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The reduction of individual carbon consumption could make an important contribution to the worldwide effort to limit global warming. Based on Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement, we hypothesized that the propensity to morally disengage concerning high-carbon behaviors (e.g., eating meat or traveling by plane) is one important factor that prevents individuals from reducing their carbon footprint. To measure the propensity to morally disengage in high-carbon-related behavior contexts, a questionnaire (MD-HCB) was developed and psychometrically validated in an online study with a German sample (N = 220). Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the final nine-item scale had a one-dimensional structure, as intended. The internal consistency of the scale was excellent (Cronbach’s α = 0.94) and the scale interpretation had predictive validity for both past low-carbon consumption behavior and the intention to engage in such behavior in the future. Correlational analyses with relevant existing instruments confirmed the construct validity of the interpretations that can be drawn from the MD-HCB, as its resulting score is related to, yet separable from, the general tendency to morally disengage and is meaningfully connected to related constructs. A pre-study with a student sample (N = 89) not only helped to identify limitations in the study design but also showed a weak predictive ability of moral competence concerning high-carbon consumption behavior and intention to change. Based on our findings, future media campaigns designed to increase people’s intention to reduce high-carbon behavior could focus on the modification of common cognitive disengagement strategies.
A long-standing controversy in emotion research concerns the question whether stimuli must be conceptually interpreted, or semantically categorized, to evoke emotional reactions. According to the semantic primacy hypothesis, the answer to this question is positive; whereas according to the affective primacy hypothesis, it is negative: Emotions can also be, and perhaps often are, elicited by preconceptual stimulus representations, such as particular shapes or color patterns.
In the present dissertation project, the semantic primacy hypothesis was tested in eight experiments using different latency judgment paradigms in which the perceptual latencies of object recognition and affect onset were measured and compared. The chronometric measurement methods comprised temporal judgments (temporal order judgments and simultaneity judgments: Publication A, Experiments 1–4; the rotating spot / rotating clock hand method: Publication B, Experiments 1–2) and speeded reaction time measurements (Publication C, Experiments 1–2). To elicit affective responses, pictures of pleasant (e.g., cats, children) and unpleasant objects (e.g., spiders, moldy food) from everyday life were presented.
According to the semantic primacy hypothesis, object recognition is a necessary partial cause of affect. This implies the following three predictions that were tested in the studies: (1) Because causes must precede their effects, the time of the onset of object recognition must precede the time of the onset of affect. (2) The longer it takes a person to recognize an object, the longer it should also take them, other factors constant, to experience affect; therefore, the latencies of the two mental events should be positively correlated across individuals. (3) An experimental manipulation that delays the onset of object recognition (in this case a moderate blurring of the pictures) should also delay the onset of affect, and the effect of the manipulation on affect latency should be mediated by the delay in object recognition.
In agreement with Prediction 1, regardless of the chronometric method used, the latency of object recognition consistently proved to be shorter than the latency of affect onset. According to the meta-analytically integrated latency differences estimated in the temporal judgment experiments, affect followed object recognition with a delay of 117 ms. This result was obtained for both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli and was independent of task order. Supporting Prediction 2, the latencies for object recognition and affect onset were positively correlated across participants (meta-analytic r = .50). Supporting Prediction 3, delaying object recognition by blurring the affective pictures was found to also delay the onset of affect and the effect of blurring on the latency of affect was found to be partly mediated by delayed object recognition.
Two additional predictions tested and confirmed in Experiment C2 were: (4) False-coloring the affective pictures delays the onset of affect but not object recognition, and this effect is mediated by reduced affect intensity. (5) Judgments of the valence of the stimuli (i.e., whether the imaged object is pleasant or unpleasant) take more time than reports of object recognition, but less time than affect onset reports, for which valence judgments have often been used as a substitute in previous studies.
Taken together, the results of the eight experiments provided consistent support for semantic primacy in the generation of pleasant and unpleasant feelings evoked by affective pictures: Object recognition can be considered a necessary partial cause of affect in the reported experiments. The results are compared to previous findings, possible reasons for deviant response patterns found in a small minority of the participants are considered, and several implications of the findings for emotion research are derived. Possible adaptations of the chronometric approach to investigate other questions of emotion research are suggested. Finally, limitations of the dissertation project are pointed out and possible ways to address these in future research are proposed.
The effects of climate change lead to increasing social injustice and hence justice is intrinsically linked to a socio-ecological transformation. In this study, we investigate whether justice sensitivity motivates pro-environmental intention (PEI) and behavior (PEB) and, if so, to what extent emotions and moral disengagement determine this process. For this purpose, we conducted two quota-sampling surveys (Study 1: N = 174, Study 2: N = 880). Multiple regression analyses in both studies suggest that a higher perception of injustice from a perpetrator’s, beneficiary’s, and observer’s perspective is associated with an increased PEI. However, moral disengagement best predicted PEB and PEI. Guilt and authentic pride were found to be emotional predictors of PEI. Additionally, mediation analyses demonstrated that guilt mediates the connection between both perpetrator and beneficiary sensitivity and PEI. These results suggest that when the predominant originators of climate change (i.e., individuals from industrialized countries) perceive global climate injustice from the perspective of a beneficiary or a perpetrator, they experience guilt and have a higher PEI. Based on this mechanism, it seems promising to render global injustice more salient to those responsible for activities that lead to climate change to motivate them to adapt their behavior. The role of moral disengagement and victim sensitivity as barriers to pro-environmental behavior is discussed in this context.
In this article, we address the climate crisis as a moral issue and discuss the relevant moral and emotional processes and the role of the media underlying the motivations of individuals to behave in a less carbon-emitting manner. We provide theoretical insights from social psychology and emotion research and empirical data based on an online survey from Germany (N = 979). In the theoretical part, we outline the role of emotions in influencing carbon-related behavior, with a particular focus on self-condemning (e.g., guilt or shame), self-praising (e.g., pride), or other-suffering emotions (e.g., empathy). We further summarize the reasons for the low influence of the media on carbon-related behavior compared to the COVID-19 pandemic. The empirical results confirm that participants reported other- suffering and self-condemning emotions in response to news content and rated their likelihood of personal behavior change as high when confronted with news about the climate crisis on a daily basis, as has been widely the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that the media is responsible for regularly reporting on the victims of the climate crisis in order to generalize self-condemning and other-suffering emotions into affective attitudes. Opinion leaders can function as role models for low-carbon behavior.