Furthermore, the interviewee shared his perspective on the role of the Mombasa Talks. The Mombasa talks took place when the Juba Talks came to a stand still. An agreement was reached, which the mediator of the Mombasa Talks expected to be drawn on during the Juba Talks. However, the agreement was not discussed during the Juba Talks.

The interviewee stated that Kony not signing the FPA was very predictable since Kony would never go to court while Museveni is president, according to the interviewee. When asked whether previous mediation outcomes mattered in the preparatory talks for the Juba Talks, the interviewee clearly stated that previous mediation outcomes were not referred to.

Illustration A1. Conflict intensity and mediation onset in the conflict between the GoU and the LRA




Table A33. Timeline for the conflict between the GoU and the LRA with a focus on mediation

01/1986	Yoweri Museveni is sworn in as president after military coup by National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M); many northern Ugandans lynched (Barnes & Lucima 2002: 5).
09/1986	Alice Auma ‘Lakwena’ forms Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) to oppose government (Lucima 2002: 89).
01-04/1987	Joseph Kony creates HSMF II, conducts forced recruitment; members from other rebel groups join HSMF II (Lucima 2002: 89).
06/1987	Government of Uganda (GoU) declares amnesty for rebels willing to surrender (International Crisis Group 2004: 29).
1988	Kony wants peace talks; HSMF II attacked by NRA due to miscommunication; talks do not take place; HSMF II suspicious (Lamwaka 2002: 31).
03.06.1988	Peace agreement between Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and NRA signed (Lucima 2002: 90).
06/1988	Ugandan army starts major operations against rebels (Lucima 2002: 90).
Late 1988	GoU troops suffer minor but important military losses (O’Kadameri 2002: 34).  Museveni creates post of ‘Minister of State for Pacification of northern Uganda, Resident in Gulu’, later renamed ‘Minister of State in Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda’; appoints Betty Bigombe (O’Kadameri 2002: 35).
03/1989	44 girls from Sacred Heart Secondary School and St Mary’s Girls School (close to Gulu) abducted (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 26; O’Kadameri 2002: 36).
Early 1990	Bigombe and other NRM officials declare war over (Branch 2005: 16).

## Appendix

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- Mid 1990 Violence increases again (Branch 2005: 16).
- 1988-1992 Bigombe tries to encourage population of northern Uganda to not follow HSMF II (O’Kadameri 2002: 35).  
Fighting between HSMF II and GoU intensifies (Accord 2010: 24).
- 31.03.1991 Operation North starts: GoU wants to defeat HSMF II; GoU troops supposedly arrest individuals arbitrarily in some cases; population refrains from supporting GoU (O’Kadameri 2002: 35).
- 07/1991 Revenge killings and one-sided violence by HSMF II (International Crisis Group 2004: 30)
- 1992 Bigombe initiates Arrow Groups (village-based self-defence); GoU decides civilians can take care of themselves, leaves them alone; HSMF II responds with even more severe attacks and maiming, cutting off hands, lips, and ears (O’Kadameri 2002: 36; Branch 2005: 16).
- 07/1992 GoU announces creation of Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme, which is based on cooperation with civilian population; supposed to end conflict (Lucima 2002: 90).  
Operation North ends; attacks against civilians become more brutal as a response to Arrow Groups and Operation North; HSMF II tries to win support of civilians by instilling fear (O’Kadameri 2002: 35–36).
- 08/1992 Kony renames HSMF II to Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army (LRA/M) (Lucima 2002: 89).
- 06/1993 Bigombe discusses rebellion with Col Samuel Wassawa (GoU), receives documents and notebooks of LRA, discovers that Yusuk Okwonga Adek plays key role, could potentially be contact person to LRA (O’Kadameri 2002: 36).  
Bigombe invites Adek to several secret meetings, discusses origin of rebellion, reasons for continuation, how to end it, wants to talk with LRA, asks if Adek can mediate, writes a letter to Kony, which Adek delivers; Kony needs time for guidance from Holy Spirit; Adek to return in three

weeks (O’Kadameri 2002: 36).

Bigombe consults with Museveni, is supposed to continue her efforts, needs to coordinate with military (O’Kadameri 2002: 36).

1993-1994 First mediation attempt, led by Bigombe (Accord 2010: 24), not backed by GoU (O’Kadameri 2002: 35).

LRA moves bases to Sudan (Sudan had invited LRA to do so), Sudan supports LRA with provisions and weapons (Accord 2010: 24).

10/1993 Initial discussions on modalities and security arrangements for first meeting with LRA; Bigombe willing to comply with LRA terms to open face-to-face talks; GoU troops insist on further security arrangements, LRA gives in; Museveni still does not openly support talks (O’Kadameri 2002: 37).

25.11.1993 First Pagik meeting in Aswa (Gulu); Bigombe is accompanied (at LRA suggestion) by several elders: Adek, Col Wasswa, Lt Col Fred Toolit, and Billie O’Kadameri; only middle-range officers take part in meeting, carry a tape-recorded message from Kony; Bigombe initially unhappy that Kony does not take part, later realises Jenaro Bongomin is Kony’s ‘eyes and ears’ – other key people who attend for LRA: Jackson Achama, Yardin Tolbert Nyeko, Cirlio Jurukadri Odego; Bigombe states she initiated talks because Acholi are suffering, points out blockage of economic and social development for northern Uganda until war is over; LRA delegation underlines meeting is considered as first contact meeting, further talks might follow, past should be left at rest, asks if amnesty covers them, does not want to be viewed as defeated, insists on talks excluding former UPDA officers: have betrayed LRA; asks for formalised ceasefire for members to return home, wants injured rebels treated in hospitals; Kony to attend next meeting, LRA cannot make decisions without him; Bigombe: existing amnesty covers LRA, agrees that past should be forgiven, nobody victor of the war, agrees not to bring former UPDA members to talks, asks for exact number of sick and wounded; both NRA and LRA voice concern that third force might sabotage process of LRA assembling; Bigombe does majority of talking; confidence built; LRA sends delegates to NRA barracks, where Bigombe lives, to discuss further talks (O’Kadameri 2002: 37–38); first ever face-to-face talks between LRA and GoU (Schomerus 2012: 58).

- 11-12/1993 Brigadier Joram Mugume and Lt Col Toolit concerned Bigombe might have given in too much; Bigombe under pressure: she does not receive political or logistical support for peace process – might be due to concerns about who receives recognition for improvement of situation in the north; asks Bigombe to not over-publicise talks, fears public expectation rising too high and GoU having to pay for potential failure of peace process; population notices changes in LRA behaviour, supports talks; NRA assumes Museveni supports process though Museveni does not do so openly, does not give NRA directions on how to behave (O’Kadameri 2002: 38).
- Three days before scheduled meeting Meeting between senior Acholi politicians and elders (also present: Tito Okello Lutwa (former Head of State), Eric Otema-Allimadi (UPDM leader (UPDM is an external political wing of the UPDA)); Okello verbally attacks LRA commanders; LRA wants to talk with religious leaders, but Catholic Church unwilling to send delegation (O’Kadameri 2002: 38).
- 10.01.1994 Next meeting in Pagik almost collapses due to unresolved questions on security issues; LRA wants to be solely responsible for security, NRA disagrees; Bigombe meets LRA delegation without protection, is accompanied by unarmed NRA officers (O’Kadameri 2002: 39–40).
- 11.01.1994 Kony attends meeting, explains why he went to the bush; holds Acholi responsible: had been sent out by Acholi who then abandoned him, wants to be seen as serious partner in peace process; Bigombe and Kony hold one-to-one meeting during which Kony announces he wants to come out of the bush, asks GoU to enable process, wants six month for rebels to regroup (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).
- Period following Pagik meeting Security on comparably high level in northern Uganda; LRA moves around freely, sometimes sits together with GoU soldiers (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).
- 22.01.1994 Atoo hill talks, LRA highlights desire for signing agreement which shows that NRA and LRA do not hold hostilities anymore; Bigombe approves; LRA: will treasure what is agreed upon, even if Kony is not there, will not attack NRA unless NRA starts attacking, highlights that even though Toolit (NRA) expects them to surrender, they have not agreed to peace talks to surrender; Toolit annoys LRA by interpreting the Bible and

talking of surrender (O’Kadameri 2002: 37–38).

24.01.1994 Third meeting at Lakwatimer Primary School; all senior LRA commanders but Kony attend; Wasswa and Toolit attend for GoU; focus on negotiating ceasefire; presence of NRA officers important as also other aspects of peace agreement, which involve army, are discussed (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).

Follow-up meeting held to work out details (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).

Problems start when LRA has impression NRA behaves arrogantly, interprets Toolit’s remarks as belittling (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).

Kony feels betrayed and abandoned by Acholi leaders (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 24).

Meeting in Bigombe’s house; Brigadier Mugume tells LRA he thought peace talks are about negotiating surrender; LRA feels humiliated (O’Kadameri 2002: 40).

02.02.1994 Meeting at Tegot-Atto; tensions increase, but ceasefire is drafted and signed by Omona (LRA) and Wasswa (NRA); Bigombe in difficult position: tries to represent GoU but has to facilitate process; LRA informs Bigombe that delegation will not come to Gulu again for further meetings after Tegot-Atto meeting, fears being arrested; Gulu-Kitgum meeting, was supposed to take place two weeks later, postponed indefinitely; army claims LRA contacted Government of Sudan (GoS), unwilling to continue talks; Bigombe not informed about this, remains in touch with LRA, which is interested in talks if army reassures not to play tricks (O’Kadameri 2002: 40–41).

Agreement called ‘Gulu Ceasefire’ reached; contents: LRA and NRA proclaim necessity of ending armed conflict and restoring peace, hostilities to cease with immediate effect, peace efforts to be handled by Office of the Minister of State, Resident in the North (Bigombe) and 4<sup>th</sup> Division Commander, NRA (Wasswa), LRA to regroup and inform 4<sup>th</sup> Division about progress; peace process to be explained to population in public rallies; Kony to meet elders for drawing up program for cleansing rituals; Gulu Ceasefire signed by: Wasswa (NRA), George Komakech Omona (LRA), witnessed by Bigombe, Adek, Okot Ogoni, Okidi Angol, Geoge William Lugai; agreement to come into force at 2 p.m. that day (Gulu Ceasefire 1994).

## Appendix

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- 06.02.1994 Museveni visits Gulu, announces that Bigombe has engaged in talks with LRA, but LRA took advantage of it, claims LRA uses talks for building up military strength, LRA has seven days to surrender with all arms, otherwise military action will follow; LRA does not follow ultimatum, disappears (O’Kadameri 2002: 41; Allen 2006b: 48); Museveni declares LRA is not a problem (Branch 2005: 18); each side blames the other for failure of ceasefire; senior rebels lose confidence in elders and cultural leaders as impartial arbitrators (Finnström 2008: 89).
- Mid February 1994 War enters into second phase (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 25).  
  
