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To what extent do norms of regional Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) have an impact on member states’ borders and their permeability? International agreements and regional integration measures quite often highlight how harmonization of mechanisms and procedures related to cross-border interaction within specific communities takes place. As these agreements and measures contain mutual expectations about appropriate behavior, a form of convergence in bordering practices – and therefore effects – is implied. This leads to the assumption that cross-border interaction is gradually increasing and eventually leading to a ‘borderless’ realm that allows for the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. However, the nature of borders or a deeper understanding of the bordering process itself is often not central to the studies of international relations. They represent mere fixtures of international interaction and appear in the public discussion only if sudden restrictions are implemented or if large-scale changes in the international environment affect their functioning.
Specific literature on borders is relatively new and located mainly within an interdisciplinary setting that largely lacks coherency in its ontological concepts or deals exclusively with individual cases. The literature on the normative capacity of (regional) IGOs on the other hand is well matured and one of the cornerstones of international studies. However, here a blatant neglect of borders and bordering is apparent. This situation is aggravated by the circumstance that the field of International Relations by definition is dealing with cross-border interaction.
Apart from the general ontological issue of what borders and bordering processes are from a political science perspective, three main gaps in conjunction with the above question could be identified within the literature. The first relates to the general efficacy of the normative influence of regional IGOs on enhancing cross-border interaction through the issuing of specific normative provisions. On this, the relevant literature is divided. Arguments range from an all-permeating relevance of norms as intersubjective understandings that create specific expectations of appropriate behavior to the primacy of rational choices that are targeted to create benefits in most economic and security- related matters. The second gap relates to the relevance of domestic precognition in cross-border interaction. It is not clear to what extent dominant normative conceptions at the national level create obstacles to the efficacy of IGO provisions in shaping cross- border interaction. Finally, the impact of critical junctures – as kind of catalysts – that shift member state preferences in following communal obligations are being analyzed. Here, the assumption is that these junctures may either enhance or negate IGO provisions dependent on the dominant domestic preferences. Essentially, the approach taken here is a layered one, where each identified gap provides the basis for the following ones. The analysis itself is divided into a quantitative and a qualitative part. For the former, a new dataset has been created that specifically lists all normative provisions targeting the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital of the two IGOs selected for this research project. This is an important departure from the usual dichotomous perception of IGO influence used throughout the literature. In conjunction with specific data related to each of the four freedoms, multiple variations of a gravimetric Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood model are specified. The qualitative approach draws upon descriptive and matching approaches to analyze the impact of dominant domestic norms and critical junctures on the bordering process. For this purpose, a corpus of source material is created that includes government declarations and media articles, as well as the specific IGO provisions on bordering to each of the four freedoms that are central to this research.
The quantitative findings indicate a strong and consistently positive impact of regulative IGO norms while evaluative IGO norms do not provide similar results. The qualitative findings point in a similar direction. As long as IGO norms have a more regulative direction and are obligatory, the effect is less likely to be diminished by contesting dominant domestic norms or critical junctures vis-`a-vis more evaluative IGO norms.
The results and additional findings of this research have implications for further research. Central to this is the capacity of regional IGOs to exert normative influence on the bordering practices of their member states. An additional finding relates to the interrelatedness of normative provisions. The more these provisions are cross-referencing each other – or are interlocked – the more robust they seem to get. This is a trait that is relevant for policy-makers and IGO bureaucracies if they want to enhance the compliance of their agents. On a methodological level, the here introduced data set on normative IGO provisions provides other researchers with a substantially more fine- grained approach to investigating the impact of specific IGO measures on a particular dimension of cross-border interaction.
Participating in an election is by far the most prevalent form of political participation in modern democracies. Turnout rates, however, not only vary considerably between countries but also over time: By trend, in many Western democracies turnout levels have declined over the last decades. Electoral systems depict a prominent factor that has always been discussed with respect to its impact on turnout. In this respect, a high number of empirical studies found aggregate turnout predominantly to be higher in countries using proportional representation compared to countries using a less proportional electoral system. Based on these findings, one should expect turnout to increase when the electoral system changes towards higher proportionality. However, empirical evidence of the actual lasting impact of changes in electoral institutions on voter turnout is all but conclusive. In this dissertation, I aim at answering the following question: What are the consequences of electoral system change for voter turnout? I argue that it is necessary to examine the relationship between electoral systems and turnout more detailed as most studies did to date by taking the level of electoral constituencies and the temporal dimension of electoral system change into account.
To assess the impact of electoral systems and further proposed causal factors associated with electoral systems, party system size for instance, on turnout empirically, I make use of a comparative research design, analyzing longitudinal data with time-series cross-sectional regression models. These data, being the basis for my empirical analyses, represent a unique data set covering 9.639 electoral districts from 146 national legislative elections in eleven European countries. The dissertation generally finds an increasing district magnitude to boost turnout, while a decreasing magnitude has negative consequences for electoral participation. The positive effect of district magnitude on turnout seems to depend on the size of the population in the respective district, however. In addition, the analyses show that a higher number of parties in a district, respectively an increase in the number of parties in a district, has a negative impact on turnout.
Abstract
This article investigates how the sex of party heads impacts party positions and uncovers that parties led by a woman modify their stances on sociocultural but not economic debates. I argue that this pattern is a consequence of dissimilar gender gaps in policy preferences across the two ideological dimensions at the elite level. The empirical evidence, based on data for 19 developed democracies around the world between 1995 and 2018, reveals that parties led by a woman tend to emphasise green, alternative and libertarian issues. In particular, anti‐growth, environmental protection and freedom and human rights become more prominent elements of party manifestos under women's leadership. Overall, these findings stress the importance of critical actors and the conditions under which the presence of women in political offices translates into responsiveness towards female citizens.
