Open Access

Das Open Access-Lehrbuch bietet eine allgemeinverständliche, aber wissenschaftlichen Ansprüchen genügende Einführung in die philosophische Ethik. Es erläutert den Begriff der Ethik, ihre zentralen Probleme, ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung, die einflussreichsten ethischen Grundpositionen und ihre aktuelle Relevanz in verschiedenen Praxisfeldern. Dabei erleichtert der historisch-systematische Zugang das Verständnis des Zusammenhangs von ethischer Theorie und gesellschaftlicher Praxis.

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision.

Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem's Betrachtungen über die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der Religion was a bestseller of the German Enlightenment, although it is a theological book. In this article, his Betrachtungen is treated as a text that tries to synthesize the newly established philosophy of history with more or less traditional theological patterns. Jerusalem uses the argument of universal development and progress in history to demonstrate the evidence of divine providence. His book thus resembles Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, which it may have influenced. The main purpose of Jerusalem is to calm and pacify the individual's soul. He wants to prove that the individual's life fits into the general order of history, which is also the purpose of ‘profane’ philosophy of history in German Enlightenment. Jerusalem's neological philosophy of history provides new answers to the problem of evil after the decline of a metaphysical theodicy in the tradition of Leibniz.

Abstract The article treats the problem of interpretation in its respect to reality by example of Umberto Eco’s moderate ‚realistic‘ position and his criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche, the “father” of postmodernism. Here the strongest arguments on both sides are evaluated: Eco’s “negative realism” pointing out the impossibility of some interpretations and Nietzsche’s thinking out the absolute absence of a privileged position proceeding from which it would be possible to unequivocally identify what is real. The article argues that the crucial point why some interpretations may prove to be stronger or weaker is best described in terms of the concept of power. One however should avoid misconceptions, since power itself is interpretation which nevertheless allows for the gradation of reality, the mobility of its horizons, their shifting and even their potential availability. A much-disputed question of prehistoric times as well as that of death as a limit of interpretability is inter alia included in the analysis. Both classical anti-realistic positions, such as that of Wittgenstein, and the argumentation of contemporary advocates of realism, such as Quentin Meillassoux, are taken into consideration.

We all know the experience of different demands on ourselves. As a parent, we want to be there for our children, and in pursuit of our career, we want to invest as much time as possible. If we are committed to both being a good parent and pursuing a career, it may be impossible to satisfy the demands stemming from both commitments. It is in such moments in which our, what I call, practical identities are conflicted that our will is in a state of volitional disunity. In this dissertation, I discuss how a person may best cope with volitional disunity. I define practical identities in line with Christine M. Korsgaard as self-descriptions under which a person finds her life worth living and her actions worth undertaking; examples of such self-descriptions are being a parent, an employee, a hobbyist pianist, the friend of Charlotte, etc. Practical identities provide the person with ideals that form a decision-making framework for her deliberations about what to do. The standard analysis of volitional disunity, is that it causes a person to not know what to do as her identities, as guides, point her in conflicting, even opposite, directions. The solutions proposed in the literature always include, what I call, the Unification Ideal: a person has to prioritize her identities by deciding which is more important to her. By unifying her identities in this way, she constitutes who she is and wants to be thereby providing herself with a clear decision-making framework regarding the question of what to do. In this dissertation however, I argue that a person does not need to overcome her volitional disunity through unification per se. In order to know what to do, a person could also explore the disunity that defines her will, which includes that she could accept the volitional disunity as hers. I base this Exploration Ideal on two assumptions about human nature: 1) we have inner responses to how we act and 2) we are opaque to ourselves. Since a person cannot always know in advance whether she will be happy with a commitment by turning her attention inwards, she can explore who she wants to be and who she can be through the bodily, psychological, and emotive responses she has to her actions. These responses, however, are not the ultimate authority. This authority stays with her practical identities in light of which she can evaluate these inner responses. Thus, a person exposed to volitional disunity should strive to explore this disunity, how she wants it to define her and whether it is constitutive of who she is (Exploration Ideal) instead of trying to overcome the disunity by striving for unification (Unification Ideal).