LRA supposedly establishes base in southern Sudan, returns to Gulu and Kitgum with more weapons, amongst others landmines; has training facilities in different parts of Sudan – considered confirmation of NRA claims by some, others view Museveni’s deadline as cause of LRA’s return; prospects for peace reduce (O’Kadameri 2002: 31; Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 25); GoU supports Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Haarhaus 2009: 3).  
  
Bigombe stays in touch with LRA; Wasswa replaced by Brigadier Chefe Ali; Major General Salim Saleh later sent to Gulu as Senior Presidential Advisor on Military Affairs in Northern Uganda; GoU wants to end war as quickly as possible by military means (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 1995 Uganda and Sudan break off diplomatic relations; UPDF invades southern Sudan (Royo 2008: 11).
- 1995-1996 One-sided violence and abductions by LRA increase (Accord 2010: 24).
- 04/1995 Massacre of 200 people in Acholi; relations between Sudan and Uganda deteriorate (Lucima 2002: 91).
- 10/1995 NRA is renamed to Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF); UPDF and SPLM/A conduct joint offensive against LRA, capture many fighters (Lucima 2002: 91).
- End of 1995 Museveni and Bigombe declare end of conflict with LRA (Branch 2005: 19).

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- 1996 LRA announces ceasefire to allow population to take part in national elections (Accord 2010: 24).
- 02/1996 LRA enters Uganda again (Branch 2005: 19).
- Until 03/1996 No further attempts to hold talks between GoU and LRA (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 10.03.1996 Delegation of forty people asks Museveni to allow peace talks with LRA (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 04/1996 LRA Lt Col Vincent Bebabeba Oola, alias Otingting, returns to Uganda, tells civilians LRA wants good relations with them; two Gulu elders arrange meeting, later contact Saleh to inform him about possibility of re-starting peace talks if he supports them – estimate costs to around USD 8,000; GoU encourages them to increase budget to USD 150,000; information leaked to media (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 05/1996 Acholi vote for Paul Kawanga Ssemwogerere in presidential election, Museveni wins, wants to defeat LRA militarily; Museveni appoints Saleh as in charge of operations in Acholiland (Lucima 2002: 91).
- 06/1996 Elders arrange meeting between ten elders and Bebabeba; prior, army captured Bebabeba’s signaller, who informs them that Alex Otti-Lagony (Kony’s deputy) has ordered rebels to kill elders, who are considered to be government decoys; Saleh informs elders not to travel, elders claim information is a trick by Bigombe to sabotage efforts because her own efforts failed; when meeting the same LRA delegation they used to meet, elders are shot dead; Otti-Lagony’s brother among the killed elders (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- Bigombe leaves Gulu, defeated in parliamentary elections (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 08-09/1996 Bebabeba killed (O’Kadameri 2002: 41).
- 09/1996 LRA abducts 152 girls from St Mary’s College; nun convinces LRA to release 109 girls; incident receives international attention; violence seems

## Appendix

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to have become cause in itself (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 26).

- 10-11/1996 Kacoke Madit (KM) (big meeting of Acholi) organised in London; Ugandan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Martin Alier, says GoU legitimised him to talk to LRA; LRA interested in talks; Sant'Egidio offers help as third party, particularly regarding freeing Aboke-girls, contacts KM organisers (Obita 2002: 42).
- 1997-1998 Diaspora attempts to negotiate settlement fails (Accord 2010: 24).
- 01/1997 LRA massacres 400 civilians (Lucima 2002: 91).
- 04/1997 Meeting of Acholi in diaspora organised, LRA and GoU representatives meet, both sides asked to find peaceful solution (Lucima 2002: 91).
- 05/1997 GoU and GoS sign agreement to release those held captive (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 29).
- Conference, commissioned by International Alert and KM, recommends undertaking efforts to end violence (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 30).
- LRA/M officials travel to Rome to discuss meeting with Sant'Egidio representatives; LRM representatives travel to Sudan; Kony and members of LRA High Command approve of initiative; London based Acholi Powell Onen Ojwang offers financial support if he becomes second in command, suggests LRA should use military force; talks with GoU, through Sant'Egidio, continue (Obita 2002: 42).
- 06/1997 Sister Rachele Dassera meets LRA commanders in Juba; LRA offers to release abducted Aboke girls in return for ceasefire; GoU refuses ceasefire; LRA blames GoU for breakdown of talks; Sant'Egidio receives information from GoU: ready to meet LRA delegation (Lucima 2002: 91).
- 22.08.1997 LRM/A officials return to Rome, hold preparatory talks with Sant'Egidio (Obita 2002: 43).
- 18.10.1997 Parallel peace process to Sant'Egidio one starts; LRA representative, Ugandan Minister for the North and Leonzio Onek (head of non-governmental organisation (NGO) Equatoria Civic Fund) meet in United Kingdom (UK); Sant'Egidio unaware of this process; GoU says amnesty

## Appendix

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- law will be implemented if LRA writes letter to signal true interest in peace; James Obita supposed to brief Kony for approval (Obita 2002: 43).
- 06.11.1997 Obita asks Carter Center to facilitate talks, suggests LRA is interested (Obita 2002: 43).
- 22.11.1997 Museveni declares GoU is ready to discuss peaceful solution within confines of Uganda's constitution (Obita 2002: 43).
- 12.12.1997 Sant'Egidio hosts meeting between GoU and LRA; GoU asks LRA for list of topics they want to discuss (Obita 2002: 44).
- 13.12.1997 LRA presents list of topics they want to discuss, both sides agree to meet again; Obita in contact with Onen, thought all was going well, only later discovered Onen had not updated Kony, had overstepped his authority, sentenced to death, but his life is spared; later arrested for fraud (Obita 2002: 44).
- 18.01.1998 Next meeting scheduled; GoU delegation present, waits for LRA in vain; Sant'Egidio increasingly impatient with lack of progress; talks break down (Obita 2002: 44).
- 02-03/1998 LRA intensifies violence (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999: 30).
- 14.05.1999 Museveni offers amnesty to LRA (BBC News 1999).
- 06/1998 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimates: 10,000 children abducted by LRA (Lucima 2002: 92).
- 07/1998 Second KM takes place, LRA does not attend; KM highlights Acholi wish for peaceful solution, asks parties to make unambiguous commitments to peaceful settlement, to declare ceasefire, accept international mediation; United States (U.S.) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright offers support for GoU in its conflict with Sudan (Lucima 2002: 92).
- 11/1999 Amnesty Act passed, enacted in 01/2000 (Quinn 2009: 63); has significant impact (Schomerus 2008: 94).

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- 12/1999 Carter Centre efforts end in Nairobi summit meeting: GoU and GoS sign Nairobi Peace Accord on December 8, 1999 (Lucima 2002: 92): GoU and GoS pledge to exchange prisoners of war, put end to supporting each other's rebel groups (Royo 2008: 11); armistice between LRA and GoU; agreement allows UPDF to set up bases in Sudan to pursue LRA, sets steps for amnesty law; LRA initially included in talks, though not in direct talks, not included in agreement (Schomerus 2012: 63; Dolan 2005: 85).
- Early2000s Local efforts to initiate dialogue stalled; UPDF attacks venues of talks repeatedly; so-called rebel collaborators imprisoned; adds to rebel mistrust (Finnström 2008: 90).
- 02/2000 Carter Center representatives meet Kony and other LRA leaders in Sudan; KM and Acholi civil society representatives call for inclusive peace dialogue (Lucima 2002: 92).
- 03/2000 Kony interested in peace talks, which Museveni has already rejected; Kony mocks amnesty (BBC News 2000).
- 15.03.2000 Museveni repeatedly calls LRA bandits with who he does not want to talk; Kony wants international negotiations, supposedly calls Museveni 'Hitler of Africa' (Borzello 2000).
- 2001 Adek charged with treason, imprisoned for a year, does not want to act as contact person to LRA after that; GoU tries to undermine peaceful solution (Dolan 2009: 98–99).
- 03/2001 Museveni wins elections, majority in northern Uganda votes for his opponent (Lucima 2002: 93).
- 26.04.2001 Acholi Religious Leader Peace Initiative (ARLPI) manages to establish dialogue with LRA; meetings are disrupted by UPDF attacks, explained by lack of coordination between GoU and UPDF, gives serious dent to talks; later on, GoU bans all communication between ARLPI and LRA (Dolan 2009: 98).
- 06/2001 Temporary ceasefire between LRA and GoU allows contact between LRA and GoU (Accord 2010: 24).

## Appendix

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- Local peace talks in Gulu under auspices of District Reconciliation and Peace Team fail (International Crisis Group 2004: 31).
- 03.-04.  
06.2001 Carter Center hosts another implementation meeting on Nairobi Peace Agreement, Lt Col Walter Ochora initiates peace dialogue with group of LRA fighters; GoU declares demilitarised zone to facilitate movement of LRA as confidence building measure (Lucima 2002: 93).
- 08/2001 LRA indicates in letter that ceasefire, effectively in place, comes to an end (Lucima 2002: 93).
- 11/2001 Carter Center (at another implementation meeting) writes letter to Kony, asks him to participate in dialogue (Lucima 2002: 93).
- 12/2001 LRA added to U.S. terrorist-watch-list (International Crisis Group 2010: 2).
- 01/2002 Talks between Sudan and Uganda, facilitated by UK: allow UPDF to enter southern Sudan up to 90 km into its territory (Haarhaus 2009: 3; Dolan 2010: 8).
- 02/2002 LRA launches attacks again (Accord 2010: 24).
- 03/2002 Operation Iron Fist: Uganda launches military offensive against LRA in southern Sudan, supported by Sudan (Accord 2010: 24); UPDF soldiers received training sponsored by U.S. before; military operation extended several times; people in Gulu and Kitgum receive weapons and most basic training (Dolan 2010: 8).
- GoU passes Anti-Terrorism Act: LRA membership is a criminal offense now; restarting peace process becomes more difficult (Dolan 2010: 8).
- LRA increases violence against civilians in Uganda (Accord 2010: 24).
- 06/2002 GoU and Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) reach ceasefire; GoU presents it as by-product of Operation Iron Fist (Dolan 2010: 8).
- 07/2002 GoU agrees to talks with LRA, highlights it is keen on rooting LRA out of its bases in southern Sudan; Bishop is allowed to talk to LRA while GoU

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- continues to pursue LRA militarily (Irin News 2002b).
- 09.08.2002 Museveni gives permission to Ugandan religious leaders to negotiate with LRA (BBC News 2002c).
- 13.08.2002 Museveni offers temporary ceasefire to LRA, says he is interested in talks but more and more ready for military operation; LRA supposedly wants ceasefire before talks can start, wants neutral person to hold talks, not GoU officials; Ugandan members of parliament want Museveni to engage in talks (BBC News 2002a).
- 24.08.2002 Museveni names delegation for peace talks with LRA, repeats conditions for ceasefire, says he is ready for talks once these conditions are met (i.e. the LRA assembling in certain areas) (BBC News 2002e).
- 28.08.2002 Museveni will only accept LRA ceasefire if LRA assembles in designated areas (BBC News 2002b).
- 10/2002 GoU cuts budget on social services by 25 percent to be able to uphold Operation Iron Fist; around 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (before Operation Iron Fist around 400,000) (Dolan 2010: 8).
- 03.10.2002 GoU orders civilians to move closer to camps protected by military (BBC News 2002d).
- 11/2002 LRA ignores call of Presidential Peace Team to assemble in safe zones (Dolan 2010: 9); Kony supposedly calls radio station, says he is ready for peace talks (Irin News 2002a).
- 24.12.2002 GoU signs comprehensive peace agreement with UNRF II (Baaré 2008: 31).
- 03.01.2003 GoU wants to take part in peace talks outside of Uganda, sponsored by United Nations (UN), UK, Netherlands, Norway (BBC News 2005c).
- 10.02.2003 Red Cross leaves northern Uganda after it has been attacked by LRA; LRA supposedly interested in peace talks (BBC News 2003b).

