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The substance of procedures
(2021)
In Democracy without Shortcuts, Cristina Lafont identifies proceduralist or ‘deep pluralist’ conceptions of democracy alongside epistemic and lottocratic approaches as shortcuts that avoid the more challenging but, in her view, preferable path of engaging with and attempting to sway competing views, values and beliefs of fellow citizens. I argue that with the wholesale dismissal of proceduralist accounts of democracy Lafont herself takes two shortcuts: The first concerns the characterization of deep pluralism as unable to explain substantive disagreement after a decision is settled, and the second undervalues proceduralism’s ability to evaluate and criticize the substance of the political decision-making process. While her critique is fitting for minimalist conceptions of proceduralism, a theory of normative proceduralism shares many objectives with Lafont’s vision of a participatory deliberative democracy. Integrating those approaches instead of dismissing proceduralism outright would render her project appealing to theorists who would not otherwise consider themselves deliberative democrats.
The comment on Cristina Lafont’s book includes two main points. (1) Minipublics do not necessarily stand in opposition to political theories that justify electoral democracy and participatory conceptions of deliberative democracy. In contrast to such a view, I argue that minipublics should be combined with electoral and participatory forms of democracy. (2) A deliberative concept of accountability may overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional, voluntaristic concepts of democratic accountability.
Many intrastate conflicts see more than one mediation effort. As the sequencing of mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts is neglected in existing research, this project addresses the question how and why previous mediation outcomes have an impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success. Drawing on bargaining theory, it is argued that governments and rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts account for previous mediation outcomes in their cost-benefit calculations on subsequent mediation onset, and, should subsequent talks set on, their behaviour during subsequent mediation efforts, which influences subsequent mediation success.
If mediation did not produce an agreement, the persistence of the private information problem is noted by the conflict parties. Yet, no new costs of mediation are uncovered, and hence the conflict parties will agree to subsequent mediation onset. Being aware of the necessity to overcome the private information and the commitment problem, the mediator will seek to account for the concerns of the conflict parties, and thereby work towards subsequent mediation success. If mediation produced a partial agreement, the benefits of mediation are underlined. The private information and the commitment problem seem solved with the assistance of the mediator. Subsequent mediation onset and eventually subsequent mediation success are observed. If a mediated agreement was reneged on by the rebel group, the government will refrain from further talks, pointing out the rebel group’s illegitimacy. If the government reneged on the agreement itself, it will also decide against subsequent mediation, as the previous mediation effort produced an agreement which did not mirror the power distribution in the dyad. Costs of mediation, which outweigh the benefits of it, were highlighted. Rebel groups will opt for mediation regardless which side reneged on an agreement. As both governments and rebel groups have to agree to subsequent mediation for talks to set on, subsequent mediation onset is unlikely if a mediated agreement was reneged on. Given the onset of subsequent mediation after a mediated agreement was reneged on, subsequent mediation success is unlikely to be observed, due to the previously underlined hazards of sharing private information and the persistence of the commitment problem.
The theoretical argument is tested with a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative analysis accounts for mediation efforts in African intrastate conflicts between 1993 and 2007. The qualitative analysis scrutinises the mediation efforts between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. The results of both parts of analysis largely go hand-in-hand, and show that partial mediation success and mediation which did not produce an agreement have a positive impact on subsequent mediation onset in particular, but also on subsequent mediation success. Reneged on mediated agreements have a severe negative impact on subsequent mediation onset and subsequent mediation success though.
By addressing the question which impact previous mediation outcomes have on subsequent mediation efforts, this research shows that mediation which does not produce an agreement is not the mediation outcome which needs to be feared by the international community. Instead, the deteriorating impact of short-lived agreements, a mediation outcome which is unaccounted for in existing research as an explanatory variable, becomes apparent. This research has important policy implications, especially for mediators, as it suggests that accepting mediation efforts to end without an agreement is more conducive for subsequent mediation efforts. Moreover, this research points towards the necessity of including reneged on agreements in mediation research as an explanatory variable more extensively, thereby shedding more light onto the dynamics at play in consecutive mediation efforts.
What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development.
This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it.
Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this situation, their optimal strategy is to agree to democratic reforms in the area on which donors place most value, elections. But to maximize their chances of electoral victory and continued access to rents from office, elites simultaneously restrain an independent rule of law and narrowly distribute private goods to their supporters.
