Open Access

Participating in an election is by far the most prevalent form of political participation in modern democracies. Turnout rates, however, not only vary considerably between countries but also over time: By trend, in many Western democracies turnout levels have declined over the last decades. Electoral systems depict a prominent factor that has always been discussed with respect to its impact on turnout. In this respect, a high number of empirical studies found aggregate turnout predominantly to be higher in countries using proportional representation compared to countries using a less proportional electoral system. Based on these findings, one should expect turnout to increase when the electoral system changes towards higher proportionality. However, empirical evidence of the actual lasting impact of changes in electoral institutions on voter turnout is all but conclusive. In this dissertation, I aim at answering the following question: What are the consequences of electoral system change for voter turnout? I argue that it is necessary to examine the relationship between electoral systems and turnout more detailed as most studies did to date by taking the level of electoral constituencies and the temporal dimension of electoral system change into account. To assess the impact of electoral systems and further proposed causal factors associated with electoral systems, party system size for instance, on turnout empirically, I make use of a comparative research design, analyzing longitudinal data with time-series cross-sectional regression models. These data, being the basis for my empirical analyses, represent a unique data set covering 9.639 electoral districts from 146 national legislative elections in eleven European countries. The dissertation generally finds an increasing district magnitude to boost turnout, while a decreasing magnitude has negative consequences for electoral participation. The positive effect of district magnitude on turnout seems to depend on the size of the population in the respective district, however. In addition, the analyses show that a higher number of parties in a district, respectively an increase in the number of parties in a district, has a negative impact on turnout.

Abstract This article investigates how the sex of party heads impacts party positions and uncovers that parties led by a woman modify their stances on sociocultural but not economic debates. I argue that this pattern is a consequence of dissimilar gender gaps in policy preferences across the two ideological dimensions at the elite level. The empirical evidence, based on data for 19 developed democracies around the world between 1995 and 2018, reveals that parties led by a woman tend to emphasise green, alternative and libertarian issues. In particular, anti‐growth, environmental protection and freedom and human rights become more prominent elements of party manifestos under women's leadership. Overall, these findings stress the importance of critical actors and the conditions under which the presence of women in political offices translates into responsiveness towards female citizens.

The comment on Cristina Lafont’s book includes two main points. (1) Minipublics do not necessarily stand in opposition to political theories that justify electoral democracy and participatory conceptions of deliberative democracy. In contrast to such a view, I argue that minipublics should be combined with electoral and participatory forms of democracy. (2) A deliberative concept of accountability may overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional, voluntaristic concepts of democratic accountability.

What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development. This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it. Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this situation, their optimal strategy is to agree to democratic reforms in the area on which donors place most value, elections. But to maximize their chances of electoral victory and continued access to rents from office, elites simultaneously restrain an independent rule of law and narrowly distribute private goods to their supporters. This rent-seeking/democracy dilemma is particularly prevalent in one of the most popular forms of post-conflict institutions: power-sharing governments. Including rebel groups in post-conflict cabinets increases the number of constituencies that need to be sustained from the government budget. In addition, the interim nature of transitional power-sharing cabinets leads elites to steeply discount the future and increase rent-seeking in the short term. My main hypothesis is therefore that large aid flows to extensive power-sharing governments should be associated with improved elections, but limits in the rule of law and more provision of private instead of public goods. To test this prediction quantitatively, I combine data on aid flows and rebel participation in post-conflict cabinets between 1990 and 2010 with indicators for democratic development, election quality, rule of law, and public goods provision. Results from a wide range of regression models provide empirical support for my argument. Individually, extensive power-sharing governments and large aid flows do not seem to have strong effects. Models that introduce an interaction term between aid and power-sharing, however, yield strong evidence of a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: Power-sharing and foreign aid jointly predict a positive, but small change in democracy scores as well as cleaner elections. At the same time, they are jointly associated with a limited rule of law and stronger distribution of private goods. For each indicator, I document evidence for mechanisms and changes in the effect over time. The theory and empirical results presented in this dissertation have a number of implications for future research. They highlight the importance of moving away from a singular focus on post-conflict elections and looking also at other institutional dimensions of post-conflict politics. My political economy model of power-sharing also demonstrates the utility of explicitly including economic functions of post-conflict institutions into power-sharing and broader peacebuilding research. And I introduce novel evidence into research and practice of aid delivery; this helps not only to clarify academic debates under which conditions aid can be effective, but also informs practitioners who help conflict-affected countries in their transition from war to democracy.