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- 03/2003 Kony announces unilateral ceasefire, Museveni agrees to it a few days later; Museveni appoints a team for negotiations (Saleh is part of it); talks do not take place (Accord 2010: 24; Dolan 2010: 8); LRA does not want to assemble in designated assembly areas, does not trust UPDF (Schomerus 2012: 64).
- 06/2002-03/2003 Around 5,000 new abductions by LRA (Dolan 2010: 8).
- 10.03.2003 GoU announces short truce for peace talks to unfold, wants information on where LRA is, to arrange safe passage for LRA to assemble in designated areas (Ross 2003a).
- 16.03.2003 Attempt to hold peace talks fails (Ross 2003b).
- 26.03.2003 LRA kills peace envoy of GoU (BBC News 2003c).
- 04/2003 Talks do not take place; ceasefire revoked (Accord 2010: 24); new peace team established; has little effect (Dolan 2010: 9).
- 09.04.2003 LRA ambushes convoy; Saleh, commander of UPDF, does not understand why LRA does not commit to offered ceasefire; LRA does not commit to ceasefire on 28 out of 45 days (Etengu 2003).
- 22.04.2003 Military operations continue though LRA declared ceasefire and GoU declared cessation of hostilities in northern Uganda; GoU negotiation team member says talks did not take place because of mistrust between GoU and LRA (BBC News 2003a).
- 12.06.2003 Talks do not unfold because GoU and LRA do not trust each other at all (Ross 2003c).
- Mid 2003 Roger Winter, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Assistant Administrator Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance in southern Sudan, tries to organise tripartite peace talks with LRA and GoU; writes letter to LRA leadership (Perrot 2010: 190–191).

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- 09/2003 SPLM/A signs 'Framework Agreement', implies support for LRA from Sudan (Accord 2010: 24).
- 03.09.2003 GoU asks U.S. for logistical and information support in its fight against LRA (BBC News 2003d).
- 23.09.2003 149 abducted children freed (BBC News 2003e).
- 11/2003 Jan Egeland, UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Humanitarian Affairs, visits Uganda, declares it one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world; draws attention of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to the conflict; increases international interest (Dolan 2010: 9).
- 2004 Number of LRA rebels applying for amnesty increases (Dolan 2010: 8).
- 01/2004 ICC opens investigations into conflict (Accord 2010: 24).
- 17.01.2004 Amnesty Act released, largely excludes LRA, especially top commanders; valid for six months, extended repeatedly due to World Bank pressure (Dolan 2009: 99).
- 02/2004 Balanyo massacre: LRA massacres around 200-300 civilians in Lira (Accord 2010: 24); shows inability of GoU to protect population; Museveni pursues LRA militarily, allows him to keep up the status quo: keeps opposition rather small (International Crisis Group 2004: i); massacre causes shift in USAID strategy: still supports negotiations, but no active promotion anymore; U.S. interested in quick solution, removing LRA command militarily is an option (Perrot 2010: 191).
- 03/2004 Operation Iron First II launched to fight LRA in southern Sudan (Accord 2010: 24).
- Army rejects Kony's offer to start mediation again (Irin News 2004a).
- 04/2004 Due to Egeland's pressure and involvement, Uganda put on UNSC agenda; Museveni sends representatives to New York to lobby against peacekeeping troops in Uganda; international donor pressure on GoU increases (Schomerus 2008: 93); Museveni: ready for negotiations with

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- LRA (Irin News 2004e).
- 16.04.2004 Museveni willing to issue ceasefire if LRA is willing to hold peace talks (BBC News 2004b).
- 05/2004 Bigombe asked to function as peace envoy, supported by Museveni, UN, local officials, and aid agencies; goes to Juba to meet Kony; meeting does not set on; supposedly, LRA was not informed about Bigombe being in Juba at the time; Sudanese military personnel stands in the way; Kony believes talks in 1994 are the only ones that could have been successful; 2002 process: Kony questions why negotiations about Uganda but supposed to take place in southern Sudan, GoU attacked LRA though they were in assembly areas (Allen 2006b: 78; Accord 2010: 24; Allen & Vlassenroot 2010: 16–17; International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- 07-11/2004 Bigombe continues to stay in touch with Kony; leads to LRA declaring unilateral ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- 08/2004 U.S. supported NGO Northern Ugandan Peace Initiative tries to create confidence among stakeholders, advises GoU on conflict resolution, opens office in Gulu; Bigombe arrives in northern Uganda as Northern Ugandan Peace Initiative consultant (Perrot 2010: 191); supposedly, LRA ready to talk (Irin News 2004c).
- 02.11.2004 LRA wants peace talks if GoU says they want to hold talks; earlier, GoU had said it wants talks but clear that GoU preferred military option; LRA supposedly only has 200 fighters from its initial 2,000 fighters left (BBC News 2004c).
- 15.11.2004 LRA and GoU open for negotiations; Museveni declares seven-day ceasefire, allows LRA to re-group, allows Bigombe to pursue talks with support from U.S., UK, and Netherlands; ceasefire extended soon (Accord 2010: 24); (Dolan 2010: 8).
- 11/2004 Ceasefire for area close to Sudan's border reached; Kony still in Sudan, supposedly ordered his fighters from Uganda to Sudan; Bigombe negotiates with Sam Kolo, believes some trust is built between them, uses her influence with Museveni to uphold ceasefire after it expired; Museveni openly sceptical about talks; UPDF commander states LRA might not be truly interested in talks but in breathing space after Operation

North; LRA wants to be taken seriously, does not want to come out by terms of GoU; amnesty law in place but LRA does not want to be forgiven, implies guilt (Allen 2006b: 78).

Safe zones are about 300 km<sup>2</sup> wide, include Patiko, Atanga, Palabek, and Atika; Acholi leaders assure LRA of their safety; negotiations seem to be close to conclusion when Museveni reduces safe zones to 100 km<sup>2</sup> after LRA attacks UPDF; Museveni issues new deadline for conclusion of negotiations; LRA stops trusting negotiation process; supposedly, GoU bombs LRA in assembly area with helicopter gunships (Schomerus 2012: 64; Allen 2006b: 78)

Museveni ready to talk with LRA, but sceptic about Kony's commitment to talks (Irin News 2004b); LRA wants talks to take place outside of Uganda, wants to be provided with passports (Irin News 2004d).

12/2004 Face-to-face talks between GoU and LRA in the presence of Bigombe; GoU sets deadline for LRA to sign peace deal to December 31 (Accord 2010: 24); Bigombe uses amnesty as major incentive (Schomerus 2012: 64).

Ceasefire zone extended to southern Sudan to allow Kony to meet Vincent Otti (Allen 2006b: 78).

GoU appoints government peace team (Ruhakana Rugunda, Betty Akech, Steven Kagoda) to negotiate on behalf of GoU (International Crisis Group 2006: 8–9).

14.12.2004 Mistrust between both sides high; LRA does not want to enter safe zones, fears it is going to be attacked; GoU fears LRA will use ceasefire to regroup (BBC News 2004a).

31.12.2004 Deadline passes; LRA refuses to sign mutual and definitive ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1); Museveni setting deadline to end of December is viewed as bad faith as LRA did not have time to study ceasefire or make changes; LRA's silence casts doubts on its seriousness (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1).

Late 2004/  
beginning of  
2005 Core Group created, members: UK, Norway, Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, and Canada; puts an effort into opening talks by providing political, technical, and financial support (Perrot 2010: 190–

- 191).
- Beginning of 2005 LRA further sub-divides to avoid being detected by the UPDF; supposedly, LRA's strength has reduced drastically, serious interest in peace talks of those who are still in the bush (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- Otti says LRA is still interested in talks, needs time to get Kony on board; Kony supposedly interested in ceasefire but not to GoU conditions (limited area and time); even if Bigombe and Otti manage to bring about ceasefire, spoilers might still undermine process (International Crisis Group 2005c: 4).
- 01.01.2005 Fighting resumes, talks continue (Kolo and Otti participate for LRA) (Accord 2010: 25); LRA attacks Alero (Gulu district) (Dolan 2010: 8).
- GoU says it will step up military action against LRA (BBC News 2005b).
- 01/2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between SPLM/A and Sudanese government signed; Southern Sudan declared semi-autonomous region (Accord 2010: 25); support for LRA from Sudan reduces (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).
- Reliable contact with LRA breaks down (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).
- 03.02.2005 GoU declares 18-day truce with LRA, wants to revive peace process; talks continue (Schomerus 2012: 64).
- 05.02.2005 Col Onon Kamdulu surrenders, was part of negotiation team (BBC News 2005a); talks become tricky (Allen 2006b: 78).
- 16.02.2005 Kolo surrenders; violence against civilians from LRA side increases again, especially in the aftermath of the GoU declaring that LRA rebellion is on its deathbed (Accord 2010: 25; International Crisis Group 2005c: 1; Schomerus 2012: 64; BBC News 2005a); Kolo's surrender increases doubts and mistrust of LRA (International Crisis Group 2005c: 4); Kolo evacuated by UPDF when he refuses to obey command from Kony to return to Sudan; no senior LRA personnel to negotiate with anymore; UPDF takes over ceasefire zone again (Allen 2006b: 78).

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- According to Otti, LRA interested in peace but does not trust Bigombe, especially not after Kolo surrendered (Schomerus 2012: 65).
- 22.02.2005 Unilateral ceasefire runs out; previously, GoU had said it will only extend ceasefire if LRA shows 'meaningful commitment to pursuing process altogether' (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1).
- 03/2005 Mutilations and killings by LRA increase again (Allen 2006b: 78).
- LRA states interest in peace talks but does not trust Bigombe anymore, considers previous peace talks insincere (Schomerus 2012: 65).
- 04/2005 First meeting between Otti and Riek Machar (Schomerus 2012: 71).
- Kony highlights he will not agree to any ceasefire if post-settlement physical security of LRA and LRA's livelihood remains unaddressed (International Crisis Group 2005c: 1).
- Kony interested in peace, tells BBC he hopes to find a peace deal (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- 17.04.2005 Kony talks directly with Bigombe, discussion on ceasefire modalities and other aspects relevant to agreements as well as obstacles LRA sees to reaching agreement (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- 05/2005 LRA attacks people close to IDP camp, kills around 20, supposedly to show it is not defeated (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- Kony does not oppose Museveni winning a third term anymore, sees three possible futures for him: prison, exile, death (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- 06/2005 Situation in northern Uganda is tense; LRA attacks against civilians increase again (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- International pressure on Sudan to end LRA support is low (International Crisis Group 2005a: 4).
- Museveni runs for president again after restrictions on presidential terms are lifted, highlights he would forgive Kony, who would receive amnesty, just like Kolo (Schomerus 2012: 66).