The substance of procedures
(2021)
In Democracy without Shortcuts, Cristina Lafont identifies proceduralist or ‘deep pluralist’ conceptions of democracy alongside epistemic and lottocratic approaches as shortcuts that avoid the more challenging but, in her view, preferable path of engaging with and attempting to sway competing views, values and beliefs of fellow citizens. I argue that with the wholesale dismissal of proceduralist accounts of democracy Lafont herself takes two shortcuts: The first concerns the characterization of deep pluralism as unable to explain substantive disagreement after a decision is settled, and the second undervalues proceduralism’s ability to evaluate and criticize the substance of the political decision-making process. While her critique is fitting for minimalist conceptions of proceduralism, a theory of normative proceduralism shares many objectives with Lafont’s vision of a participatory deliberative democracy. Integrating those approaches instead of dismissing proceduralism outright would render her project appealing to theorists who would not otherwise consider themselves deliberative democrats.
The comment on Cristina Lafont’s book includes two main points. (1) Minipublics do not necessarily stand in opposition to political theories that justify electoral democracy and participatory conceptions of deliberative democracy. In contrast to such a view, I argue that minipublics should be combined with electoral and participatory forms of democracy. (2) A deliberative concept of accountability may overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional, voluntaristic concepts of democratic accountability.
Many intrastate conflicts see more than one mediation effort. As the sequencing of mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts is neglected in existing research, this project addresses the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Drawing on bargaining theory, it is argued that governments and rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts account for previous mediation outcomes in their cost-benefit calculations on subsequent mediation onset, and, should subsequent talks set on, their behaviour during subsequent mediation efforts, which influences subsequent mediation success.
If mediation did not produce an agreement, the persistence of the private information problem is noted by the conflict parties. Yet, no new costs of mediation are uncovered, and hence the conflict parties will agree to subsequent mediation onset. Being aware of the necessity to overcome the private information and the commitment problem, the mediator will seek to account for the concerns of the conflict parties, and thereby work towards subsequent mediation success. If mediation produced a partial agreement, the benefits of mediation are underlined. The private information and the commitment problem seem solved with the assistance of the mediator. Subsequent mediation onset and eventually subsequent mediation success are observed. If a mediated agreement was reneged on by the rebel group, the government will refrain from further talks, pointing out the rebel group’s illegitimacy. If the government reneged on the agreement itself, it will also decide against subsequent mediation, as the previous mediation effort produced an agreement which did not mirror the power distribution in the dyad. Costs of mediation, which outweigh the benefits of it, were highlighted. Rebel groups will opt for mediation regardless which side reneged on an agreement. As both governments and rebel groups have to agree to subsequent mediation for talks to set on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely if a mediated agreement was reneged on. Given the onset of subsequent mediation after a mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely to be observed, due to the previously underlined hazards of sharing private information and the persistence of the commitment problem.
The theoretical argument is tested with a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative analysis accounts for mediation efforts in African intrastate conflicts between 1993 and 2007. The qualitative analysis scrutinises the mediation efforts between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. The results of both parts of analysis largely go hand-in-hand, and show that partial mediation success and mediation which did not produce an agreement have a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset in particular, but also on subsequent mediation success. Reneged on mediated agreements have a severe negative impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success though.
By addressing the question which impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts, this research shows that mediation which does not produce an agreement is not the mediation outcome which needs to be feared by the international community. Instead, the deteriorating impact of short-lived agreements, a mediation outcome which is unaccounted for in existing research as an explanatory variable, becomes apparent. This research has important policy implications, especially for mediators, as it suggests that accepting mediation efforts to end without an agreement is more conducive for subsequent mediation efforts. Moreover, this research points towards the necessity of including reneged on agreements in mediation research as an explanatory variable more extensively, thereby shedding more light onto the dynamics at play in consecutive mediation efforts.
What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development.
This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it.
Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this situation, their optimal strategy is to agree to democratic reforms in the area on which donors place most value, elections. But to maximize their chances of electoral victory and continued access to rents from office, elites simultaneously restrain an independent rule of law and narrowly distribute private goods to their supporters.
This rent-seeking/democracy dilemma is particularly prevalent in one of the most popular forms of post-conflict institutions: power-sharing governments. Including rebel groups in post-conflict cabinets increases the number of constituencies that need to be sustained from the government budget. In addition, the interim nature of transitional power-sharing cabinets leads elites to steeply discount the future and increase rent-seeking in the short term. My main hypothesis is therefore that large aid flows to extensive power-sharing governments should be associated with improved elections, but limits in the rule of law and more provision of private instead of public goods.
To test this prediction quantitatively, I combine data on aid flows and rebel participation in post-conflict cabinets between 1990 and 2010 with indicators for democratic development, election quality, rule of law, and public goods provision. Results from a wide range of regression models provide empirical support for my argument. Individually, extensive power-sharing governments and large aid flows do not seem to have strong effects. Models that introduce an interaction term between aid and power-sharing, however, yield strong evidence of a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: Power-sharing and foreign aid jointly predict a positive, but small change in democracy scores as well as cleaner elections. At the same time, they are jointly associated with a limited rule of law and stronger distribution of private goods. For each indicator, I document evidence for mechanisms and changes in the effect over time.
The theory and empirical results presented in this dissertation have a number of implications for future research. They highlight the importance of moving away from a singular focus on post-conflict elections and looking also at other institutional dimensions of post-conflict politics. My political economy model of power-sharing also demonstrates the utility of explicitly including economic functions of post-conflict institutions into power-sharing and broader peacebuilding research. And I introduce novel evidence into research and practice of aid delivery; this helps not only to clarify academic debates under which conditions aid can be effective, but also informs practitioners who help conflict-affected countries in their transition from war to democracy.