This rent-seeking/democracy dilemma is particularly prevalent in one of the most popular forms of post-conflict institutions: power-sharing governments. Including rebel groups in post-conflict cabinets increases the number of constituencies that need to be sustained from the government budget. In addition, the interim nature of transitional power-sharing cabinets leads elites to steeply discount the future and increase rent-seeking in the short term. My main hypothesis is therefore that large aid flows to extensive power-sharing governments should be associated with improved elections, but limits in the rule of law and more provision of private instead of public goods.
To test this prediction quantitatively, I combine data on aid flows and rebel participation in post-conflict cabinets between 1990 and 2010 with indicators for democratic development, election quality, rule of law, and public goods provision. Results from a wide range of regression models provide empirical support for my argument. Individually, extensive power-sharing governments and large aid flows do not seem to have strong effects. Models that introduce an interaction term between aid and power-sharing, however, yield strong evidence of a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: Power-sharing and foreign aid jointly predict a positive, but small change in democracy scores as well as cleaner elections. At the same time, they are jointly associated with a limited rule of law and stronger distribution of private goods. For each indicator, I document evidence for mechanisms and changes in the effect over time.
The theory and empirical results presented in this dissertation have a number of implications for future research. They highlight the importance of moving away from a singular focus on post-conflict elections and looking also at other institutional dimensions of post-conflict politics. My political economy model of power-sharing also demonstrates the utility of explicitly including economic functions of post-conflict institutions into power-sharing and broader peacebuilding research. And I introduce novel evidence into research and practice of aid delivery; this helps not only to clarify academic debates under which conditions aid can be effective, but also informs practitioners who help conflict-affected countries in their transition from war to democracy.
The thesis is about ideological change of political parties and the way parties gather information, learn by updating their beliefs and ultimately make "rational choices". Analyzing 1451 policy moves of 137 parties in 22 OECD-countries from 1950 to 2013 it is a story about rational learning, about emulating other parties abroad and chasing public opinion. Yet, the "internal life" of a party conditions the effects when activists have some influence over the formation of party policy. As volunteers facing a scarcity of time and resources, members of the party on the ground have a different information horizon, and may arrive at the opposite decision where to move than party elites which (can) rest their decision on a broader set of information resources. In some parties the party on the ground thus constitutes an "internal wall of resistance" to the strategy party elites would choose, if they were free from constraints.
Das diplomatische Protokoll ist ein integraler Bestandteil der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen. Darüber hinaus regelt das Protokoll innerstaatliche zeremonielle Strukturen bzw. die offiziellen Formen der staatlichen Repräsentation. Neben der Pflege der internationalen Beziehungen zwischen Staaten gibt es eine Vielzahl von Bereichen, in denen offizielle Beziehungen zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren bestehen. Beispielsweise nehmen internationale Unternehmen im Rahmen von Global Governance eine zunehmend bedeutende Rolle ein. Hierbei stellt sich die Frage, ob bzw. inwieweit sich Wirtschaftsunternehmen an die Einhaltung protokollarischer Gepflogenheiten gebunden fühlen. Die vorliegende Dissertation widmet sich der institutionellen Komposition von Ordnungen, die sich in der Politik sowie darüber hinaus in anderen Bereichen der Gesellschaft widerspiegeln. Sie untersucht die Anwendung von protokollarischen Gepflogenheiten in Unternehmen. Thematisch bewegt sich die Forschungsarbeit im disziplinenübergreifenden Dreieck aus internationaler Diplomatie, politischer Theorie und Unternehmenskommunikation bzw. -repräsentation. Die zentrale Frage lautet: Gibt es ein mit dem Staatsprotokoll vergleichbares Unternehmensprotokoll, welches entsprechend dem Staatsprotokoll funktioniert? Im Kern der empirischen Studie geht es darum aufzuzeigen, inwieweit das Protokoll in global agierenden Wirtschaftsunternehmen mit dem internationalen diplomatischen Protokoll vergleichbar ist. Die empirische Grundlage bilden zu Teilen Organisations- und Geschäftsverteilungspläne sowie 72 leitfadengestützte Experteninterviews, geführt im Zeitraum von 2008 bis 2012. Das Ergebnis belegt empirisch, dass es sich beim Protokoll um eine politische Institution handelt. Des Weiteren wird eruiert, wie sich das Protokoll aus der Sicht der interviewten Protokollexperten im staatlichen und öffentlichen Bereich darstellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die hierbei gewonnenen Befunde mit denen aus den Interviews mit den Protokollexperten aus der Industrie abgeglichen. Abschließend kommt diese Forschungsarbeit zu dem Fazit, dass das Unternehmensprotokoll in großen Teilen mit dem diplomatischen Protokoll vergleichbar ist.