- 07/2005 National referendum: multiparty politics re-introduced (Dolan 2010: 9).
- International Criminal Court (ICC) issues five sealed arrest warrants (Accord 2010: 25); Bigombe highlights talking to LRA in the same way as before is impossible with ICC arrest warrants, remains in touch with LRA, considers mediation onset less likely (Allen 2006b: 78).
- 08/2005 Bigombe waits for response from Kony, hopes for talks are low; Otti confirms on phone that Kony is interested in talks (Allen 2006b: 78).
- 09/2005 Bigombe prepares extensive peace proposal draft, accepted by Museveni as a starting point; Bigombe is unable to present draft to Kony before ICC arrest warrants are unsealed due to logistical problems (International Crisis Group 2006: 8).
- Autumn 2005 Otti: LRA wants peace negotiations; opponents of ICC think peace negotiations are going to be difficult (Schomerus 2012: 187).
- 10/2005 ICC arrest warrants for five LRA commanders, including Kony, unsealed; Bigombe: warrants increase difficulty of peace talks; her initiative ends (Accord 2010: 25).
- LRA draws back into Garamba Nationalpark (Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC) (Haarhaus 2009: 3).
- Parts of LRA consider negotiations good option for addressing ICC-situation, are unsure what ICC is going to hold for them; others consider talks sensible because international community does not expect negotiations to take place (Schomerus 2012: 67–68).
- 11/2005 Museveni’s main political opponent, Kiiza Besigye, arrested: accusations of treason and collusion with LRA (Perrot 2010: 192).
- Allan Rock (Canada’s ambassador to the UN) states (in letter to the UNSC) action is necessary as humanitarian situation in Uganda deteriorates, asks UNSC to use more ‘robust diplomacy’, highlights full measures of the UN Charter will be used if GoU and LRA do not cooperate; would have liked military deployment; clear that UN will not send troops to Uganda at that point (Perrot 2010: 194–195).
- Bigombe talks regularly with Otti and other high LRA commanders on the

phone; Otti is sceptic about coming out of the bush and agreeing to ceasefire: would give the impression that LRA only gives in because of pressure from ICC (International Crisis Group 2006: 8).

29.11.2005 Otti calls BBC World Service, calls for renewed peace negotiations; welcomed by head of GoU's peace team Rugunda (International Crisis Group 2006: 5).

12/2005 LRA representatives meet Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) Pax Christi in Nairobi, have contact with Machar on the way there (Schomerus 2012: 187).

20.12.2005 Members of SPLM have been in touch with LRA via email; according to Machar (by then Vice President of Southern Sudan), LRA has accepted mediation offer though there has not been any direct contact; parallel contact established through IKV Pax Christi and Uganda Amnesty Commission (Schomerus 2012: 69); first hints Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) might mediate (Accord 2010: 25).

End of 2005 UK, Norway, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden reduce financial budget over concerns about Uganda's political transition, press freedom, and public administration expenditure; partly reallocated funds to humanitarian relief in northern Uganda; belief that GoU's firm resistance to donor pressure should be softened by more robust diplomacy (Perrot 2010: 192–193).

LRA not interested in Bigombe as a mediator; her contact with LRA reduces (Schomerus 2010: 97); Bigombe temporarily suspends efforts of presenting recently prepared peace plan (International Crisis Group 2006: 1).

Early 2006 IKV Pax Christi tries to set up talks, believes civil society should be engaged in talks, only way to establish lasting peace (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).

Machar tries to reach out to LRA, LRA reaches out to IKV Pax Christi; IKV Pax Christi facilitates initial contact with Machar; series of covert meetings takes place until Machar communicates LRA's preparedness for talks to GoU (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).

Southern Sudanese politicians receive signals from both conflict parties

that major obstacle to peaceful settlement was lack of common platform and trusted mediator (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).

Museveni under pressure from donors, President of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir, and northern Ugandans (Hendrickson & Tumutegereize 2012: 6).

01/2006      Rock: Uganda should be on UNSC agenda for immediate consideration regarding military intervention: conflict further destabilises an already instable region (Perrot 2010: 193).

Kony writes IKV Pax Christi, asks for mediation; most likely motivated by the arrest warrants issued by the ICC; IKV Pax Christi establishes contact with Machar (Assefa 2010: 14).

11.01.2006      Supposedly, Sudan still supports LRA (Allen 2006a).

02/2006      National elections, Museveni not voted for by population living in conflict-affected areas (Dolan 2010: 9).

GoSS and LRA hold talks about LRA behaviour in Southern Sudan, agree that GoSS serves as mediator between LRA and GoU if LRA reduces hostile activities in Southern Sudan; GoSS threatens: LRA should accept mediation offer, otherwise forced to leave; LRA: GoU has not done enough to solve the conflict, needs to try to get rid of ICC arrest warrant (Atkinson 2010: 210).

02.02.2006      Machar and Otti talk on phone (Schomerus 2012: 69).

14.02.2006      Small delegation of LRA and IKV Pax Christi takes chartered plane to Juba, paid for by IKV Pax Christi, meets Machar face-to-face (Schomerus 2012: 69–70).

03/2006      GoSS quietly makes known it has an agreement with LRA on onset of peace talks; information trickles to Ugandan politicians (Atkinson 2010: 212).

11.04.2006      Machar meets Otti at location decided on by LRA: Nabanga; important to LRA to be in control of territory; Otti agrees to second meeting, at which Kony participates; shows trust of LRA in Machar (Schomerus 2012: 70–71).

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- 05/2006 Museveni rules out option of talks with LRA (Atkinson 2010: 212).
- 03.05.2006 Kony and Machar meet in Nabanga; Machar hands over USD 20,000 to buy food (Schomerus 2012: 71).
- 13.05.2006 Salva Kiir shows video of second meeting to Museveni to prove that the meeting took place; Museveni: amnesty for LRA high command still in place (Schomerus 2012: 71–72).
- Museveni announces that talks can take place; GoU will guarantee Kony's safety if he is serious about talks, issues deadline (August 1) for Kony to end insurgency; SPLA and UPDF will take Kony out militarily if he does not stick to deadline; ICC, U.S., and European Union (EU) highlight continued validity of arrest warrants; doubts about GoU's genuine interest in peace talks (Schomerus 2012: 72; Atkinson 2010: 213).
- 24.05.2006 Video of meeting is leaked to Reuters; Machar accused of bribing Kony to take part in talks (Schomerus 2012: 72).
- 30.05.2006 Museveni asks U.S. to contribute to agreement with UN, wants to hunt LRA down militarily (Atkinson 2010: 214).
- 06/2006 Kony appoints delegation to represent LRA at peace talks; GoU approached by GoSS to enter mediation in Juba (Accord 2010: 25); GoU wants to prosecute LRA militarily, will not send delegation to Juba (Atkinson 2010: 214).
- 02.06.2006 Interpol sends wanted persons red notices to 184 countries in connection with ICC arrest warrants against LRA high command; provisional LRA delegation travels to Juba, accompanied by two representatives from Sant'Egidio; representatives of IKV Pax Christi follow a few days later, are surprised to find Sant'Egidio there (Schomerus 2012: 72).
- 07.06.2006 Delegations meet Machar, reiterate commitment to peace efforts, plans made to travel to bush to connect with Otti and Kony (Schomerus 2012: 72).
- 08.06.2006 UNSC head, Ambassador to UN of the UK in Darfur, Emyr Jones Parry, meets Kiir, who highlights arresting Kony would solve the problem

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(Schomerus 2012: 72–73).

- 11.06.2006 Machar meets Kony and Otti in Nabanga (Schomerus 2012: 73).
- 12.06.2006 Machar and delegates leave bush (Schomerus 2012: 73).
- Mid 06/2006 Following second meeting, Museveni declares GoU cannot meet people who are accused by ICC; ICC insists engaging in talks with LRA will not impede the arrest and prosecution of leaders; Machar remains optimistic, especially because the general perception is that LRA can only gain from talks (Schomerus 2012: 73–74).
- 20.06.2006 Uganda’s ambassador to Juba announces GoU delegation is going to come to Juba (Schomerus 2012: 74).
- 28.06.2006 GoU reports it was formally invited to attend talks with LRA by GoSS, will send technical team for preliminary meetings (Schomerus 2012: 74).
- After video appears in which Kony says he has not committed atrocities he is accused for, Museveni says he is willing to discuss peace but not with those indicted by ICC, says Kony has until the end of July to end war and that his safety will be guaranteed (BBC News 2006c).
- End of 06/2006 GoU decides to send delegation to Juba (Atkinson 2010: 214).
- 03.07.2006 GoU team arrives, led by Rugunda, who states GoU is prepared for talks after meeting with Kiir and Machar (Schomerus 2012: 74).
- 05.07.2006 Museveni reiterates offer of amnesty for all LRA members, including top command, still does not want to meet with LRA leadership, does not address contradictions of this statement compared to previous one (Schomerus 2012: 74).
- 07.07.2006 LRA spokesperson says in radio interview LRA does not deny having committed atrocities, wants to talk peace, rejects amnesty; ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo: Kony must face trial (Schomerus 2012: 74–75).
- Museveni offers amnesty to all LRA members, including Kony, ahead of

talks; LRA spokesperson in Juba says amnesty offer is redundant as parties taking part in negotiations are equal, amnesty presupposes surrender which means discussions are no longer held; ICC: accused ones still wanted; U.S. voices concerns about amnesty offer; Annan says Uganda, Sudan, and DRC should coordinate their security forces to deal with LRA, welcomes talks (BBC News 2006h).

09.07.2006 Otti says LRA accepts amnesty offer; Museveni offers amnesty if the war in the north is ended (BBC News 2006j).

10.07.2006 Museveni: will not agree to further peace talks if GoU has reliable partners in the region and the world to fight LRA (BBC News 2006g).

11.07.2006 Machar tries to convince Otti at meeting in Ri-Kwangba to join delegates (Schomerus 2012: 75).

12.07.2006 Machar tries to meet LRA to convince them to send at least one senior commander, LRA refuses; Otti: not going to send any of the ICC wanted, but Kony will sign a deal if one is reached; ICC: GoU has not asked for any withdrawal of arrest warrants (BBC News 2006e).

Juba Talks supposed to start (BBC News 2006j).

GoU sets deadline for LRA's disarmament to September 12, 2006; LRA has little hope that proper peace talks are going to set on with a deadline set; overall, high level of mistrust (Schomerus 2012: 91).

14.07.2006 Juba Talks set on after external actors continuously pressured the conflict parties and convinced the GoU to come to the table (Perrot 2010: 197).

Agenda items: 1) cessation of hostilities, 2) comprehensive political solution, 3) justice and accountability, 4) demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), 5) permanent ceasefire (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10).

