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The thesis is about ideological change of political parties and the way parties gather information, learn by updating their beliefs and ultimately make "rational choices". Analyzing 1451 policy moves of 137 parties in 22 OECD-countries from 1950 to 2013 it is a story about rational learning, about emulating other parties abroad and chasing public opinion. Yet, the "internal life" of a party conditions the effects when activists have some influence over the formation of party policy. As volunteers facing a scarcity of time and resources, members of the party on the ground have a different information horizon, and may arrive at the opposite decision where to move than party elites which (can) rest their decision on a broader set of information resources. In some parties the party on the ground thus constitutes an "internal wall of resistance" to the strategy party elites would choose, if they were free from constraints.
A Brief History of APIs
(2021)
Online platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter offer a wide range of data for scientific research. Since many of the social media providers have set up application programming interfaces (APIs), extensive volumes of data can be collected automatically (Jünger, 2018; Keyling & Jünger, 2016). Social media data are attractive, inter alia, because they not only include already available communication, such as that from public media, but they also make organisational and interpersonal communication visible (Ledford, 2020). In addition, these data are process-generated (Baur, 2011, p. 1234), meaning that they are generated independently of scientific research and thus promise an authentic insight into human behaviour. 1 A wide range of studies in the social sciences exploit APIs for data collection and analysis. Thus, the establishment and development of APIs has significant implications for science.
Being a master of metaphors
(2023)
What shapes the prospect for democracy in the aftermath of civil conflicts? Some authors claim a successful transition from violence to elections mainly depends on the ability of political institutions, such as power-sharing arrangements, to mitigate the security dilemma among former battlefield adversaries. Drawing on a broader literature, others point to potential effects of foreign aid on democratic development.
This predominant focus on elections and the security dilemma, however, limits our understanding in a number of ways. We do not know how the choice of post-conflict elites to hold elections is strategically intertwined with their willingness to reform other state institutions. We also have only begun to understand how post-conflict power-sharing governments function as revenue source for elites. Knowing how this economic function drives or obstructs post-conflict democratic development is particularly helpful if we shift our attention to a major source of income for post-conflict elites: foreign aid, and the democratic conditions donors attach to it.
Addressing these gaps, I argue that both the economic utility from office as well as political conditionalities give rise to a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma for post-conflict elites: they can either hold elections and face uncertainty over their access to power, but secure economic rents from aid. Or they refuse to democratize, secure their hold on power, but risk losing revenues when donors withdraw aid. In this situation, their optimal strategy is to agree to democratic reforms in the area on which donors place most value, elections. But to maximize their chances of electoral victory and continued access to rents from office, elites simultaneously restrain an independent rule of law and narrowly distribute private goods to their supporters.
This rent-seeking/democracy dilemma is particularly prevalent in one of the most popular forms of post-conflict institutions: power-sharing governments. Including rebel groups in post-conflict cabinets increases the number of constituencies that need to be sustained from the government budget. In addition, the interim nature of transitional power-sharing cabinets leads elites to steeply discount the future and increase rent-seeking in the short term. My main hypothesis is therefore that large aid flows to extensive power-sharing governments should be associated with improved elections, but limits in the rule of law and more provision of private instead of public goods.
To test this prediction quantitatively, I combine data on aid flows and rebel participation in post-conflict cabinets between 1990 and 2010 with indicators for democratic development, election quality, rule of law, and public goods provision. Results from a wide range of regression models provide empirical support for my argument. Individually, extensive power-sharing governments and large aid flows do not seem to have strong effects. Models that introduce an interaction term between aid and power-sharing, however, yield strong evidence of a rent-seeking/democracy dilemma: Power-sharing and foreign aid jointly predict a positive, but small change in democracy scores as well as cleaner elections. At the same time, they are jointly associated with a limited rule of law and stronger distribution of private goods. For each indicator, I document evidence for mechanisms and changes in the effect over time.
The theory and empirical results presented in this dissertation have a number of implications for future research. They highlight the importance of moving away from a singular focus on post-conflict elections and looking also at other institutional dimensions of post-conflict politics. My political economy model of power-sharing also demonstrates the utility of explicitly including economic functions of post-conflict institutions into power-sharing and broader peacebuilding research. And I introduce novel evidence into research and practice of aid delivery; this helps not only to clarify academic debates under which conditions aid can be effective, but also informs practitioners who help conflict-affected countries in their transition from war to democracy.
How can powerful states best extract domestic concessions from their junior allies? What are the conditions under which the powerful state is more likely to succeed in inducing such domestic policy change? This article explores the link between US security commitments and Washington’s ability to attain favourable policy outcomes within the allied domestic arena. It provides an illustrative case of how the USA, using security guarantees as leverage, can enter allied domestic space and shape its decision-making process. After it was revealed that Latvia had served as a key node through which North Korea attempted to evade the sanctions regime, the USA, by playing its security guarantor card, pressured Riga to carry out substantial policy reforms in relation to its financial system. This approach yielded considerable results. In order to preserve the existing security arrangements with the dominant alliance member, Latvia offered significant policy concessions. This finding demonstrates that US security alliances come with side benefits that are often underrated or neglected in the scholarly literature.
The political science literature often points to populism as the cause of democratic backsliding. The literature purports that populism undermines democracy's liberal component, meaning the horizontal checks and balances on executive power by legislatures and courts and the vertical checks and balances by civil society, such as a free press and social movements. Populists promote political polarization to build sustainable ruling coalitions during and between elections that legitimize and support the illiberal policies above. However, this debate often ignores the economic tools that populists in power possess, such as capturing direct and indirect international rents to finance clientelist mechanisms to co-opt political support. This paper contributes to the rich literature on how economic rent conditions the negative relationship between populism and liberalism by disaggregating the moderating effects of direct and indirect international rents through panel regression models in 18 Latin American countries from 1991 to 2019. I find that direct international rents, such as natural resource rents, moderated a deepening in processes of democratic backsliding. Contrastingly, indirect international rents, such as remittances, moderately mitigated democratic backsliding.
Abstract
This article investigates how the sex of party heads impacts party positions and uncovers that parties led by a woman modify their stances on sociocultural but not economic debates. I argue that this pattern is a consequence of dissimilar gender gaps in policy preferences across the two ideological dimensions at the elite level. The empirical evidence, based on data for 19 developed democracies around the world between 1995 and 2018, reveals that parties led by a woman tend to emphasise green, alternative and libertarian issues. In particular, anti‐growth, environmental protection and freedom and human rights become more prominent elements of party manifestos under women's leadership. Overall, these findings stress the importance of critical actors and the conditions under which the presence of women in political offices translates into responsiveness towards female citizens.
The comment on Cristina Lafont’s book includes two main points. (1) Minipublics do not necessarily stand in opposition to political theories that justify electoral democracy and participatory conceptions of deliberative democracy. In contrast to such a view, I argue that minipublics should be combined with electoral and participatory forms of democracy. (2) A deliberative concept of accountability may overcome some of the shortcomings of the traditional, voluntaristic concepts of democratic accountability.