GoU considers talks possibility to end conflict with LRA, claims to have basically defeated LRA, wants to negotiate LRA's surrender, rejects LRAs initial demands for cessation of hostilities; LRA considers talks open-ended political process. different approaches to talk cause several stalemates; LRA walks away from talks repeatedly (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11; Omach 2006: 18–19).

Observers presume LRA wants to buy time to regroup and remobilise by participating in talks; GoU uses talks to come up with new strategy (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11; Haarhaus 2009: 5).

Difficult: neither conflict party represented by leaders; parts of GoU negotiation team have been involved in military offensive against LRA (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11).

LRA delegation unable to represent itself as equal negotiation partners: lack technical assistance (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11).

LRA has security concerns; GoU not interested in internationalising talks under UN auspices, would rise the LRA's political status; LRA interested in internationalisation of the process, believes it comes along with additional security guarantees; Kony and Museveni do not trust each other; neither favours political settlement, both have stated opposition against talks on several accounts; GoU refuses to treat LRA as equal partner as long as ICC arrest warrants in place; most LRA delegation members only have weak links to LRA and northern Uganda (Hendrickson & Tumutegereize 2012: 15, 19, 26).

Tensions between IKV Pax Christi and Machar about who chairs talks (Hendrickson & Tumutegereize 2012: 22; Interview 2016).

LRA lists grievances (e.g. abuse of democratic principles by GoU, land grabbing), wants repatriation, peace, reconciliation, share its side of the story, does not want to be perceived as militarily weak (Schomerus 2012: 15–16).

15.07.2006 LRA delegation: not there to surrender, but to negotiate peace (BBC News 2006d; Omach 2006).

19.07.2006 Talks in Juba end early: LRA wants to negotiate ceasefire first, GoU wants to negotiate ceasefire later, says LRA has used ceasefires in the past to recruit, reorganise, treat sick and wounded, loot food; LRA says it has never before formally signed ceasefire (BBC News 2006n).

02.08.2006 Kony holds 4-minute press conference (Schomerus 2012: 95).

Spokesperson of the GoU says GoU evaluates Kony's statement as positive development, underlines GoU has shown a lot of goodwill, hence, LRA should trust GoU; Machar tries to convince ICC to withdraw arrest warrants for Kony so he can take part in talks; Museveni offers amnesty

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- and protection to LRA if they renounce violence; Southern Sudan wants conflict between LRA and GoU to end, fears spill-over (BBC News 2006i).
- 03.08.2006 Machar continues to insist on Kony and Otti taking part in mediation, both reluctant; Kony does not see necessity, fears for his security; LRA delegation stays in the bush; Machar leaves with transport that was used for LRA delegation to go to talks (Schomerus 2012: 95–96).
- 04.08.2006 LRA declares unilateral ceasefire (Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5) to prove seriousness with talks (Schomerus 2012: 96), calls BBC to announce ceasefire; GoU does not reciprocate (ICG 2006b: 3–4), wants to wait and see what really happens on the ground before responding (BBC News 2006a).
- 05.08.2006 LRA delegation gets to Juba, furious about previous treatment (Schomerus 2012: 96).
- 07.08.2006 Talks are scheduled to resume (Schomerus 2012:96); LRA wants ceasefire; GoU does not agree, continues military activities (Atkinson 2010: 214).
- 09.08.2006 Talks continue, GoU: will not cease hostilities. LRA leaves angry, walks away from talks, says Machar had said GoU will cease hostilities if LRA comes back to table, says GoU does not commit to talks, does not want to issue ceasefire as a sign of good will; press believes: end of talks; LRA expected to state where exactly located and how strong; ceasefire monitoring team proposed; LRA does not want to lay down weapons without ceasefire in place (Schomerus 2012: 96–97; BBC News 2006m; BBC News 2006o).
- 11.08.2006 Kiir invites LRA to his house, talks about SPLA struggle, says SPLA has never agreed to ceasefire during talks; creates an early impasse and fewer means to exert pressure; LRA delegates: meeting Kiir was impressive and insightful (Schomerus 2012: 97).
- 12.08.2006 LRA commander Raska Lukwiya killed by UPDF; LRA denies it at first, then asks for three-day mourning period, says continuation of talks is important, does not want to use an eye-for-eye approach (BBC News

2006l; Schomerus 2012: 58).

LRA asks for another mediator: Otti demands South Africa to take over mediation, feels betrayed by GoSS; Museveni rejects suggestion immediately, says LRA should assemble in Southern Sudan, says that DRC will allow UPDF to attack LRA in Garamba Park should talks fail (Schomerus 2012: 97); GoU promises amnesty to LRA but cannot implement it due to ICC arrest warrants (Atkinson 2010: 215; International Crisis Group 2007: 6).

24.08.2006 Museveni emails his delegates new terms for Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH): LRA has to assemble in designated areas in Southern Sudan, Museveni offers safe passage to rebels through Uganda, SPLA to guarantee security at assembly points; if LRA concentrates forces at two assembly points, GoU will cease hostilities as a first step and expression of goodwill; assembly points are several hundreds of miles apart, ensures LRA cannot easily regroup (Schomerus 2012: 98).

26.08.2006 CoH signed: GoU and LRA underline necessity for peace and reconciliation on all levels, agree to cease hostilities, hostile media and propaganda, including acts that undermine each other's standing; LRA supposed to show itself and assemble in South Sudan, places of worship in Uganda might serve as a sanctuary for LRA, from there proceed to assembly area; assembly areas: Owiny-Kibul and Ri-Kwangba; GoU guarantees safe passage for LRA, SPLA monitors and protects LRA at assembly areas; if peace talks fail, LRA allowed to leave assembly areas peacefully; content of agreement to be communicated by military communication, media houses (local and international), places of worship, local councils, and NGOs; LRA supposed to assemble within three weeks, if it does not manage: review situation; Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) reports to mediator, made up of senior SPLA military officer appointed by GoSS, two representatives of each party, two senior military officers appointed by African Union (AU); CHMT supposed to monitor implementation of agreement, investigate and verify allegations and violations, amicable resolution of disagreements that arise out of implementation or interpretation of agreement, draft joint statements to be approved by mediator, arrange escort and security for LRA to get to assembly areas, monitor basic assistance to LRA in assembly areas, recommend additional assembly areas if necessary; GoSS provides food and service support to LRA in assembly areas; once LRA has assembled, agreement shall be renewed bi-weekly upon review of the progress of the negotiation and compliance by parties; agreement comes

into force at 6 a.m. on 29.08.2006; signed by Rugunda (GoU), Ojul (LRA), and Machar (Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities 2006).

CoH almost instantly violated by both sides, difficult to monitor due to limited resources; some violations due to vagueness of agreement (assembly areas not clearly demarcated), others deliberate (eastern assembly area surrounded by GoU helicopters; attacks on LRA by UPDF reported, GoU denies this); LRA attacks civilians in Southern Sudan as response to GoU attacks; credibility of Juba Talks reduces (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12; Mwaniki & Wepundi 2007: 5).

Museveni: UPDF to provide safe passage for LRA; Otti: LRA to meet with main field commanders Dominic Ongwen and Caesar Achellam, not to attack civilians or UPDF soldiers (Schomerus 2012: 100).

When asked how the agreement was signed so quickly, two delegates of the LRA state they 'had to sign an agreement quickly to ensure that the talks would continue.' Observers muse that the GoU expect the LRA to assemble and therefore assumed that signing the agreement would not have consequences (Schomerus 2012: 98).

Once agreement signed, international actors more willing to support peace talks (Schomerus 2012: 99).

28.08.2006      Parts of LRA state GoU presents Juba Talks as true negotiations though they are trying to set terms without negotiating or debating (Schomerus 2012: 109).

09/2006          Accusations of breaches on CoH, nevertheless, talks on reconciliation, justice and comprehensive solution to the problems in northern Uganda continue (Accord 2010: 25).

Parts of LRA move into DRC for the first time; DRC President Joseph Kabila sets deadline for LRA to leave; Museveni threatens to enter DRC if LRA is not removed (Accord 2010: 25).

Mediation team considers three LRA officers joining the CHMT a breakthrough (Baaré 2008: 26).

LRA announces Owiny-Kibul is not a suitable assembly point due to landmines, fears it is a trap; second assembly point open for discussion again (Schomerus 2012: 102; Baaré 2008: 28).

A lot of back and forth regarding assembly areas. LRA assembled 804

persons, SPLA said they did not assemble appropriately; Otti states him and Kony have been there, but conditions were very bad: no beds, no clean water, no medical attention, food is rotten, life is better in the bush; no confirmation that CoH extended, so Kony and Otti left again; Otti says he would sign a peace agreement even without ICC arrest warrant lifted as LRA wants peace, as long as signed in Nabanga (Schomerus 2012: 105).

Many weapons found in LRA hotel room, unclear who brought them there; suspicion that Sudanese Armed Forces are responsible; role the SPLA plays not entirely clear; GoSS apologises (Schomerus 2012: 109–111).

- Late Autumn 2006 Talks come to a serious standstill, delegations frustrated, mistrust and animosity between delegates high; LRA asks for change of venue (Assefa 2010: 14), loses confidence in talks, does not trust that GoSS is able to provide security and be an impartial mediator (Atkinson 2010: 214–215).
- 12.09.2006 GoU drops deadline for completion of talks (BBC News 2006f).
- 23.09.2006 LRA delegation holds press conference at Juba airport, says Kony has secretly travelled to assembly areas to check how the situation is there; confusion about that: some say Kony travelling is impossible, Machar believes it might be possible; LRA delegation asks GoU to include political personnel into delegation as well, says about 7,000 LRA fighters would assemble but UPDF has to withdraw from Owiny-Kibul (Schomerus 2012: 106).
- 25.09.2006 Third round of Juba Talks starts; LRA issues press statement, highlights UPDF has increased troop deployment around assembly area (Schomerus 2012: 106–107).
- LRA presents 26-page document on comprehensive solutions to northern Uganda, rejected by GoU immediately (Schomerus 2012: 109).
- 27.09.2006 GoU claims LRA does not follow CoH terms, has moved away from assembly area; spokesperson of GoU says might have to deal with LRA militarily if LRA does not stick to agreement terms (Grainger 2006).
- 10/2006 UN Juba Initiative Fund established to address talks' earlier financial problems (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12); establishment of the fund crucial, silences doubts of donors on legitimacy of talks considering ICC

arrest warrants (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 16).

- 01.-  
03.10.2006 CHMT first mission: ask both parties if CoH was violated; parties leave to Owiny-Kibul to confirm if agreement was broken; LRA not in assembly area, last information from Achellam: LRA chased away by UPDF convoy; both sides blame each other; CHMT decides to wait another day to see if LRA makes contact; in the evening, report on radio says UPDF is chasing LRA again because CHMT said LRA not assembled: LRA broke agreement and cannot be trusted; it becomes known that Museveni contacted U.S. for military support; Otti: cannot stay in contact with CHMT because UPDF announced to chase LRA (Schomerus 2012: 112–115).
- Museveni meets Minister of Northern Carolina, announces that if no comprehensive solution is found soon, U.S. military support expected, hints that agreement is under way (Schomerus 2012: 113).
- 09.10.2006 Otti: LRA is not going to sign agreement unless ICC arrest warrants are dropped (Schomerus 2012: 117).
- 12.10.2006 LRA movement after Otti announced LRA can move again if in secure area; supposedly, LRA carries white flag but is attacked by Mundari militias (group of fighters supported by Sudan) close to Juba; LRA unhappy about attack; GoU unhappy about LRA moving, considers movement sign of LRA not honouring agreement (Schomerus 2012: 117–118).
- Machar: progress is difficult due to lack of trust between GoU and LRA; parts of GoU believe only military solution viable (Schomerus 2012: 119).
- 15/16.10.2006 LRA to assemble in Owiny-Kibul again; Otti wants to proof LRA values CoH, attacked on the way there; UPDF argues passage LRA chose not a safe passage (Schomerus 2012: 117–118).
- 17.10.2006 Food deliveries to LRA by LRA delegation and SPLA prove to be difficult: SPLA drives truck, accompanied by Achama; Achama: treated inappropriately, held captive in barracks, UPDF soldiers threatened to kill him (Schomerus 2012: 118).
- 18.10.2006 Machar hears about Achama's detention and that LRA has killed UPDF commander, is outraged about developments; neither UPDF nor LRA

supposed to be close to location where incidents happened (Schomerus 2012: 119).

- 21.10.2006 Museveni attends Juba Talks, turns out to be a disaster; LRA delegation does not want to shake hands with him, wants him to apologise for what he has done to northern Ugandans; unclear what really happened during talks; Museveni attending talks perceived as having caused more problems than solved, unclear to which extent GoU delegation really represents Museveni's perspective; Museveni made clear how little he cares about Juba Talks; LRA decision of not wanting to shake hands discussed ambivalently; a few days later, attacks increase again, supposedly initiated by the LRA, but unclear; Otti orders LRA not to assemble anymore; Museveni announces DRC has asked him to get rid of LRA from DRC (BBC News 2006b; Schomerus 2012: 58).
- 01.11.2006 First Addendum to CoH signed: recommitment of parties to implement CoH terms, violations of CoH are defined: attacks against each other or civilians, failure of LRA to assemble, removal of food or services from assembly areas, obstructing activities of CHMT, acquisition of arms in Southern Sudan, other acts considered as violations by CHMT or mediator; if mediator receives complaints, forwarded to CHMT, meeting with both parties to discuss violations; GoSS supposed to ensure LRA does not get arms, no kinds of support to LRA outside of assembly area; GoSS ensures security around assembly areas; LRA supposed to assemble within one week in Owiny-Kibul, provide all relevant information to mediator concerning members in Uganda; mediator, CHMT, LRA to ensure assembly of all LRA forces in Uganda; mediator provides logistical and service support at Ri-Kwangba; LRA to complete assembling within two weeks; agreement to last until formal ceasefire is reached; signed by Rugunda, Ojul, Machar (CoH Addendum 1 2006).
- 11/2006 LRA fails to assemble; talks slow down; LRA delegates travel to Garamba to consult with Kony (Accord 2010: 25).
- LRA to present position paper but does not do it, says it was too preoccupied with safety; GoU angered that no progress is made (Schomerus 2012: 123).
- 06.11.2006 LRA presents position paper on Agenda item 2; most suggestions rejected by GoU delegation straight away; suggestions contain demands on safety and protection for LRA, assembly area in northern Uganda; local leaders

and donors responsible for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and recovery of war-affected areas; provides for referendum within 12 months on whether to sign a final peace deal and transition to federalism; GoU rejects the preamble in which LRA states LRA and GoU have realised the necessity for ending the conflict without arms, agrees LRA children need access to education; special fund for northern Uganda to be established; Equal Opportunities Act to rebuild northern Uganda to be issued (Schomerus 2012: 123–124).

Kony wants to meet Egeland in person; GoU says it will not consider amnesty for LRA unless peace deal is signed (BBC News 2006k).

08.11.2006 LRA delegation leaves Juba after newspaper article from UPDF perspective published: claims LRA does not stick to CoH, supposedly not committed to process (Schomerus 2012: 124).

12.11. 2006 Egeland meets Kony, Otti, and other central commanders in person, is accompanied by Machar, other members of mediation team, representatives of GoU, and representatives of civil society; Egeland: LRA rather paranoid and afraid for its safety (S/PV.5571).

Museveni still interested in military solution (Schomerus 2012: 125).

27.11.2006 LRA fighters gather to assemble in Owiny-Kibul again (Schomerus 2012: 126).

29.11.2006 Heavy fighting between SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces, Machar's attention now on those matters; three LRA fighters killed, Otti: LRA constantly under military pressure (Schomerus 2012: 126).

LRA: does not want to continue face-to-face talks until UPDF has left Sudan; lack of confidence in Machar, their safety and reputation not guaranteed, suggests talks somewhere else (Schomerus 2012: 127).

30.11.2006 LRA and UPDF fire shots at each other; UPDF flies with helicopter gunships, bombs LRA close to Owiny-Kibul; LRA accuses UPDF of breaking CoH: GoU deployed new troops, LRA demands for credible protection; UPDF: LRA has no right for demands since most of their troops are abducted anyways; LRA delegation: unhappy with how Machar handles mediation, thinks he is biased towards GoU, does not treat LRA delegation appropriately (Schomerus 2012: 126–127).

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- 12/2006 Fighting between LRA and Ugandan forces outside ‘safe zones’ reported (Accord 2010: 24).
- 01.12.2006 Helicopter gunships close to assembly area bomb LRA (Schomerus 2012: 128–129).
- 03.12.2006 Helicopter close to the assembly area heard again (Schomerus 2012: 129).
- 04.12.2006 Mosambique’s former president Joaquim Chissano appointed as UN’s Special Envoy for LRA-Affected areas to contribute to finding political solution, to address conflict’s root causes (Schomerus 2012: 130).
- 09.12.2006 CHMT denies the involvement of helicopters, angers LRA delegation (Schomerus 2012: 130).
- 12.12.2006 Kony and Otti meet mediation team’s legal advisor, highlights why ‘for him the preceding months had replicated previous failed peace attempts: “While talking, there is troop movement from Eastern Equatoria to here, 7 miles from here”, he explained’ (Schomerus 2012: 131); Kony: LRA interested in peace, otherwise would not have initiated peace talks (Schomerus 2012: 131–132); Chissano credited for bringing international gravitas to process, maintaining momentum; appointment underlines UN commitment to treating conflict as political and regional; Chissano criticised for not taking strong position on military offensive of GoU in 12/2008 (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 12).
- 14.12.2006 Talks continue (Accord 2010: 25).
- 15.12.2006 SPLA soldiers storm Juba, complain: have not been paid; no talks take place (Schomerus 2012: 132).
- 16.12.2006 Second Addendum to Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed, extends deadline for assembly (Accord 2010: 25).
- Parties recommit to CoH, agree to review on March 1, 2007; LRA in Southern Sudan to assemble in Owiny-Kibul within one month; two weeks after their assembly, LRA supposed to provide all relevant information on if there are LRA forces in Uganda to mediator; mediator continues to give logistical and service support at Ri-Kwangba, then LRA

supposed to assemble within one month; mediator and CHMT ensure LRA forces in Uganda are relocated to Owiny-Kibul; implementation of agreement supposed to reviewed in 02/2007 (CoH Addendum 2 2006).

Late 2006 Signals that Kony is not interested in signing any agreement (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 19).

2007 International actors send mixed signals regarding support for talks; moments when international actors are able to contribute to reaching a solution are rare; leverage often either unavailable or not used appropriately (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 13).

Museveni sometimes officially contradicts what delegation has said before; supposedly, intelligence manipulated to put pressure on the GoU delegation and to sway talks (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 24).

Museveni engages in direct talks with Kony when it becomes apparent that no agreement will be reached unless his safety is secured; 'gentlemen's agreement' reached: GoU to bring challenges to UNSC, suspend ICC indictment, open way for Special Court to try and sentence Kony, Kony to be imprisoned in the north; Kony asked to accept language of international agreements; Machar accepts parallel process, knows he is unable to address most sensitive issue: Kony's unwillingness to surrender to ICC (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 24).

Several persons deliver direct messages from Museveni to Kony in Garamba, Machar not formally debriefed after meetings during which decisions on e.g. the reduction of the number of assembly areas (from Owiny-Kibul and Ri-Kwangba to only Ri-Kwangba) are made (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 24–25).

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs withdraws from administrative and logistical tasks, UN involvement now increasingly focuses on political level (Schomerus 2008: 95).

01/2007 LRA delegation walks away from talks, states security issues as main reason: supposedly, fears for own safety and safety of troops in Southern Sudan; demands for increase of daily allowances (Among 2007).

No talks take place in Juba; LRA demands change of venue, expresses dissatisfaction with Machar mediation, refuses to meet Chissano (Accord 2010: 25).

- 09.01.2007 Kiir announces LRA not welcome in Southern Sudan anymore (Schomerus 2012: 161), loses patience with LRA; Omar el-Bashir (President of Sudan): Sudan prepared to constitute joint force to eliminate LRA, if no peaceful solution, military solution will be pursued (Atkinson 2010: 215).
- 12.01.2007 LRA withdraws from talks (International Crisis Group 2007: i), demands new venue and new chief mediator (Riley 2008: 16); head of the LRA delegation Ojul reacts to statements of Kiir and el-Bashir: LRA not going back to Juba, security issues (Atkinson 2010: 215).
- 02/2007 Talks remain stalled (Accord 2010: 25). LRA rejects renewal of CoH a few days before it runs out. Machar demands that Otti attends talks, Otti refuses: security concerns, especially in light of ICC arrest warrants, further encourages halt of talks; during this stand-off, LRA delegation detained at military outpost of SPLA, abused verbally; GoU, supported by the GoSS, Machar, and many international and domestic actors; wants to drop agenda item 2, seems disrespectful to LRA delegation: dropping suggests LRA is unable to handle comprehensive topics (Atkinson 2010: 215–217); rumours LRA has moved to Central African Republic (CAR), LRA troops now largely concentrated in Southern Sudan and DRC (Accord 2010: 25).
- 05.02.2007 LRA releases statement: distrusts Machar, and has security concerns (Schomerus 2012: 161–162).
- Kenya refuses to continue Juba Talks in Kenya, after LRA demanded change of venue, to avoid forum shopping and distraction to talks; LRA spokesperson Obonyo Olweny: LRA insists on change of venue, considers Italy or South Africa as other venues, says GoSS is working together with GoU (BBC News 2007a).
- 06.02.2007 U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to be created (Schomerus 2012: 162).
- 01-  
04.03.2007 Acholi Peace Conference held in Juba, demands GoU and LRA to return to bargaining table to resume Juba Talks; Juba to remain venue, CoH to be uphold, security of conflict parties to be reassured, Machar to remain mediator, others to be invited (Resolution of Acholi Peace Conference 2007).

- 02.03.2007 Chissano meets Kony in DRC, logistics are provided by UN instead of (as previously) by GoSS (Schomerus 2012: 164); Chissano: talks to restart in April (Accord 2010: 25).
- 03/2007 Chissano meets Kony, announces talks will continue in mid-April (Accord 2010: 25). Rugunda, Uganda's chief mediator, confirms talks will continue on April 13 (Atkinson 2010: 218). Museveni still reluctant to resume talks, Chissano tries to get support for talks (Schomerus 2012: 164).
- 31.03.-  
06.04.2007 Representatives of the LRA and GoU meet in Mombasa; mediation under the auspices of IKV Pax Christi; talks unannounced to public; agreement outlined, kick-starts stalled Juba talks; Mombasa Talks exacerbate mistrust within LRA delegation, contribute to split in LRA leadership and spiralling complexity of talks (Interview 2016; Atkinson 2010: 218–219; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 11).
- Results of Mombasa Talks supposed to be transferred to Juba Talks (Interview 2016); mediators of Mombasa Talks assumed mediators of Juba Talks would be informed about progress made during back-channel talks in Mombasa; Mombasa talks allow for more open and genuine interaction (Assefa 2010: 14).
- Mombasa Talks reduce Machar's control over Juba Talks; widely viewed as damaging (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 23).
- Chissano meets LRA in Ri-Kwangba, crucial for continuation of peace process (Atkinson 2010: 218).
- 04/2007 Third addendum to CoH signed: deadline for assembly moved to August 2007; idea of assembly area in Eastern Equatoria dropped (Accord 2010: 25; Baaré 2008: 29).
- 13.-  
14.04.2007 Chissano and LRA high command meet in Nabanga; LRA agrees to restart talks on April 26; decision to remain with only Ri-Kwangba as assembly area (Schomerus 2012: 168).
- 14.04.2007 Third Addendum to CoH signed: parties recommit to CoH, welcome decision of AU to deploy additional members to CHMT, all LRA forces to assemble in Ri-Kwangba instead of in two areas, have six weeks to assemble, implementation to be reviewed in June 2007; signed by

## Appendix

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- Rugunda and Ojul, witnessed by: Machar, Chissano, Japhet Getugi (Kenya), and Francisco Caetano Madeira (Mozambique) (CoH Addendum 3 2007).
- 26.04.2007 Substantive talks restart (Accord 2010: 25); not the same persons in the delegation, some replaced, some did not want to take part anymore; what has been agreed upon in Mombasa not accounted for; UN representatives angry about IKV Pax Christi's separate initiative (Schomerus 2012: 168).
- 05/2007 Kony does not want to sign peace deal unless ICC arrest warrant is withdrawn (BBC News 2007b).
- 02.05.2007 Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions to problems in northern Uganda reached; LRA delegation travels to Garamba to discuss next agenda item (accountability and reconciliation) (Accord 2010: 25); considered as a break-through (Baaré 2008: 29), states: parties are determined to resolve conflict peacefully; defines various terms; includes several principles of governance, i.e. democracy, representation of national character, gender, social diversity, ethnicity, inclusion of all people of Uganda; GoU supposed to bring about balanced development in Uganda, special measures in underdeveloped areas; no arbitrary detentions; unifying language supposed to be used; rule of law to be strengthened, access to justice in affected areas to be promoted; members of LRA who are willing and qualified to be integrated into national armed forces and other security agencies; children of LRA combatants to benefit from policies of Universal Primary Education and Universal Post-Primary Education and Training; safe return of IDPs; land issues addressed; need for security of LRA leaders, combatants, and personnel during transition period highlighted; signed by Okello Henry Oryem (GoU), Ojul (LRA), witnessed by Samson Kwaje (acting mediator), Getugi (Kenya), Madeira (Mozambique), Gilbert Lebeko Ramano (South Africa), Ali Siwa (Tanzania), and David Gressly (UN) (Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 2007).
- 01.06.2007 Talks officially restart (Schomerus 2012: 169).
- 06/2007 Process regarding Agenda item 3 made, parties agree: formal and informal justice measures are to handle war crimes (Schomerus 2012: 170).
- 10.06.2007 Confusion as GoSS, GoU, and DRC representatives meet in Juba to work

on Plan B (military solution) to the LRA problem (Schomerus 2012: 170).

29.06.2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed: defines terms used in agreement; highlights that the parties shall promote formal and informal justice and reconciliation mechanisms, reconciliation mechanisms, truth-seeking and -telling mechanisms; reparations said to be necessary; women, girls, and children more especially addressed; GoU will make necessary resources available; GoU will adopt appropriate policy framework for implementation of agreement, introduce amendment to Amnesty Act or Uganda Human Rights Act to bring conformity with the principles of agreement; GoU will remove LRA from list of terrorist organisations if LRA abandons rebellion, ceases fire, and submits members to DDR; GoU will ask other countries to remove LRA from terrorist lists; signed by: Ragoda (GoU), Ojul, witnessed by: Machar, Siwa (Tanzania), and Getugi (Kenya) (S/2007/435 2007).

Food deliveries seem to work, Denmark and Canada provide bilateral technical assistance to strengthen CHMT; AU observers in place (Baaré 2008: 29).

13.07.2007 Otti expects talks to last for another year, states that the LRA needs to 'learn to trust' if they want peace (Schomerus 2012: 170).

28.08.2007 Museveni tells U.S. Senator Russell Feingold that he has warned DRC President Kabila that DRC needs to let GoU troops into DRC territory to get rid of LRA, otherwise DRC has to partner up with another military partner to not become 'holiday centre' of LRA (Schomerus 2012: 173).

09/2007 Museveni and Kagame sign Ngurdoto-Agreement which sets deadline for LRA to leave DRC to 90 days; after 90 days, military actions will follow; LRA and GoU continue consulting stakeholders (Accord 2010: 26).

LRA: ready to hand over fighters that have committed atrocities, demands GoU to do the same with UPDF soldiers (Matsiko et al. 2007).

Gressly (senior UN representative in South Sudan): LRA and GoU ready for talks because of 'fatigue' with long running conflict; some say Museveni fears that with ICC investigations, atrocities committed by his own soldiers become apparent (Hannan 2007).

05.09.2007 Museveni calls peace process a 'circus' and Kony a 'trickster' in meeting

with Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer. Frazer approves of Museveni's efforts for military solution in case that talks fail (Schomerus 2012: 175).

08.09.2007 U.S.: military actions will be taken to get rid of LRA in case peace talks fail; LRA has to leave Garamba by end of 12/2007, otherwise military action; LRA responds with renewed attacks (Schomerus 2012: 175).

Autumn 2007 Uganda and DRC sign military deal, openly supported by U.S.; LRA trust reduces; U.S. announces creation of AFRICOM for coordination of security interests, pressure on U.S. to push for military solution; U.S. appoints representative to Juba Talks, further suspicion and discontent on LRA side (Schomerus 2008: 96); Ojul and Achama accept personal invitation from Museveni, go to State House for a meeting without telling other delegates; unclear what was discussed during this meeting (Schomerus 2012: 174–175).

10/2007 LRA claims GoU talks about split within LRA as propaganda: LRA is not split but very much intact (BBC News 2007d, 2007e).

GoU launches Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan for northern Uganda (Accord 2010: 26).

Uganda and DRC sign agreement that makes joint military operation against LRA possible; UN peacekeeping in DRC (MONUC) announces readiness to use force to push rebels out of Garamba National Park; LRA spokesperson Godfrey Ayoo highlights that U.S. behaviour is extreme provocation, cannot be tolerated; U.S. attack will be seen as declaration of war, end of Juba Talks (Ochieng 2007c).

01.10.2007 AFRICOM officially launched (Schomerus 2012: 176); U.S. representative joins mediation team; confusion around AFRICOM's mandate adds to suspicion that it will support GoU in fight against LRA (Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 13).

02.10.2007 Opio Makasi, third-highest ranking in LRA, surrenders to MONUC forces, is granted amnesty on 01.11.2007; LRA delegation gets to Kampala (Schomerus 2012: 176).

04.10.2007 LRA delegation meets Museveni; CoH extended until end of January 2008; LRA delegation says it will travel to Juba in the following week to

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- meet Machar; Otti under house arrest; in conversation with U.S. embassy, Achama states Ojul had claimed Otti is dead (Schomerus 2012: 177)
- 02.11.2007 LRA wants justice in Uganda not by ICC, main sticking point (BBC News 2007c).
- 03.11.2007 4th addendum to CoH signed: parties recommit to CoH, agree to review of implementation at end of January 2008, signed by Rugunda, Ojul, witnessed by Gier Chuang Aluong (representative of chief mediator), Getugi (Kenya), Ramano (South Africa), and André Kapanga (DRC) (CoH Addendum 4 2007).
- LRA negotiation team arrives in Uganda, begins consultations on details of accountability and reconciliation agreement, meets Museveni, asks him to request ICC to suspend the arrest warrants (Accord 2010: 26).
- Late 2007 Donors to UN fund, especially U.S., put deadline of talks to 31.01.2008 (Baaré 2008: 24).
- 12/2007 Rumours of Otti's death rejected (Ochieng 2007a).
- 01/2008 U.S., EU, Canada, and Norway send observers to talks (International Crisis Group 2008: 2).
- UN staff meets LRA for the first time since Otti's deaths is confirmed; Meeting is described as difficult as LRA delegates still mourn Otti's deaths, do not know how to interact with LRA members in the bush; notable split in LRA (Schomerus 2012: 221–223).
- Supposedly, GoU never wanted peace deal, but wanted to use time to pursue other solutions, e.g. with the U.S.; while initially setting deadline after deadline for the conclusion of talks, GoU now willing to allow LRA time to mourn Otti's deaths before talks resume (Schomerus 2012: 225–226).
- 22.01.2008 First meeting again between Machar and LRA delegates; difficult because LRA does not know how to behave; delegation has changed (Schomerus 2012: 222).
- 23.01.2008 David Masonga takes over lead of LRA delegation from Ojul (BBC News

2008c).

Death of Otti confirmed by Machar; date of his death: 08.10.2007 (International Crisis Group 2008: 2), or 02.10.2007; Kony had started to mistrust Otti; also dead: Ben Achellam and Alfred 'Record' Otim, close allies to Otti; Kony feared Otti was willing to sign peace deal even if he does not agree; several reasons for mistrust, amongst others, Mombasa Talks supposed to have caused a rift; Otti's death causes negative tensions within LRA delegation as LRA delegation is scared of Kony, says Otti was the only one able to talk to Kony (Schomerus 2012: 178); Otti seemed to have been voice of reason, received a lot of credit for progress during talks (Ochieng 2007a).

News about massacre by LRA in Southern Sudan, never confirmed, also disregarded by UN and GoU (Schomerus 2012: 227–228).

27.01.2008 Chissano meets Timothy Shortley (U.S.) to discuss whether U.S. is interested in taking action against LRA (Schomerus 2012: 225).

30.01.2008 Peace talks in Juba resume after a six-months stand-still (Schomerus 2012: 228; Baaré 2008: 27)

5th addendum to CoH signed: parties recommit to CoH, CoH extended to end of February; signed by Rugunda, Matsanga (LRA), witnessed by Machar, Kapanga (DRC), Ramano (South Africa), Gordon Kricke (EU), and Shortley (U.S.) (CoH Addendum 5 2008).

19.02.2008 Annex to agenda item 3 signed (Schomerus 2012: 229) without consulting with Kony; many aspects crucial for LRA left out (Schomerus 2012: 229); annex outlines how agreement is supposed to be implemented: GoU to establish a body which deals with conflict's history; manifestos of the conflict, human rights violations during the conflict with particular attention to women and children to be documented; public and private hearings to be held; provisions for witness protection; promotion of truth telling; gathering information on those who disappeared during conflict; recommendations for modalities or reparations and for preventing future conflict; special High Court supposed to be installed, addresses reparations and traditional justice mechanisms; signed by Rugunda and Matsanga, witnessed by Machar, Kapanga (DRC), Getugi (Kenya), Nsavike Ndatta (Tanzania), Madeira (Mozambique), Ramano (South Africa), Jan Ledang (Norway), Anna Sundström (EU), and Shortley (U.S.) (Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 2008).

- 21.02.2008 LRA delegation walks out of talks in Juba; disagreement over proportion of positions LRA would get in government and military: LRA wants 35 percent in each and cash rewards for senior commanders (Oluka 2008b).
- 22.02.2008 Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions signed by Rugunda, Matsanga, witnessed by Machar, Chissano (UN), Kapanga (DRC), Getugi (Kenya), Ndatta (Tanzania), Ramano (South Africa), Heidi Johansen (Norway), Sundström (EU), Bryan Burton (Canada), and Shortley (U.S.) (Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 2008).
- Museveni sets deadline for war to end to 28.02.2008 (BBC News 2008a).
- 23.02.2008 Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration signed: defines terms used first; DDR supposed to become integral part of Government's Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda; ceasefire monitoring team supposed to record intention of LRA members who want to join Ugandan army or national security agency; reintegration of children and women explicitly addressed; agencies to reintegrate children and youth to be set up; disarmament to be guided by UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards; LRA to mobilise in Ri-Kwangba Assembly Area; Rugunda and Matsanga sign, witnesses: Machar, Chissano, Getugi (Kenya), Ndatta (Tanzania), Ramano (South Africa), Johansen (Norway), Roeland van de Geer (EU), Burton (Canada), and Shortley (U.S.) (Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 2008).
- Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire signed: defines terms used in agreement; supposed to commence 24 hours after signature of Final Peace Agreement (FPA); LRA to assemble and camp within Ri-Kwangba Assembly Area, to respect buffer zones around the area; CHMT to transform into ceasefire monitoring team, to be made up of a senior officer in the SPLM/A as team leader, a deputy team leader who is a senior officer in SPLA, five representatives of each party, five members from each AU observer country, five-person liaison team from UN; ceasefire violations are amongst others: attacks or threats of violence against each other or civilians, hostile propaganda against the other party, presence, movement or other actions of LRA outside Ri-Kwangba Assembly Area, acquisition of arms by LRA, recruitment of forces by LRA; GoSS protects Assembly Area, signed by Rugunda, Matsanga, witness by: Machar, Chissano (UN), Kapanga (DRC), Getugi (Kenya), Ndatta (Tanzania), Ramano (South Africa), Johansen (Norway), Sundström (EU), Burton

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- (Canada), and Shortley (U.S.) (Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire Juba, Sudan 2008).
- 28.02.2008 LRA delegates travel to Ri-Kwangba to present texts to Kony, only speak to him on phone; supposedly, Kony likes the agreement (Schomerus 2012: 230).
- 29.02.2008 Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms signed: defines terms used in agreement, notes which agreements the FPA is made up of: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement plus 6 addenda, Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions and its Protocol, Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire, Agreement on DDR, Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms; final agreement and implementation schedule which recommits the parties to implementation of named agreements to be signed; Oversight Forum which monitors implementation of FPA to be created, made up of mediator, special envoy of the UN, AU observer, representative from EU, representative from each country that witnessed the signing of the FPA; chief mediator to stay in contact with both parties, provide LRA with legal advice and support on issues relevant to implementation of FPA; Joint Liaison Group to be established to facilitate monitoring and implementation of FPA for nine month, made up of three persons nominated by GoU, three persons nominated by LRA, one person nominated by mediator; after FPA signed, one month transition period for parties to prepare for DDR; signed by Rugunda, Matsanga, witnessed by Machar, Chissano (UN), Kapanga (DRC), Getugi (Kenya), Ndatta (Tanzania), Ramano (South Africa), van de Geer (Great Lakes Region), Burton (Canada), and Shortley (U.S.) (Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms 2008).
- 01.03.2008 CoH extended to March 28, 2008, by then FPA should be signed; signed by: Rugunda, Matsanga, witnessed by Machar, Burton (Canada), and Gressly (UN) (CoH Addendum 6 2008).
- 10.04.2008 Kony to sign FPA, Museveni four days later; Kony fails to sign FPA (Atkinson 2010: 220); attacks and abduction in DRC and Southern Sudan become more frequent (Accord 2010: 26); Kony says he did not get an adequate offer, which is why he does not want to sign (Allen & Vlassenroot 2010: 18).
- 18.04.2008 Kony demands renegotiations on Agenda 3 and withdrawal of ICC arrest

## Appendix

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- warrants (Schomerus 2012: 238).
- 10.-  
13.05.2008 Workshop held with LRA delegation and Kony's wives to update LRA and to discuss judicial concerns; Kony reiterates commitment to peace but does not show up for signing FPA again; GoU increasingly impatient; some say Kony's health is poor, he does not trust anyone (International Crisis Group 2008: 4).
- 25.05.2008 Kony: not going to sign FPA, not going to continue talks, as 'he would rather die in the bush than turn himself over to the GoU or ICC and 'be hanged'' (Atkinson 2010: 220).
- 06/2008 GoU is increasingly frustrated; Machar continues to push for agreement; Kony: wants to return to talks but arrest warrants need to be dropped (Accord 2010: 26).
- Meeting between GoU, GoSS, and DRC to discuss military option against LRA; LRA attacks SPLA, kills seven soldiers and 14 civilians (Schomerus 2012: 240).
- 11.07.2008 Kony writes letter to Machar, UN, and AU observers, demands for security plan for Ri-Kwangba and Nabanga (border posts between Sudan and DRC) where he wants to meet Machar (Matsiko 2008).
- 07-08/2008 Fragile Ceasefire seems to collapse (International Crisis Group 2008: 1).
- 19.08.2008 GoU rejects further talks after Chissano says Kony approached him to hold further discussions; GoU: no outstanding issues are to be resolved (BBC News 2008b).
- 28.08.2008 U.S. State Department calls Kony a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (Executive Order 1334), allows U.S. to increase military action against LRA (Schomerus 2012: 243).
- 09/2008 Kony does not attend scheduled meeting, blames ICC arrest warrants; LRA attacks in DRC intensify (Accord 2010: 26).
- 10/2008 Kiir highlights necessity of deadline for Kony to sign FPA (Atkinson 2010: 220).

## Appendix

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- 05.11.2008 Machar holds conference in Kampala, brings together stakeholders who demand Kony to sign agreements by 30.11.2008 (Accord 2010: 26).
- 28.11.2008 Meeting between Kony, Chissano, and Machar scheduled, does not take place (Accord 2010: 26); Kony highlights mistrust and his interest in peace; until this point, talks inside the LRA have been about peace and the war being over soon, now expectations shattered (Schomerus 2012: 243–244).
- 30.11.2008 Kony fails to sign FPA again; reports on LRA killing and abducting civilians in DRC and South Sudan increase (Baaré 2008: 30); Kony calls former LRA spokesperson, explains he does not trust the mediator anymore, believes Machar is government-biased, complains about bribery that has taken place during mediation in Mombasa, highlights peace agreement for Uganda should be signed in Uganda with him and Museveni present at the same time, and him and his commanders should not be prosecuted as he was willing to make peace (International Crisis Group 2008: 3–4).
- 12/2008 Machar officially ends peace process, military options taken by GoU (Kazooba 2008).
- 01.12.2008 GoU begins to implement plans to send UPDF to DRC to attack LRA, plans are denied officially; LRA supposedly prepares for war (Accord 2010: 26) (Atkinson 2010: 220–221).
- 02.12.2008 Juba Talks officially end, option for Kony to sign FPA remains open (Accord 2010: 26).
- 05.12.2008 LRA delegates, Machar, and Kabila in favour of talks: consider talks to be better for protecting civilians than military option (Schomerus 2012: 245).
- 08.12.2008 GoU attacks LRA; Kony not signing FPA considered as him not being interested in peace, having exploited peace process to divert international community's attention and expand organisation's ability to project military power (Kazooba 2008).
- Press statement of military chiefs from the armies of Uganda, Southern Sudan, and DRC: Kony used negotiations to buy time to abduct, rearm,

and continue killing civilians (Kazooba 2008).

- 14.12.2008 Operation Lightning Thunder launched: joint military operation between Ugandan, DRC, and Southern Sudanese troops, supported by U.S.-military and AFRICOM, fails to have a significant impact; LRA responds with massacres and large-scale abductions (BBC News 2009; Schomerus & Ogwaro 2010: 10); MONUC also supports Operation Lightning Thunder (Haarhaus 2009: 1).
- Discussions around new talks become ‘taboo issue’ to U.S. and certain European donors, who support ICC; GoU: Kony had his chance and did not use it, no longer trusted; privately, some say military solution is unlikely to bring lasting solutions (Hendrickson & Tumutegyereize 2012: 23).
- 2009 Operation Lightning Thunder continues sporadically throughout the year, its name is dropped in March; LRA requests for universal ceasefire to allow clarification of issues with agreements on justice, accountability and disarmament; Machar supports non-military solution (Accord 2010: 26).
- 15.03.2009 Operation Lightning Thunder officially ends; UPDF still holds covert operation in DRC; Ugandan army starts to pursue LRA fighters in Southern Sudan and CAR (International Crisis Group 2010: 1).
- 15.10.2011 U.S. sends troops to fight LRA; troops equipped to take part in combat, supposed to provide information and advice to partner nation forces, will not engage in fighting unless for self-defence (BBC News 2011).
- 05/2012 Senior LRA commander Ceasar Achellam and family captured (BBC News 2012).
- 01/2014 Kony writes to GoU, asks for forgiveness and resumption of peace talks; GoU is not willing to hold new talks, asks Kony to surrender and to apply for amnesty (Weseka 2014).
- 01/2015 Dominic Ongwen caught and in front of ICC (BBC News 2015).
- 03.03.2016 LRA supposedly has abducted 217 children in CAR since the beginning of 2016 (BBC News 2016).

- 06.12.2016 Ongwen's trail opens at ICC (ICC 2016).
- 04/2017 UPDF and U.S. special forces start withdrawing from CAR, end LRA-pursuit (Ocungi 2017); Kony is supposedly ill (Owich 2017).

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